Writing from the Body to Understand Nasty Rhetoric: Hate, Threats and Violence in Swedish Climate Politics

1. Introduction

In an instant I was a targeted foe Hated and threatened

Studying the agency of policy entrepreneurs in Swedish climate policymaking, I identified systematic use of hatred and threats towards different opponents in the rhetoric of the right-wing government and its supporters (von Malmborg, 2024a). It is not only a tactic of the anonymous far-right movement but also of leading politicians, including the prime minister (PM), to use hate and threats to delegitimize and dehumanize climate activists, climate scientists and climate journalists (von Malmborg, 2024b, 2024c). A leading Swedish newspaper recently described Swedish climate politics as “a musty rant with accusations of betrayal, sin and devil pacts”. This is a dangerous phenomenon – for the persons targeted and for democracy.

Given the rise of such ‘nasty rhetoric’ (Zeitzoff, 2023), this paper aims at digging deeper along the slope of what touches me deeply – a democratic decline in climate politics – a wicked problem that needs strong democracy to be governed – and a democratic decline in Sweden more generally. Writing differently, embodying emotions triggered by hate and threats I received myself, I explore and explain the nature of nasty rhetoric in Swedish climate politics, addressing the following research questions:

• Who uses nasty rhetoric, in what forms and in which forums?
• Who is targeted?
• Why is nasty rhetoric used?
• Is there a difference in form and purpose depending on who is using nasty rhetoric?
• What are the implications of nasty rhetoric for democracy?

The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 presents the theory of nasty politics and rhetoric, including previous research on its use in climate politics. Section 3 presents the method and material used to analyze nasty rhetoric in the case of Swedish climate politics, including the context of the case study. As part of the method and material used, section 3 also reflects on how to write academically about nasty rhetoric. Sections 4–7 are the key sections of the paper, making up a story of better understanding the phenomenon of nasty rhetoric. Section 4 presents emotionally my own experiences of nasty rhetoric. Sections 5 and 6 present, analyze and discuss the results of the case study: Here’s what I found going back to understand the nature of nasty rhetoric in Sweden. Section 7 draws conclusions and presents actions to take: Here’s what the analysis might mean in the future.

2. Theory of nasty rhetoric

The phenomenon of hate and threat rhetoric targeting oppositional politicians, scientists, journalists and activists in Swedish climate politics has recently got a name in social science literature – nasty politics and nasty rhetoric. Nasty politics is an “umbrella term for a set of tactics that politicians can use to insult, accuse, denigrate, threaten and in rare cases physically harm their domestic opponents” (Zeitzoff, 2023, p. 6). Nasty rhetoric, central to nasty politics, is characterized by divisive and contentious rhetoric with insults and threats containing elements of hatred and aggression that entrenches polarization and ‘us vs. them’ narratives, designed to denigrate, deprecate, delegitimize, dehumanize and hurt their target(s) to make them silent (Kalmoe et al., 2018). Zeitzoff (2003) has proposed a typology of nasty rhetoric (Figure 1).

2.1. Nasty Rhetoric and Far-Right Populism

Populist parties have increased their votes in every election to national parliaments in Europe since the 1980s and autocratization is increasing (Mudde, 2004, 2021; V-Dem Institute, 2024). To reach their political aims, populists disseminate conspiracy theories about the state of society and use nasty rhetoric (Lührmann et al., 2020; Mudde, 2021; Zeitzoff, 2023).

Narratives of ‘disaster’ or ‘anxiety’ are important for the success of far-right populists (Kinnvall & Svensson, 2022). These refer to a fantasy of a constant crisis, rather than an actual crisis of the nation, caused by long-term mismanagement by a corrupt ‘elite’ (Kinnvall & Svensson, 2022; Ketola & Odmalm, 2023). Entrenching an ‘us vs. them’ narrative, far-right populists refer to a homogeneous ‘people’, the popular, as a counterpoint to the ‘elite’. They portray themselves as the savior of the nation and the people, and the ‘elite’ should be punished for their crimes against the ‘people’. While sometimes talking the language of the ‘people’, populists are not responsive to popular will. Their ideology is based on a unitary and non-pluralist vision of society’s public interest, and they themselves are rightful interpreters of what is in the public interest – a putative will of the ‘people’ (Bitonti, 2017; Caramani, 2017). They act on their own will and invite their audience to identify with them (White, 2023).

2.2. Nasty Rhetoric and Emotional Governance

Based on the work of Mouffe (2013), Chang (2019) and Olson (2020) show that nasty rhetoric is not only about what is conveyed explicitly by use of language. Political sentiments are often emotional and affective, determined by viscerally experienced sentiments and a physically imagined sense of rightness or wrongness. Political persuaders, particularly populists, use language or images to affect emotions, perceptions of knowledge, belief, value, and action (Shah, 2024). This aligns with notions of persuasion that stress pathos as an equally important part of rhetoric as logos and ethos respectively (Olson, 2020). Populist rhetoric operates in a world where it is not required for “every statement be logically defensible” (McBath & Fisher, 1969, p. 17).

Populism is based on emotional appeals to the ‘people’, anti-elitism, and the exclusion of outgroups who are routinely blamed and scapegoated for perceived grievances and social ills (Aalberg & de Vreese, 2016). Emotions are central in nasty rhetoric, thus in the structural and affective changes that underlie populist mobilization and the polarization of everyday insecurities in general (Kinnvall & Svensson, 2022). Such ‘emotional governance’ includes techniques of surveillance, control, and manipulation, i.e. how society governs emotions through cultural and institutional processes, meaning how it “affords individuals with a sense of what is regarded as appropriate and inappropriate behavior” (Crawford, 2014, p. 536). Emotional rhetoric is central in reproduction of structural power and power relations between ‘us’ and ‘them’ as it pays attention to collective emotions as patterns of relationships and belonging (Kinnvall & Svensson, 2022), thus central in structural policy entrepreneurship aimed at enhancing governance influence by altering the distribution of formal authority (Boasson & Huitema, 2017).

2.3. Nasty Rhetoric in Climate Politics

Donald Trump is a well-known user of nasty rhetoric promoting hatred and violence (Valcore et al., 2023). He is not the only world leader accused of publicly denigrating people based on their racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds (Piazza, 2020), but he violates numerous democratic norms in delivery and content of his speeches (e.g., Jamieson & Taussig, 2017; Ross & Rivers, 2020). Use of nasty rhetoric and strategic agency of far-right populists is well-known in policy domains such as migration and identity policy (Yılmaz, 2012; Lutz, 2019; Weeks & Allen, 2023; Svatoňová & Doerr, 2024) and is now used also in the climate policy domain (von Malmborg, 2024a).

Then President Donald Trump openly called newly elected congress woman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, initiator of the US Green New Deal, a “nasty woman” and said that many of the newly elected congress women should “go back to their countries” (Miller & Bloomfield, 2022). This shows the power dynamics circling not only female politicians but also climate policy. Combining climate denial and anti-feminism, Donald Trump and many other male politicians also directed and instigated hate and treats towards Greta Thunberg, the figurehead number one of the climate justice movements (Andersson, 2021; Vowles & Hultman, 2021a; White, 2022; Arce-García et al., 2023).

Polarizing rhetoric used to frame contesting views of political advocates and deniers of climate change have been studied extensively (e.g. Eubanks, 2015; Sharman & Howarth, 2017; Bsumek et al. 2019; Nordensvärd & Ketola, 2022; Pandey, 2024), but re-search on nasty rhetoric in climate politics is sparse. Knight and Greenberg (2011) analyzed adversarial framing for discrediting reputation of Canadian social movement/counter-movement relations. Both sides discredited their opponents based on combinations of practices, moral character, competence and qualifications, social associations, and real versus apparent motivations.

Nasty rhetoric is often found in social media, particularly X/Twitter, Facebook and TikTok, where senders can be anonymous (Oltmann et al., 2020). Anderson and Huntington (2017) found that while instances of incivility were low overall in Twitter discussions on climate politics, such rhetoric was mainly used by right-leaning people. The climate justice movement has been particularly targeted by hate in social media, often related to gender (Agius et al., 2021; Andersson, 2021; White, 2022; Arce-García et al., 2023). Uncivil hate of climate sceptic far-right people are also targeting climate journalists, aiming to discredit individual journalists and newspapers but also to undermine the deliberative function of online user forums (Björkenfeldt & Gustafsson, 2023; Schulz-Tomančok & Woschnagg, 2024).

