Submitted:
20 May 2026
Posted:
20 May 2026
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. The Construction and Consolidation of Liberal IPE
2.2. Cracks in the Liberal Framework
2.3. Identifying the Five Research Gaps
2.4. The Contemporary Research Landscape: A Critical Synthesis
3. Methodology
3.1. Research Design and Epistemological Foundations
3.2. Multi-Method Synthetic Strategy
3.3. Source Selection and Evaluation
3.4. Scope and Limitations
4. Data Analysis and Results
4.1. Gap One: The Retreat of Liberal Ontology and the Rise of Non-Liberal Orders
4.2. Gap Two: The Material Politics of Climate Change and Green Transition
4.3. Gap Three: The Return of War and the Re-Militarization of Economics
4.4. Gap Four: Digital Sovereignty and the Intangible Economy
4.5. Gap Five: Re-Centering the Political in Global Finance
5. Discussion
5.1. The Structural Coherence of the Contemporary Moment
5.2. The Methodological Imperative for Pluralism
5.3. Policy and Governance Implications
6. Conclusions
7. Recommendations for Further Research
6.1. Specific Theoretical Priorities
6.2. Empirical Priorities
6.3. Institutional and Pedagogical Recommendations
The funding statements
Conflicts of Interest
Transparency
The Author Contribution declaration
Consent to Publish declaration
Consent to Participate declaration
Ethics declaration
References
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| Domain | Traditional IPE Assumption | Contemporary Reality |
| Systemic structure | Liberal hegemony; unipolarity stabilizing open economies | Great-power competition; contested and parallel orders |
| Economic integration | Complex interdependence as pacifying force | Weaponized interdependence; strategic decoupling |
| State–market relation | State retreat; ascendancy of market governance | Resurgent industrial policy; new varieties of state capitalism |
| Institutional role | International institutions as cooperation-enhancing | Institutions as sites of geopolitical contestation |
| Security–economy nexus | Analytically separate; peace through trade | Re-militarization of economics; finance as statecraft |
| Nature of capital | Tangible assets; manufacturing as development engine | Intangible assets; data as strategic infrastructure |
| Framework | Ontological Foundation | Primary Analytical Focus | Key Assumptions | Limitations in Contemporary Context |
| Liberal institutionalism | Anarchy; rational states | International cooperation; institutional design | States cooperate for mutual gains; institutions reduce transaction costs | Struggles with non-liberal institutions; cannot explain weaponized interdependence or authoritarian capitalism |
| Hegemonic stability theory | Structural realism | Hegemonic provision of collective goods | Single dominant state required for open economy maintenance | Cannot explain multipolar governance; treats liberal hegemony as normative baseline |
| Open economy politics | Domestic interest aggregation | Trade and financial policy preferences | Factor- or sector-based distributional preferences drive policy | Treats international structure as exogenous; systematically underweights ideational factors and state autonomy |
| Constructivism | Ideational structures | Norms, identities, and discourse | Ideas and norms constitute and shape state interests | Limited materialist analysis; underdeveloped on power, coercion, and resource politics |
| Critical IPE / neo-Gramscian | Historical materialism | Class relations; hegemony; global social structures | Capitalism as primary driver; hegemony as ideological project | Prescriptive orientation; limited policy traction; underemphasizes state agency in economic coordination |
| Developmental state theory | Political economy of late development | Late industrialization; state–market coordination | Embedded autonomy enables strategic industrial policy | Developed for a specific historical context requires substantial updating for digital and green transitions |
| Research Gap | Representative Contributions | Central Theoretical Innovation |
| Non-liberal orders | Babic et al. (2020); Hopewell (2021); Weiss and Wallace (2021) | Transnational state capital; contested trade governance; regime-type effects on global order |
| Climate transition | Allan et al. (2021); Bridge (2022); Newell (2021) | Green industrial policy; critical minerals political economy; power shift analytics |
| Economic re-militarization | Drezner et al. (2021); Farrell and Newman (2023); Miller (2022) | Generalization of weaponized interdependence; "underground empire" thesis; chokepoint technologies |
| Digital sovereignty | Kalyanpur and Newman (2019); Zuboff (2019); Aggarwal and Reddie (2021) | Regulatory extraterritoriality; surveillance capitalism; techno-nationalism |
