Submitted:
05 September 2024
Posted:
09 September 2024
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
- Quantum State Preparation: Bob prepares qubits in one of the four initial states: (polarization states) or (phase states), forming the basis of the communication.
- Initial Transmission to Alice: Bob sends these qubits to Alice via the quantum channel.
- Eavesdropping Detection: Alice randomly selects some received qubits for immediate measurement in basis X or Z. The results are communicated to Bob through the classical service channel. Bob then verifies if the measured qubits match the initially prepared states. Any discrepancy indicates potential eavesdropping by Eve, causing the process to terminate if the error rate () exceeds a predefined threshold. Otherwise, Alice and Bob proceed to estimate the secrecy capacity ().
- Message Encoding: Alice encodes the message bits () into codewords () using a predetermined coding scheme.
- Photon Modulation: Alice modulates the remaining qubits by applying either the identity operator (I) or the unitary operator (U) based on the bit values ’0’ or ’1’ of . These modulated photons are then stored in a quantum memory.
- Return Transmission to Bob: The modulated photons are sent back to Bob through the same quantum channel.
- Demodulation and Decoding: Bob demodulates the received photons to retrieve the codewords (), then decodes these to extract the original message ().
- Eavesdropping Detection: The immediate measurement of randomly selected qubits allows Alice and Bob to detect any interference by Eve, leveraging the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics where any measurement alters the quantum state.
- Quantum Memory Utilization: Unlike protocols that operate memory-free, DL04 requires quantum memory, ensuring qubits are stored securely between initial transmission and modulation. This aids in maintaining the integrity and sequence of transmitted qubits.
- Secrecy Capacity Estimation: The protocol allows for precise estimation of the secrecy capacity (), which is crucial for determining the security of the communication channel.
- Two-Way Transmission: The bidirectional flow of qubits between Alice and Bob enhances the robustness of the protocol by providing an additional layer for detecting and mitigating eavesdropping attempts.
- Introduction of a novel LF QSDC system designed for Web 3.0 networks.
- Introduction of a detailed and practical road map to the implementation of LF QSDC into global communication networks.
- Development and optimization of a quantum-aware LDPC and PAT technology to enhance quantum communication reliability and efficiency.
- Proposal of a novel AQCA aimed at mitigating atmospheric disturbances and improving security over long distances satellite communication.
2. Long-Distance Free-Space QSDC Overview
2.1. Quantum State Preparation and Encoding
2.1.1. Basis Determination ():
- If , the basis is computational, with states .
-
If , the basis is superpositional, where further dictates the specific state:
- −
- : State becomes
- −
- : State becomes
- If , the phase states remain as initially encoded.
-
If , the phase states are swapped:
- −
- becomes and vice versa.
2.2. Measurement Protocols and Two-Way Communication
- If , he measures in the basis:
- If , he measures in the basis:
2.3. Integration of Advanced Quantum Technologies
- Quantum-Aware LDPC Coding: Specifically designed for quantum information, these codes correct errors that occur during the quantum state transmission, thus ensuring that the integrity and secrecy of the data are maintained even over long distances.
- Pointing, Acquisition, and Tracking (PAT) Systems: These technologies are critical for maintaining the alignment of the quantum communication link, especially in dynamic environments such as satellite communications, where precision pointing is crucial for successful data transmission.
- Atmospheric Quantum Correction Algorithms: These algorithms are designed to compensate for the quantum signal degradation caused by the atmosphere. By correcting errors induced by atmospheric turbulence, these algorithms significantly improve the reliability and stability of the quantum channel.
2.4. Security Checking Process
- Error Rate Estimation: Alice and Bob share a portion of their measurement results to estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER). If the QBER exceeds a predefined threshold, the communication is deemed insecure, and the process is aborted.
- Entanglement Verification: By verifying the entanglement of the transmitted quantum states, Alice and Bob can ensure that no eavesdropping has occurred. This involves comparing the measurement results to check for correlations consistent with the expected entangled states.
- Classical Post-Processing: Any discrepancies identified during the verification steps are corrected through classical post-processing techniques, such as error correction and privacy amplification. This ensures that the final shared data is secure and free from eavesdropping.
