In this paper, mean-field type games between two players with backward stochastic dynamics are defined and studied. They make up a class of non-zero-sum differential games where the players' state dynamics solve backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) that depend on the marginal distributions of player states. Players try to minimize their individual cost functionals, also depending on the marginal state distributions. Under some regularity conditions, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria. Player behavior is illustrated by numerical examples, and is compared to a centrally planned solution where the social cost, the sum of player costs, is minimized. The inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium, compared to socially optimal behavior, is quantified by the so-called price of anarchy. Numerical simulations of the price of anarchy indicate how the improvement in social cost achievable by a central planner depends on problem parameters.

By studying game theory, we find that the Nash equilibrium does not exist in some games or, if there is in one, does not describe a real event. Here we show that the matching pennies game with pure strategy has the solution, but this solution is a game that happens simultaneously with this game. Using this solution, we will answer the Brookings Institution's question of boycotting the elections whether the opposition's boycott of elections is, in different circumstances, a defeated strategy. A strategy that its result in most cases is a failure or political suicide and the least possible consequence by the opposition. The findings of this article show that in general, it can be concluded that the election boycott strategy is a dominated strategy, and most of the opposition groups that have used it have failed and they donated the playground to the ruling group.

Damage to crops from wildlife interference is a common threat to food security among rural communities in or near Game Management Areas (GMAs) in Zambia. This study uses a two-stage econometric model and cross-sectional data from a survey of 2,769 households to determine the impact of land use planning on the probability and extent of wildlife-inflicted crop damage. The results show that crop damage is higher in GMAs as compared to non-GMAs, and that land use planning could be an effective tool to significantly reduce the likelihood of such damage. These findings suggest that there is merit in the current drive to develop and implement land use plans as means to minimize human-wildlife conflict such as crop damage. This is especially critical as Zambian conservation policies do not have an explicit provision for compensation in the event of damage from wildlife.

We employ the solution concept of ex post Nash equilibrium to predict the interaction of a finite number of agents competing in a finite number of basic games simultaneously. The competition is called a multi-game. For each agent, a specific weight, considered as private information, is allocated to each basic game representing its investment in that game and the utility of each agent for any strategy profile is the weighted sum, i.e., convex combination, of its utilities in the basic games. Multi-games can model decision making in multi-environments in a variety of circumstances, including decision making in multi-markets and decision making when there are both material and social utilities for agents as, we propose, in the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Trust Game. Given a set of pure Nash equilibria, one for each basic game in a multi-game, we construct a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the multi-game. We then focus on the class of so-called uniform multi-games in which each agent is constrained to play in all games the same strategy from an action set consisting of a best response per game. Uniform multi-games are equivalent to multi-dimensional Bayesian games where the type of each agent is a finite dimensional vector with non-negative components. A notion of pure type-regularity for uniform multi-games is developed and it is shown that a multi-game that is pure type-regular on the boundary of its type space has a pure ex post Nash equilibrium which is computed in constant time with respect to the number of the types and is independent of prior probability distributions. We then develop an algorithm, linear in the number of types of the agents, which tests if a multi-game is pure type-regular on the boundary of its type space in which case it returns a pure ex post Nash equilibrium for the multi-game.

The managers’ strategic behavior of commercial real estate in a competitive environment is discussed. The means of this research are methods of mathematical and experimental game theory. Illustrates an example of a decision-theoretic game problem with two players engaged in the management of competing shopping centers. The strategies of these players are determined by the costs of the development. Since the number of visitors is constantly and changing the quality of shopping centers, managers actually pull visitors from each other, the game-theoretical formulation of the problem of management of shopping centers corresponds to the zero-sum game. The model example shows that with the help of mathematical modeling it is possible to determine the theoretical expected behavior of agents. The model of the software module created specifically for experimental research is described. The experiments are designed to compare the theoretically predicted behavior with the real actions of people. The novelty is that at significant costs of the Manager for the development and promotion of shopping and entertainment centers, the strategies of managers are resistant to each other's actions, in contrast to changes in the external environment is shown.

