From Procedural Completeness to Audit-Proof Security: The Public Disclosure Gap in Rules Governing the Disclosure of Foreign-Related Impacts and Agency Relationships by Legislative Proposal Submitters to the National People's Congress

1. Introduction: Transforming "Factual Disputes" into Provable Propositions of "Rule Auditability"

Regarding whether legislative proposers are subject to undue foreign influence, external research typically faces an evidentiary dilemma in proving negative facts. Rather than directly debating whether internal scrutiny exists, a more provable and substantively rule-of-law-oriented question concerns whether publicly verifiable institutional texts have transformed foreign influence and agency relationships into enforceable, reviewable, and accountable procedural obligations. (National People's Congress, 2023; National People's Congress, 2024)

Official NPC statements outline procedural structures for bill introduction, deliberation, voting, and promulgation. (National People's Congress, 2024) The Legislation Law provides the foundational institutional framework as a basic statute. (National People's Congress, 2023) Deliberation rules at both the plenary session and Standing Committee levels respectively regulate meeting procedures, bill processing, and related operational mechanisms. (Legislative Database of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC, 2021, Articles 17, 19, 23–25) Building upon this foundation, whether ‘legislative security’ can be further transformed into ‘audit-able security’ (where external parties can assess the existence of closed-loop mechanisms based on published rules, while internal parties can conduct authorised spot checks and corrections using traceable documentation) constitutes the institutionalised problem awareness of this study. (National People's Congress, 2024)

2. Research Questions, Proposition Structures and the Boundaries of Provability

2.1. Research Questions

RQ1: Do the publicly available Legislative Law, Rules of Procedure for the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, and official legislative explanatory notes impose mandatory disclosure obligations regarding the foreign influence/agency relationships of proposal sponsors? (National People's Congress, 2024)

Based on newly obtained Rules of Procedure for the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China, explicit procedural requirements are established concerning ‘proposal texts and explanatory notes,’ ‘accompanying materials,’ and ‘basic information and rationale for appointment/removal proposals.’ These stipulate that Standing Committee meetings shall in principle be open to the public, with relevant agenda items temporarily closed to the public when necessary, forming an ‘open-with-exceptions’ structural framework. However, the disclosure provisions do not further codify requirements for such matters, thereby constituting a ‘public-with-exceptions’ structural framework. Basic Information and Rationale for Appointment/Dismissal Proposals,‘ establishing a ’disclosure-exception" structured framework. However, the disclosure provisions do not further codify requirements for proposers to disclose foreign funding support, agency relationships, or foreign interests held by close relatives, nor do they establish corresponding verification and audit trail fields (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2022, Articles 16–21). (See Appendix F, lines 1–4)

RQ2: Does a corresponding independent verification mechanism (verifying body, authority, standards, timing, legal consequences) and auditable traceability arrangement exist? (Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2022, Articles 16–21)

RQ3: Should the published text lack such mechanisms, how might a ‘minimal closed-loop’ system be proposed to strengthen provisions within the constraints of proportionality and due process, ensuring it becomes codified, implementable, and auditable? (OECD, 2025; UK Government, 2025a; U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.)

2.2. Proposition—Contraposition—Boundary (Reviewer-Friendly Structure)

Proposition P (Verifiable): The published normative text provides relatively comprehensive provisions on procedural elements such as legislative procedures, meeting operations, and document disclosure. However, no explicit clause is found establishing ‘foreign-related impacts/agency relationships/significant foreign-related connections of close relatives’ as essential elements of proposal materials, accompanied by verification and audit traceability loops. (National People's Congress, 2023; Legislative Database of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC, 2021; NPC Standing Committee, 2022; NPC, 2024) (See Appendix F, lines 1–4)

Contraposition ¬P (not directly falsifiable): Internal mechanisms for unpublished review, disciplinary requirements, or coordination may exist.

Verifiability Boundary Conclusion: This paper can only determine the institutional gaps of ‘closed-loop clauses absent from public texts’ and ‘external non-auditability of verification,’ without asserting that internal reviews never occur. (National People's Congress, 2024)

The paper's principal contributions include: (1) proposing the ‘Normative Text OSINT Evidence Audit’ methodology, transforming legislative process disputes into falsifiable propositions of ‘public rules versus auditability’; (2) Providing a codified closed-loop framework comprising ‘minimum disclosure set—tiered verification—audit trail—security exceptions/remedies’, alongside trigger conditions directly embeddable within normative texts; (3) Constructing an audit trail field dictionary and threshold calibration mechanism, endowing ‘legislative security’ with computable, sample-auditable, and reproducible institutional interfaces (National People's Congress, 2023).