3. Method and Materials

3.1. Qualitative Case Study

This paper analyzes the nature of nasty rhetoric, with a focus on climate politics. I will address questions like: What does it mean? Who is using it and in which forums? Who is targeted? Why is it used? Is there a difference in types of hate and threat and forums used between different groups of users? What are the implications for democracy?

I do this in a qualitative case study of Sweden, chosen since the use of nasty rhetoric has sky-rocketed in only a few years, linked to a recent far-right turn of Swedish politics entrenching a populistic ‘us vs. them’ polarization of Swedish climate politics (von Malmborg, 2024a). I will analyze the use of nasty rhetoric by politicians and their supporters from all quarters, climate advocates and climate sceptics, as found in written texts, photos and audio-visual material. To enhance the understanding of the phenomenon, I will also use my own experiences as a target of nasty politics. The study focuses primarily on the use of nasty rhetoric from early 2022 and onwards, when it became a topic in Swedish media.

3.1.1. Far-Right Populist Takeover

Sweden has been considered a bastion of strong liberal democracy since the end of World War II, able to develop and maintain a green and equitable welfare state (Boese et al., 2022; Silander, 2024). However, the 2022 elections to the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) marks a shift. Then, far-right nativist populist Sweden Democrats (SD) won 20.5 % of the votes and 73 out of 349 seats, becoming the second largest party in the Riksdag after the Social Democrats (S). This progress made SD gain formal powers in the Riksdag, holding the chairs in the committees of justice, labor market, foreign affairs and industry, and having direct influence over the government in most policy areas. Bargaining on who was to form a government for the 2022–2026 term resulted in the Tidö Agreement (Tidö parties, 2022) between SD and a liberal-conservative troika of the Moderates (M), the Christian Democrats (KD) and the Liberals (L). SD supports the Tidö government, under the condition that SD takes part in decisions in six policy areas to undergo a rapid paradigm shift: climate and energy, criminality, economic growth and household economy, education, migration and integration, and public health, of which criminality, migration and climate change are deemed the most important (Rothstein, 2023). SD holds no seats in the cabinet but has political staff in the PM’s Office within the Government Offices of Sweden. In that sense, SD holds tangible powers but is not accountable for the government’s decisions. In all, the Tidö quartet holds majority with 176 of 349 seats in the Riksdag, while the opposition, consisting of S, the Center Party (C), the Green Party (MP), and the Left Party (V), holds 173 seats.

When formed in 1988, SD was extremist and violent rooted in neo-fascism, but with the election of current party leader Jimmie Åkesson in 2005, SD tried to distance itself from its neo-fascist past and show a more respectable façade to gain legitimacy (Rydgren & van der Meiden, 2016; Widfeldt, 2023). However, SD has continued to combine populism, anti-pluralism and authoritarianism with nativism – the longing for a homogenous nation state – and propose populist and illiberal policies in many areas, primarily migration but also social, justice and environmental policy (Hellström, 2023). SD hails Victor Orbán’s Hungary, the worst example of autocratization in the world (Meléndez & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021; Mudde, 2021; Boese et al., 2022; Silander, 2024; V-Dem Institute, 2024), as a role model of democratic governance. Due to the success of SD, Sweden is currently one of the strongholds of far-right populists in the EU (Widfeldt, 2023). To understand SD political agency, they “sacralize their core ideas and predominantly employ virtue ethical justification strategies, positioning themselves as morally superior to other parties” (Vahter & Jakobson, 2023, p. 1). They assign essentialist value to their key political concepts, a stance that sharply contrasts with the moral composition of the rest of the political spectrum adhering to liberal or deliberative perspectives on democracy.

Reviewing the Tidö government’s first years in power, Civil Rights Defenders (CRD, 2023), United Nations Association of Sweden (UNAS, 2023) and Gustavsson (2024) identifies several signs of autocratization in Sweden and reasons for concern related to the strong influence of SD on the government. Such concerns have been raised also by democracy scholars (Rothstein, 2023; Silander, 2024; V-Dem Institute, 2024; von Malmborg, 2024a).

3.1.2. From Climate Policy Role Model to International Scapegoat

Sweden used to be considered an international role model in climate policy (Matti et al., 2021), advocating high ambitions in global and EU climate governance as well as nationally. In 2017, the Swedish Riksdag adopted with support of all parties but SD a new climate policy framework, including:

A.

A target that Sweden should have net-zero emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs) by 2045;

B.

A Climate Act, stating among other things that the government shall present to the Riksdag a Climate Action Plan (CAP) with policies and measures to reach the targets, at the latest the calendar year after national elections; and

C.

Establishment of the Swedish Climate Policy Council (SCPC), an independent and interdisciplinary body of climate scientists, to evaluate the alignment of the government’s policies with the 2045 climate target.

Sweden’s GHG emissions in total decreased by approximately 37% from 1990 to 2022 and a decoupling of emissions and economic growth began in 1992, when Sweden introduced carbon dioxide taxation. This long-term trend of emissions reductions was halted when the Tidö government supported by SD entered office. They advocated a radical change of Swedish climate policy and governance. SD has long since been vocal as a climate change denier (Jylhä et al., 2020; Vihma et al., 2021), wanting to abort national climate targets and climate policies. SD is culturally and cognitively motivated by conflicting ‘evil’ beliefs of previous governments for decades, both S-led and M-led. Like other European far-right populist parties, SD is mobilizing a ‘cultural war’ on climate change, making climate policy less ambitious (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2022; Marquardt et al., 2022; Cunningham et al., 2024). Climate policy was purposefully included in the Tidö Agreement by SD, opening a window of opportunity for SD to dictate and veto the government’s climate policy. Bargaining on finalizing the CAP, SD now accepts the 2045 target but managed to reduce overall climate policy ambitions by deleting short- and medium-term targets and actions important for reaching long-term targets. The Tidö quartet focuses entirely on emission reductions by 2045, ignoring climate science saying that reducing every ton of GHG emitted from now to 2045 is what counts (Lahn, 2021).

Tidö climate policy can be characterized as anti-climate action with increased GHG emissions. The CAP was welcomed by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (CSE) and its neoliberal thinktank Timbro, but heavily criticized domestically by the political op-position, climate scientists, economists, government authorities, the environmental and social justice movement, business associations other than CSE, citizens and editorial writers in leading national newspapers for its lack of short- and medium-term domestic action, manipulation of information, and a large focus on new nuclear power and cli-mate compensation in other countries. SCPC (2024) and Swedish Environmental Protection Agency (2024) claimed that Tidö policies lead to increases of annual GHG emissions, corresponding to more than 10 % of Sweden’s total annual emissions, and that the CAP will not suffice for Sweden to reach the target on climate neutrality by 2045, nor Sweden’s responsibilities in relation to EU’s 2030 climate target.

In critique of Tidö climate policy, three out of four parties in the Riksdag opposition (C, MP and V) tabled a motion of non-confidence, calling for the setting aside of climate minister Romina Pourmokhtari (L) for failing to deliver policies that reduce GHG emissions. The critique towards Pourmokhtari also refers to the fact that she herself promised to resign if Sweden does not meet Swedish and EU climate targets – which it will not. In addition, more than 1 350 critical L-politicians from local and regional levels demanded the resignation of Pourmokhtari because she and L gave way to SD’s influence over the CAP, implying crossing several red lines of L’s party program and ideology. When the Riksdag voted, the critics did not gather enough support to set Pourmokhtari aside.

Besides domestic criticism, Tidö climate policies were criticized also internation-ally, claiming that Sweden is losing its role as climate policy frontrunner and risk dragging the EU down with it. The European Commission has rejected Sweden’s ap-plication for SEK 40 billion funding from the EU Recovery Fund since Sweden will meet neither national nor EU climate targets for 2030.

3.2. Materials

Despite social media being an important forum for nasty rhetoric due to its wide reach and possibility of anonymity (Benkler et al., 2018; Olson, 2020; Agius et al., 2021), I have not systematically analyzed posts on social media platforms. This choice was made deliberatively because of the anonymity problem. I do not only want to identify which kinds of insults, accusations etcetera that are used, but which persons and organizations that send them. It was recently revealed by Swedish news media that SD’s communications office, inspired by Donald Trump and directed by party leader Åkesson, runs a ‘troll factory’. Using anonymous ‘troll accounts’ in social media, SD has deliberately and systematically spread misinformation and conspiracy theories to shape opinion, manipulate voters and incite outgroups. Åkesson has, without shame, confirmed that SD use ‘troll accounts’, particularly on TikTok, to avoid getting public accounts reported and closed due to their frequent use of hate and threats.

