The Identification, Definition, Types and Propagation of the Instability and Insecurity Elements from Romanian Power System

1. Introduction

A. Essential information regarding National Power System (Figure 1):

Romania is integrated into the European electricity transmission network, part of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E). International interconnections enable energy exchanges, optimisation of energy resources and contribute to system stability in the event of major variations in consumption or production. The structure of the National Power System is the set of interconnected components that ensure the production, transmission, distribution and consumption of electricity. Electricity production in Romania is based on a combination of energy sources, and the energy landscape of the country has evolved over time, based on conventional and renewable energy sources. Romania has a diversified energy infrastructure, with power plants that use several energy sources, including nuclear energy, hydropower, fossil fuel energy (lignite, hard coal, natural gas) and renewable energy (wind, solar, biomass). Electricity transmission is carried out through the National Power Grid, which plays a key role in the transmission of electricity from producers to distributors and is responsible for the safety and reliability of the National Power System. The structure of the power grid includes very and high voltage overhead power lines, power substations and dispatching. The power infrastructure is composed of 81 power substations, of which 1 power substation at 750 kV (working at 400 kV), 38 power substation at 400 kV and 42 power substations at 220 kV. The distribution of electricity is carried out through the Power Distribution Network, which is an essential part of the national power infrastructure, responsible for the distribution of electricity to consumers. This network includes overhead power lines and power substations at 110 kV providing power to both urban and rural areas [1,2].

B. The importance of the study in the context of ensuring energy security: [3]

The essential purpose of this paper is to identify all the all elements of instability and insecurity to critical infrastructures within The National Power System, by next actions:

• identifies the possible systemic dysfunctions, deficiencies and non-compliances;
• identifies the possible vulnerabilities originated from systemic dysfunctions, deficiencies and non-compliances;
• identifies the possible risks originated from vulnerabilities;
• identifies the possible threats originated from risks ;
• identifies the possible hazards orginated from threats;
• identifies the possible aggressions originated from dangers.

Knowing all the instability and insecurity elements the following actions can be carried out:

• the assessment of the vulnerabilities;
• the assessment of the risks;
• the assessment of the threats;
• the assessment of the hazards;
• the assessment of the agressions.

Following the assessment of the vulnerabilities, risks, threats, hazards and aggressions, the following actions can be carried out:

• assessment of the security state of The National Power System;
• development of the security strategies of The National Power System.

Types of national security strategies:

(a)

The national strategy of security and protection of the critical infrastructures within the National Power System:

∙

power plants for producing electricity;

∙

power substations for transmission of electricity;

∙

overhead power lines for transmission of electricity.

(b)

The national strategy of power safety focused on The National Power System:

∙

power plants for producing electricity;

∙

power substations for transmission of electricity;

∙

overhead power lines for transmission of electricity.

Because The National Power System is vulnerable, it can be, at any time, the target of terrorist threats or attacks (bomb or cyber attacks), natural risks (calamities caused by nature) and anthropic risks (caused by man), which could endanger the proper functioning, or in the most unfortunate case, its total outage – black-out, generating a major crisis that could cause extreme damage to the citizen, society and state.

The National Power System is the generator of critical infrastructures (power plants, power substations and overhead power lines), because it ensures the health and safety of the citizens by supplying all of the state systems, the industry and the national economy with electricity and has a substantial contribution to ensuring national security and well-being, as shown in Figure 2 [4].

C. The risk analysis – Quantitative risk matrix on 5 levels: [5]

Defining likelihood and impact levels:

A. Likelihood (L):

• 1: Very low;
• 2: Low;
• 3: Medium;
• 4: High;
• 5: Very high.

B. Impact (I):

• 1: Very low;
• 2: Low;
• 3: Medium;
• 4: High;
• 5: Very high.

Building the risk matrix:

$$FR=P\cdot I$$

(1)

where:

$P={\left[\begin{array}{ccccc}5& 4& 3& 2& 1\end{array}\right]}^T$;

$I=\left[\begin{array}{ccccc}1& 2& 3& 4& 5\end{array}\right]$.

Following the calculations, we get:

$FR=\left[\begin{array}{ccccc}5& 10& 15& 20& 25\\ 4& 8& 12& 16& 20\\ 3& 6& 9& 12& 15\\ 2& 4& 6& 8& 10\\ 1& 2& 3& 4& 5\end{array}\right]$The classification of the risks:

The risks shall be classified according to the FR value obtained:

• FR between 1 and 3: Very low risk;
• FR between 4 and 6: Low risk;
• FR between 7 and 12: Medium risk;
• FR between 13 and 16: High risk;
• FR between 17 and 25: Very high risk.