3. Research Methodology: Standardised Textual OSINT Evidence Audit

3.1. Corpus and Hierarchy of Authority

Category A (Fundamental Laws): The Legislation Law of the People’s Republic of China. (National People’s Congress, 2023; People’s Daily Online, 2023)

Category A (Procedural Norms): Rules of Procedure of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. (Legislative Database of the Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People’s Congress, 2021, Articles 17, 19, 23–25)

Category A (Procedural Norms): Rules of Procedure of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China. (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2022, Articles 16–21)

Category B (Official Procedural Explanations): NPC “How the NPC and its Standing Committee Legislate”. (National People’s Congress, 2024)

Category C (Institutional Correlates): Authoritative discussions on challenges in advancing asset disclosure, illustrating common verification and enforcement difficulties in disclosure systems. (Supreme People's Procuratorate, 2015)

Comparative References: OECD Recommendations on Transparency and Integrity and supporting texts (including recommendations on ‘Disclosure of Foreign National Interest-Related Activities’ and ‘Regulatory Footprint’), alongside information portals for the US FARA, UK FIRS, and Australian FITS. (OECD, 2025; U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.; UK Government, 2025a, 2025b; Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.; Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2019)

3.2. Retrieval Strategy and Determination Rules (Reproducible)

Keyword clusters are established around the closed-loop elements of the ‘Disclosure-Verification-Consequences-Traceability’ system:

Disclosure (Declaration/Disclosure/Statement/Registration/Filing/Public Notice/Reporting);

Verification (Review/Verification/Spot Check/Correction/Investigation);

Foreign-Related (Overseas/Foreign/Foreign Capital/Commissioned/Agency/Foreign Influence/Foreign Interference); Disposition (recusal/return/suspension/postponement of deliberation/disciplinary linkage).

Determination rule: Only serve as positive evidence when provisions explicitly stipulate obligations, procedures, or consequences; failure to detect shall be interpreted solely as ‘not present in publicly available texts’, not implying ‘non-existence internally’. (National People's Congress, 2024)

3.3. Explanation of Regulatory Framework Coverage (Justifying Conclusion of ‘Core Public Disclosure Framework’)

This paper selects the Legislation Law and the Rules of Procedure for the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee as the ‘core public disclosure framework’ because they constitute foundational legal and procedural norms for disclosure. These typically form the most central, stable, and verifiable institutional framework for legislative activities. (National People's Congress, 2023; Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People's Congress, 2021; Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2022)

Concurrently, this paper explicitly acknowledges potential omissions: should unpublished internal working documents, review checklists, or disciplinary requirements exist, these fall outside the scope of OSINT verification; should disclosure rules merely articulate abstract principles without detailed provisions for closed-loop foreign influence disclosure and verification traceability, disclosure should still be deemed insufficiently auditable. (National People's Congress, 2024) (See Appendix F, lines 1–4)

4. Findings

Procedural rules are comprehensive, but the closed-loop mechanism concerning "foreign-related influence—agency relationship" remains uncodified

4.1. Institutional Foundations for Procedural and Outcome Transparency

The NPC's official explanatory system outlines legislative stages and operational mechanisms. (National People's Congress, 2024) The Legislation Law provides the overarching framework for legislative activities. (National People's Congress, 2023) The Rules of Procedure for the NPC and its Standing Committee constitute vital institutional underpinnings for session operations and bill processing. (Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC, Legal Database, 2021, Articles 17, 19, 23–25). This confirms that publicly available texts demonstrate a robust foundation where ‘procedures exist, procedural operations are describable, and outcome disclosure is foreseeable’ (National People's Congress, 2024).

4.2. Core Gap: Absence of Explicit Provisions for the ‘Disclosure–Verification–Audit Trail’ Tripartite Mechanism (See Appendix F, Lines 1–4)

Based on this paper's ‘closed-loop elements’ criteria, within the scope of the publicly available text audit, no explicit provisions were identified embedding the following mechanisms into the pre-proposal or pre-deliberation stages: (1) Mandatory Disclosure: Standardised declaration obligations for proposers regarding overseas funding support, activities influenced by foreign mandates, and significant foreign-related interests of themselves or close relatives; (2) Independent Verification: Clear definition of verification entities, authority, standards, timing, and legal consequences; (3) Audit-traceable documentation: Creation of audit packages with traceable identification numbers for authorised supervisory sampling. This leads to the unequivocal conclusion that an ‘auditability gap’ exists at the public rules level, rendering external verification of such closed-loop mechanisms impossible based solely on published regulations. (National People's Congress, 2023; Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2022; National People's Congress, 2024) (See Appendix F, lines 1–4)

