An examination of Emmanuel Levinas’ writings on money reveals his distance from—and indebtedness to—a philosophical predecessor, Georg Simmel. Levinas and Simmel share a phenomenological approach to analyses of the proximity of the stranger, the importance of the face, and the interruption of the dyadic relationship by the third. Money is closely linked to the conception of totality because money is the medium that compares heterogeneous values. Levinas goes beyond Simmel in positing an ethical relation to money permitting transcendence.

Information theory has been developed for seventy years with technological applications that have transformed our societies. The increasing ability to store, transmit, and process information is having a revolutionary impact in most disciplines. The goal of this work is to compare the formal approach to information with Buddhist philosophy. Considering both approaches as compatible and complementary, I argue that information theory can improve our understanding of Buddhist philosophy and vice versa. The resulting synthesis leads to a worldview based on information that overcomes limitations of the currently dominating physics-based worldview.

To show that underlying Schmitt's account of fascist politics lies a Gnostic-like metaphysical dualism separating the realms of value and power. Contrary to the normative political tradition of the West, which defends an ethical politics, Schmitt - jurist and theorist of the Nazis - aligns himself with Machiavelli and Hobbes to defend realpolitik: where sovereignty is ultimately a function of the Dictator's will alone. This paper shows the contradiction within such a position, which criticizes values in politics but by its advocacy, and its defense of the Dictator's willing, relies on valuation, choice, and hence the ethical.

We discuss the fate of the correspondence principle beyond quantum mechanics, specifically in quantum field theory and quantum gravity, in connection with the intrinsic limitations of the human ability to observe the external world. We conclude that the best correspondence principle is made of unitarity, locality, proper renormalizability (a refinement of strict renormalizability), combined with fundamental local symmetries and the requirement of having a finite number of fields. Quantum gravity is identified in an essentially unique way. The gauge interactions are uniquely identified in form. Instead, the matter sector remains basically unrestricted. The major prediction is the violation of causality at small distances.

I explore previous attempts, including recent ones, to introduce aspects of digital information and computation into the discussion of ethical frameworks. I study some limitations and advantages of previous attempts to produce guiding principles at different scales. In particular, I survey and discuss questions and approaches based on, or related to, simulation, information theory, integrated information, computer simulation, intractability, algorithmic complexity, and measures of computational organisation and sophistication. I discuss and propose a set of desirable features of ethical frameworks that may be considered well-grounded, both in theoretical and methodological terms. I will show that while global ethi- cal frameworks that are uncomputable are desirable because they provide non-teleological directions with open-ended meaning, constrained versions should be able to provide guidelines at more local and immediate time scales. In connection to the ethics of artificial intelligence, one point that must be underscored in relation to computational approaches is that (General) AI should only share and embrace an ethical framework that we humans are willing to adopt, preempting the need for possibly flawed distinctions between human and machine actions, especially in connection to concerns of a much more fundamental nature than the classical issues raised by AI development such as job displacement and legal liability. I think that such framework is possible by following a general and universal (in the sense of computation) framework from first computational principles.

A revitalized practice of natural philosophy can help people to live a better life and promote a flourishing ecosystem. Such a philosophy is natural in two senses. First, it is natural by seeking to understand the whole of nature, including mental phenomena, In particular, a comprehensive natural philosophy should address the phenomena of sentience by embracing first- and second-person methods of investigation. Moreover, to expand our understanding of the world, natural philosophy should embrace a full panoply of explanations, similar to Aristotle’s four causes. Second, such a philosophy is natural by being grounded in human nature, taking full account of human capacities and limitations. Future natural philosophers should also make use of all human capacities, including emotion and intuition as well as reason and perception, to investigate nature. Finally, since the majority of our brain's activities are unconscious, natural philosophy should explore the unconscious mind with the aim of deepening our relation to the rest of nature and enhancing well-being.

The cosmological relevance of emptiness—that is, space without bodies—is not yet sufficiently appreciated in natural philosophy. This paper addresses two aspects of cosmic emptiness from the perspective of natural philosophy: the distances to the stars in the closer cosmic environment and the expansion of space as a result of the accelerated expansion of the universe. Both aspects will be discussed from both a historical and a systematic perspective. Emptiness can be interpreted as “coming” in a two-fold sense: Whereas in the past knowledge of emptiness as it were came to human beings, in the future it is coming insofar as its relevance in the cosmos will increase.The longer and more closely emptiness was studied since the beginning of modernity, the larger became the spaces over which it was found to extend. From a systematic perspective, I will show with regard to the closer cosmic environment that the earth may be separated from the perhaps habitable planets of other stars by an emptiness that is inimical to life and cannot be traversed by humans. This assumption is a result of the discussion of the constraints and possibilities of interstellar space travel as defined by the known natural laws and technical means. With the accelerated expansion of the universe, the distances to other galaxies (outside of the so-called local group) are increasing. According to the current standard model of cosmology and assuming that the acceleration will remain constant, in the distant future this expansion will lead first to a substantial change in the epistemic conditions of cosmological knowledge and finally to the completion of the cosmic emptiness and of its relevance, respectively. Imagining the postulated completely empty last state leads human thought to the very limits of what is conceivable.