Example: Suppose we have a risk with:

• medium likelihood: 3;
• high impact: 4;
• FR = 3∙4 = 12;
• medium risk level: 12.

This matrix model allows for a clear and structured risk assessment, facilitating their identification and effective management.

The residual risk calculation:

Residual risk (RR) is the remaining risk after applying the control factors.

The control factors are used to reduce the risk.

These factors may include preventive, detector, and corrective measures.

Each control factor has an efficiency (E) between 0 and 1, where 1 means maximum efficiency.

$$RR=FR\cdot \left(1-E\right),$$

(2)

Example: Suppose we have a risk with:

• medium likelihood:3;
• high impact: 4;
• control factor with 0.7 efficiency.

Then:

$FR=3\cdot 4=12$

$RR=12\cdot \left(1-0.7\right)=3.6$

The assessment of the combined risk:

For multiple risks, we evaluate the combined risk (CR) using an aggregation method, such as the weighted amounts of individual risks:

$$RC={\displaystyle \sum _i\left(F{R}_i\cdot W_i\right)}$$

(3)

where:

(FR_i) is the risk factor for the risk i;

(W_i) is the weight assigned to risk i.

Note:

To develop previous relationships, a risk factor must be identified.

The identification of risk factors relevant to the specific context (for example, environmental, financial, operational, technological risk, etc.).

2. State of Art – Recent Evolution

Identifying the instability and insecurity elements (dysfunction, deficiences, non-compliances, vulnerabilities, risks, threats, hazards and agression) of a power system is crucial to ensuring energy security, reducing risks and promoting sustainability. Here are some main reasons why this analysis is crucial: Ensuring Energy Security (the vulnerabilities of an power system can lead to power supply disruptions, affecting the economy and quality of life, while identifying weak points allows for the development of resilience strategies), Managing Geopolitical Risks (electricity is often used as a geopolitical tool, and excessive dependence on fossil fuel imports from certain regions can expose states to major risks in the event of international conflicts or economic sanctions), Adapting to Climate Change (climate change affects power infrastructure through extreme weather events, and assessing vulnerabilities enables the development of adaptation solutions and investments in renewable sources), Protection Against Cyber and Physical Attacks (power systems are increasingly digitalized, making them vulnerable to cyberattacks; additionally, physical infrastructure: power stations and high-voltage overhead and underground power lines, can be targeted by terrorist attacks or sabotage), Ensuring Equitable Access to Energy (many regions of the world still lack stable access to electricity, and identifying vulnerabilities helps in developing effective electrification and economic development policies), Stabilizing Energy Markets and Preventing Economic Crises (electricity prices are influenced by the vulnerabilities of power systems, and energy crises can destabilize entire economies, making continuous risk analysis essential), Developing Resilient and Sustainable Energy Systems (identifying vulnerabilities helps build flexible systems based on energy source diversification, energy storage, and the development of smart grids). The analysis of instability and insecurity elements within an power system is essential for ensuring energy security, economic stability, and environmental protection. It allows for the identification of risks, threats, hazards, and aggressions that may affect energy supply and provides solutions to mitigate their impact [6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31].

Worldwide research on the insecurity and instability of power systems, as well as the analysis and identification of vulnerabilities, risks, dangers and aggressions on them, are summarized:

Specialists	Entity	Paper
Banghua Xie, Xiaoge Tian, Liulin Kong, Weiming Chen	Faculty of Engineering, China University of Geosciences, Wuhan, Chia	The vulnerability of the power grid structure: a system analysis based on complex network theory
Francesco Cadini, Luca Lomazzi, Enrico Zio	Politecnico di Milano and Centre for Research on Risk and Crises, Paris	Vulnerability analysis of power transmission grid subject to cascading failures
Ersen Akdeniz, Mustafa Bagriyanik	Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey, Siemens Gamesa Renewable Enerji, Izmir, Turkey	A preventive control approach for power system vulnerability assessment and predictive stability evaluation
Tianlei Zang, Zian Wang, Xiaoguang Wei, Yi Zhou, Jiale Wu, Buxiang Zhou	Sichuan University, Chengdu, China, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chendu, China	Current status and perspective of vulnerability assessmeny of cyber-physical power system based on complex network theory
Nikolaos Nikolaou, Abdreas Papadakis, Konstantinos Psychogyios, Theodore Zahariadis	Sunelixis Solution, Chalkida, Greece, School of Pedagogical and Technological Education, Athens, Greece, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece	Vulnerability identification and assessmeny for critical infrastructures in energy sector
Jun Guo, Tao Feng, Zelin Cai, Xiaolong Lian, Wenhu Tang	State Key Laboratory of Disaster Prevention and Reduction for Power Grid Transmission and Distribution Equipment, Changsha, China, School of Electric Power Engineering, South Chia University of Technology, Guanzhou, China	Vulnerability assessment for power transmission lines under typhoon weather base on a cascading failure state transition diagram
Yu-Shuai Li, Da-Zhong Ma, Hua-Guang Zhang, Qie-Ye Sun	Northeastern University, Shenyang, China	Critical nodes identification of power systems based on controllability of complex networks