| Finance and politics | Helleiner (2021); McDowell (2023); Norrlöf (2020) | National self-sufficiency revival; sanctions-driven de-dollarization; dollar hegemony as power |
| Dimension | Liberal Order | Non-Liberal Order |
| Market governance | Market-led; regulatory state at arm's length | State-led; developmental or party-state coordination |
| Property regime | Private property dominance; depoliticized | Mixed; strategic state ownership in key sectors |
| International integration | Openness; binding multilateral commitments | Managed integration; selective strategic decoupling |
| Institutional logic | Rule-based; conditional access; liberal norms | Sovereignty-based; non-interference; bilateral flexibility |
| Firm–state relation | Arms-length regulation; regulatory capture as pathology | Embedded coordination; strategic alignment as policy tool |
| Geopolitical posture | Integration as peace strategy; interdependence as constraint | Autonomy as security imperative; interdependence as vulnerability |
| Feature | Liberal Institutions (WTO, IMF, World Bank) | Non-Liberal Institutions (AIIB, NDB, SCO) |
| Conditionality | Extensive; structural adjustment and liberalization requirements | Minimal; project-based lending; no policy conditionality |
| Membership model | Formally universalist; substantive Western dominance | Selective or region-based; emerging-economy voice emphasized |
| Governance structure | Weighted voting; U.S. and European dominance institutionalized | Consensus-based; formal equality among major contributors |
| Normative foundation | Liberal economic norms as membership criteria | State sovereignty; non-interference as operational principles |
| Relationship to U.S. hegemony | Structurally embedded in U.S.-led international order | Explicitly parallel; designed to reduce dependence on U.S.-led order |
| Dimension | Hydrocarbon Era (20th Century) | Critical Mineral Era (21st Century) |
| Geographic concentration | Middle East, Russia, Venezuela (production) | China (processing dominance); DRC (cobalt); Australia, Chile (lithium and copper) |
| Supply chain structure | Long pipeline and tanker routes; geographic diversification of production | Concentrated processing; shorter but tightly controlled value chains |
| Key state actors | National oil companies; OPEC cartel governance | State-backed mining firms; Chinese processing monopolies; resource-nationalist governments |
| Conflict dynamics | Resource wars; petro-aggression; pipeline politics | Supply chain coercion; export restrictions; mining-related local conflict |
| Rentier state dynamics | Oil rents enabling authoritarian redistribution | Mixed evidence; potential for new forms of mineral rentierism |
| Environmental justice | Localized extraction impacts; downstream refining pollution | Processing pollution concentrated in Global South; artisanal labor exploitation |
| Mineral | Primary Transition Use | Top Producer | Processing Concentration | Geopolitical Risk | Priority IPE Research Gap |
| Lithium | EV batteries; grid storage | Australia; Chile; China | China (~70% of global refining) | Resource nationalism; U.S.–China rivalry | Political economy of sovereign acquisition strategies |
| Cobalt | Battery cathodes | DRC (~70% of production) | China (~80% of global refining) | Conflict minerals; artisanal labor governance | Governance of artisanal mining in global supply chains |
| Rare earth elements | Permanent magnets; wind turbines; electronics | China (~85% of global supply) | China (overwhelmingly dominant) | Export restriction leverage; monopoly leverage over allies | Systematic theory of rare earth statecraft |
| Copper | Broad electrification infrastructure | Chile; Peru; DRC | Geographically distributed | Resource nationalism; permitting backlash | Political economy of green extractivism in Global South |
| Nickel | Battery cathodes; stainless steel | Indonesia; Philippines; Russia | Geographically dispersed | Indonesian export restrictions; Russian sanctions exposure | Supply chain resilience modeling under geopolitical fragmentation |
| Polysilicon | Solar photovoltaic panels | China (~80% of global supply) | China (dominant) | Trade restrictions; Xinjiang labor rights concerns | Labor governance and human rights compliance in solar supply chains |
| Dimension | Global North | Global South |
| Historical responsibility | High cumulative greenhouse gas emissions since industrialization | Disproportionately low cumulative contribution to atmospheric concentrations |
| Transition financing | State-subsidized green industries; access to capital markets | High capital costs for transition; severely constrained fiscal space |
| Trade measures | Imposing carbon border adjustment mechanisms | Facing potential deindustrialization; new barriers to export markets |