Data on the use of nasty rhetoric in different forums were collected using qualitative text analysis of secondary written and audio-visual material from official policy documents, political debates, newspapers, magazines, blogs, television, radio etcetera (Appendix A).

To identify relevant political debates, I screened all debates in the Riksdag archive from January 2022 to August 2024. I found one party leader debate and twelve interpellation debates, where members of the Riksdag debate with the responsible minister. These are video recorded and transcribed and available at the Riksdag webpage. In all, 13 debates on climate policy and related issues were held from November 2022 to May 2024. In addition, I found two party leader debates and one debate of top candidates for the 2024 EU elections sent in Swedish public service television and radio.

News articles, essays, editorials and op-eds in newspapers, magazines and blogs were identified through Boolesk searches during April–August 2024 in Retriever Mediearkivet (https://www.retrievergroup.com/sv/product-mediearkivet) the largest media archive in the Nordic countries covering more than 1 000 newspapers, magazines etcetera. Searches were made using the terms presented in Table 1 in different combinations. Some terms, like antidemocratic, sabotage/saboteur and terrorism/terrorists, were included since such accusations on climate activists were widely discussed in national media in early 2024. I also screened programs on television, radio and podcasts, scanning webpages of state-owned and privately owned national television and radio for news on climate politics and climate activism.

As for newspapers, magazines and blogs, I found editorials, op-eds and articles commenting Tidö nasty climate politics in left, green, social democrat, liberal, conservative and far-right media. In total, 98 editorials, op-eds, news articles, blogs, social media posts, TV programs, and radio programs were identified, showing, reporting or discussing the use of nasty rhetoric in Swedish climate politics between January 2022 and August 2024.

Nasty rhetoric is usually emotional and affective, but emotions are not always contained in the written or spoken language itself, but they can be triggered by it and be used to anticipate a phenomenon (Chang, 2019; Olson, 2020). Nasty rhetoric can also be expressed visually (Bleiker, 2018), where far-right populism deploys a range of visual images to portray its ideas, such as Pepe the Frog memes (Bedford, 2017). In attacking climate activists, far-right populists also use memes of Greta Thunberg showing emotions to distinguish ‘rational men’ from ‘emotional women’ (White, 2022). Thus, I have also identified subtle expressions of nasty rhetoric, e.g. refusal to give interviews, photos and videos of rhetorical actions.

In these 114 pieces of written, visual and audio-visual material, I identified different expressions of insults, uncivil hate and threats which were coded in relation to the typology of nasty rhetoric suggested by Zeitzoff (2023). Each expression was also coded with reference to sender, partisanship (or organizational belonging if not a politician) of the sender, position in the party/organization of the sender, target, if it was a firsthand expression or a response to a previous accusation or threat, and finally forum used for communication.

Regarding research ethics, I choose to name individual persons uttering insults, accusations etcetera if they themselves, as official, politically elected or appointed persons, have chosen to use nasty rhetoric in public. Since nasty rhetoric is not only used by anonymous trolls it matters who said what and who did what, especially if uttered by political leaders. Think of the research on nasty rhetoric of Donald Trump – what if it didn’t mention his name? However, some scholars may have chosen to anonymize the senders.

3.3. Reflections on Academic Writing

How we approach academic writing is important. A groundswell of resistance towards traditional norms of academic writing in critical management and organization studies claims that these norms are “restrictive, inhibit the development of knowledge and excise much of what it is to be human from our learning, teaching and research” (Gilmore et al., 2019; p. 3). They claim that in a similar way academics employ different methods in our research, there is also a choice to write differently.

Polish-Swedish organizational sociologist Barbara Czarniawska-Joerges (1995) was a pioneer in experimental forms of academic writing, using novels and poems to critically understand organizations and management to reach beyond the often-stultifying formats inculcated by ‘scientific’ norms, to engage and absorb the readers so that learning happens almost unknowingly through emotions (Parker, 2014; Kociatkiewicz & Kostera, 2016). While some advocate writing differently to communicate less abstractly (Grey & Sinclair, 2006), others suggest that creativity might follow if academics were loosened from the binds of traditional academic writing that elision the author from the text (Gilmore et al., 2019). Drawing on the works of French literary scholar Hélène Cixous (1976), writing differently acknowledges the value of incorporating the voice and material presence of the author (Höpfl, 2007), aiming to provide a mode of writing that develops a distinct, affective feminist politics for research seeking to effect concrete changes in challenging gendered structures (Vacchani, 2019). Some scholars write of their body, where the body has the potential to become a site of power and change, while others write from the body, embodying and giving voice to the writer’s emotions, unlocking her vulnerabilities (e.g. Pullen & Rhodes, 2008; Helin, 2019). Embodying the writer’s emotions, often fear, angst or anger, is the most common approach to writing differently in management and organization studies (see e.g. Beavan, 2019; Boncori & Smith, 2019; Helin, 2023), and the approach I use in this paper.

Writing from the body does not seek to escape from academic rigor. The aim is to deepen and broaden our understanding of different phenomena in society, organizations and politics through research and theorizing in which the writing itself contributes to research and theory. It is not trying to replace academic writing with art forms such as poetry, novels, autobiographies, music and painting. Doing so would be to abandon the riches that academic research offers. Rather, writing differently aim to enrich knowledge through maintaining academic rigor while slipping the surly bonds of stultifying writing bound to a comforting but empty, homogenous and horizontal, masculine temporality following the chronological time from the past to the future (Fjelkestam, 2018). Writing differently moves towards a vertical, feminine temporality that shift focus from counting to content, and to a cognitive process that leads to problematizing instead of harmonizing, contextualizing instead of neutralizing, and specifying instead of generalizing (cf. Bränström Öhman, 2012). As proposed by French philosopher of science and phenomenologist Gaston Bachelard (2013), a vertical temporality is multidimensional and connected to sensing simultaneities, a time of complexity and multitude, a time of the body that can host contradictory feelings, a time of heights and depths. It is a time of the instant, that will always die and make every moment unique. Contrary to the aim of traditional academic writing based on horizontal temporality to fill gaps, writing differently based on a vertical temporality aims at creating gaps by thought-provoking research and academic texts on instants that take us by surprise (Helin, 2023). Writing differently aims at “broadening, widening and deepening knowledge and understanding by giving our ideas space in which they can flourish, create new meanings, help us learn and become human” (Gilmore et al., 2019, p. 4).

3.4. Embodying Emotions to Enhance the Understanding of Nasty Rhetoric

I’m not interested in analyzing the development of nasty rhetoric or its frequency in a horizontal temporality, but what it really represents in a more vertical temporality, beyond time as represented by the clock. Nasty rhetoric aims at evocating feelings and emotionally hurt its targets, making people afraid (Chang, 2019; Olson, 2020). It aims at demonizing and dehumanizing people (Cassese, 2021; Wahlström et al., 2021), making them silent and disappear from the political conversation. Politics has become increasingly emotional (Shah, 2024) and emotions are now a legitimate subject of political study (Beattie et al., 2019).

Nasty rhetoric is nasty emotional. Analyzing the phenomenon only through what is conveyed explicitly by use of language, pictures and physical action provided by the material described in section 3.2 would give a flat and dry understanding of nasty rhetoric. Following the course of scholars in critical management and organization studies, I write this paper differently but still adhering to norms of academic rigor. Writing from the body, as part of my method, adds a human dimension to the otherwise soulless presentation of language and pictures of political hatred and threats. My own emotions of fear, angst and anger, evocated by being personally hit by political hate and threat campaigns, provides a complementary set of ‘material’ presented in section 4. Adding to my own emotions, I also include emotional testimonies of climate journalists, climate scientists and climate activists interviewed in September 2024 to further embody what nasty rhetoric can do to those affected. In all, I analyze insults, accusations, intimidations, incitements and physical violence identified in the written and audio-visual material, together with embodied emotions of fear, angst and anger, as instants in a vertical temporality, a time of heights and depths and a body that can host contradictory feelings simultaneously (cf. Bachelard, 2013). In this sense, “this is how we can go deep in the sense of associating with that which is most important to us as well as finding ways to fly high and be connected to something bigger through writing” (Helin, 2023, p. 382).

My intention with writing from the body is to emotionally engage and absorb the readers to enhance learning and understand nasty rhetoric through feeling, or at least imagining, the pain, fear, angst and anger that comes with being a target of nasty rhetoric, being dehumanized (cf. Parker, 2014; Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014; Kociatkiewicz & Kostera, 2016; Page, 2017; Beavan, 2019). Writing differently could provide an opportunity for the possibilities of wonder, disgust and imagination in critical policy studies revealing the true nature of nasty rhetoric (cf. Carlsen & Sandelands, 2015).

