Submitted:
04 September 2025
Posted:
05 September 2025
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
2.1. Rethinking Legitimacy in Mining
2.2. Governance, Good Governance, and Its Role in Legitimacy
2.3. Translating Good Governance into Mining Mechanisms
- The Social License to Operate (SLO) as an informal, dynamic form of community approval grounded in trust and engagement rather than legal compliance (Owen & Kemp, 2013). It has influenced ESG standards and corporate practice globally, but risks devolving into a narrow reputation management tool that overlooks structural power asymmetries and the role of state institutions (Hall et al., 2015; Brueckner & Eabrasu, 2018).
- Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), rooted in ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP (2007), codifies Indigenous peoples’ right to consent to projects affecting their territories. While fundamental to Indigenous rights, FPIC has limitations in pluralistic contexts where it risks becoming a procedural box-checking exercise, insufficient to address inequities or incorporate non-Indigenous stakeholders (Thorpe & Hughes, 2020; Kung et al., 2022).
2.4. Beyond Procedural Frameworks
2.5. Advancing Social Legitimacy for Mining
2.6. Research Gap and Justification
3. Methods
3.1. Research Design and Philosophical Orientation
3.2. Case Selection, Boundaries, and Units of Analysis
3.2.1. Units of Analysis
- Local communities – directly affected populations whose perspectives illuminate procedural justice and relational governance.
- Institutional actors – regulatory, judicial, and policy bodies central to institutional trust and credibility.
- National stakeholders – a diverse group including Indigenous leaders, business chambers, activists, academics, students and legal/policy experts. These actors influence public discourse, generate competing knowledge claims, and shape epistemic legitimacy and broader societal acceptance.
3.3. Data Collection
3.4. Data Analysis
4. Results
4.1. Procedural Justice: Transparency, Accountability, and Institutional Weakness
4.2. Trust and Institutional Credibility
4.3. Epistemic Legitimacy: Divergent Knowledge Claims and Environmental Concerns
4.4. Relational Governance: Intermediaries, Inclusion, and Plural Voices
4.5. Cross-Cutting Insight
5. Discussion
5.1. Legitimacy Beyond Technical Compliance
5.2. Trust, Institutions, and the Reconstruction of Legitimacy
5.3. Plural Voices and Uneven Influence
5.4. Global Frameworks, Local Skepticism
5.5. Toward a Stakeholder-Informed Framework: Social Legitimacy for Mining (SLM)
- Frames legitimacy as ongoing and interactive, shaped through four dimensions: procedural justice, institutional trust, epistemic legitimacy, and relational governance.
- Emphasizes multi-scalar applicability, from local to national and global levels.
- Incorporates stakeholder salience to analyze how power, legitimacy, and urgency shift across crises (Mitchell et al., 1997).
- Provides practical diagnostic tools to identify legitimacy breakdowns and chart pathways for restoration.
6. Policy and Practice Implications
- Institutionalize Binding Commitments: full implementation of Panama’s Escazú Agreement6 obligations—ensuring timely information access, participatory decision-making, and effective grievance mechanisms—could address core transparency and accountability concerns identified by participants.
- Integrate Measurable Standards in Regulation: while interviewees expressed skepticism toward voluntary initiatives, frameworks such as Towards Sustainable Mining (TSM)7 – formally endorsed by the Panamanian Chamber of Mines, CAMIPA - and ICMM Performance Expectations provide reference points for responsible practice. Their integration into public regulation, alongside independent oversight, may enhance institutional credibility.
- Illustrative Use of the IAP2 Spectrum for Public Engagement: to demonstrate a stepwise approach from informing to collaboration, this study adapts SLM to the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2)8 Spectrum as an example (IAP2, 2018). This globally recognized model can clarify how participation mechanisms might progress from simple information-sharing to empowered co-governance. Its use here is illustrative, pointing to options for incremental, context-sensitive reform, rather than prescribing a universal solution for Panama.
- Build Capacity and Empower Stakeholders: long-term legitimacy is likely to require sustained investment in technical, legal, and monitoring skills for regulators, communities, Indigenous organizations, and civil society, to ensure meaningful participation and oversight.
- Foster Multi-Actor Oversight Structures: aligning with SLM’s emphasis on relational governance, multi-actor oversight entities can support joint monitoring, deliberation, and accountability, but should be shaped by ongoing stakeholder input to reflect diverse perspectives and needs.
- Create a Depoliticized Mining Authority: to address institutional fragility and restore credibility, stakeholders emphasized the need for an autonomous, professionalized body capable of regulating the mining sector at arm’s length from partisan politics. In collaboration with the previous government (2019 – 2024) the IDB proposed the establishment of such a depoliticized Mining Authority in Panama, to ensure consistency, technical rigor, and accountability in governance. Anchoring this authority in law—with transparent appointment processes, independent funding mechanisms, and structured stakeholder representation—could mitigate risks of political capture, strengthen institutional trust, and provide a stable foundation for long-term sector governance (IDB, 2023).
6.1. Adaptation of the IAP2 Spectrum
| Level | Community Promise | Engagement Goal (within SLM) | Examples Practices for Panama |
| Inform | We will keep you informed, though this does not yet imply shared decision-making. | Provide transparent, accessible information as a baseline for legitimacy (necessary but insufficient on its own). | Public information portals on contracts, revenues, and monitoring data; open access to environmental impact assessments; site visits; disclosure consistent with Escazú obligations. |
| Consult | We will listen and explain how your input influences decisions. | Obtain stakeholder input on decisions and ensure visible feedback loops. | Public hearings with published responses; accessible feedback mechanisms; surveys and summaries in culturally and linguistically appropriate formats. |
| Involve | We will incorporate your concerns into decision-making. | Strengthen epistemic legitimacy by validating diverse knowledge systems (technical, Indigenous, community-based). | Stakeholder forums; technical workshops with communities; participatory mapping of biodiversity and water resources; integration of local knowledge into project design. |
| Collaborate | We will co-develop options and solutions with you. | Advance relational governance by fostering joint ownership of strategies and decisions. | Joint advisory boards (government–industry–Indigenous–civil society); tripartite commissions for strategic planning; participatory monitoring aligned with TSM standards. |
| Empower | We will make decisions together before implementation. | Institutionalize shared authority in critical areas, ensuring affected groups have meaningful influence. | Co-approval processes for high-risk decisions; Indigenous organizations with formal roles in governance structures relevant to their territories; community-led environmental monitoring with recognized authority in oversight. |
7. Conclusion
7.1. The Future of Mining and the Mining of the Future
7.2. Contribution and Way Forward
Closing Reflection
Funding
Ethics Statement
Reflexivity and Limitations
Data Availability Statement
Use of Artificial Intelligence Tools
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
Appendix A: Stakeholder Distribution by Gender