3. Identification and Definition of the Instability and Insecurity Elements

3.1. Identification

The following instability and insecurity elements are identified for critical infrastructures within The National Power System, through The Power Transmission Grid, as shown in Figure 3: [29]

(a)

Systemic elements:

∙

dysfunctions;

∙

deficiencies;

∙

non-compliances.

(a)

Vulnerabilities;

(b)

Risks;

(c)

Threats;

(d)

Hazards;

(e)

Agressions.

3.2. Definition

A. Systemic elements

a) Dysfunctions: The dysfunctions are those actions manifested by failures and/or disturbances of the functions of a system, with the effect of reducing, integrating or adapting of critical infrastructure, and the unidentification, superficial treatment or poor management of the dysfunctions automatically generates vulnerabilities, which can affect the smooth running of the critical infrastructure.

b) Deficiencies: The deficiencies represents the lack of physical attributes manifested by defects or gaps and are characterized by deficiency, and a critical infrastructure with deficiencies cannot operate at its normal parameters and urgent re-commissioning or resilience measures must be taken.

c) Non-compliances: The non-compliances represents the failure to meet the requirements of a critical infrastructure, manifested by the deviation of some characteristics from the requirements specified in the security plan or operating manual, and a critical infrastructure with non- compliances cannot operate at its normal parameters and urgent measures must be taken to eliminate non- compliances.

B. Vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities generated by systemic dysfunctions, deficiencies or non-compliances are factual states, processes and phenomena that diminish the responsiveness of critical infrastructures to potential risks or threats or that favor their emergence and development, with consequences in terms of functionality and utility. Non-knowledge, non-management or poor and faulty management of vulnerabilities may result in risk factors, threats, dangers or aggression towards national objectives, values, interests and needs subsumed to critical infrastructures.

C. Risks

The risks generated by certain vulnerabilities, designate situations, circumstances, elements or internal or external conjuctions, sometimes doubled and operative, which determine or favor the materialization of a threat to critical infrastructure, generating insecurity effects.

D. Threats

The threats generated by risk factors are capacities, strategies, intentions, plans that potentiate a danger to critical infrastructures, materialized by attitudes, gestures, acts, facts that create states of imbalance or instability and generate states of hazard, with impact on security.

E. Hazards

The hazards arising from certain threats are situations, events that can endanger or threaten the existence or integrity of critical infrastructures.

F. Agressions

The aggressions arising from certain danger condtions are attacks, including armed attacks, which jeopardize the existence, balance or integrity of critical infrastructures.

4. Types of the Instability and Insecurity Elements from Romanian Power System

A. Types of systemic elements

a) Dysfunctions: dysfunctions identified within The National Power System, as shown in Table 1: [1,2,3,4].

b) Deficiencies: deficiencies identified within The National Power System, as shown in Table 2: [1,2,3,4].

c) Non-compliances: non-compliances identified within The National Power System, as shown in Table 3: [1,2,3,4].

B. Types of vulnerabilities

The vulnerabilities identified caused by systemic elements (dysfunctions, deficiences and non-compliances) within The National Power System are the following, as shown in Table 4: [1,2,3,4].

C. Types of risks

The risks identified caused by vulnerabilities within The National Power System are the following, as shown in Table 5: [1,2,3,4].

D. Types of threats

Identified threats caused by risks within The National Power System are the following, as shown in Table 6: [1,2,3,4].

Other identified threats naturally caused with a crisis or collapse effect on The National Power System, as shown in Table 7: [1,2,3,4].

E. Types of hazards

Identified hazards caused by threats within The National Power System are the following, as shown in Table 8: [1,2,3,4].

Other identified hazards naturally caused with a crisis or collapse effect on The National Power System, as shown in Table 9: [1,2,3,4].

F. Types of agression

Identified aggression caused by dangers within The National Power System are the following, as shown in Table 10: [1,2,3,4].

Other identified aggressions naturally caused with a crisis or collapse effect on The National Power System, as shown in Table 11: [1,2,3,4].

5. Propagation of the Instability and Insecurity Elements

Figure 4 shows the scheme of propagation of system, instability and insecurity elements, and Figure 5 shows the sequence (phases) of propagation. [1,2,3,4].