4. My Emotions and Vulnerabilities Embodied

Referencing freedom of speech, the Swedish police force permitted the Nordic Resistance Movement (NMR), a violent neo-Nazi organization recently classified by the US government as a terrorist organization, to demonstrate at the Almedalen week in 2018 – the main Swedish and the world’s largest forum for democratic dialogue between politicians, private sector actors, civil society organizations and concerned citizens. Legal and democracy experts claimed that this decision could lead to violence and that there were legal grounds not to permitting the NMR demonstration. To me, as an aca-demic scholar and civil servant of democracy, a point was reached where I had to react. Permitting a violent, extremist and outspoken antidemocratic organization to demonstrate at the hallmark of Swedish democratic dialogue on loose legal grounds was an ‘in-your-face’ provocation to Swedish democracy and to me. I commented in social media that the police were cowards.

My comment sparked the worst months in my life. A well-known far-right influencer claimed that I was a scam criticizing the Swedish police force. This was followed by months of accusations, intimidations and incitement by a few public and hundreds of anonymous accounts on Twitter, Facebook and phone calls. I was displayed as an enemy to the ‘people’ with my name, photo, home address and telephone number posted on far-right extremist internet forums. I should be sacked from my jobs. A man claiming to be a police officer stalked me from different anonymous phone numbers for two months, claiming that I had to come to court to defend myself or else I would be sentenced to prison. My bones should be broken. I should be killed. It was not only me that was threatened. My family and everyone working with me should have their bones broken.

I had been threatened before, by drunkards in the night streets of Stockholm, but not me as a person and not related to my personal opinions. I was just a random man that got bullied. Those instants ended after me keeping calm. In this new situation I was attacked as a person, because my political opinion was different from others and me being me. My kids were threatened because they were my kids. It left me with anger about how wicked and evil some people and the political climate had become. It also left me with fear and anxiety about what was going to happen next. I couldn’t control or influence the inflow of evil other than closing my Twitter account, changing name on my Facebook account and turn off my mobile. The only way to handle the situation was through disappearance. But why must I disappear for using my constitutional right? I had to go to work, get my kids from school, answer the phone, run, shop food, meet with friends and family. But leaving home every morning was associated with fear and angst, as was getting home. Who would wait for me and my family outside the entrance of our house? Will there be someone following me to physically harm or kill me? The anxiety exacerbated by not knowing when the inflow of hatred and threats would end. Would it continue for a week, a couple of weeks, a month, several months or longer? At some points fear and angst created darkness and depression. I lost my self-esteem and intrinsic value as a human being. Who am I? Why was I bereft of my voice?

The offenders succeeded in their tactics. I fell silent for more than five years. I self-censored my posts on social media. I stopped commenting Swedish politics.

5. Exploring Nasty Rhetoric in Swedish Climate Politics

5.1. Nasty Rhetoric of the Tidö Parties and Climate Sceptics

5.1.1. Insults

Insults are the mildest type of nasty rhetoric. Insults of climate scientists, journal-ists, activists and oppositional politicians are made outspoken by the PM and cabinet ministers, party leaders, press secretaries and climate policy spokespersons in political debates, press conferences and social media (Table 2). Insults are also made by Timbro and in editorials in far-right media.

Climate journalists have increasingly received insults in social media and by e-mail. Insults are targeted at both male and female journalists, but female journalists seem to receive more hateful and aggressive insults, e.g. “left pack”, “crypto environmentalist”, “motherfucker” and “moron hag”.

5.1.2. Accusations

The second level of nasty rhetoric includes accusing opponents of doing something illegal or shady, or conspiracy theories that they are controlling the economy or politics (Radnitz, 2021). Accusations have mainly been directed towards public service media, scientists and climate activists (Table 3).

5.1.3. Intimidations

The third level of nasty rhetoric advocates economic and/or legal action against an opponent, e.g., that they should be fired, be investigated or sent to prison. Intimidations are mainly directed to climate activists, suggesting stronger state repression, but also towards climate scientists and journalists (Table 4).

In spring 2024, the intimidation towards climate activists was further accentuated when the chair of the Riksdag industry committee, Tobias Andersson (SD), deliberately walked across a banner of climate activists, including Greta Thunberg, demonstrating and blocking the entrance to the Riksdag (Figure 2). The situation was filmed and posted on an SD-related YouTube channel (Video showing Tobias Andersson (SD) intimidating Greta Thunberg and other climate activists. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZlBy2uc6JuU&t=2s), showing how Andersson redirects his steps when identifying Greta Thunberg in an act of showing power, that he owns her.

Climate scientists and public service journalists are often intimidated with threats of getting fired since they are often paid by taxpayers’ money. Journalists scrutinizing the actions of the far-right movement related to climate activists are also seriously harassed, starting with insults but rapidly expanding to accusations or intimidations. An SD-related media person attacked a male journalist in an interview, where part of the interview was posted on social media and set in motion a hate drive:

“You are a showman, an idiot, a dishonest person, a political activist. There is no reason for me to be serious with you. The only way I can treat you is to fool around. I will post this conversation just so you know.”

5.1.4. Incitements

Incitement is the most threatening kind of nasty rhetoric, likely to provoke actual physical violence. It includes threats encouraging or facilitating physical violence against opponents, which if the statement is followed would imply physical harm to opponents. Table 5 presents incitements with threats of assault, rape and death targeting primarily climate activists, but also MP and female climate journalists.

5.1.5. Physical Violence

Shortly after an online campaign against XR in spring 2022, XR reported that five masked people attacked a climate action, and that one activist had been assaulted. About an hour after the attack, the far-right extremist that organized the campaign appeared at the spot with video camera and studio light but did not get any interviews. “They weren’t so talkative last night when I came by with a studio light and everything...”, he wrote in his Telegram channel. In a later post, he questioned that the attack on XR really took place but added that he distances himself from the event “if it is true”.

Another act of physical violence was experienced in late April 2024, when five masked members of a neo-Nazi fight club attacked a political meeting in a Stockholm, organized by V and MP on how to deal with the nasty politics of the far-right movement and its implications for democracy. Several people were assaulted.

5.2. Nasty Rhetoric of the Opposition and Climate Advocates

The data reveals that climate scientists and activists as well as journalists are also using nasty rhetoric, in response to how they perceive of Tidö climate policy. A significant difference is that climate advocates only use insults and accusations of a rather mild kind.

5.2.1. Insults

Insults of oppositional politicians, climate activists, scientists and journalists are mainly targeting the government as a collective, SD and individual ministers, in particular the PM and the climate minister (Table 6).

5.2.3. Accusations

While all climate advocates insulted the government and individual Tidö politicians, mainly oppositional politicians and some groups of scientists used accusations (Table 7).

6. Understanding Nasty Rhetoric in Climate Politics

Data from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ, 2023a) shows that about one third of politically elected representatives at local, regional and national level were targeted by hate and threats during the election year 2022, mainly via social media. Almost 70 % of these were exposed more than once. Women and young people and representatives of MP are targeted more often than others. In most cases the perpetrators were anonymous, but if identifiable, they were usually angry middle-aged men often related to the far-right (extremist) movement. In addition to C and MP politicians as targets, hate and threats targeting climate scientists, climate journalists and particularly climate activists have increased since the Covid-19 pandemic. Several people active in the climate debate testify that hatred and threats have increased even more since the national elections in 2022. Hate crimes related to climate change is not yet a category in Swedish statistics and hate crime surveys (BRÅ, 2023b).

6.1. How is Nasty Rhetoric Used?

The results reveal that nasty rhetoric is used by members of all parties in the Riksdag but C. Former party leader of C, Annie Lööf, herself a target of far-right hate and threats from 2015 to 2022- when she resigned due to the threats, stood firm in criticizing the use of nasty rhetoric in Swedish politics. Emma Wiesner (C), top candidate in the 2024 EU elections, was the only politician in the final debate in Swedish television that did not use nasty rhetoric. Nasty rhetoric is widely used by party leaders and government ministers, including the PM. It is also used by neoliberal and far-right influencers and climate sceptics, applauding the weakening of Swedish climate policy. The political opposition in the Riksdag, and to a lesser extent scientists and activists, all advocating stronger climate policy based on climate science also use it. While Tidö parties and climate sceptics use all types of nasty rhetoric, from insults to incitements and physical violence, oppositional politicians and climate advocates only use insults and accusations.