Appendix B: Perceptions of Mining: Risk vs Opportunity
- 5 respondents (20%) → opportunity only
- 18 respondents (72%) → both opportunity & risk
- 2 respondents (8%) → risk only
- 0 respondents (0%) → neither

Appendix C: Top 10 most frequent words in interviews

Appendix D: List of Notable Quotes from Interviewees in No Specific Order
| Quotes |
| “There are examples of responsible mining in Latin America. Panama should learn from them instead of banning the sector outright.” |
| “The government simply does not have the capacity or credibility to monitor a project of this size. People assumed corruption, and trust collapsed.” |
| “When no clear data is available, people imagine the worst. Fear spreads faster than facts.” |
| “Mining could transform Panama’s economy if managed transparently. It brings revenues and jobs that no other sector can match.” |
| “The country cannot depend only on the Canal. Mining offers a chance to diversify and fund social programs.” |
| “With so much rain, tailings are simply too risky here. The climate itself makes mining unviable here.” |
| “Even if mining could help the economy, no one trusts the institutions to manage it fairly.” |
| “Without transparency, no reform will matter. People must see the numbers and the monitoring in real time.” |
| “People want a voice, not a checkbox consultation. Real inclusion means being part of decisions, not just informed after.” |
| “Unless rules outlast the five-year political cycle, nothing will change. Stability is part of legitimacy.” |
| “There are examples of responsible mining in Latin America. Panama should learn from them instead of banning the sector outright.” |
| “Without trusted information, people imagine the worst. If local governments were stronger, communities educated, and companies truly part of the community, mining could be seen differently.” |
| “If the community sees transparency, stronger institutions, and real benefits, mining could be accepted — but not under the old model of secrecy and corruption.” |
| “Communities paid the price in health and environment but saw no benefits — mining will only be accepted if people are included and truly see the results.” |
| “People saw wealth leaving the mine but not reaching their communities — if mining returns, it must bring real benefits and be managed with honesty.” |
| “Mining needs independent oversight and credible institutions to be seen as legitimate. Trust must be rebuilt step by step — and young voices must be part of shaping that change.” |
| “Mining needs to be seen as the multisectoral driver that it is, not only an extractive business.” |
| “People rejected mining not just for the contract, but because they don’t trust the government. Transparency is the key.” |
| “Without legal certainty and strong institutions, mining in Panama will always face rejection — contracts must be clear, transparent, and genuinely beneficial to the people.” |
| “Mining was not banned because of geology or economics, but because the state lost legitimacy — people no longer trusted the process. Without institutions that inspire confidence, no contract will ever be seen as acceptable.” |
| “For mining to be accepted, people must identify with it as they do with the Canal. That sense of ownership, supported by education and trust-building, could take a generation to achieve.” |
| “The contract fell because of distrust. Mining can only return if oversight improves and citizens see tangible benefits.” |
| “Institutional weakness opened the door for extremism and fake news. To regain trust, Panama needs strong institutions, education to prevent radical contagion, and long-term coherent policies that integrate government and industry.” |
| “Mining can regain acceptance if we improve communication, ensure transparency, and demonstrate clear benefits for society.” |
| “Just as the Canal gave Panamanians a sense of ownership, mining too must be seen as ours. But legitimacy will take a generation to be regained, it needs to be shaped by today values of equality, minority rights, and environmental protection.” |
| “If you can see the scar of Donoso from space on Google Maps, of course people are afraid — but with more education and transparency, in 5 or 10 years I believe mining could be accepted again.” |
| “The problem is not mining itself but doing it the wrong way — with weak laws, poor oversight, and without educating the population.” |
| “Mining could only return if our communities are part of the decisions, with real benefits and respect for our rights — otherwise, it will always be rejected.” |
| “Is it really worth sacrificing our ecosystems and the future of our children just to send copper abroad, while the people see no real benefit?” |
| “Even if mining could help the economy, no one trusts the institutions to manage it fairly.” |
| “The government has no credibility. People don’t believe in its ability to audit mining operations or enforce environmental protections.” |
| “Mining is a necessity in today’s world, but in Panama it should only proceed if the operations minimize negative impacts and protect biodiversity.” |
| “We cannot let short-term economic pressure undo the protection of our environment and our communities.” |
Appendix E: Cross-Case Comparative Matrix - Themes Summary

