Submitted:
12 November 2024
Posted:
13 November 2024
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
- A data-driven FDIA detection method is proposed to identify false data that bypasses the traditional bad data detection (BDD) mechanism to further improve the security of power system.
- The method is completely data-driven and has excellent scalability without considering the physical model and topology of the power system.
- The proposed method is validated by simulation on IEEE-9, IEEE-14, and IEEE-118 bus systems, considering the interference of measured data in real environments.
2. Related Work
2.1. Based on Model Detection Method
2.2. Based on Data-Driven Detection Method
3. State Estimation and FDIA
3.1. State Estimation
3.2. BDD Technology
3.3. False Data Injection Attack
3.4. Problem Analysis
4. Proposed Detection Method
4.1. Distinction Enhancement and Information Fusion

4.2. Attention Convolutional Neural Network
- Feature invariance: pooling operation removes unimportant information in data features, while the retained information is scale invariance and still representative of the data features before pooling.
- Feature dimensionality reduction: the pooling layer reduces the data dimensionality by removing redundant information and extracting only the most important features, thus reducing the amount of computation and preventing overfitting to a certain extent.

5. Experiments
5.1. Dataset Setup
5.1.1. Simulation Case Description
5.1.2. Data Generation
5.1.3. Data Preprocessing
- Balancing Process. From the generated dataset, 15k normal data and 15k false data were randomly selected to form the sample balanced dataset, details are given in Table 3.
- Normalization Process. The features of the dataset are deflated to between [0,1]. The deflation process is as follows:
| Bus name | Bus-9 | Bus-14 | Bus-118 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Normal data | 15000 | 15000 | 15000 |
| False data | 15000 | 15000 | 15000 |
| Number of features | 36 | 68 | 608 |
| Total | 30000 | 30000 | 30000 |
- 3.
- Dataset splitting. Throughout the experiments, each dataset was divided into 60% training set, 20% validation set and 20% test set.
5.2. Evaluation Metrics
5.3. FDIA Detection Performance
5.3.1. Ideal Environment
5.3.2. Noise Environment
6. Conclusion
7. Patents
References
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| name | Column | Description |
|---|---|---|
| bus | PD | real power demand |
| QD | reactive power demand | |
| generator | PG | real power output |
| QG | reactive power output | |
| branch | PF | real power injected at “from” bus end |
| QF | reactive power injected at “from” bus end |
| Test case | Type | Number | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| IEEE-9 bus | 9 (9 buses) | 36 | |
| 9 (9 buses) | |||
| 9 (9 branch) | |||
| 9 (9 branch) | |||
| IEEE-14 bus | 14 (14 buses) | 68 | |
| 14 (14 buses) | |||
| 20 (20 branch) | |||
| 20 (20 branch) | |||
| IEEE-118 bus | 118 (118 buses) | 608 | |
| 118 (118 buses) | |||
| 186 (186 branch) | |||
| 186 (186 branch) |
| System | Method | Accuracy | Precision | Recall | F1-Score |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEEE-9 bus | Proposed | 99.22 | 99.97 | 98.48 | 99.22 |
| KNN | 94.65 | 100.00 | 89.31 | 94.35 | |
| DT | 98.80 | 98.95 | 98.66 | 98.80 | |
| MLP | 94.25 | 100.00 | 88.58 | 93.95 | |
| CNN | 95.58 | 99.93 | 91.30 | 95.42 | |
| GRU | 95.92 | 99.93 | 91.96 | 95.78 | |
| DBN | 90.38 | 99.96 | 80.94 | 89.45 | |
| AE | 89.33 | 99.62 | 79.12 | 88.20 | |
| No-CBAM | 98.05 | 100.00 | 96.13 | 98.03 | |
| IEEE-14 bus | Proposed | 99.83 | 100.00 | 99.67 | 99.83 |
| KNN | 94.44 | 100.00 | 88.88 | 94.11 | |
| DT | 99.40 | 99.38 | 99.42 | 99.40 | |
| MLP | 95.62 | 100.00 | 91.30 | 95.45 | |
| CNN | 98.38 | 99.73 | 97.05 | 98.37 | |
| GRU | 96.15 | 99.96 | 92.39 | 96.03 | |
| DBN | 91.87 | 97.42 | 86.14 | 91.43 | |
| AE | 85.87 | 95.29 | 75.68 | 84.36 | |
| No-CBAM | 99.32 | 99.60 | 99.04 | 99.32 | |
| IEEE-118 bus | Proposed | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| KNN | 58.80 | 100.00 | 17.58 | 29.90 | |
| DT | 99.84 | 99.89 | 99.79 | 99.84 | |
| MLP | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |
| CNN | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |
| GRU | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |
| DBN | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | |
| AE | 89.63 | 100.00 | 79.42 | 88.53 | |
| No-CBAM | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
| Dataset | λ (Noise level) | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| IEEE-9 bus | 0 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 |
| IEEE-14 bus | 0 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 1.2 |
| IEEE-118 bus | 0 | 0.5 | 1.0 | 1.5 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 3.0 |
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