That high-level politicians in the government and the Riksdag utter insults, accusations and intimidations towards journalists, scientists and activists can be considered an important reason for the increase in threats. Nasty rhetoric has become normalized when the PM and other cabinet ministers and people with leading positions in the Riksdag use it, calling XR “totalitarian”, “security threats”, “terrorists”, “saboteurs” and “a threat to Swedish climate governance and Swedish democracy” that should be “sent to prison”. Insults, accusations, intimidations and incitements are made openly, mainly in social media from official accounts of ministers and other politicians. Intimidations targeting climate activists are also made in national radio, on the streets, and in political debates in the Riksdag.

Politicians rarely humiliate or denigrate other politicians in person, but other political parties. Except for the hate on Greta Thunberg, the same holds true for nasty rhetoric of politicians targeting climate activists or scientists. It is primarily the organizations, not the persons who are targeted. Some exceptions in politicians’ rhetoric are the accusations of (i) former MP party leader Bolund calling the PM a “provoking naked liar”, (ii) former MP party leader Stenevi calling SD party leader Åkesson a “Nazi” and the climate minister a “week minister in a puppet government”, and (iii) S spokesperson Guteland criticizing the climate minister for her “superhero attitude”. Hate and threats sent by anonymous haters are often targeting individual climate activists, scientists, journalists and other outgroups, orchestrated by SD and AfS, who display names, photos, addresses and phone numbers of the ‘enemies’ in far-right extremist web forums.

Nasty rhetoric is an outspoken tactic of SD to entrench the ‘us vs. them’ and the ‘people vs. elite’ narratives. But it has turned out that SD also uses nasty rhetoric through its anonymous troll accounts targeting ministers of M-KD-L for being part of The Cry. The insults and accusations towards the government were condemned by the political opposition and criticized by PM Ulf Kristersson (M), who required an excuse and that posts on social media smearing the government were deleted, but he did not criticize the widespread use of nasty rhetoric in general – he uses it himself. In a statement after the revealing of SD’s troll factory, party leader Åkesson continued to claim that SD represents the ‘people’ and replied: “To you in the Cry...we are not ashamed. It is not us who have destroyed Sweden... It is you who are to blame for it”.

People from different quarters use nasty rhetoric differently and with different purposes. While Tidö politicians, libertarians, far-right movements and climate sceptics use nasty rhetoric to delegitimize and threaten their enemies to silence, insults and accusations from climate advocates target the government as a collective or the PM and Pourmokhtari directly to delegitimize them in affective response to what they consider to be inferior climate policy in substance and process. They also insult and accuse the PM and the climate minister for lack of leadership. Being climate minister, Pourmokhtari is bound to take the hit, although everyone understands that she is only a “liberal minister in SD’s puppet government”.

Climate activist organizations are a main target of nasty rhetoric of Tidö parties and its supporters. But they are also using it themselves, with a humoristic twist. Adhering to norms of deliberative democracy, sacralizing the good argument, hate and threats have little or no place in the repertoire of climate activists. On the contrary, climate ac-tivists use civil disobedience, are ‘radically kind’ and use humor in digital activism to transform democracy (Pickard et al., 2020; Sloam et al., 2022; Chiew et al., 2024). For in-stance, Greta Thunberg turned insults of then Brazilian president José Bolsonaro and then US president Donald Trump into humor, adding the Portuguese word “pirralha” (Eng. brat) and “A very happy young girl looking forward to a bright and wonderful future” to her X/Twitter profile (Vowles & Hultman, 2021a; White, 2022). The humoristic turn to ‘nasty’ rhetoric was also evident in Greta Thunberg’s insulting response to To-bias Andersson’s (SD) intimidation outside the entrance of the Riksdag – a laughter, saying that he is a looser – and the subtle insults related to the governments “climate meeting” with “civil society organizations”.

Another difference between insults and accusations of Tidö parties, the far-right movement and Timbro compared to the opposition, scientists and activists is that the former are grasped from thin air, based on emotions, while the latter are based on sub-stance and facts. Insults and accusations of the latter are used to enhance the good argument. The PM and the climate minister accused climate activists of being a threat to Swedish democracy, but without factual grounds, only emotions. When S party leader Andersson accused SD of being a threat to democracy, and MP leader Stenevi accused Pourmokhtari of being minister in a “puppet government”, these accusations have concrete bearing on results and conclusions from democracy research (e.g. Silander, 2024; V-Dem Institute, 2024; von Malmborg, 2024b, 2024c). They were not slurs, but well-substantiated accusations. It is ironically symptomatic that SD party leader Åkesson, basing his entire politics and rhetoric on emotional governance, accuses the former S–MP government’s climate policy to be based on emotions, not on facts, while Tidö climate policy is based on false hope and putative will of the people.

6.2. Why is Nasty Rhetoric Used?

Fear of system critique

Obviously, the highest representatives of Tidö parties as well as CSE and Timbro regard strong climate policy, requiring green economic and industrial transition, and climate activists as threats. Climate activists formulate system criticism based on cli-mate science calling for a just transition (Evans & Phelan, 2016; Wang & Lo, 2021). Tidö parties’ response is to demonize and delegitimize non-violent climate activists “a threat to democracy”, “totalitarian forces” or simply “terrorists” to be “sent to prison” and “executed”. Such accusations, intimidations and incitements are not a matter of isolated occasions, and it cannot be considered innocent mistakes. The words come from the highest-ranking politicians, including the PM, whose rhetoric agitates that climate activists really are a threat to democracy.

But when Nazis attacked participants in an antifascist meeting in a Stockholm suburb with fist fights and spray cans, the same politicians were not as sharp in their words. Contrary to the political opposition, Tidö leaders did not take the words Nazi or far-right extremists in their mouths. The PM did not mention the perpetrators at all but spoke sweepingly about how “an attack on a democratic meeting is an attack on our entire democracy”. When another Nazi attack targeting the premises of V occurred in late summer 2024, neither the PM nor any other minister commented the hate crime. They were silent. The situation was similar when it was revealed that SD party leader Åkesson invited the president of a criminal MC gang to his recent wedding. The PM didn’t dare to criticize him, even though the PM as well as Åkesson have stated that the actions of criminal gangs in Sweden can be equated with terrorism.

How come that we have a political climate in Sweden where Tidö politicians talk of climate activists as if they were Nazis, but not about Nazis as... Nazis? I want to believe that these politicians know that climate activists are not dangerous to Swedish citizens, that their actions of civil disobedience are not threatening our democracy. The only threat they pose is to expose the failures of Tidö and previous governments to embark on the just transition journey, and to form opinion for what possibly scares politicians and transition averted business more than appearing bad: an economic and political system that must change fundamentally.

That Greta Thunberg has gone from pet peeve to pariah among Tidö parties, CSE and Timbro and other climate sceptics is no coincidence. The change follows a sharpening of the climate activists’ message – economic degrowth (Heikkurinen, 2021). It is about the realization that the whole economic system of today is wrongly inverted (Bailey et al., 2011; Davidson, 2012). An insight transformed into a critique of the neoliberal economic system and its focus on free markets and economic growth (Euler, 2019; Khmara & Kronenberg, 2020). In addition, a critique of the hegemonic (neo)liberal democratic system with its increasing focus on restricted and competitive participation, as opposed to a more deliberative and inclusive ecological democracy (Pickering et al., 2020; von Malmborg, 2024a). Degrowth and a resulting perceived intrusion upon their dominant status in society is what right-wing and far-right politicians painting a threatening picture of climate activists are afraid of. Instead of answering the degrowth narrative with good arguments in a public debate, Tidö politicians use nasty rhetoric to silence the outgroup.

A similar fear of system critique, Olof Palme’s attacks on neoliberal economics and libertarian political philosophy as threats to the welfare state, and Annie Lööf’s socio-liberal views on migration policy, made Swedish right-wing and far-right politicians in M, KD, SD and AfS and their supporters paint pictures that Palme and Lööf stood for something evil. For this, they should be punished – silenced:

“There shall be only One Truth!”