Phase 1: The identification and analysis of the systemic elements:

• dysfunctions;
• deficiencies;
• non-compliances;

Phase 2: The identification and assessment of vulnerabilities generated by systemic elements (dysfunctions, deficiencies and non-compliances);

Phase 3: The identification and assessment of risks generated by the identified vulnerabilities;

Phase 4: The dentification and assessment of threats generated by the identified risks;

Phase 5: The identification and assessment of hazards generated by the identified threats;

Phase 6: The identification and assessment of the aggressions generated by the identified dangers;

Phase 7: The assessment of the security state of The National Power System;

Phase 8: The development of The National Power System security strategies.

6. Prioritizing of the Instability and Insecurity Elements from Romanian Power System

6.1. Vulnerabilities

A. Estimating the Gravity: in this stage, the vulnerability gravity will be estimated:

Level	Gravity
1. Very low	The event produces a minor disturbance in the activity, without material damage
2. Low	The event causes minor material damage and limited disruption to activity
3. Medium	Injuries to staff, and/or certain losses of equipment, utilities and delays in providing the service.
4. High	Serious staff injuries, significant loss of equipment of installations and facilities, delays and/or interruption of service provision.
5. Very high	The consequences are catastrophic resulting in deaths and serious injuries to staff, major losses in equipment, installations and facilities and termination of service provision.

B. Estimating the Impact: in this stage, the vulnerability impact will be estimated:

Level	Impact
1. Very low	The event produces a minor disturbance in the activity, without material damage
2. Low	The event causes minor material damage and limited disruption to activity
3. Medium	Injuries to staff, and/or certain losses of equipment, utilities and delays in providing the service.
4. High	Serious staff injuries, significant loss of equipment of installations and facilities, delays and/or interruption of service provision.
5.Very high	The consequences are catastrophic resulting in deaths and serious injuries to staff, major losses in equipment, installations and facilities and termination of service provision.

C. Scenario type: after estimating the vulnerability gravity and impact, the type of scenario will be decided, according with Table 12:

• 1. The worst;
• 2. Plausible the worst;
• 3. Moderate.

1. The worst	2. Plausible the worst	3. Moderate

6.2. Risks

A. Estimating the Likelihood: in this stage, the risk likelihood will be estimated:

Score level	The likelihood	Time
1. Very low	It has a very low likelihood of occurring. Normal measures are required to monitor the evolution of the event.	over 20 years
2. Low	The event has a low likelihood of occurring. Efforts are needed to reduce the likelihood and/or mitigate the impact produced.	16 – 20 years
3. Medium	The event has a significant likelihood of occurring. Significant efforts are needed to reduce the likelihood and/or mitigate the impact produced.	11 – 15 years
4. High	The event has a likelihood of occurring. Priority efforts are needed to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the impact produced.	6 – 10 years
5. Very high	The event is considered imminent. Immediate and extreme measures are required to protect the objective, evacuation to a safe location if the impact so requires.	1 – 5 years

B. Estimating the Gravity: in this stage, the risk gravity will be estimated:

Level	Gravity
1. Very low	The event produces a minor disturbance in the activity, without material damage
2. Low	The event causes minor material damage and limited disruption to activity
3. Medium	Injuries to staff, and/or certain losses of equipment, utilities and delays in providing the service.
4. High	Serious staff injuries, significant loss of equipment of installations and facilities, delays and/or interruption of service provision.
5. Very high	The consequences are catastrophic resulting in deaths and serious injuries to staff, major losses in equipment, installations and facilities and termination of service provision.

C. Scenario type: after estimating the likelihood and gravity, the type of scenario will be decided, according with Table 13:

• 1. The worst;
• 2. Plausible the worst;
• 3. Moderate.

1. The worst	2. Plausible the worst	3. Moderate

6.3. Threats

A. Estimating the Intention: in this stage, the threats intention will be estimated:

Score level	The intention
1. Very low	Very low intention of threatening
2. Low	Low intention of threatening.
3. Medium	Medium intention of threatening.
4. High	High intention of threatening.
5. Very high	Very high intention of threatening.

B. Estimating the Capability: in this stage, the threats capability will be estimated:

Level	The capability
1. Very low	Very low capability of threatening
2. Low	Low capability of threatening.
3. Medium	Medium capability of threatening.
4. High	High capability of threatening.
5. Very high	Very high capability of threatening.

C. Scenario type: after estimating the intention and capability, the type of scenario will be decided, according with Table 15 and Table 16:

• 1. The worst;
• 2. Plausible the worst;
• 3. Moderate.

