4. The Mosaic Patchwork Hypothesis
When we consider the two hypothetical universes, and , it becomes evident that they do not represent our universe in its entirety. However, if we focus on a very small portion of the universe, we may attempt to observe the evolution of its structure and compare it with the evolutionary paths of these hypothetical universes. There exists a non-zero probability that the evolution of such universes might, in some way, coincide with our own.
Here is the hypothetical idea: imagine dividing our universe U into different regions, each with a defined dimension and cubic volume, denoted as . While n could, in principle, be infinite, to keep the argument less complicated we will assume n is finite.
Now, to proceed clearly, we define a few assumptions which are crucial and central to our argument:
1. Our universe is divided into cubic volumes,
2. There exist corresponding hypothetical universes,
each with its own mathematical framework to describe the universe. This can be represented completely as
3. The most important of all assumptions: these hypothetical universes will not necessarily explain or describe our universe as a whole, but only a fraction of it at a given frame .
With these assumptions, each such hypothetical universe can effectively describe the evolution or structure of one particular cubic region of the universe, though not the entire universe. In other words, a given hypothetical universe may account for the structure, evolution, or phenomena of a specific celestial region.
Thus, for each of the n cubic volumes, we could have n corresponding hypothetical universes that provide explanatory frameworks for those regions. Does this imply that within such a complex mathematical paradigm, we may construct as many frameworks as needed — some of which explain certain physical aspects of reality while others remain abstract and less relevant? Importantly, the lack of universal applicability does not mean these frameworks are illogical or inconsistent. Rather, they may remain abstract in some regions, while in others they can successfully predict, explain, or resemble aspects of physical reality.
Let us now take the argument one step further. If there exist n cubic volumes, each with n corresponding hypothetical universes, and if some of these evolutionary descriptions resemble aspects of our own universe, does this imply that we require n such theories to fully explain our universe as a whole?
To sharpen this argument, let us narrow it down to a simpler case. Suppose we divide the universe into four cubic volumes, denoted as , and consider eight different hypothetical universes, (with particular attention to and , as discussed in the paper).
Now, let us define a concept called the universal base clock, denoted as , where . This represents a universal measure of time. For example, at , which we consider as the initial frame of space-time, each universe describes a defined scenario within one cubic volume: describes the defined scenario of , describes that of , of , and of .
Moving forward, it is also possible that at the next frame, , other universes describe these volumes differently: for instance, might describe , describe , describe , and describe . This process can continue across successive frames, where at each , different universes among the eight may provide the explanation for a given cubic volume.
At this point, let us also introduce the notion of defined scenarios. Corresponding to the hypothetical universes, these scenarios are represented as , with each describing the outcome or structure provided by its respective universe. Corresponding to our actual universe, however, we define a composite defined scenario, denoted as , which integrates the descriptions of the cubic volumes at each frame.
For example, at , universe may describe cubic volume with defined scenario of , while at the same time contributing to the composite scenario of our universe . At the next frame, , the same universe may describe cubic volume with defined scenario of , and this would then contribute to the composite scenario of our universe .
Here we must note two possibilities for analysis:
Single-framework condition (restricted case): At any given frame , only one hypothetical universe contributes the defined scenario for a cubic volume. This simplifies the mapping and avoids complications.
Multiple-framework condition (general case): At any given frame , multiple hypothetical universes may yield the same defined scenario for a cubic volume. In this case, the mapping becomes many-to-one, and equivalence across different frameworks emerges naturally.
The central idea is that with each frame change, the universe responsible for explaining a particular cubic volume may differ. We can imagine this mathematical framework as a line segmented into many parts, with each part being useful for describing certain scenarios at specific frames for specific cubic volumes.
Moreover, because there are more possible defined scenarios than cubic volumes (), redundancy arises naturally: equivalent scenarios can appear at different times or be explained by different universes. For example, suppose a defined scenario occurs in cubic volume , described by at frame . Then, at another frame, , an equivalent scenario (where ) may occur in cubic volume , this time described by .
With this reasoning in place, multiple interpretations and extensions of the argument can be developed.
Figure 10.
The conceptual diagram of the Thought Experiment
Figure 10.
The conceptual diagram of the Thought Experiment
We begin by defining
as the set of cubic regions of our universe. Let
denote the set of frames, where each frame is written as
In particular, the universal frame can be expressed as
meaning the first frame
starts at 0.
Now, let
be the set of hypothetical universes, and let
be the set of mathematical frameworks corresponding to these hypothetical universes.
Next, let
D denote the set of possible defined scenarios — atomic local outcomes that correspond to structures, processes, events, and evolutions within hypothetical universes. We assume
D is finite, so that
Accordingly, there are
n such defined scenarios. We then define a composite defined scenario, which represents essentially the same class of defined scenarios but distinguished from the hypothetical-universe-specific ones by using the term composite. This is given as
which we also assume to be finite.
For each universe
, we define a function
such that
gives the defined scenario that
predicts for region
at frame
T, under its corresponding mathematical framework
. In other words,
encodes the full local description or prediction that
assigns to any region and frame.