1.1.1. Libertarian and far-right populism

This fear is also why neoliberal and libertarian thinktanks such as Atlas Network and Timbro have orchestrated lobbying in Sweden and world-wide (The Atlas Network: Big Oil, Climate Disinformation and Constitutional Democracy. Research Seminar, University of Technology Sidney, 8 December 2023. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlQOw6qpblY), financed by the oil and gas industry, to initiate climate denying movements and cast doubt on climate science and climate policy, influence politicians, and attack climate activists (Ekberg & Pressfeldt, 2022; Walker, 2023). The current Swedish PM and minister of justice, both from M, worked at Timbro when the campaigning started. The former CEO of Timbro, responsible for nasty rhetoric towards climate activists and journalists, was recently appointed Swedish minister of development aid and trade. Eight other Tidö ministers, including the climate minister, were educated at the Sture Academy, Timbro’s cutting-edge education in libertarian ideology, politics and opinion formation. Timbro also approached SD to make them take on a sceptical position on climate change and climate policy.

Initially championing environmentalism, being an important ingredient in ‘blood and soil’ nationalist narratives, SD and other far-right populist parties began to deny climate change a decade or two ago. Based on a combination of anti-establishment rhetoric, knowledge resistance and emotional communication of doubt, industrial/breadwinner masculinities and ethnonationalism, SD is mobilizing a ‘culture war’ on strong climate policies (Hultman et al., 2019; Jylhä et al., 2020; Agius et al., 2021; Vihma et al., 2021; Vowles & Hultman, 2021a). They look back to a great national past during the oil-fueled record years of the 1950s and 60s, when men had lifelong jobs in industry and sole access to society’s positions of power. It is mainly white older men that support SD and are climate sceptics (Vowles & Hultman, 2021a).

Accusing Swedish established media of being “climate alarmist propaganda centers” belonging to a “left-liberal conspiracy”, SD and other nationalist right-wing groups built their own ecosystem of digital media news sites, blogs, video channels and anonymous troll accounts in social media, which did not have to relate to the rules of press ethics. Normalizing knowledge resistance and using nasty rhetoric were central to their strategy of structural policy entrepreneurship (von Malmborg, 2024a). And the tie between Tidö ministers and climate denying SD is tighter and stronger than the Tidö Agreement. At the center is Timbro and CSE, two of few organizations that welcomed Tidö low-ambition climate policies. Tidö climate governance, including nasty rhetoric, adheres not only to populism, but also libertarian neoliberalism. Many strategies and actions of far-right populists around the world ascend from libertarian philosophy and neoliberal economics and the ‘There is no Alternative’ narratives used to support it (Goldwag, 2017; Séville, 2017).

Timbro had a significant role also in the hate and threats targeting Olof Palme. In 1984, they published the book “Who is Olof Palme?” (Östergren, 1984), the most elaborate and offensive attack on Palme as a person and politician.

1.1.1. The emperor is naked

Contrary to nasty rhetoric of Tidö parties and the far-right movement, nasty rhetoric of the political opposition, climate activists and scientists does not aim to silence their opponents. They value pluralism and freedom of speech. Like Kamala Harris and Tim Walz are calling Donald Trump and J.D. Wance “weird”, former party leaders of MP, Per Bolund and Märta Stenevi show with their accusations and the eye of a child that the PM and climate minister are “naked emperors” – that the Tidö quartet lack credible political reforms, no visions of building a climate neutral society. Tidö’s response to the climate emergency is “Tourette-like tirades” about new nuclear power at upfront costs of about USD 30–60 billion and USD 1 000 in annual nuclear taxation per Swedish household. The nasty rhetoric of Bolund and Stenevi, an everyday call to laugh at the emperor’s nakedness, can arouse broad popular engagement. This is indicated by the results of the 2024 EU elections, were Swedish left-wing and green parties more than doubled their votes compared to the national elections in 2022, collecting almost 25 % of the votes in total. SD dropped from 20.5% in the national elections to 13 % in the EU elections, for the first time ever getting reduced support in a nationwide election. The main reason for the success of the red–green parties and decline of SD was the high interest in climate policy among the voters, ranking it as a top three issue in the elections (von Malmborg, 2024a).

6.3. The Nature of Nasty Rhetoric

6.3.1. Nasty Rhetoric as a Double-Edged Sword

Nasty rhetoric is a double-edged sword used to emotionally hurt the outgroup ‘enemies’, while at the same time mobilizing ingroup supporters to intensify and expand the hate and threats towards the outgroup. When used by leading politicians, including the PM, nasty rhetoric is normalized and legitimized. In line with the findings of Wahlström et al. (2021), the demonizing and delegitimizing rhetoric on climate activists as criminals (saboteurs and anti-democratic terrorists), climate journalists as a left-liberal conspiracy and climate scientists as opinion leaders, all blamed and scape-goated for perceived grievances and social ills, gives rise to emotions of hate and threat offenders such as vindictiveness, disgust and hate, and calls for retribution and execution. Similar findings have been reported in studies of hate crime in the US, where defensive hate crime offenders react to a perceived intrusion upon their dominant status in society, e.g. fear of lost status or economic distress (McDevitt et al., 2002). Legitimation of violent actions by appealing to higher loyalties is complemented by a “denial of injury by framing violence as ‘educational’ and denial of the victim through dehumanization or by framing violence as ‘just retribution’” (Wahlström et al., 2021, p. 3307). Nasty politics with denigrating and deprecating rhetoric is a powerful tactic for politicians to persuade followers to expand and aggravating nasty rhetoric and violent actions to silence the opponents (Anastasio et al., 2021; Valcore et al., 2023; Zeitzoff, 2023). Deprecation, i.e. insults and accusations to make claims about action, may be a precursor to more targeted violent rhetoric and action, and act as a provocation and incitement to addressees and bystanders as much as words that wound the targets of a speech, text, picture or video. As for violence, “speech can and does inspire crime” (Cohen-Almagor et al., 2018, p. 38; Schweppe & Perry, 2021). As mentioned by Valcore et al. (2023, p. 251), “deprecation is a perlocutionary message and permission to hate not because of some characteristic of the hated other, but for what has presumably been done by the hated other to the safe, clean, Arcadian, white world the speaker cherishes”.

6.3.2. Nasty Rhetoric as a Swarm of Instants

For the targets of nasty rhetoric, each insult, accusation, intimidation or incitement is an instant. Even if each case comes into being after a process of thinking and preparation from the sender, it appears suddenly to the target. To Bachelard (2013), every instant is suspended between two voids. An instant will always die, making every moment unique, with no history or future (Helin, 2023). Targets of nasty rhetoric, re-acting with fear, angst and sometimes anger (Lazarus, 1991; Renström et al., 2023), would wish that an accusation or incitement has no future or history, that it would die. But they keep coming, in new shapes, in new forms, from new offenders. Not in a continuous flow in a horizontal temporality, but haphazardly as new instants. Each time, the target hopes that the instant dies, but each new instant adds to a swarm of instants with no clear beginning and end. The victim becomes lost in the void.

6.4. A Threat to Liberal Democracy

According to Zeitzoff (2023), nasty rhetoric is divisive and contentious and includes insults and threats with elements of hatred and aggression that entrenches ‘us vs. them’ polarization, designed to denigrate, deprecate, hurt and delegitimize their target(s). As found in this study, nasty rhetoric is used by climate sceptic right-wing and far-right people to emotionally hurt their enemies, threatening them to silence.

In all, this study confirms but also adds to previous research on nasty politics, focusing on its implications for democracy (see Zeitzoff, 2023). When politicians view their opponents as traitors or illegitimate, they violate a core principle in liberal and deliberative democracy – pluralism of ideas (von Malmborg, 2024a). Uncivil disagreement between political opponents breeds general mistrust in politics (Mutz & Reeves, 2005) Previous studies tell that some politicians make these nasty appeals (i) to grab media attention and attention of targeted groups (Ballard et al., 2022), (ii) to be persuasive and strike an emotional chord and solidify ingroup members (Schulz et al., 2020; Dimant, 2023), and (iii) pave the way for democratic breakdown (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). Zeitzoff (2023, p. 53) argues that nasty politics bear some positive effects to democracy since it provides a tactic for marginalized groups and politicians to exercise power, but that the negative impacts are more detrimental:

• It makes people more cynical of democracy and less willing to vote and participate;
• Politicians in power can use nasty politics as a tool to demonize their political rivals and stay in power, eroding the democracy in the process;
• An increase in nasty politics leads good politicians to choose not to run and to re-tire, and nastier politicians take their place; and
• Heightened nasty politics precedes actual political violence.

The latter three have been identified and described in this study. But the literature primarily focuses on nasty rhetoric between politicians and the silencing of politicians like Annie Lööf, who resigned as party leader and from all political assignments after years of steady-fast resistance against the haters – “They shouldn’t fucking win”. Anxiety and fear eventually made her fed up with politics, crying herself to sleep. It hooks onto what she and many other elected officials have been exposed to for many years by digital online warriors who hide behind their computer screens: “traitor”, “assassinate”, “kill”.