| Adaptation and loss | Primarily mitigation-focused; adaptive capacity resilient | Severe adaptation needs; escalating loss-and-damage claims |
| Technology access | Indigenous innovation capacity; first-mover advantages | Structurally dependent on technology transfer; IP barriers |
| Debt dynamics | Low borrowing costs for sovereign green investment | Chronic debt distress; persistent climate finance gaps relative to need |
| Type | Objectives | Primary Instruments | Illustrative Cases |
| Green industrial policy | Climate mitigation; renewable energy deployment at scale | Production subsidies; feed-in tariffs; green bond frameworks | U.S. Inflation Reduction Act; EU Green Deal Industrial Plan |
| Strategic autonomy policy | Reducing dependence on strategic rivals; supply chain resilience | Export controls; tariffs; domestic content requirements; localization mandates | EU Chips Act; U.S. CHIPS and Science Act |
| Developmental state 2.0 | Technological catch-up; strategic sector dominance; dual-use capacity | State-owned enterprise coordination; R&D investment; procurement preferences | China's Made in China 2025; dual circulation strategy |
| Defense-industrial policy | Wartime production capacity; munitions stockpile reconstruction | Defense procurement; defense industrial base subsidies; production mobilization | European Defence Fund; U.S. Defense Production Act activation |
| Mechanism | Description | Primary Cases |
| Financial sanctions | SWIFT exclusion; central bank asset freezes; secondary sanctions targeting third-country actors | Russia (2022); Iran; North Korea |
| Technology export controls | Restrictions on advanced dual-use technologies; semiconductor fabrication equipment bans | U.S. restrictions on advanced chips and equipment to China |
| Supply chain weaponization | Strategic leveraging of existing dependencies in critical sectors | European energy dependence on Russia; Chinese rare earth export leverage |
| Investment screening | Mandatory national security reviews of inbound foreign direct investment | CFIUS (U.S.); EU Foreign Direct Investment Screening Regulation |
| Industrial mobilization | Rebuilding wartime production capacity; reconstructing munitions and defense industrial base | European NATO members' munitions production expansion; U.S. Defense Production Act activation |
| Digital infrastructure control | Leveraging control over subsea cables, cloud computing infrastructure, and 5G network standards | Huawei network exclusion campaigns; cloud sovereignty initiatives across G7 |
| Strategy | Definition | Implementation Mechanisms | Primary Costs and Limitations |
| Full decoupling | Complete severance of economic ties with target state | Comprehensive trade bans; mandatory divestment; technology denial | Massive efficiency losses; strong incentives for bloc formation; difficult to sustain multilaterally |
| Selective decoupling | Targeted restrictions confined to strategic sectors | Sectoral export controls; targeted investment prohibitions; limited tariffs | Moderate efficiency losses; definitional difficulty of "strategic" boundary |
| Friendshoring | Deliberate supply chain diversification toward allied economies | Preferential trade agreements; supply chain subsidies; investment incentives for allied firms | Significant reconfiguration costs; political alignment constraints; limited supply alternatives |
| Resilience-building | Maintaining ties while reducing shock vulnerability | Strategic reserves; domestic production capacity subsidies; redundant supply chains | Higher ongoing costs; reduced just-in-time efficiency; difficult to sustain politically |
| De-risking | Reducing exposure to rivals without severing economic ties | Supplier diversification; hedging strategies; export monitoring | Partial risk reduction only; definitional ambiguity exploited in practice; implementation complexity |
| Era | Period | Defining Characteristics | Representative Cases |
| Bilateral sanctions | 1945–1990 | Unilateral measures; limited multilateral coordination; modest ambitions | U.S. sanctions on Cuba; U.S. grain embargo on USSR (1980) |
| Multilateral sanctions | 1990s–2000s | UN Security Council authorization; broad coalitions; humanitarian exemptions | Comprehensive Iraq sanctions (1990s); Libya (1990s) |
| Smart sanctions | 2000s–2010s | Targeted financial measures; individual asset freezes; travel bans; minimizing civilian impact | Post-9/11 counter-terrorism designations; Iran nuclear sanctions |
| Bloc-based sanctions | 2020s–present | G7-coordinated coalitions; secondary sanctions imposing third-country compliance; functioning as international order-sorting mechanism | Russia (2022 onward); U.S.-led technology sanctions on China |
| Dimension | Tangible Economy (20th Century) | Intangible Economy (21st Century) |