It has been a challenge to visualize in nature some concepts from abstract subjects such as mathematics and philosophy. Irrationality is certainly among the least comprehensive. This essay aimed to propose that irrationality is simply an illusion resulting from the human inability to grasp the full nature of reality, rather than actual continuity flaws in the fabric of existence. There are three major arguments: (1) human senses have limitations and these are likely to be extended to the intellect, (2) there are no observable existential discontinuities in everyday experience, and (3) some rational phenomena have irrational components. These arguments point towards the existence of a physical existence of irrational quantities or distances, visible to the human eye but not fully comprehended through arithmetic abstraction.

The French-Swiss Professor in inductive philosophy Richard Avenarius (1843-1896), the father of empirio-criticism together with Ernst Mach, is one of the most underrated and misunderstood philosophers ever.  It mostly depends upon his terminology, which displays an insurmountable difficulty.  However, influenced by the most innovative proposals of his times of transition between the idealistic/rationalist legacies and the new Materialism/scientific interpretation of reality – i.e, by cultural evolutionism, linguistics, biomechanics, entropy/energy and, above all, by the newborn experimental psychology-, he produced a complete system of philosophy and innovative methods of investigation of the laws of knowledge.  Hints (chunk, scrap, fragments) of his original ideas can be found not only in philosophers of mind after him - such as Gestalt, phenomenalism, behaviourism, functionalism and cybernetics, autopoiesis, dynamical systems theory, embedded/embodied mind, free-energy principle of the brain – but also in recent neuroscientific theories – nervous transduction, electric spikes, cracking of neural code, multisensory integration -.  Our aim is to provide the first chronological English summary of his masterpiece, the “Kritik”, to give the possibility to the (almost) totally unaware English speakers to appreciate such a neglected and innovative thinker.

Epistemological naturalism dismisses the notion that epistemology is a basis for the
empirical sciences. In particular, it rejects the demand for a general justification of induction. Making
inductive generalisations is a basic habit among humans. There is no such thing as a logic of inductive
inference. The role of induction in science is heuristic; it is our way of inventing new theoretical
predicates and developing theories. We discover new laws by applying inductive thinking; but this is
not any kind of inference which can be evaluated as more or less rational.

Subjectivity has always been a part of philosophical speculations. However, Immanuel Kant is mentioned as the main figure to bring in subjectivity in modern philosophy by comparing the Critique of Pure Reason with the Copernican revolution. We might include Descartes as well, and not least the followers of Kant, like Fichte and Hegel. Yet none of these end up with subjectivity as the only premise for thinking, but rather combine it with objectivity. Hence, subjectivity has appeared as a stranger in philosophy and yet not fully accepted. In this paper, I try to pursue the aspect of subjectivity by not looking at philosophy, but rather at psychology. The appearance of the term can be dated back to 1520 when the Croatian humanist Marcus Marulus published the thesis entitled “Psychology, the Nature of the Soul”. This thesis is lost, but by pursuing the appearance of the term, four different movements seem to contribute with and highlight an aspect of subjectivity. One is Humanism, the other is Reformation, the third is a focus on the empirical aspects of science and the fourth is the dissemination of folk culture to academics and aristocracy by means of the art of printing. The finding, therefore, is that psychology is not to be regarded as a discipline that grows out of philosophy, but rather as a discipline that conflicts philosophy, but nevertheless intervenes it and makes it progress.

In this paper it is examined how, if at all, logical laws can be normative for human reasoning, wherein the notion of normativity is analysed with respect to approaches to logic given in works of Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Frege and Wittgenstein. During the ancient and medieval period, logic was being considered in terms of discourse and dialogical practice, but since Descartes and especially Kant it has been treated as a system of laws with which the process of individual human reasoning has been compared. Therefore, normativity can be investigated in private sphere (for thinking and reasoning) and in public sphere (for dialogic practices in a community). Wittgenstein discussed both aspects of normativity: in Tractatus, a focus is on laws of logic that are primarily normative for the state of affairs in the world, while in Philosophical Investigations an emphasis is on a social aspect of normativity (which is closer to Aristotle’s view), which is derived from adopted rules that have been applied in a certain community. Taken that way, logic is certainly normative in the public sphere, but the more difficult issue is whether logic is normative for thinking, regarding to the difference between the logical laws and those of thought.