This article discusses the use of game design as a method for interdisciplinary project-based teaching in secondary school education to convey informatics and society topics. There is a lot of knowledge about learning games but little background on project-based teaching using game design as a method. We present the results of an analysis of student-created games and an evaluation of a student-authored database on learning contents found in commercial off-the-shelf games. We further contextualise these findings using a group discussion with teachers. Results underline the effectiveness of project-based teaching to raise awareness for informatics and society topics. We further outline informatics and society topics that are particularly interesting to students, genre preferences and potentially engaging game mechanics stemming from our analyses.

Urban cycling is a sustainable transport mode that cities currently try to expand. However, cities still do not take advantage of geospatial technologies to understand cycling mobility based on the behavioural patterns and difficulties faced by cyclists. This study analyses a geospatial dataset crowdsourced by urban cyclists using an experimental geo-game. About 20 participants per city recorded bicycle trips during one week and, by aggregating them, we found not only the cyclists’ preferred streets but also the frictions faced during cycling. We successfully identified 284 places potentially having frictions: 71 in Münster, Germany; 70 in Castelló, Spain; and 143 in Valletta, Malta. At such places, Participants not only recorded bicycle trips but also segments at lower speeds indicating a deviation from an ideal cycling scenario. We described the potential frictions preventing from bicycle commuting based on the distance to bicycle paths, surrounding infrastructure, and location in the urban area.

Starting with BitTorrent and then Bitcoin, decentralized technologies have been on the rise over the last 15+ years, gaining significant momentum in the last 2+ years with the advent of platform ecosystems such as the Blockchain platform Ethereum. New projects have evolved from decentralized games to marketplaces to open funding models to decentralized autonomous organizations. The hype around cryptocurrency and the valuation of innovative projects drove the market cap of cryptocurrencies to over a trillion dollars at one point in 2017. These high valued technologies are now enabling something new: globally scaled, decentralized business models. Despite their valuation and the hype, these new business ecosystems are frail. This is not only because the underlying technology is rapidly evolving, but also because competitive markets see a profit opportunity in exponential cryptocurrency returns. This extracts value from these ecosystems, which could lead to their collapse, if unchecked. In this paper, we explore novel ways for decentralized economies to protect themselves from, and coexist with competitive markets at a global scale utilizing decentralized technologies such as Blockchain.

This article puts forward the bi-matrix games with crisp parametric payoffs based on interval value function approach. We conclude that the equilibrium solution of the game model can converted into optimal solutions of the pair of the non-linear optimization problem. Finally, experiment results show the efficiency of the model.

In this paper we present an application of the dynamic tracking games framework to a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear three-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union to analyse the interactions between fiscal (governments) and monetary (common central bank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the OPTGAME algorithm we calculate solutions for several games: a noncooperative solution where each government and the central bank play against each other (a feedback Nash Equilibrium solution), a fully cooperative solution with all players following a joint course of action (a Pareto optimal solution), and three solutions where various coalitions (subsets of the players) play against coalitions of the other players in a noncooperative way. It turns out that the fully cooperative solution yields the best results, the noncooperative solution fares worst, and the coalition games lie in between, with a broad coalition of the fiscally more responsible countries and the central bank against the less thrifty country coming closest to the Pareto optimum.

Energy storage systems will play a key role for individual users in the future smart grid. They serve two purposes: (i) handling the intermittent nature of renewable energy resources for a more reliable and efficient system, and (ii) preventing the impact of blackouts on users and allowing for more independence from the grid, while saving money through load-shifting. In this paper we investigate the latter scenario by looking at a neighbourhood of 25 households whose demand is satisfied by one utility company. Assuming the users possess lithium-ion batteries, we answer the question of how each household can make the best use of their individual storage system given a real-time pricing policy. To this end, each user is modelled as a player of a non-cooperative scheduling game. The novelty of the game lies in the advanced battery model, which incorporates charging and discharging characteristics of lithium-ion batteries. The action set for each player comprises day-ahead schedules of their respective battery usage. We analyse different user behavior and are able to obtain a realistic and applicable understanding of the potential of these systems. As a result, we show the correlation between the efficiency of the battery and the outcome of the game.