| Primary productive assets | Factories; machinery; physical inventory | Data; algorithms; intellectual property; brand equity |
| Trade patterns | Containerized goods; bilateral merchandise flows | Cross-border data flows; digital services exports |
| Ownership and jurisdiction | Clear property rights; physical location determines regulatory jurisdiction | Ambiguous; digital jurisdiction genuinely contested across legal systems |
| Regulatory instruments | Tariffs; product safety standards; customs enforcement | Data localization requirements; privacy regulation; platform-specific antitrust |
| Geopolitical stakes | Resource competition; control of trade routes and chokepoints | Digital sovereignty; platform power concentration; semiconductor supremacy |
| Dominant firm structure | Vertically integrated multinational corporations | Platform ecosystems; network firms; data intermediaries |
| Type | Definition | Mechanisms | Illustrative Actors and Cases |
| Infrastructural power | Control over the underlying physical and logical architecture of the internet | Ownership of subsea cables; cloud computing infrastructure; semiconductor fabrication nodes | AWS; Azure; Google Cloud; TSMC; Chinese telecommunications infrastructure |
| Algorithmic power | Capacity to shape information environments and behavior through code | Search ranking; content recommendation systems; content moderation policy | Google search algorithm; TikTok recommendation engine; Facebook content moderation |
| Data power | Capacity to extract, analyze, commodify, and leverage large-scale behavioral information | Surveillance; predictive analytics; behavioral micro-targeting | Surveillance capitalism model (Zuboff, 2019); targeted political advertising |
| Platform power | Control over multi-sided markets connecting producers, consumers, and developers | Market access gatekeeping; fee structures; API control; vertical integration | Amazon marketplace; Apple App Store; WeChat super-app ecosystem |
| Narrative power | Capacity to shape political and social discourse at scale through digital distribution | Algorithmic amplification; disinformation distribution; computational propaganda | State-linked social media operations; viral political content |
| Dimension | Industrialization Era | Platform Economy Era |
| Core growth model | Manufacturing-led; export-oriented; learning-by-doing | Services-led; digital exports; network effects as primary driver |
| Employment structure | Formal manufacturing employment; structured labor relations | Gig and platform-mediated informal work; compressed labor bargaining power |
| Capital requirements | Fixed physical capital; factory construction and machinery | Intangible capital; algorithmic infrastructure; user data |
| Technology acquisition | Foreign direct investment; technology licensing; reverse engineering | Digital infrastructure dependency; cloud services; platform API access |
| State development role | Classic developmental state; strategic industrial policy; embedded autonomy | Digital sovereignty regulation; data localization; digital public infrastructure |
| Key development vulnerability | Commodity dependence; adverse terms of trade; middle-income trap | Data colonialism (Couldry & Mejias, 2019); platform dependency; digital infrastructure asymmetry |
| Jurisdiction | Regulatory Philosophy | Key Instruments | Digital Sovereignty Priority | Key Limitations and Tensions |
| United States | Market competition; limited federal intervention; first-mover advantage protection | Antitrust enforcement (post-2020 reform); Section 230 liability shield; no comprehensive federal privacy law | Infrastructure security (cloud, 5G); foreign platform screening | Highly fragmented regulatory landscape; significant enforcement gaps; innovation–protection tension |
| European Union | Rights-based; precautionary principle; fundamental rights framework | GDPR; Digital Markets Act; Digital Services Act; EU AI Act | Data sovereignty; algorithmic accountability; regulatory autonomy from U.S. platforms | Potential innovation-chilling effects; uneven enforcement capacity across member states |
| China | State sovereignty; party-state control; data as national security resource | Data Security Law; Cybersecurity Law; platform crackdowns (2020–2022); Great Firewall | Comprehensive; national data treated as strategic state resource | Significant market distortion; constraints on private innovation; foreign platform exclusion |
| India | Emerging regulatory state; development-oriented | Personal Data Protection Act; intermediary guidelines; data localization requirements | Data localization; digital public infrastructure (Aadhaar, UPI) | Regulatory uncertainty; implementation capacity gaps; balancing development and sovereignty goals |
