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Bolstering Prime-Ministerial Countercheck: A New Game-Based Investiture Scheme for Semi-Presidential Systems
Yiping Cheng
This paper presents a fully articulated semi-presidential constitutional scheme (Scheme C) that embraces parliamentary fragmentation and minority governments as the new normal rather than pathologies requiring cure. Evolved from Schemes A and B, it strengthens prime-ministerial counterweights against the assembly. The scheme fuses (i) Westminster-style executive continuity and prime-ministerial dissolution initiative, (ii) French-style presidential authority in foreign and defence policy plus a robust legislative veto, (iii) synchronised presidential-legislative elections complemented by semi-mid-term legislative contests, and (iv) a game-based investiture rule paired with an innovative two-tier no-confidence procedure, both anchored in formal legislative confidence. Scheme C thereby achieves an unprecedented synthesis: more parliamentary than classic president-parliamentary or premier-presidential systems, more stable than Westminster models amid fragmented legislatures, and endowed with stronger mid-term democratic correctives than existing benchmarks. Its architecture simultaneously shields the prime minister from presidential overreach, the president from parliamentary extortion, and the state from governmental paralysis or authoritarian drift---even under unified political control of both branches. Scheme C is thus advanced not as theoretical speculation but as a coherent, stress-tested model ready for adoption in contemporary democracies facing persistent legislative fragmentation.
This paper presents a fully articulated semi-presidential constitutional scheme (Scheme C) that embraces parliamentary fragmentation and minority governments as the new normal rather than pathologies requiring cure. Evolved from Schemes A and B, it strengthens prime-ministerial counterweights against the assembly. The scheme fuses (i) Westminster-style executive continuity and prime-ministerial dissolution initiative, (ii) French-style presidential authority in foreign and defence policy plus a robust legislative veto, (iii) synchronised presidential-legislative elections complemented by semi-mid-term legislative contests, and (iv) a game-based investiture rule paired with an innovative two-tier no-confidence procedure, both anchored in formal legislative confidence. Scheme C thereby achieves an unprecedented synthesis: more parliamentary than classic president-parliamentary or premier-presidential systems, more stable than Westminster models amid fragmented legislatures, and endowed with stronger mid-term democratic correctives than existing benchmarks. Its architecture simultaneously shields the prime minister from presidential overreach, the president from parliamentary extortion, and the state from governmental paralysis or authoritarian drift---even under unified political control of both branches. Scheme C is thus advanced not as theoretical speculation but as a coherent, stress-tested model ready for adoption in contemporary democracies facing persistent legislative fragmentation.
Posted: 04 December 2025
The Discipline of Disruption: Coordinated Electoral Volatility in Religiously Segmented Communities
Boris Gorelik
Posted: 27 November 2025
Electoral Transparency and Sequential Voter Rationality: A Dynamic Game-Theoretic Analysis of Implementing a Political Rating Agency
Akhenaton Izu Makongo
Posted: 18 November 2025
AUKUS: Public Opinions
Kerry Liu
Posted: 13 November 2025
Systemic Poverty as a Tool for Economic and Social Slavery: From Colonialism to Political Class Colonisation
Olakunle Onaolapo
,Adejoke Onaolapo
Posted: 11 November 2025
Resource Dependence and Social Stratification in Sub-Saharan Africa
George Ayunne Akeliwira
,Isaac Owusu-Mensah
Posted: 06 November 2025
Perceived vs. Actual Political Orientation: A Study of Political Self-Awareness Among Bangladeshi University Students
Khalid Saifullah Khan Juel
Posted: 24 October 2025
Assessing the Impact of Responsible Digital Social Innovation: The Case of the Digital Living Lab of Catalonia
Fàtima Canseco-López
,Marta Martorell Camps
Posted: 20 October 2025
Irish Soft Power in United States Politics: Mechanisms, Evolution, and Impact, (2005–2025) --- A Qualitative Analysis
Safran Safar Almakaty
Posted: 01 October 2025
A Study on the Significance of Awareness and Accessibility of Fundamental Rights Guaranteed by the Indian Constitution
Rishit Grover
,Naitik Agarwal
,Saksham Gupta
,Samarth Shukla
,Jahaan Rastogi
,Devyansh Agarwal
Posted: 09 September 2025
The Politics of Vacuum Filling, Power Shifts, and Strategic Dynamics in International Relations: A Qualitative Study
Safran Almakaty
Posted: 21 August 2025
International Seminars and Conferences as Soft Power Engines in an Era of Geostrategic Transformation: A Qualitative Study
Safran Almakaty
Posted: 20 August 2025
Game-Based Schemes for Prime Minister Selection in Multi-Party Semi-Presidential Systems
Yiping Cheng
Posted: 29 July 2025
Economic Transformation Trough a Federalism Model
Nerhum Sandambi
Posted: 16 July 2025
Cultural Communication and the Global Reach of Saudi Culture: A Qualitative Study
Safran Almakaty
Posted: 11 July 2025
Weird Sporting with Double Edged Swords: Understanding ‘Nasty Rhetoric’ in Swedish Climate Politics
Fredrik von Malmborg
Posted: 08 July 2025
What Evidence Informs Urban Policy in East Africa, and How Does It Get There?
Anton Cartwright
Posted: 03 July 2025
Evidence-Informed Agricultural Policymaking at Regional Level within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Frejus Thoto
,Rodrigue Castro Gbedomon
,Laurenda Todome
Posted: 03 July 2025
Indigenous Contestations of Carbon Markets, Carbon Colonialism, and Power Dynamics in International Climate Negotiations
Zeynep Durmaz
,Heike Schroeder
Posted: 30 June 2025
BWC Article X: Building Assurance Through International Cooperation & Assistance
Matthew Shearer
,Rachel Vahey
,Alanna Fogarty
,Christina Potter
,Gigi Gronvall
Posted: 27 June 2025
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