The meticulous study of finite automata has produced many important and useful results. Automata are simple yet efficient finite state machines that can be utilized in a plethora of situations. It comes, therefore, as no surprise that they have been used in classic game theory in order to model players and their actions. Game theory has recently been influenced by ideas from the field of quantum computation. As a result, quantum versions of classic games have already been introduced and studied. The PQ penny flip game is a famous quantum game introduced by Meyer in 1999. In this paper we investigate all possible finite games that can be played between the two players Q and Picard of the original PQ game. For this purpose we establish a rigorous connection between finite automata and the PQ game along with all its possible variations. Starting from the automaton that corresponds to the original game, we construct more elaborate automata for certain extensions of the game, before finally presenting a semiautomaton that captures the intrinsic behavior of all possible variants of the PQ game. What this means is that from the semiautomaton in question, by setting appropriate initial and accepting states, one can construct deterministic automata able to capture every possible finite game that can be played between the two players Q and Picard. Moreover, we introduce the new concepts of a winning automaton and complete automaton for either player.

This paper proposes a game-theoretic framework for quantifying effects of strategic bidding behavior of load aggregators (LAs) on wholesale electricity market equilibrium. The independent system operator (ISO) employs double-sided auction design to settle transactions in the wholesale electricity market. Generating companies (GENCOs) and LAs submit their bids to the ISO in the economic model of supply function equilibrium. Under the smart grid paradigm, a LA participates in the electricity market on behalf of end-consumers to minimize their total payment for purchasing electricity. In this paper, bi-level programming (BLP) method is employed to determine optimal bidding strategy of self-interested market participants. In the upper level, the profit of intended market participant is maximized and in the lower level, the ISO clears the market via a bid-based security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Also, competition of GENCOs and LAs is modeled as a non-cooperative game. To examine the effects of strategic bidding behavior of LAs on market equilibrium, the proposed model is applied to the IEEE 9-bus and the IEEE 30-bus test systems. According to numerical results, to allow the LAs to behave strategically along with the GENCOs makes the former better off and the latter worse off, while the net effect of this on total social welfare turns out to be case-contingent.

The chemical industry is an integral part of the world economy and a substantial income source for developing countries. However, existing regulations or the enforcement of these regulations, on controlling atmospheric pollutants sometimes may be insufficient, leading to the deterioration of surrounding ecosystems and to a quality decrease of the atmospheric environment. Previous works in this domain fail to generate executable solutions for inspection agencies due to practical challenges. In addressing these challenges, we introduce a so-called Chemical Plant Environment Protection Game (CPEP) to generate reasonable schedules of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations for inspection agencies. First, Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) are incorporated together with source estimation methods into this research. Second, high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations as well as gas sensors are modeled into the CPEP. Third, simplified data analysis on the regularly discharging of chemical plants is utilized to construct the CPEP. Finally, an illustrative case study is used to investigate the effectiveness of the CPEP Game, and a realistic case study is conducted to illustrate how the models and algorithms being proposed in this paper, work. Results show that playing a CPEP Game can reduce operational costs of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations; moreover, playing the game leads to more compliance from the chemical plants towards the inspection agencies.

Real-time strategy (RTS) game has proposed many challenges for AI research for its large state spaces, enormous branch factors, limited decision time and dynamic adversarial environment. To tackle above problems, the method called Adversarial Hierarchical Task Network planning (AHTN) has been proposed and achieves favorable performance. However, the HTN description it used cannot express complex relationships among tasks and impacts of environment on tasks. Moreover, the AHTN cannot handle task failures during plan execution. In this paper, we propose a modified AHTN planning algorithm named AHTNR. The algorithm introduces three elements essential task, phase and exit condition to extend the HTN description. To deal with possible task failures, the AHTNR first uses the extended HTN description to identify failed tasks. And then a novel task repair strategy is proposed based on historical information to maintain the validity of previous plan. Finally, empirical results are presented for the μRTS game, comparing AHTNR to the state-of-the-art search algorithms for RTS games.