3. Lossless and Secure Long-Distance Free-Space Transmission Techniques
3.1. Quantum-Aware LDPC Coding
3.1.1. LDPC Code Parameter Optimization
- Extended Definition and Impact: The degree distribution of an LDPC code, represented by the polynomials for variable nodes and for check nodes, fundamentally determines the code’s performance in terms of error correction efficiency and rate. These polynomials dictate how bits are interconnected within the LDPC graph.
- Technical Enhancement: A comprehensive optimization function that not only maximizes mutual information I(X; Y) and minimizes QBER but also considers the decoding threshold and the code rate. The optimization can integrate more complex constraints related to the noise model of the quantum channel.
-
New Mathematical Formulation:Optimization Goal:Subject to:Here, represents the additional constraint related to the code rate.
-
Machine Learning Prediction and Iterative Update Algorithm: a machine learning and an iterative update algorithm designed to predict upcoming alterations in the quantum channel and modify the LDPC code parameters, guided by immediate feedback from the quantum communication system.
- Initialization: Set initial LDPC code parameters based on average channel conditions.
-
Real-time Feedback Loop:
- *
- Collect real-time CQ data.
- *
- Adjust LDPC parameters for immediate channel conditions.
-
Predictive Adjustment:
- *
- Use the ML model to predict short-term future CQ.
- *
- Preemptively adjust LDPC parameters based on predictions.
-
Iterative Update:
- *
- Continuously repeat steps 2 and 3.
- *
- Employ a decay factor to balance between recent adjustments and new predictions.

3.1.2. Adaptive Decoding Algorithm with Graph Neural Network Enhanced Belief Propagation and Adaptive Iteration
- Input: Messages from each node, current iteration number, and additional features like channel conditions.
- Architecture: Utilize a GNN architecture capable of handling graph-structured data. Layers can include graph convolutional networks (GCN) or Graph Attention Networks (GAT).
- Output: Adjusted messages and probability of error for each node.
- Dynamically Adjust Iterations: Based on channel conditions and convergence rate, the number of iterations, T, is adapted.
- Stopping Criterion: Utilize error patterns and rate of convergence to determine when to stop the iterations.
- Let be the message from node i to node j at iteration t.
- GNN output influences the update rule:
- Adaptive iteration count T based on GNN feedback and channel conditions.
- Pseudocode:

3.1.3. Security Enhancement Techniques
- Employ decoy states with varying intensities to estimate channel parameters.
- Use statistical methods to analyze the difference in detection rates between signal and decoy states to estimate and detect eavesdropping.
- The estimation can be formulated as solving a set of linear inequalities derived from decoy state intensities and detection rates.
3.2. PAT Technologies
3.2.1. Design
3.2.2. Performance Evaluation and Optimization Algorithms
3.3. Atmospheric Quantum Correction Algorithm
3.3.1. Design
3.3.2. Mathematical Formulation
3.4. Integration with LF QSDC Protocol
- The transmitter and the receiver measure the atmospheric parameters, such as the Fried parameter, the absorption coefficient, and the scattering cross section, using the disturbance modeler module of the AQCA.
- The transmitter and the receiver select the appropriate quantum code, such as a CV code or a DV code, based on the quantum signal’s modulation scheme and the atmospheric parameters, using the quantum error corrector module of the AQCA.
- The transmitter encodes the quantum state into the quantum signal, using a quantum source and a quantum modulator, and applies the quantum code to the quantum signal, using the encoding step of the QEC process.
- The transmitter directs the quantum signal toward the receiver, using the pointing device of the PAT system, and adjusts the quantum signal’s path in real-time, using the adaptive optics system module of the AQCA.
- The receiver detects the incoming quantum signal, using the tracking device of the PAT system, and measures the quantum signal’s phase distortions, using the wavefront sensor of the adaptive optics system.
- The receiver compensates the quantum signal’s phase distortions, using the deformable mirror of the adaptive optics system, and enhances the quantum signal’s SNR, using the signal enhancer and recoverer module of the AQCA.
