A Fragmentation-Resilient Investiture Scheme for Semi-Presidential Systems

This paper consolidates our previous work and articulates Scheme C, a constitutional architecture designed to resolve deadlocks and instability in fragmented democracies by synthesising previous findings into a self-contained theoretical framework. The scheme's centrepiece is a game-based investiture rule that guarantees the appointment of a prime minister through a strategic nomination process, eliminating the risk of investiture-related collapse. Central to this system is also a bifurcated confidence structure -- assigning the prime minister either type I (majority) or type II (minority) status -- managed by a dynamic no-confidence mechanism. Stability is reinforced by a synchronised electoral rhythm and a Westminster-style dissolution mechanism that protects cohesive assemblies while resulting in contingent, quasi-midterm elections. To ensure continuity, a novel hybrid caretaker office bridges Westminster and Presidential traditions by automatically converting a departing prime minister into a tenure-secured, though authority-attenuated, caretaker. This "converted" logic is balanced by a presidential-style "acting" appointment mode for vacancies, ensuring administrative resilience throughout the electoral cycle. Ultimately, Scheme C provides a resilient architecture that ensures unyielding governmental functionality and rigorous legislative oversight regardless of the underlying electoral system or party landscape.