We now introduce the composite defined scenario of our universe. This is described by the map
where
represents the actual defined scenario of our universe at region
and time frame
T.
The key relation between
and
C is as follows: for each
, there exists at least one
such that
That is, at every location and time frame, the actual scenario coincides with the scenario given by at least one hypothetical universe.
There are two possible cases in this thought experiment. In the first case, only one hypothetical universe describes the local cubic volume at a given frame. In this situation, there exists a function
such that for every
:
Thus, exactly one universe describes that region of our universe at the given frame.
In the second case, more than one hypothetical universe describes the same cubic volume at a given frame. For this, we define a relation
such that for each
, the nonempty set
is precisely the set of universes whose descriptions agree with
C at that frame. Formally,
and this set may have cardinality
.
We must now consider the dynamics of how scenarios evolve over time frames, and in doing so, explain the fraction of our universe that corresponds to each. At time frame , suppose a hypothetical universe , with mathematical framework , successfully describes the defined scenario of region . At the next frame, however, it is possible that a different hypothetical universe , with framework , may instead describe the evolution of that same region . In other words, the responsibility for explaining the defined scenario of a given region can shift from one hypothetical universe to another as time progresses, although it may also remain with the same universe.
Moreover, in cases where more than one hypothetical universe provides a valid description of the same cubic region at a given frame, we require a mechanism — a kind of selection machine — that takes as input the set of hypothetical universes (each with its mathematical framework and corresponding defined scenarios), examines their predictions at that frame, and then assigns to each cubic region the defined scenario from whichever universe coincides with our own universe’s evolution.
Thus, at any given time frame
T, the following objects are known: for each universe
, its local description at
, namely
, as well as the composite defined scenario of the universe at time
T, namely
. We then define witness sets at each site as
By the hypothesis of the thought experiment, each
is nonempty. In essence,
is the set of witness universes for a region
at time frame
T: that is, all universes
whose prediction matches the actual scenario at that specific cubic volume and time frame. These are precisely the indices
k for which
meaning the universes that match reality at that location.
Now let us talk about the selection operator, which is defined as
where
is the output of the function. To understand this, note that
represents a list of all universe’s cubic region maps at time frame
T. Each map
specifies, for every region
, what scenario universe
predicts at time
T. The function
represents our universe’s composite defined scenario’s cubic region map at that same time. In essence,
S compares the predictions from all hypothetical universes at time
T with the actual observed scenarios of our universe at that same time, and then makes a selection. Thus,
S takes functions as input and produces
as output. Since
itself is a function, the operator
S effectively returns a function.
We now define
as follows:
This can be understood as follows: the domain of
is
V, the set of cubic regions (i.e., the actual universe), and the codomain is
. Here
is the power set of
(the set of all subsets of universes), from which we exclude the empty set
. Therefore, for each region
, the function
returns a nonempty subset of universes. In words,
Formally,
where
is the witness set, i.e., the set of all universes whose prediction or defined scenario matches reality (our universe) at region
. This constraint enforces that the machine is only allowed to select universes that agree with our universe in the given region at the given time frame.
We begin with a machine which, for given inputs, produces the required output. What remains is to design a rule or mechanism that determines which subset of candidate outputs to keep and which to discard. In other words, given the input, the machine must apply an underlying principle that selects the required output, thereby explaining the cubic regions of our universe at a given frame of time.
The idea behind this mechanism is as follows: for each cube at time T, we compare the microstate distribution of our universe’s observed scenario with the corresponding microstate distributions implied by each hypothetical universe’s scenario . We then apply a similarity measure, together with entropy-based constraints, to score each universe. The machine then selects the universe(s) with the top score(s) as the admissible witness set . The selected universe’s microstate dynamics are then used to predict .
Let
D denote the set of macro-defined scenarios. Each macrostate
corresponds to a (possibly large) set of microstates
. For our observed universe, the composite macrostate at
is denoted
. Its associated microstate distribution over
is written as
with normalization
For a hypothetical universe
, the macrostate of region
at time
T is
with microstate distribution
If , we map both to a common feature space (via coarse-graining, histograms, momenta, fields, etc.). From this point forward, we assume both distributions are defined on the same finite space (or ).
We require a numerical measure of closeness between
and
. For this we use the Bhattacharyya overlap [
19]:
This equals 1 if the two distributions are identical and 0 if their supports are disjoint. Larger overlap is better.
The Shannon entropy [
20] of a discrete distribution is defined as
For region
at time
T:
If microstate distributions are close, their entropies should also be close. We define the entropy mismatch as
where small values indicate better matches.
Each hypothetical universe
specifies a dynamical law governing how microstates evolve:
At time
T, universe
provides not a single microstate but a distribution:
The law
acts on distributions, yielding the prediction
The entropy at times
T and
is
Physically, not all entropy changes are admissible. We therefore impose a plausibility condition, for example requiring that entropy is non-decreasing on average:
The entropy-based score is defined as
where
is a sensitivity parameter. Thus, the entropy score of
at cube
is high if (i) its entropy matches the observed region closely, and (ii) its predicted entropy evolution is physically plausible.
