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Exploring the Interplay of New Energy Vehicle Enterprises, Consumers, and Government in the Context of the 'Dual Carbon' Target: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis
Song, R.; Shi, W.; Qin, W.; Xue, X. Exploring the Interplay of New Energy Vehicle Enterprises, Consumers, and Government in the Context of the “Dual Carbon” Target: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis. PLOS ONE 2023, 18, e0291175, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0291175.
Song, R.; Shi, W.; Qin, W.; Xue, X. Exploring the Interplay of New Energy Vehicle Enterprises, Consumers, and Government in the Context of the “Dual Carbon” Target: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis. PLOS ONE 2023, 18, e0291175, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0291175.
Song, R.; Shi, W.; Qin, W.; Xue, X. Exploring the Interplay of New Energy Vehicle Enterprises, Consumers, and Government in the Context of the “Dual Carbon” Target: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis. PLOS ONE 2023, 18, e0291175, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0291175.
Song, R.; Shi, W.; Qin, W.; Xue, X. Exploring the Interplay of New Energy Vehicle Enterprises, Consumers, and Government in the Context of the “Dual Carbon” Target: An Evolutionary Game and Simulation Analysis. PLOS ONE 2023, 18, e0291175, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0291175.
Abstract
To promote low-carbon and green travel, this study proposes a tripartite evolutionary game model among new energy vehicle manufacturers, consumers, and government agencies. The game strategy combinations of each party and the stability conditions of the equilibrium point in the evolutionary game system are analyzed, and the validity of the conclusions is verified through simulation results. The study shows a strong correlation between the three parties in the evolutionary game system. From the perspective of car manufacturers, the probability of producing new energy vehicles is positively proportional to the subsidy received from new energy policy, the additional revenue gained from the management of the carbon trading scheme, and the fine received for producing conventional fuel vehicles. However, from the consumer perspective, the likelihood that consumers purchase new energy vehicles is positively related to the utility value to consumers and the coverage of public charging points in the city, and inversely related to the sales price of new energy vehicles. From the government perspective, a combination of direct subsidy policies and indirect support strategies should be considered to stimulate the rapid development of the new energy vehicle industry.
Keywords
new energy vehicles; “dual carbon” targets; evolutionary games; government subsidies
Subject
Engineering, Energy and Fuel Technology
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
