Zhu, Z.; Chen, B.; Reniers, G.; Zhang, L.; Qiu, S.; Qiu, X. Playing Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Games with Historical Monitoring Data. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health2017, 14, 1155.
Zhu, Z.; Chen, B.; Reniers, G.; Zhang, L.; Qiu, S.; Qiu, X. Playing Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Games with Historical Monitoring Data. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2017, 14, 1155.
Zhu, Z.; Chen, B.; Reniers, G.; Zhang, L.; Qiu, S.; Qiu, X. Playing Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Games with Historical Monitoring Data. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health2017, 14, 1155.
Zhu, Z.; Chen, B.; Reniers, G.; Zhang, L.; Qiu, S.; Qiu, X. Playing Chemical Plant Environmental Protection Games with Historical Monitoring Data. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2017, 14, 1155.
Abstract
The chemical industry is an integral part of the world economy and a substantial income source for developing countries. However, existing regulations or the enforcement of these regulations, on controlling atmospheric pollutants sometimes may be insufficient, leading to the deterioration of surrounding ecosystems and to a quality decrease of the atmospheric environment. Previous works in this domain fail to generate executable solutions for inspection agencies due to practical challenges. In addressing these challenges, we introduce a so-called Chemical Plant Environment Protection Game (CPEP) to generate reasonable schedules of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations for inspection agencies. First, Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) are incorporated together with source estimation methods into this research. Second, high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations as well as gas sensors are modeled into the CPEP. Third, simplified data analysis on the regularly discharging of chemical plants is utilized to construct the CPEP. Finally, an illustrative case study is used to investigate the effectiveness of the CPEP Game, and a realistic case study is conducted to illustrate how the models and algorithms being proposed in this paper, work. Results show that playing a CPEP Game can reduce operational costs of high-accuracy air quality monitoring stations; moreover, playing the game leads to more compliance from the chemical plants towards the inspection agencies.
Keywords
chemical plant environmental protection; stackelberg security games; source estimation methods; historical monitoring data; game theory
Subject
Engineering, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
