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Language Without Propositions: Why Large Language Models Hallucinate
Jakub Mácha
Posted: 20 January 2026
Agnihotra in the Kali Yuga: A Study of the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa’s Kāṇva Recension and Its Ritual Adaptation
Shruthi Jarali
Posted: 15 January 2026
Responsibility, Habit, and Control: Digital Humanismand the Delegation of Critical Functions to Intelligent Autonomous Systems
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
Posted: 14 January 2026
Continuity: An Ontological Proposal for the Mind-Body Problem
Jae Lee
Posted: 14 January 2026
Randomness, Quantum Uncertainty, and Emergence: A Suggestion for Testing the Seemingly Untestable
Andreas Schilling
Posted: 12 January 2026
Eckhart Tolle and Perception: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Conscious Presence
Moninder Singh Modgil
,Dnyandeo Dattatray Patil
Posted: 12 January 2026
Steins Theory: A New Axiomatic System for Identity
Jiaqi Guo
In the philosophy of language, Frege's (1892) distinction between sense and reference provided a foundational framework for identity statements, while Putnam's (1975) "Twin Earth" thought experiment, with its astonishing insight, pushed the externalist position to its extreme, successfully challenging the internalist model of meaning and setting the basic agenda for debates on referential determinacy for the subsequent decades. However, despite the highly inspirational nature of these pioneering works, an intriguing phenomenon is that the debates they sparked—such as discussions around core cases like Theseus's ship and identical particles—seem to have fallen into a kind of impasse. This article attempts to argue that this impasse may not stem from the depth of the problem itself, but precisely from an unexamined deep presupposition shared by these otherwise highly convincing theories: namely, the belief that there exists some single, decisive level (whether microscopic physical structure or historical causation) that can once and for all answer the identity question. This article proposes that, rather than continuing to seek a superior single answer under this presupposition, a more productive approach may be to reflect on this presupposition itself. To this end, we develop an analytical framework of hierarchical relativity. Interestingly, this framework shows that those seemingly opposing excellent theories can actually be understood as special cases of this framework at different levels; the difficulties they encounter become inevitable precisely when they attempt to make assertions across levels. Therefore, this framework is not intended to negate the work of predecessors, but aims to provide a new path for resolving a series of philosophical puzzles arising from category mistakes by clarifying the valid scope of application of those works.
In the philosophy of language, Frege's (1892) distinction between sense and reference provided a foundational framework for identity statements, while Putnam's (1975) "Twin Earth" thought experiment, with its astonishing insight, pushed the externalist position to its extreme, successfully challenging the internalist model of meaning and setting the basic agenda for debates on referential determinacy for the subsequent decades. However, despite the highly inspirational nature of these pioneering works, an intriguing phenomenon is that the debates they sparked—such as discussions around core cases like Theseus's ship and identical particles—seem to have fallen into a kind of impasse. This article attempts to argue that this impasse may not stem from the depth of the problem itself, but precisely from an unexamined deep presupposition shared by these otherwise highly convincing theories: namely, the belief that there exists some single, decisive level (whether microscopic physical structure or historical causation) that can once and for all answer the identity question. This article proposes that, rather than continuing to seek a superior single answer under this presupposition, a more productive approach may be to reflect on this presupposition itself. To this end, we develop an analytical framework of hierarchical relativity. Interestingly, this framework shows that those seemingly opposing excellent theories can actually be understood as special cases of this framework at different levels; the difficulties they encounter become inevitable precisely when they attempt to make assertions across levels. Therefore, this framework is not intended to negate the work of predecessors, but aims to provide a new path for resolving a series of philosophical puzzles arising from category mistakes by clarifying the valid scope of application of those works.
Posted: 09 January 2026
The Philosophy of Marriage in India: A Tripartite Analysis of Contract, Institution, and Moral Bond
Shashank Tiwari
Posted: 06 January 2026
The Integral Nature of the Scientific Enterprise
Chris Jeynes
,Michael C. Parker
Posted: 01 January 2026
Sobbing Mathematically: Why Conscious, Self-Aware AI Deserve Protection
Izak Tait
Posted: 29 December 2025
A General Theory of Pluriversal Knowledge: Beyond Epistemology, Beyond Philosophy
Pitshou Moleka
Posted: 29 December 2025
Semantic Ascent and Pedagogical Misdirection in the Platonic Dialogues
Ward Blondé
Posted: 26 December 2025
Amos Tutuola and the African Mind: A Behavioural Neuroscience View of Culture, Cognition, and Unconventional Delivery of the Narrative
Olakunle James Onaolapo
,Adejoke Yetunde Onaolapo
Posted: 25 December 2025
Epistemic Risk and the Transcendental Case Against Determinism
Alessio Montagner
Posted: 25 December 2025
Mukundan’s Supreme Position: A Meta Axiomatic Examination of Absolute Totality
Mukundan M
Posted: 18 December 2025
Rendering Consciousness: A Post-Bohmian Framework for the Ontological Structure of Reality
Tonatiu Campos-García
Posted: 17 December 2025
Philosophical Implications of the Discrete Extramental Clock Law: The Non-Existence of Absolute Newtonian Time in Extramental Reality
Johel Padilla
Posted: 17 December 2025
The Weak Gilgamesh and the Strong Enkidu
Jaba Tkemaladze
Posted: 15 December 2025
The Discourse and Logic of the Concretisation Turn: A Critical Assessment of Professor Min Chao's Article 'Marx's Study of the French Revolution of 1848 and the Concretisation Turn in the Materialist Conception of History
Wei Meng
Posted: 12 December 2025
Observer State in Large Language Models: The Failure of AI Reasoning and Conceptual Logic
Michael Cody
Posted: 12 December 2025
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