4.3. Corroborative Evidence: Supporting Significance of Common ‘Verification Dilemmas’ in Disclosure Systems

A discussion on challenges in advancing official asset disclosure, republished on the Supreme People's Procuratorate's official website, indicates that disclosure systems lacking verification and enforcement loops risk becoming mere formalities. (Supreme People's Procuratorate, 2015) While this evidence does not directly prove insufficient scrutiny during legislative proposal stages, it supports the systemic inference: the absence of verification and traceability arrangements undermines external auditability and accountability. (Supreme People's Procuratorate, 2015) (See Appendix F, lines 1–4)

5. International Benchmarks: Transparency and Integrity Framework, Regulatory Footprint and Foreign Influence Registration System: Comparative Analysis of Key Elements

The OECD's revised recommendations emphasise establishing a more enforceable transparency and integrity framework for lobbying and influence activities. They advocate for the disclosure of influence activities conducted on behalf of foreign state interests and the introduction of a ‘regulatory footprint’ tool to enhance the transparency and enforceability of public decision-making processes. (OECD, 2025) The US FARA, UK FIRS, and Australian FITS all adopt registration/disclosure as their core approach to enhancing the visibility and traceability of foreign influence activities. (U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.; UK Government, 2025a; Australian Government Attorney-General’s Department, n.d.) This paper does not advocate direct transplantation but abstracts these into minimal closed-loop elements applicable to domestic institutional design: standardised disclosure fields (MVD) — verification tiering (RBC) — audit trails/regulatory footprint (ALT) — security exceptions and remedies. (OECD, 2025)

6. Institutional Design: Minimal Closed-Loop (MVD—RBC—ALT) and Fundamental Policy Choices

6.1. Design Objectives and Constraints

The objective is to transform ‘legislative security’ into ‘audit-compliant security’, whilst avoiding the covert transformation of proposal rights into administrative licensing. Institutional design must be achieved under the constraints of the principle of proportionality: appropriateness (capable of mitigating risks of undue impact), necessity (prioritising options with lesser infringements), and balance (where gains to the public interest significantly outweigh costs to duty performance and participation). It must also satisfy due process requirements for predictability, remedies, and traceability. (OECD, 2025; National People's Congress, 2024)

6.2. Minimal Closed-Loop Structure (MVD—RBC—ALT—Security Exceptions)

Minimum Disclosure Set (MVD): Standardised fields pre-emptively incorporate foreign-related impact information as essential proposal materials.

Risk-Based Verification (RBC): Enhanced verification for high-sensitivity matters; randomised verification for general matters.

Audit Trail/Regulatory Footprint (ALT): Disclose minimal transparency information externally while internally forming audit packages with security exceptions.

Remedies and Correction: Provide review channels for verification conclusions and remedial measures. This framework aligns with the OECD's guidance on enforceable, auditable transparency and integrity systems. (OECD, 2025)

7. Clause-Based Tiered Verification Trigger Conditions: Clause Sets That May be Directly Embedded Within Normative Documents

7.1. Verification Level Definitions

L1 (Basic): Formal review + sampling verification.

L2 (Enhanced): Full-field consistency verification + key field evidence extraction.

L3 (High-Sensitivity): Pre-agenda verification + key correlation verification (may include collaborative verification within statutory authorisation frameworks).

7.2. Proposed Provision: Article X [Verification Grading and Trigger Conditions]

1. Verification comprises three tiers: L1 (Basic), L2 (Enhanced), L3 (Highly Sensitive).

2. Tier L3 applies where any of the following circumstances arise: 2.1 The proposal concerns highly sensitive domains including national security, major fiscal and financial matters, critical infrastructure, or foreign-related legal systems/external relations; 2.2 Significant contradictions in key fields of the disclosure form, involving overseas funding support or activities influenced by overseas mandates; 2.3 Risk assessment scoring reaches the high-sensitivity threshold T3.

3. At least Level 2 shall apply where any of the following occurs: 3.1 Omissions in the disclosure form, refusal to rectify, or multiple inconsistencies; 3.2 The proposal involves substantial economic interest distribution, licensing approvals, or market access where disclosures indicate potential conflicts of interest; 3.3 The risk assessment score reaches threshold T2.

4. Proposals not meeting conditions in paragraphs 2 or 3 shall be subject to Level 1 scrutiny.

5. Verification procedures at all levels shall minimally include: formal review, field consistency verification, evidence extraction, and traceable numbering; L3 may incorporate necessary key-related verification and collaborative verification.

6. Verification conclusions shall be documented in written summaries and archived; information involving national security or legally required confidentiality shall be handled in accordance with regulations, but shall not exempt the authorisation from supervisory audit. (OECD, 2025; UK Government, 2025a; U.S. Department of Justice, n.d.)