6.4. Hazards

A. Estimating the Likelihood: in this stage, the danger likelihood will be estimated:

Score level	The likelihood	Time
1. Very low	It has a very low likelihood of occurring. Normal measures are required to monitor the evolution of the event.	over 20 years
2. Low	The event has a low likelihood of occurring. Efforts are needed to reduce the likelihood and/or mitigate the impact produced.	16 – 20 years
3. Medium	The event has a significant likelihood of occurring. Significant efforts are needed to reduce the likelihood and/or mitigate the impact produced.	11 – 15 years
4. High	The event has a likelihood of occurring. Priority efforts are needed to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the impact produced.	6 – 10 years
5. Very high	The event is considered imminent. Immediate and extreme measures are required to protect the objective, evacuation to a safe location if the impact so requires.	1 – 5 years

B. Estimating the Gravity: in this stage, the danger gravity will be estimated:

Level	Gravity
1. Very low	The event produces a minor disturbance in the activity, without material damage
2. Low	The event causes minor material damage and limited disruption to activity
3. Medium	Injuries to staff, and/or certain losses of equipment, utilities and delays in providing the service.
4. High	Serious staff injuries, significant loss of equipment of installations and facilities, delays and/or interruption of service provision.
5. Very high	The consequences are catastrophic resulting in deaths and serious injuries to staff, major losses in equipment, installations and facilities and termination of service provision.

C. Scenario type: after estimating the likelihood and gravity, the type of scenario will be decided, according with Table 17 and Table 18:

• 1. The worst;
• 2. Plausible the worst;
• 3. Moderate.

6.5. Agression

A. Estimating the Impact: in this stage, the agression impact will be estimated:

Level	Impact
1. Very low	The event produces a minor disturbance in the activity, without material damage
2. Low	The event causes minor material damage and limited disruption to activity
3. Medium	Injuries to staff, and/or certain losses of equipment, utilities and delays in providing the service.
4. High	Serious staff injuries, significant loss of equipment of installations and facilities, delays and/or interruption of service provision.
5.Very high	The consequences are catastrophic resulting in deaths and serious injuries to staff, major losses in equipment, installations and facilities and termination of service provision.

B. Scenario type: after estimating the agression impact, the type of scenario will be decided, according with Table 19 and Table 20:

• 1. The worst;
• 2. Plausible the worst;
• 3. Moderate.

1. The worst	2. Plausible the worst	3. Moderate

6.6. Prioritizing Scenarios

A. The identification of the worst scenarios: according with Table 21. [1,2,3,4]

B. Choosing the worst scenarios for the assessment: according with Table 22. [1,2,3,4]

7. Conclusions

Following the analysis of the instability and insecurity elements within the National Power System, the following were identified: 7 dysfunctions, 11 deficiencies, 3 non-compliances, 21 vulnerabilities, 21 risks, 1 risk from outside, 21 threats, 1 threat from outside, 21 hazards, 1 hazard from outside, 4 aggressions and 1 aggression from outside.

Following the prioritization of the identified instability and insecurity elements within the National Power System (7 dysfunctions, 11 deficiencies, 3 non-compliances, 21 vulnerabilities, 21 risks, 21 threats, 1 threat from outside, 21 hazards, 1 hazards from outside, 4 aggressions and 1 aggression from outside), the following types of risk scenarios have been highlighted:

• Vulnerabilities: 5 the worst scenarios; 8 the plausible the worst; 8 moderate scenarios;
• Risks: 6 the worst scenarios; 8 the plausible the worst; 8 moderate scenarios;
• Threats: 6 the worst scenarios; 8 the plausible the worst; 8 moderate scenarios;
• Dangers: 6 the worst scenarios; 8 the plausible the worst; 8 moderate scenarios;
• Aggression: 2 the worst scenarios; 2 the plausible the worst; 1 moderate scenarios.

In total is 25 the worst scenarios, 34 plausible the worst and 33 moderate scenarios.

Following the highlighting of the 25 the worst scenarios, the authors propose that only 2 risk scenarios with very high probability and severity, may endanger the malfunctioning of the National Power System (black-out), to be evaluated in future paper:

• Poor management of the transmission operator activity (exploitation, maintenance and development) of the Power Transmission Grid installations → Risk of technical incident (isolated/associated), technical disturbance or damage → Technological threat → Hazard of technologically instability (incident / damage) → black-out;
• Risk of natural disaster → Threat of natural disaster → Hazard of natural disaster → Attacks caused by natural disasters (earthquake, landslide, volcano, avalanche, tsunami, solar flare, meteor strike, hurricane, drought, frost, etc.).