- The receiver measures the quantum signal, using a quantum detector, and applies the quantum code to the quantum signal, using the syndrome measurement and decoding steps of the QEC process, to recover the original quantum state.
- The transmitter and the receiver exchange classical information, such as basis choices, error correction codes, and privacy amplification keys, using a classical channel, such as a radio or optical link.
- The transmitter and the receiver perform post-processing steps, such as error correction, privacy amplification, and authentication, to ensure the security and reliability of the quantum communication.
4. LF QSDC Simulation Plan and Analysis
4.1. Simulation Plan
4.2. Predicted Results and Analysis
5. Implementation Plan for LF QSDC
5.1. Technical Implementation of LF QSDC
5.1.1. 1-Way Transmission Protocols in Free-Space Channel
5.1.2. Experimental Implementation
5.2. Feasibility and Adaptability of Satellite-based QSDC
5.2.1. Feasibility of Satellite Communication with LF QSDC
5.2.2. Expanding Feasibility with LF QSDC
5.3. Web 3.0 Compatibility
5.4. Stages of Gradual Implementation

5.4.1. Phase 1: Development of Basic LF QSDC Infrastructure
5.4.2. Phase 2: Enhancing Efficiency and Security
5.4.3. Phase 3: Integration with Global Quantum Networks
5.5. Business Case of LF QSDC in The Web 3.0 Era
6. Discussion
6.1. Comparison With Similar Protocols
6.1.1. Security
6.1.2. Distance
6.1.3. Channel Loss and Atmospheric Disturbances
6.1.4. Cost
6.2. Limitations and Future Work
6.2.1. Theoretical Challenges
- Quantum Decoherence and Noise: Quantum states are highly susceptible to decoherence and environmental noise, which can severely limit the distance over which LF QSDC can be effectively implemented.
- Security Proofs: Complete, universally accepted security proofs for LF QSDC under all potential attack scenarios are challenging to develop, raising concerns about its absolute security.
6.2.2. Technological Constraints
- Quantum Sources and Detectors: The efficiency and reliability of quantum sources (e.g., single-photon sources) and detectors are critical, yet current technologies may not provide the necessary performance for long-distance communication.
- Atmospheric Interference: Free-space transmission is significantly affected by atmospheric conditions (e.g., cloud cover, atmospheric turbulence), which can degrade the quantum signal over long distances.
6.2.3. Implementation Challenges
- Infrastructure Development: Establishing a global LF QSDC network requires significant investment in both ground-based and potentially satellite-based infrastructure, posing a substantial financial and logistical challenge.
- Interoperability: Compatibility with existing communication technologies and standards is crucial for widespread adoption, necessitating complex integration efforts.
6.2.4. Impact Considerations
- Scalability: While promising for point-to-point communication, scaling LF QSDC to a multi-node quantum network presents considerable technical challenges.
- Accessibility: The high cost and complexity of LF QSDC technology may limit its accessibility, particularly in developing regions, potentially exacerbating the digital divide.
- Regulatory and Ethical Issues: The deployment of LF QSDC might raise questions regarding regulation, data sovereignty, and privacy, requiring careful consideration and potentially new legal frameworks.
7. Conclusions
8. Acknowledgement
9. Data Availability
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| Category | Type of Protocol | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LF QSDC | DL04 Protocol | Memory-Free DL04 | QKD | |
| Communication Distance | Long-distance (intercontinental) | Moderate distance | Moderate distance | Moderate distance |
| Security Level | High (no key exchange required) | High (can transmit secure messages without key exchange) | High (can transmit secure messages without key exchange) | High (key exchange fundamental) |
| Implementation Complexity | Moderate (enhanced by PAT technologies) | High (requires quantum memory) | Moderate (no quantum memory required) | Low (proven by ample experimentation) |
| Suitability for Globalized Web 3.0 | Highly suitable | Moderately suitable | Moderately suitable | Less suitable for global scale |
| Atmospheric Disturbances Resistance | Strong (mitigated by adaptive optics) | Moderate (susceptible to some atmospheric effects) | Moderate (susceptible to some atmospheric effects) | Weak (highly susceptible to atmospheric effects) |
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