8. Threshold Intervalisation Expression and Annual Calibration Mechanism (Reducing Parameter Arbitrariness)

8.1. Risk Scoring Model

It is recommended that risk scores be expressed as: R = a*Foreign-related Association Strength + b*Funding Sensitivity + c*Conflict of Interest Intensity + d*Impact Scope + e*Historical Anomaly Records. Where a–e represent adjustable weightings calibrated annually based on risk landscape and implementation assessments. (OECD, 2025)

8.2. Threshold Intervalisation (Avoiding Technical Parameter Rigidity in Higher-Level Regulations)

Thresholds shall be set as intervals rather than fixed points: T₂ ∈ [T₂ₒ, T₂ₓ], T₃ ∈ [T₃ₒ, T₃ₓ]. Specific interval values shall be determined through implementation rules and annual assessment reports, thereby avoiding the codification of technical parameters within higher-level procedural regulations. (OECD, 2025)

8.3. Proposed Provision: Article Y [Threshold Calibration and Public Disclosure]

1. Verification thresholds and weighting parameters shall be calibrated by the implementing authority based on the annual risk assessment report;

2. Calibration shall be based on at least: spot-check hit rate, false positive rate (adjusted pass rate), major anomaly detection rate, processing timeliness, and resource costs;

3. External disclosure: Whether annual calibration occurred, along with the framework and scope of indicators used for calibration (excluding classified content), to meet minimum transparency requirements;

4. Internal documentation: Complete calibration records shall be incorporated into audit packages for authorised supervisory review. (OECD, 2025)

9. Audit Traceability Field Dictionary: Translating "Traceability" into an Implementable Data Dictionary

9.1. Identification and Object Fields

case_id (year-session-sequence); proposal_id (proposal number); stage (agenda preparation/pre-deliberation/under deliberation/supplement); verification_level (L1/L2/L3).

9.2. Minimum Disclosure Fields (MVD)

foreign_support_flag; foreign_principal_flag; family_foreign_interest_flag; conflict_interest_flag; narrative_note (character limit); supporting_docs_hash (document summary verification).

9.3. Verification Action Fields

formal_check_result; consistency_check_result; evidence_sampling_log (reference number); decision_record (rectification/deferral/return/disciplinary referral recommendation); reasoning_memo (key points of rationale for internal audit).

9.4. Minimum Transparency Set for External Disclosure

disclosure_submitted; verification_completed; major_issue_exists; confidentiality_applied. (OECD, 2025)

10. Proportionality Principle and Due Process Test: A Clause-by-Clause Compliance Analysis of the Proposed Provisions

10.1. Overall Examination Framework

This paper applies the proportionality principle (appropriateness, necessity, and proportionality) to the integrated framework comprising ‘minimum closed-loop + trigger clause set + threshold calibration mechanism + field dictionary’, whilst examining due process elements (predictability, justification, remedies, and traceability). (OECD, 2025; National People's Congress, 2024)

10.2. Component-Level Assessment Conclusions

(1) Material Requirements as Essential Elements: Defining fields and security exceptions imposes a lower control burden than comprehensive disclosure or full review, constituting a less intrusive alternative. (OECD, 2025)

(2) RBC Graded Verification Provisions: Verification intensity aligns with risk types; explicit triggering conditions reduce arbitrariness and chilling effects. (OECD, 2025)

(3) Threshold Intervalisation and Annual Calibration: Calibration via assessment metrics enhances interpretability and error-correction capacity, avoiding the fixation of technical parameters in higher-level regulations. (OECD, 2025)

(4) Audit trail dictionary for alternative compliance treatments: Without trails, auditable closed loops cannot be formed; common verification challenges in disclosure regimes underscore trail importance. (Supreme People's Procuratorate, 2015)

(5) Remedies and error correction: Codifying trigger conditions enhances predictability; verification conclusions and enforcement decisions must be documented in writing with appeal pathways to strengthen due process safeguards. (National People's Congress, 2024)

11. Conclusions

Based on an OSINT evidence audit of normative texts including the Legislation Law, the Rules of Procedure for the National People's Congress and its Standing Committee, and the NPC's official legislative procedure guidelines, this paper confirms that the disclosure rules provide relatively comprehensive provisions for procedural elements such as legislative stages, meeting operations, and document publication. (National People's Congress, 2024; Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee, 2021; Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2022). However, no explicit codified provisions exist at the level of publicly verifiable texts for the closed-loop mechanism of ‘disclosure-verification-audit traceability’ concerning the foreign influence and agency relationships of proposal sponsors. (National People's Congress, 2023; National People's Congress, 2024). Without expanding inferences about internal practices, this paper proposes a minimal closed-loop system comprising embeddable normative clauses, threshold calibration mechanisms, and an audit trail field dictionary. It completes compliance arguments within the frameworks of proportionality and due process, providing an executable solution for institutional upgrading from ‘legislative security’ to ‘audit-traceable security’. (OECD, 2025) (See Appendix F, lines 1–4)