This article investigates the information matching efficiency of the sponsored auction mechanism of search engine platform by implementing consumer purchase strategy. Then we examine the incentive mechanism for sellers to report product quality truthfully under information asymmetry and the reason how product quality signal could improve information matching efficiency of the sponsored auction mechanism. Using the data collected from Baidu search engine, we empirically test the theoretical research results. Our main research finding: under information asymmetry and without product quality signal mechanism, the equilibrium of bidding rank cannot match the consumer purchase strategy at all, causing the consumer welfare to suffer double losses due to the adverse selection of sellers. In the contrast, the search engine could improve partially the information matching efficiency of the sponsored search auction mechanism by identifying the product quality signal brought by the sellers with the highest product quality. However, the search engine has no incentive to design product quality signal for sellers.

Open bidding is widely used in Sinopec's material procurement due to its advantages of openness, transparency, and cost savings. However, there have been many complaints about collusive bidding in recent years. Collusive bidding will pose significant challenges to fair competition and increase project costs for material procurement. Therefore, there is an urgent need for an analysis model to identify and prevent the collusive bidding. In this paper, we propose a statistical model for identifying collusive bidding using the coefficient of variation cv, the ratio of high to low average quotation rP and the deviation rate of quotation δ as indicators, based on the statistics of the historical quotations for material A. Through a case study of the framework agreement bidding for material B, we identified the collusion behavior of bidders effectively, thereby verifying the applicability of this statistical model.

The deepening of electricity reform results in increasingly frequent auctions and the surge of generators, it becomes difficult to analyze generators’ behaviors. Since it’s hard to find analytical market equilibriums, approximate equilibriums were obtained instead in previous studies by market simulations, which are strict to initial estimations and simulation results are chaotic in some cases. In this paper, a multi-unit power bidding model is proposed to reveal the bidding mechanism under clearing pricing rule by employing auction approach, for which initial estimations are non-essential. Normalized bidding price is introduced to construct generator's price-related bidding strategy. Nash equilibriums are derived depend on the marginal cost and the winning probability which are computed from bidding quantity, transmission cost and demand distribution. Furthermore, we propose a comparative analysis to explore the impact of uncertain elastic demand on the performance of the electricity market. The result indicates that, there exists market power among generators leading to social welfare decreases even under competitive conditions but elastic demand is an effective way to restrain generators’ market power. The feasibility of the models is verified by a case study. Our work provides decision support for generators and a direction for improving market efficiency.

Abstract: The increased penetration of renewables in distribution power systems has motivated researchers to take significant interest in local energy transactions. The major goal of Local Energy Markets (LEM) is to promote the participation of small consumers in energy transactions and providing an opportunity for transactive energy systems. Such energy transactions in LEM are considered as a bi-level optimization problem in which all agents at upper and lower levels try to maximize their profits. But typical bi-level problem is very complex as it is inherently nonlinear, discontinued and strongly NP-hard. So, this article proposes the application of hybridized Cross Entropy Covariance Matrix Adaptation Evolution Strategy (CE-CMAES) to tackle such a complex bi-level problem of LEM. The proposed CE-CMAES secured the 1st rank in Testbed-2 entitled, “Bi-level optimization of end-users’ bidding strategies in local energy markets (LM)” at international competitions on Smart Grid Problems, held at GECCO 2020 and WCCI 2020. CE method is used for global exploration of search space and CMAES is used for local exploitation as its adaptive step-size mechanism prevents its premature convergence. A practical distribution system with renewable energy penetration is considered for simulation. The comparative analysis shows that the overall cost, mean fitness and Ranking Index (R.I) obtained from CE-CMAES are superior to those obtained from the state-of-the-art participated algorithms. Wilcoxon Signed Rank Statistical test also proves that CE-CMAES is statistically different from the tested algorithms.

This paper proposes a game-theoretic framework for quantifying effects of strategic bidding behavior of load aggregators (LAs) on wholesale electricity market equilibrium. The independent system operator (ISO) employs double-sided auction design to settle transactions in the wholesale electricity market. Generating companies (GENCOs) and LAs submit their bids to the ISO in the economic model of supply function equilibrium. Under the smart grid paradigm, a LA participates in the electricity market on behalf of end-consumers to minimize their total payment for purchasing electricity. In this paper, bi-level programming (BLP) method is employed to determine optimal bidding strategy of self-interested market participants. In the upper level, the profit of intended market participant is maximized and in the lower level, the ISO clears the market via a bid-based security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Also, competition of GENCOs and LAs is modeled as a non-cooperative game. To examine the effects of strategic bidding behavior of LAs on market equilibrium, the proposed model is applied to the IEEE 9-bus and the IEEE 30-bus test systems. According to numerical results, to allow the LAs to behave strategically along with the GENCOs makes the former better off and the latter worse off, while the net effect of this on total social welfare turns out to be case-contingent.