Submitted:
22 July 2025
Posted:
23 July 2025
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. The State of the Art in Smart Energy Management
2.1. Energy Monitoring Paradigms: ILM vs. NILM
2.2. IoT Platforms for Energy Management
- Sensing Layer: Composed of sensors (temperature, humidity, occupancy) and actuators (relays, switches), this layer is the direct interface with the physical world, collecting data and executing commands.
- Network Layer: Includes gateways and data acquisition systems that aggregate information from sensors, convert formats, and provide connectivity to broader networks, such as the internet.
- Data Processing Layer: Acts as the central processing unit, where data is analyzed, pre-processed, and stored. Edge computing plays a growing role in this layer to improve efficiency.
- Application Layer: This is the interface with the end-user, providing visualization dashboards, alerts, and control through cloud or local applications.
2.3. Access Control for IoT Resources
- Discretionary Access Control (DAC): In this model, the owner of a resource defines access permissions. Its static nature and the need for manual management of access control lists (ACLs) make it unsuitable for dynamic and large-scale IoT environments.
- Role-Based Access Control (RBAC): RBAC grants permissions based on roles assigned to users. While it simplifies administration in some contexts, it faces the problem of "role explosion" in heterogeneous IoT ecosystems and has difficulty supporting the necessary dynamism.
- Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC): ABAC is widely considered the most promising model for IoT.12 It makes access decisions based on policies that evaluate a combination of attributes of the subject (user/device), object (resource), action, and environment (location, time of day). This flexibility allows for the creation of rich, dynamic, and context-sensitive access policies.
2.4. Security and Privacy in Smart Metering Systems
3. The PlugID Platform for Authenticated Energy Consumption
3.1. System Architecture
- The Edge (PlugID Devices): At the level closest to the user, multiple PlugID devices are deployed in electrical outlets. The design includes different models (PlugID-E, PlugID-E/AT, PlugID-ETH) to meet various use cases, from simple monitoring to authenticated measurement and correlation with environmental data.
- The Communication Layer: The devices at the edge use their Wi-Fi capabilities to securely transmit the collected data to a central broker. Communication is based on the MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) protocol, which operates on a publish/subscribe model.
- The Cloud (SmartEnergy Platform): A central server hosts the MQTT broker (mosquitto) and the data analytics platform, named SmartEnergy. This platform is responsible for receiving, storing, processing, and visualizing the data. It was implemented using the Elastic Stack technology, with Elasticsearch for storage and indexing, and Kibana for creating visualization and analysis dashboards.
3.2. The PlugID Device: Hardware and Firmware
- Rule1: This set of rules handles periodic and initialization events. One rule is triggered on system startup to obtain and store the device's MAC address, which serves as a unique identifier. Another rule is triggered periodically (every teleperiod) to publish a status message via MQTT, containing the MAC, an authentication capability indicator (TokenAuth), and the UID of the currently logged-in user (if any).
- Rule2: This set is dedicated to the RFID authentication logic. It is triggered by read events from the RC522 module. When a card is brought near, the rule checks if a session is already active. If not, it stores the card's UID, starts a new session, and triggers an LED for visual feedback. If a session is already active, the rule checks if the presented card's UID is the same as the current session's. If so, the session is terminated. Cards with different UIDs are ignored while a session is active.
3.3. Secure Communication and Data Model
4. Case Study
4.1. Implementation of hardware, firmware, and software
- Possibility of high granularity in the temporal aspect of energy consumption monitoring;
- Ease of connection to electrical outlets and circuits typical of homes and offices;
- Ability to identify the user responsible for energy consumption at each instant of time;
- Interoperability without relying on specific software applications to access consumer data.
4.2. Deployment Scenario
- PlugID-E/AT (with authentication): Installed at shared workstations, where multiple employees could use the same computer at different times. RFID authentication was necessary to attribute consumption to the correct user.
- PlugID-E (without authentication): Used at fixed workstations, assigned to a single individual, where continuous authentication was considered unnecessary for the proof of concept.
- PlugID-ETH (with environmental sensor): Positioned in key locations to collect temperature and humidity data, allowing for the correlation between environmental conditions and energy consumption, especially of the air conditioning system.
4.3. Data Collection and Visualization
- Tasmota Web Console: Each PlugID device offers a local web interface for real-time configuration and monitoring. Figure 7 shows an example of this interface, with instantaneous readings of power, voltage, current, and, in applicable models, temperature, humidity, and the UID of the last RFID session.
- MQTT Broker: On the server, raw data arrived as JSON messages, as per the examples in Table 3. This confirmed the correct data flow and proper formatting.