| Global South (general) | Development-oriented; severely capacity-constrained | Nascent and fragmented data protection frameworks | Avoiding data colonialism; leveraging digital development potential | Structurally asymmetric power vis-à-vis U.S. and Chinese platforms; deep technology dependency |
| Domain | Post-2008 Research Focus | Contemporary Frontier Questions |
| Monetary policy | Central bank independence; inflation targeting effectiveness; unconventional policy tools | Distributional effects of quantitative easing; political pressures on central bank mandates; inflation politics |
| Currency system | Dollar hegemony maintenance; currency peg sustainability | De-dollarization trends, competition among digital and reserve currencies, and the effects of sanctions on dollar-based financial infrastructure |
| Financial regulation | Macroprudential tools; Basel III capital adequacy | Regulatory fragmentation along geopolitical lines; non-bank financial intermediation; shadow banking |
| Crypto-assets | Peripheral; limited systemic relevance | State responses to crypto proliferation; sanctions circumvention mechanisms; digital monetary sovereignty |
| Financialization | Corporate governance reform; shareholder primacy critique | Intangible asset financialization; private equity political economy; wealth concentration |
| Debt dynamics | Sovereign debt crises; austerity politics | Climate finance architecture gaps; debt-for-nature swap mechanisms; developing country debt distress |
| Policy Tool | Primary Beneficiaries | Primary Losers | Core Transmission Mechanism |
| Quantitative easing | Asset holders; financial sector; high-net-worth individuals | Savers; wage earners; public pension funds | Asset price inflation across equities and real estate; yield suppression on savings instruments |
| Sustained low interest rates | Borrowers; real estate investors; corporate sector | Savers; fixed-income retirees; conservative institutional investors | Suppressed savings returns; artificially low borrowing costs increasing asset leverage |
| Inflation regime | Debtors; holders of real assets; fiscal authorities | Fixed-income households; nominal wage earners; cash savers | Erosion of real wages; automatic deleveraging of nominal debt burdens |
| Rapid interest rate increases | Savers; currency holders; fixed-income investors | Highly leveraged borrowers; mortgage holders; emerging market dollar debtors | Increased debt service costs; recession risk; capital flow reversal to emerging markets |
| Currency intervention | Export-oriented domestic producers | Importers; households purchasing consumer goods; foreign currency debtors | Exchange rate manipulation; competitive devaluation dynamics; imported inflation |
| Indicator | Observed Trend | Emerging Alternatives |
| Dollar share of global foreign exchange reserves | Gradual decline from approximately 66% to approximately 58% | RMB; gold; SDRs; diversified reserve currency baskets |
| SWIFT alternative payment infrastructure | Growth of CIPS (China Interbank Payments System); SPFS (Russian system) | Bilateral currency swap arrangements; Project mBridge (BIS) |
| Central bank digital currency development | Active pilot programs or research in 130+ countries | Digital yuan (e-CNY) as leading operational case; digital euro in development |
| Bilateral non-dollar trade settlement | Increased frequency of non-dollar commodity trade contracts | RMB–rial; rupee–ruble; BRICS currency discussion frameworks |
| Central bank gold accumulation | Record central bank net purchases in 2022 and 2023 | Systematic diversification away from dollar-denominated reserve assets |
| Sanctions circumvention infrastructure | Proliferation of shadow payment systems and cryptocurrency adoption by sanctioned states | Cryptocurrency adoption in Iran, Russia, and North Korea |
| Response Type | Regulatory Approach | Illustrative Cases | Primary Political-Economic Rationale |
| Prohibition | Comprehensive bans on trading, mining, or holding | China (2021); Algeria; Bolivia | Monetary sovereignty protection; capital control enforcement |
| Regulated integration | Licensing regimes with AML/CFT compliance requirements | United States; European Union; Japan | Balancing innovation facilitation with consumer protection and systemic risk management |
| Strategic embrace | Crypto-friendly regulatory environment; mining attraction | El Salvador; UAE; Switzerland | Investment and innovation hub positioning; economic diversification |
| Sanctions circumvention | De facto tolerance enabling sanctions evasion | Russia; Iran; North Korea | Bypassing Western dollar-denominated financial sanctions |
| CBDC development | State-backed digital currency replacing or complementing cash | China (e-CNY operational); Nigeria (eNaira); Sweden (e-krona pilot) | Preserving monetary sovereignty in digital economy; advancing financial inclusion goals |