Iterated games, in which the same economic interaction is repeatedly played between the same agents, are an important framework for understanding the effectiveness of strategic choices over time. To date very little work has applied information theory to the information sets used by agents in order to decide what action to take next in such strategic situations. This article looks at the mutual information between previous game states and an agent's next action by introducing two new classes of games: ’invertible games’ and ‘cyclical games'. By explicitly expanding out the mutual information between past states and the next action we show under what circumstances these expressions can be simplified. These information measures are then applied to the Traveler's Dilemma game and the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the Prisoner's Dilemma being invertible, to illustrate their use. In the Prisoner's Dilemma a novel connection is made between the computational principles of logic gates and both the structure of games and the agents' decision strategies. This approach is applied to the cyclical game Matching Pennies to analyse the foundations of a behavioural ambiguity between two well studied strategies: ‘Tit-for-Tat' and ’Win-Stay, Lose-Switch'.

REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) aims to achieve its purpose by working across multiple sectors and involving multi-level actors in reducing deforestation and forest degradation in tropical countries. By contrast, the European Union (EU) Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and its Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs) focus on forestry and functions at bilateral state level. The FLEGT Action Plan specifically aims to tackle illegal logging, legalise timber production and trade improve forest governance in countries exporting tropical timber to the EU. Since illegal logging is just one driver of deforestation and forest degeneration, and legalisation of logging does not necessarily reduce deforestation and forest degradation, the two instruments differ in scale and scope. However, by addressing the causes of deforestation and forest degradation and their underlying governance issues, the EU FLEGT and REDD+ share many functional linkages at higher levels of forest policy and forest governance. The contribution and participation of civil society organisations (CSOs) and other actors is imperative to both processes. Our study is based on a survey of key actors (national and international) in REDD+ and FLEGT VPA processes in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. Our analysis was guided by the theoretical perspectives of the policy arrangement approach and examination of two specific dimensions of this approach, namely resources and rules of the game. This paper argues that participation of CSOs in both processes is crucial as it facilitates and nurtures the very much needed cooperation between other national and international actors. The paper also argues that participation of CSOs feeds valuable information and knowledge into REDD+ and FLEGT VPA processes, thus contributing to increased legitimacy, justice and transparency.

To improve carbon efficiency for urban logistics service system composed of a third-party logistics service provider (3PLs) and an e-business enterprise, low-carbon operation game between them was studied. Considering low carbon technology investment cost and sales expansion effect of low carbon level, profit functions for both players were constituted. Based on their different bargaining capabilities, totally 5 types of game scenarios were designed. Through analytical solution, Nash Equilibria under varied scenarios were obtained. By analyzing these equilibria, 4 major propositions were given, in which, some key variables and system performance index were compared. Results show that the best system yields could only be achieved under the fully cooperative situation; limited cooperation only for carbon emission reduction would not benefit the system performance improvement; E-business enterprise-leading game’s performance overtook 3PLs-leading ones.

We study a two-echelon supply chain made up of a supplier and a manufacturer, both of which can reduce their component/product carbon emissions. With the vertical technology spillovers, we explore the optimal decisions of centralized and decentralized supply chains with price dependent demand and propose coordination strategy for the decentralized supply chain. Considering the cost contraction effectiveness of the technology spillovers, the centralized and decentralized game theoretic models of a two-echelon supply chain are developed to investigate optimal decisions of pricing and carbon emissions reduction. Through a systematic comparison and numerical analysis, we show that the profits of both players and the entire supply chain improve with the effect of technology spillovers increasing. Carbon emissions reduction will be taken by various protective measures so that the supplier and the manufacturer who do not innovate can hardly share the results of innovating via the “free-riding” methods when the technology spillover is relatively small. We also propose a revenue-cost sharing contract through bargaining to enhance the performance of the decentralized supply chain.