This feeds into the canonical scoring rule:
where
are weights that balance similarity, entropy consistency, and the penalty term
, which discourages ’jumpy’ or overly complex explanations.
The selection operator
S returns
A canonical selection rule is
That is, for a cube at time T, we compute the score for every candidate universe , and select the universe(s) yielding the maximum score.
Once
is selected for cube
at time
T, its internal evolution law determines the subsequent state:
Thus, the predicted next state of cube
is
The composite predicted scenario of the universe at time
is then
This provides a patchwork-style prediction of the universe’s evolution across all cubic regions.
So, now let’s say we have selected a cubic region of our universe with a defined scenario . We consider two possibilities: (i) only one hypothetical universe at time frame explains or aligns with the defined scenario of our universe’s at the cubic region ; and (ii) more than one hypothetical universe—let’s say four such hypothetical universes—align with the defined scenario of our universe at that given cubic region .
The main argument is this: if all such abstract universes exist, and we imagine that there are infinitely many such hypothetical universes instead of just some finite number n, then all of them in one way or another explain some part of our universe. We consider our universe as a reference because we do not know whether multiple universes exist or not. These abstract universes, formed out of mathematical frameworks, exist since the mathematics used to build them is consistent. That means these universes exist apart from physical reality, something like Plato’s world of forms [
37]. A fraction of them, at a given frame, explains the physical reality we live in.
That is one way to argue based on the thought experiment. Another way is this: if mathematics is supposed to be the universal language to explain the universe [
10], then it should have one fixed framework. But as we saw in the thought experiment, this is not the case. That means mathematics is not the universal language in the way we thought it was. Maybe it is, but in a different sense. It is not a universal language, but rather a universal space of possible languages [
12]. This is very important, because it can also mean that there could exist other abstract languages which, if they exist, might validate interpretations that align with reality, or even suggest that the existence of such abstract universes is an independent reality on its own.
A third argument is this: what matters most is that mathematical abstraction connects to reality depending on the interpreter—whether it is a species or some other entity X—that is trying to comprehend it [
38]. The meaning and universality of mathematics are not in mathematics alone, but come out of the interaction with the intelligence interpreting it. This makes mathematics not an absolute thing but a relational entity. This idea is important because it means that in our first argument—where we said all abstractions exist in some form—only those that connect to our physical reality appear aligned. But for that to happen we need an interpreter, like a species, to actually understand or make sense of how such frameworks are aligning with reality.
For example, in our formalization of the thought experiment, in the selection mechanism we introduce microstate distributions and entropy [
20,
39]. A machine could use this to maximize alignment between a cubic region of our universe and the defined scenario of hypothetical universes at that given time frame, and then choose the universe that best explains our cubic region. Now think of another way to do the same task. Again we imagine a machine, but this time instead of using microstates or entropy, it relies on the third argument. Let’s say we have four interpreters: a human, an advanced AI, an alien species, and an animal on Earth (say a dolphin). Each of them acts as the mechanism for the machine to choose the most fitting defined scenario of hypothetical universes that matches our universe’s defined scenario at the cubic region and at that time frame.
One interpretation from this is that the method or rule each of the four uses to evaluate the hypothetical universes and match them to our cubic region will be different, because it depends on how they perceive or comprehend reality. But if we consider the opposite argument—that each species, whether human, AI, alien, or animal, will always use some method that is still part of the set of all possible methods of interpretation—then it follows that there must exist some scenario where all of them could actually choose the same method and select the same hypothetical universe’s scenario for our cubic volume. How that would happen is beyond the scope of this paper. But still, the argument stands until we have a clearer understanding of what we mean when we talk about a “universe,” and also what we mean by “mathematics” itself.
From here another argument arises. It could be possible that one of the most important aspects of mathematics, or its abstraction, is that we can never really understand what it exactly means [
40]. To do that, we would first have to understand where mathematics itself comes from. The problem is this: There are two possibilities: (i) Mathematics has existed since the universe came into existence [
12,
42]. If so, it would mean you cannot explain the universe with mathematics to such an extent, since the very language of mathematics itself arises from, or existed because of, the existence of the universe. (ii) You cannot explain mathematics using mathematics, because to do so you would have to explain its origin, and it already arises from mathematics. In simple terms, if we have x (say, a language) that originates from X (a universe here), then x cannot fully explain X, since x itself comes from X. This creates a limit of comprehension—x cannot explain X. Which means there is always an undecidability about whether x can explain X or not.
So these arguments lead us to ask whether, with such abstraction, we will ever really be able to understand the universe—or even what we mean when we say “universe.” Such questions can only be approached through more understanding and scientific development, which can help us comprehend the observational aspects of the universe. Step by step, piece by piece, we might then be able to pull out the ideas that shape our reality, and through that, move closer to understanding it.