Appendix F: Codebook Sample

| 1 | Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness, transparency, and inclusivity of decision-making processes, especially as experienced by stakeholders involved in governance arrangements (Tyler, 2006; Bäckstrand, 2006). |
| 2 | Cobre Panamá is operated by Minera Panamá S.A., a subsidiary of First Quantum Minerals Ltd., a Canadian mining company. |
| 3 | In Catholic social teaching, “creation” refers to the natural environment and all living beings as part of God’s creation. The phrase “defense of creation” is commonly used by the Church to frame ecological protection as both a moral and spiritual responsibility (see Francis, 2015, Laudato Si’). |
| 4 | Development Partner Institute. Mindsets: Faith-based dialogue in the mining sector. https://dpimining.org/mindsets/
|
| 5 | Comparative analysis of frameworks: The Social License to Operate (SLO); Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC); and the proposed Social Legitimacy for Mining (SLM). |
| 6 | The Escazú Agreement (2018) is a legally binding regional treaty for Latin America and the Caribbean that guarantees rights of access to environmental information, participation, and justice, and includes provisions to protect environmental defenders. |
| 7 | Towards Sustainable Mining (TSM) is a performance-based sustainability program created by the Mining Association of Canada in 2004. It requires participating companies to measure and publicly report on environmental and social performance across areas such as tailings management, community engagement, and biodiversity, with external verification to ensure transparency. |
| 8 | IAP2 is a global association established in 1990 that promotes the practice of inclusive, transparent, and effective decision-making processes by aligning public input with decision-making authority (IAP2, 2018). |
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| Dimension | SLO | FPIC | SLM (Proposed) |
| Core Objective | Community acceptance (voluntary) | Protection of Indigenous rights (legally mandated) | Broad-based, institutional and societal legitimacy |
| Primary Stakeholders | Local communities | Indigenous communities | All affected & influential actors, including state, civil society, industry |
| Legal/Normative Basis | Informal norm | International legal standard | Proposed governance framework grounded in legitimacy and multi-scalar inclusion |
| Target Scale | Project | Project & territorial | Institutional, regional, national level |
| Engagement Mechanisms | Dialogue, benefit-sharing | Prior, informed consent | Continuous co-constructive governance and trust building |
| Temporal Focus | Reactive | Pre-approval consent | Forward-looking and adaptive |
| Inclusivity/ Pluralism | Limited to local groups | Focuses on Indigenous rights holders | Multiple worldviews, institutions, and national publics |
| Procedural Mechanisms | Community agreements, monitoring | Consent procedures, standalone legal steps | Legitimacy thresholds, scenario planning, audits, cross-sector co-governance |
| Crisis Resilience | Firm-centric, lacks legal grounding, localized | Procedural insufficient in systemic crises | Co-produced, transparent, inclusive, justice-based decision-making |
| Institutional Trust Focus | Assumes stable institutions | Assumes legal enforcement | Centers credibility, accountability and systemic reform |
| Stakeholder Salience | Rarely explicit | Rarely explicit | Central: analyzes actor power, legitimacy, urgency |
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