But Zeitzoff and other scholars do not analyze and problematize nasty rhetoric targeting activists, scientists and journalists. These groups have important roles in a liberal democracy. As argued below, nasty rhetoric leads good scientists, journalists and non-violent activists to silence, giving space to nastier people to take their place, eroding the democracy in the process.

1.1.1. Silencing climate activists

Some climate activists use civil disobedience to protest governments’ lack of action to reduce GHG emissions (Berglund & Schmidt, 2020). Failure to understand such cli-mate actions as a right to demonstrate is a mistake, in an antiliberal democratic direction where constitutional rights are at stake. The right to demonstrate is a central building block in every democratic society. It is protected in Swedish constitution and through several international conventions. Even civil disobedience is covered by the right to demonstrate if violence is not used.

Since 2020, 310 persons have been prosecuted in Swedish district courts for different crimes related to civil disobedience, some of them several times. Of these, 200 persons were convicted, mainly to fines or suspended sentence. In 2022, without change of legislation, prosecutors around Sweden suddenly began to charge climate activists performing roadblocks at demonstrations for sabotage. Between summers 2022 and 2023, 25 persons were convicted for sabotage, some of which were sentenced to prison, but most were later acquitted in the Court of Appeal. Several climate activists felt that this change in the judicial system was an act of political commissioning following the campaigning and nasty rhetoric of leading SD and M politicians.

The new legal praxis in lower courts, cheered by the minister of justice, can be seen as a threat to human rights and freedom of demonstration. Swedish law professor Anna-Sara Lind considers, in an interview in Swedish newspaper Dagens Arena, the criminal classification of roadblocks as sabotage to be disproportionate. “Limitations of constitutional rights may only take place in the manner specified in the constitution”, Lind says and specify that a “restriction may not extend so far that it constitutes a threat to the free formation of opinion”. Categorizing roadblocks as sabotage gives the police the right to preventive interception of people without concrete criminal suspicions, and a person can be charged of sabotage for just planning a roadblock. This happened in the UK in July 2024, when several climate activists were sentenced to four years in prison for planning a roadblock in a Zoom meeting.

A similar development of increased state repression of climate activists is seen in other European countries, e.g. Austria, France, Germany, Spain and the UK. UN special rapporteur on environmental organizations’ rights under the Aarhus Convention, Michel Forst, claims that “by categorizing environmental activism as a potential ter-rorist threat, by limiting freedom of expression and by criminalizing certain forms of protests and protesters, these legislative and policy changes contribute to the shrinking of the civic space and seriously threaten the vitality of democratic societies” (Forst, 2024, p. 11). But not all who perform roadblocks are considered terrorists. Think of farmers blocking highways in Europe and burning hay bales in Brussels months before the EU elections in June 2024. Some even destroy public buildings. They were not treated as terrorists but hailed as heroes by far-right populist politicians such as Marine le Pen and Victor Orbán. It’s a matter of money and political clout.

In relation to state repression of climate activists in Sweden, Michel Forst recently criticized the Tidö government for its handling of a case where a person engaged in Mother Rebellion was fired from her job at the Swedish Energy Agency due to accusations and intimidations of her predecessor, right-wing media and minister for civil defence that she was a threat to Swedish national security. In a letter to the Swedish government, Forst states:

“She appears to have been subjected to punishment, persecution and harassment because of her climate commitment and participation in peaceful environmental demonstrations. /…/ In this time of climate emergency, I am gravely concerned that the government has deemed her participation in peaceful environmental protests a threat to national security. /…/ I am also deeply concerned about minister Bohlin’s public statements. Bohlin, as a minister in the Swedish government, has a responsibility under the Aarhus Convention to protect citizens' right to be active in environmental issues.”

Sentence to prison and getting fired are not the only retributions of climate activists. A young female climate activist being intimidated by SD at a FFF demonstration testifies how the hatred affected her:

“They never said who they were but wanted to ask a few questions. I had no idea that they had evil intent. It was very naïve. /.../ They had put on clown music and cut the interview so that I appeared stupid and ignorant. I felt extremely humiliated. The video had over 2,000 comments and the tone was very harsh and mocking. From fear that right-wing extremists would start harassing me, I didn’t dare to respond to the comments.”

1.1.1. Silencing climate journalists

Independent media plays an important role to raise awareness in societies, which is why the first actions of autocratizers are often directed against established media (Laebens & Lührmann, 2021). Attacks on public service and independent media can discourage critical scrutiny of power. When journalists are hated and threatened, it risks that investigations are not carried out and important facts are never published. Consequently, citizens loose important information. In Sweden, Tidö parties, the far-right movement and other climate sceptics consider climate journalists in established media to belong to a left-liberal conspiracy censoring the climate debate and being climate alarmist propaganda centers. Public service journalists have experienced an increase of insults and incitement since 2019 when financing of Swedish public service changed from a license fee to taxation.

A widespread culture of silence and self-censorship has taken hold. In a recent survey by the Swedish Union of Journalists, as many as 39 % state that they engage in self-censorship to avoid hate and threats, 48 % that they have adapted their reporting for the same reason (Swedish Union of Journalists, https://www.sjf.se/yrkesfragor/yttrandefrihet/hot-och-hat-mot-journalister). A long-since female climate journalist testifies how the hate and threats affected here:

“At the same time as I have carried out my assignment as a climate journalist, I have been in a storm of hatred, threats and insults. Lies about my person and alleged political affiliation have been glued to me. My feeling of powerlessness has been paralyzing at times. I have, to use an old-fashioned word, felt dishonored. Therefore, I have now resigned as a journalist.”

Besides hate and threats targeting journalists, Tidö parties have recently reviewed the guidelines for public service, proposing that public service journalism in the future must be evaluated by external reviewers, and adapt the content to a certain type of populist political opinion, which goes against basic journalistic principles of impartial-ity, neutrality of consequences and truth-seeking (Bjereld, 2024). As a response, Swedish public service television and radio have decided not to keep their climate correspond-ents, effectively reducing the dissemination of information and knowledge about cli-mate change and climate policy to Swedish citizens.

1.1.1. Silencing climate journalists

Nasty rhetoric attacks on climate scientists are made to delegitimize individual researchers, but also to cast doubts on the scientific community and the role of science in providing knowledge for citizens, businesses, public authorities and politicians to make informed decisions. After being attacked, many researchers refrain from researching in areas that have become politically charged, and those who conduct research in such areas are often afraid to communicate their research results to the public. When scientists feel attacked and pressured by the far-right, it risks leading to perspectives that are considered controversial being weeded out. A Swedish professor of climate policy testifies how hatred and threats affected him:

“I’ve received hate and threats for long. Being criticized in substance is part of being a re-searcher, that is what brings science forward. But being criticized in person, often related to conspiracy theories, is detrimental. Once, haters threatened to send a death squad to the university. The hatred and threats drain me of energy and to avoid it, I refrain from participating in the public discussion on climate policy.”

Claims that climate science is “just an opinion” and that science based climate activism is “undermining public trust in science” invokes knowledge resistance (Strömbäck et al., 2022), that poses grave challenges for the functioning of liberal democracy, e.g. (i) citizens ability to evaluate public policy, hold politicians accountable and make informed votes (Wikforss, 2021), (ii) undermining democratic processes by corrupting political discussions (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Dahl, 1998), and (iii) undermine the legitimacy of the democratic system as such (Lago & Coma, 2017).

Many scientists have asked themselves how they can spread awareness about climate science results when political decision-makers are constantly ignoring warnings published in scientific journals, magazines and newspapers. Some have turned to climate activism within Scientists Rebellion. Such activism may be perceived as political. Then minister of education and research Mats Persson (L) claimed, contrary to scientific findings, that scientists' climate activism undermines trust in science and should be stopped. But such activism is based on scientific knowledge and well in line with the third duty of Swedish scientists according to the law on higher education: “Knowledge shall be disseminated about what experience and knowledge has been gained and about how these experiences and knowledge can be applied”. Swedish professor of philosophy of science, Harald A. Wiltsche, argues that passive consent, non-activism, would be contrary to what is expected of Swedish scientists under Swedish law. One does not have to look far at history to see that science-based activism and civil disobedience have been instrumental in ending social injustices such as discrimination, slavery, apartheid, and providing universal suffrage, and thereby in building our modern liberal society.

