Version 1
: Received: 31 July 2018 / Approved: 1 August 2018 / Online: 1 August 2018 (06:27:55 CEST)
How to cite:
Alekseev, A.; Spirina, V.; Andronova, A. Mathematical and Experimental Research of the Shopping Centers’ Managers’ Strategic Behavior. Preprints2018, 2018080002. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201808.0002.v1
Alekseev, A.; Spirina, V.; Andronova, A. Mathematical and Experimental Research of the Shopping Centers’ Managers’ Strategic Behavior. Preprints 2018, 2018080002. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201808.0002.v1
Alekseev, A.; Spirina, V.; Andronova, A. Mathematical and Experimental Research of the Shopping Centers’ Managers’ Strategic Behavior. Preprints2018, 2018080002. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201808.0002.v1
APA Style
Alekseev, A., Spirina, V., & Andronova, A. (2018). Mathematical and Experimental Research of the Shopping Centers’ Managers’ Strategic Behavior. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201808.0002.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Alekseev, A., Varvara Spirina and Aleksandra Andronova. 2018 "Mathematical and Experimental Research of the Shopping Centers’ Managers’ Strategic Behavior" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints201808.0002.v1
Abstract
The managers’ strategic behavior of commercial real estate in a competitive environment is discussed. The means of this research are methods of mathematical and experimental game theory. Illustrates an example of a decision-theoretic game problem with two players engaged in the management of competing shopping centers. The strategies of these players are determined by the costs of the development. Since the number of visitors is constantly and changing the quality of shopping centers, managers actually pull visitors from each other, the game-theoretical formulation of the problem of management of shopping centers corresponds to the zero-sum game. The model example shows that with the help of mathematical modeling it is possible to determine the theoretical expected behavior of agents. The model of the software module created specifically for experimental research is described. The experiments are designed to compare the theoretically predicted behavior with the real actions of people. The novelty is that at significant costs of the Manager for the development and promotion of shopping and entertainment centers, the strategies of managers are resistant to each other's actions, in contrast to changes in the external environment is shown.
Keywords
experimental economy; mathematical game theory; experimental game theory; behavioral experiment; business game; shopping centers; property management
Subject
Computer Science and Mathematics, Applied Mathematics
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