| Ambivalent accommodation | Permissive but largely unregulated environment | India; Brazil; most emerging market economies | Balancing innovation potential against systemic and macrofinancial risk |
| Domain | Legacy Architecture (Pre-2010) | Contemporary Reconfiguration |
| Principal creditors | Paris Club governments; IMF; World Bank; private bondholders | Chinese policy banks; private bondholders; commodity-collateralized lenders |
| Transparency norms | Relatively high (Paris Club disclosure) | Widespread non-disclosure of Chinese lending terms (Horn et al., 2021) |
| Restructuring venues | Paris Club; London Club; IMF programs | G20 Common Framework; fragmented ad hoc processes |
| Conditionality logic | Structural adjustment; fiscal discipline | Mixed; project-linked collateral; strategic-asset claims |
| Climate finance integration | Largely absent | Emerging debt-for-nature and debt-for-climate swap mechanisms |
| Crisis resolution speed | Moderate; standardized procedures | Markedly slower; coordination failures across creditor blocs |
| Research Gap | Quantitative and Formal Methods | Qualitative and Historical Methods | Integrative Research Potential |
| Non-liberal orders | Formal modeling of state–firm coordination; institutional design theory; comparative economic performance analysis | Historical institutionalism; comparative political economy; area studies expertise | Combine formal models of institutional incentives with country-specific historical institutional analysis |
| Climate transition | Econometric modeling of transition costs and distributional effects; supply chain network mapping | Political ethnography; coalition formation analysis; critical discourse analysis | Model distributional effects of transition; explain political feasibility constraints through qualitative mechanisms |
| War and economics | Sanctions effectiveness quantitative analysis; global financial network topology analysis | Archival research; elite interview methods; process tracing; strategic studies integration | Formal models of coercive leverage complemented by historical case analysis of outcomes |
| Digital sovereignty | Platform economics; network topology mapping; algorithm auditing methodologies | Critical infrastructure studies; firm-level ethnography; comparative legal analysis | Model digital power concentration quantitatively; trace institutional evolution of governance regimes qualitatively |
| Finance and politics | Monetary policy transmission modeling; financial network analysis; wealth distribution measurement | Central bank ethnography; archival financial policy research; critical political economy | Link quantitatively measured distributional effects to political processes through qualitative institutional analysis |
| Gap | Priority Research Question | Theoretical Contribution Required | Recommended Methodological Approach |
| Non-liberal orders | How do authoritarian political structures systematically condition patterns of economic coordination, innovation, and international engagement? | Systematic theory of non-liberal institutional logic and state–firm coordination | Comparative historical institutionalism; formal modeling of authoritarian economic coordination |
| Climate transition | Under what political-economic conditions do green industrial policy generate genuine developmental benefits for Global South economies rather than new dependency relationships? | Integrated theory connecting green extractivism, climate finance, and just transition conditions | Mixed methods; political economy of development; case comparison across transition mineral producers |
| War and economics | Under what conditions do bloc-based sanctions function as mechanisms of international order-making rather than simply instruments of bilateral coercion? | Theory of sanctions as institutional sorting and order-building mechanisms | Process tracing across contemporary cases; financial network analysis; historical comparative case study |
| Digital sovereignty | How do different configurations of state regulatory capacity, platform market structure, and geopolitical alignment shape national development outcomes in the digital economy? | Political economy of digital power asymmetries and developmental consequences | Comparative regulatory analysis; platform economics; mixed-method firm-level and macro-level analysis |
| Finance and politics | Through what specific political processes do the distributional consequences of monetary policy translate into institutional change or political instability? | Theory of monetary politics under conditions of advanced financialization | Central bank ethnography; quantitative distributional analysis; comparative political economy of central bank governance |
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