1.1.1. It is the whole that worries

Swedish scholars of democracy (Rothstein, 2023; Silander, 2024; V-Dem Institute, 2024; von Malmborg, 2024a) as well as CRD and UNAS argue that the current developments in Swedish politics and society risk weakening Sweden’s liberal democracy and may be another step in the process of gradual autocratization overseen by democratically elected but antidemocratic leaders. Tidö parties use democratic institutions to erode democratic functions, e.g. censoring media, imposing restrictions on civil society, harassing activists, protesting, and promoting polarization through disrespect of counterarguments and pluralism (Silander, 2024; V-Dem Institute, 2024; von Malmborg, 2024a). Even the editorial offices of Sweden’s largest newspapers, independent liberal Dagens Nyheter, and Sweden’s largest tabloid, independent social democrat Aftonbladet, are worried of the development, arguing that “Sweden is now taking step after step towards less and less freedom”.

Autocratization is hard to identify since it often takes place gradually in democratic states (Sato et al., 2022). It is the sum of the decisions and the style of governance of il-liberal and anti-democratic actors that leads to defective democracies with increasingly illiberal characteristics (Lührmann et al., 2020; Mudde, 2021; Merkel & Lührmann, 2021). It is this whole that worries, or as stated by Merkel and Lührmann (p. 870), “if the illiberal virus persists long enough, it transforms the liberal dimension, polarizes the political space, and may affect the institutional core of democracies as well”.

This concern of democracy experts made opposition and party leader Magdalena Andersson (S) write a critical op-ed in Dagens Nyheter six months after the Tidö government entered office, accusing the government of showing totalitarian tendencies:

“Instead of a traditional government, we have a right-wing regime led by Sweden Democrats. A regime that uses its position of power to threaten and silence critical voices. /…/ The SD led government destroys what makes Sweden Swedish.”

Following this claim, 18 representatives of labor unions, civil society organizations and left-liberal thinktanks recently called in an op-ed for a commission to (i) appoint an inquiry with proposals to defend and strengthen democracy, (ii) protect the right to freedom of organization and assembly, and (iii) strengthen support for civil society and journalism.

Shortly after, 74 scientists, journalists and writers in Sweden, including myself, made an appeal in Sweden’s largest newspaper that Swedish opinion leaders, including the Tidö government and the Riksdag, must take measures to end nasty rhetoric due its detrimental effects on democracy. The appeal includes 25 emotional testimonies embodying the emotions and vulnerabilities of the targets of nasty rhetoric. Many of us were threatened to silence but chose to raise our voice again in company of others, to stand the grounds for liberal democracy. We spoke also for those who continue to stay silent. those who don’t dare to speak of fear to be hated and threatened again.

Significant for the political climate in Sweden and the self-positioning of libertarians and far-right populists as morally superior, this call was immediately attacked by a leading Swedish libertarian YouTube influencer. Manipulating his 50K followers on Facebook, he claimed that we, the signatories, are “inflated prima donnas” performing a “Princess and the Pea coterie” being sad and call for political action to restrict freedom of speech because “some insults made us loose our privilege of interpretation”. In his post, he ignored the testimonies of incitement, threats of assault and death. Our call for an end to nasty rhetoric was not about our privilege of interpretation, but about our dignity as human beings and more importantly about safeguarding basic norms and institutions in a liberal, pluralistic democracy.

7. Conclusions

Perceiving a threat to the current economic system and the economic growth paradigm, with fear of economic distress and losing societal status, libertarian thinktanks, liberal-conservative and far-right populist politicians in Sweden use insults, accusations, intimidations and incitements to demonize, delegitimize, emotionally hurt and silence political opponents – the ‘enemies’ of the nation. They also use such nasty rhetoric to mobilize more offenders in a ‘cultural war’ on climate politics, ultimately leading to physical violence. Climate science is described as “just an opinion”, green politicians as “strawmen” that should be “killed”, female climate journalists as “left pack” and “moron hags” that “will be raped”, and climate activists as “totalitarian terrorists” and “a threat to democracy” that should be “sent to prison” and “executed”. The political opposition, climate scientists, climate journalists and climate activists also use nasty rhetoric, but only insults and accusations targeting the government and individual minister, aiming to reveal that Tidö climate politics is a flaw.

Nasty rhetoric is not empty words. Political sentiments in nasty rhetoric stress the evocation of feeling, aiming at dehumanizing and hurting people emotionally. Each case is an instant. It appears instantaneously, hitting the targets hard without warning and leaving them with fear, angst and anger. Being hit, nasty rhetoric does something to people. Some get pissed off, bite the bullet and try to win the battle: “They shouldn’t fucking win”. Some respond with humor. Some get angry and respond with nasty rhetoric, sometimes of a less aggressive form, showing with the eye of a child and based on science that the truly nasty ones are wicked and naked like the emperor. People house contradictory emotions in a vertical temporality. But if the hate and threats keep coming, they eventually run out of energy and resign. Most people, like me, react to hate and threats with fear and angst, isolation and silence. They disappear from the public political conversation – forever or for some years. When free speech and informed and dignified political conversation is silenced, our democracy is silenced. Our democracy is under threat.

No matter how we, as targets of nasty rhetoric, respond, we are marked with fear and angst of losing control of our own lives, losing our self-esteem and intrinsic value as human beings, especially if we have been targeted by intimidation and incitement – threats of legal or economic repression, physical harm or even death. Fear and angst about who is waiting at the entrance door to our homes, what is in the envelope or parcel on the door mat, what is the next step, and when or if ever it will stop. It is a fear we cannot control ourselves. Proper anxiety. You start to question what is important in life. Anxiety becomes darkness.

Nasty rhetoric and far-right populist demounting of climate politics is an international phenomenon, but Swedish opinion leaders and politicians have a responsibility for developments in Sweden. Climate politics and norms for a democratic discourse in general can be restored, but this requires that everyone understands what is happening and that those with influence over the norms take their responsibility. One contribution to such an understanding was made by scientists, journalists and writers in Sweden, including myself, in an appeal that Swedish opinion leaders must take measures to end nasty rhetoric to safeguard basic norms and institutions in a liberal, pluralistic democracy. Another contribution was made by representatives of labor unions, civil society organizations and left-liberal thinktanks calling for protecting the right to freedom of organization and assembly, and stronger support for civil society and journalism.

This paper makes a third contribution. Traditional norms of academic writing excise much of what it is to be human from our research and learning. Writing differently about dehumanizing nasty rhetoric in Swedish climate politics, openly embodying and resonating with my emotions and vulnerabilities, the fear and anxiety related to people – humans – hit by hate and threats, adds a new, emotional and vulnerable dimension to the otherwise soulless presentation of words and pictures of political hate crime. Writing differently can be seen as “earthquakes that shift the tectonic plates of management learning to usher in something new” (Gilmore et al., 2019, p. 9). The same would be true for policy studies or social sciences in general. I hope that I, through vertical writing, can touch vulnerable flesh and help the reader and the critical policy studies community to understand and learn more engaged about the nature of nasty rhetoric as a phenomenon targeting humans and, like the appeal of Swedish journalists and scientists, invoke new political and ethical practices to delegitimize nasty politics and nasty rhetoric in climate politics and in general (cf. Henderson & Black, 2017; Gil-more et al., 2019; Helin, 2019, 2023). Even the smallest vertical movement to engagement with non-linear forms of temporality, addressing the instant, might help in moving toward such a vulnerable ethics (Page, 2017).

Critical and emotional writing about nasty rhetoric, explaining its effect on people, society and democracy, is a first step to mobilize supporters for its ending. But it must be followed with talk and action to shape a durable discourse that questions nasty rhetoric. It should be possible. Four out of five Swedes and three out of four M-KD-L voters are critical to Tidö climate policy and nine out of ten believe that liberal democracy is the best governance model (von Malmborg, 2024a). People with informal and formal power must collaborate and take responsibility and table concrete policy proposals for how to stifle nasty rhetoric. Such a policy will be criticized by libertarians and far-right supporters currently demounting liberal democracy, manipulatively claiming that it re-duces the liberal democratic institution of free speech – that they will be silenced. PM Kristersson is aware of the negative consequences of silencing people and what is currently happening due to nasty rhetoric as well as criminal gangs silencing people: "The development is really dangerous. If clear boundaries are not set early, there are no boundaries at all.” He also underlined that what moves boundaries are the unpleasant and increasingly drastic consequences for those who speak out: "This creates fear". But he himself is afraid of criticizing SD leader Åkesson – the man who can bring down the PM at any time and show who is in charge.

Talking about climate politics, we must talk about threats to pluralistic democracy and dignified dialogue based on the good argument based also on social science.