- SmartEnergy Platform (Kibana): The data ingested and stored in Elasticsearch was used to create interactive dashboards in Kibana. These dashboards, as exemplified in Figure 6, allowed for the visualization of energy consumption time series, the correlation of consumption peaks with authenticated user sessions, and the analysis of the impact of environmental factors on energy use.
- analyze energy consumption data;
- implement energy consumption policies.
4.4. Proof of Concept: Enabling Granular Energy Policies
- Accountability Scenario: An office manager observes, through the SmartEnergy dashboard, a spike in energy consumption at a shared workstation over the weekend. Traditional aggregated consumption would only flag the event. With the PlugID platform, the manager can cross-reference the timestamp of the consumption peak with the RFID session logs. The system reveals that UID "9996E8B8" was logged in at that time, allowing the manager to identify the responsible user and initiate a targeted conversation about the policy for using equipment outside of working hours. This transforms an anonymous problem into a matter of personal responsibility.
- Active Access Control Scenario: Based on the collected data, which shows a pattern of equipment being left on overnight, the company decides to implement a more active energy policy. Using the control capabilities of the PlugID (via its internal relay), a rule is configured on the SmartEnergy platform: all workstation outlets are automatically de-energized at 8:00 PM. Access after this time is only permitted if the user authenticates with an RFID token associated with a profile that has "after-hours access" privileges. This scenario demonstrates the transition from passive monitoring to active and dynamic access control, a key feature of advanced energy management systems.
5. Discussion
5.1. The Impact of Authentication on Energy-Related Behavior
5.2. Security and Privacy Analysis of the PlugID Platform
5.3. Limitations and Future Directions
- Scale: The deployment was a small-scale proof of concept (seven devices in a single office). The scalability of the platform, both in terms of device management and data processing, was not tested in a large-scale deployment.
- Duration: The data collection period was relatively short, which prevents the extraction of statistically significant conclusions about long-term behavioral changes.
- Focus: The main objective of the project was the development and validation of the technological tool (the PlugID platform), rather than conducting a formal study of energy efficiency or behavior.
- Longitudinal Behavioral Study: Conduct a large-scale, long-term deployment in different types of environments (e.g., offices, university labs, co-working spaces) to quantitatively measure the impact of authenticated consumption on energy savings and behavioral change.
- Enhanced Authentication: Integrate alternative and more secure authentication factors to overcome the limitations of RFID. This could include PINs entered on an attached keypad, biometric authentication, or, more pragmatically, authentication based on smartphone apps (via Bluetooth Low Energy or Wi-Fi).
- Advanced ABAC Policies: Develop and implement more complex, attribute-based energy access control policies on the SmartEnergy platform. For example, policies that grant different energy quotas to different user roles or that dynamically adjust access based on the time of day and the cost of grid energy.
- Integration with Building Management Systems (BMS): Explore the integration of the PlugID platform with existing commercial BMS. This would allow authenticated consumption data at the outlet level to be correlated with data from centralized systems (like HVAC and lighting), providing a truly holistic view of the building's energy use.
6. Conclusion
Author Contributions
Funding
Conflicts of Interest
Abbreviations
| ABAC | Attribute-Based Access Control |
| ACL | Access Control List |
| ADC | Analog-to-Digital Converter |
| BMS | Building Management System |
| CA | Certificate Authority |
| DAC | Discretionary Access Control |
| DoS | Denial of Service |
| ESP | Espressif Systems Platform |
| ETH | Environmental Temperature and Humidity (PlugID variant) |
| FDI | False Data Injection |
| GPIO | General-Purpose Input/Output |
| HVAC | Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning |
| ILM | Intrusive Load Monitoring |
| IoT | Internet of Things |
| JSON | JavaScript Object Notation |
| MAC | Media Access Control (Address) |
| MFA | Multi-Factor Authentication |
| MQTT | Message Queuing Telemetry Transport |
| NILM | Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring |
| OTA | Over-The-Air (Firmware Update) |
| PUF | Physical Unclonable Function |
| RBAC | Role-Based Access Control |
| RFID | Radio-Frequency Identification |
| SPI | Serial Peripheral Interface |
| TLS | Transport Layer Security |
| UID | Unique Identifier |
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| Feature | Intrusive Load Monitoring (ILM) |
Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM) |
PlugID (Authenticated ILM) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Accuracy | High |
Variable (lower than ILM) |
High |
| Installation Cost | High | Low |
Moderate (per measurement point) |
| Installation Complexity | High | Low | Moderate (plug-and-play) |
| Maintenance | Difficult | Easy | Easy (per device) |
| Privacy | Invasive | Preserved |
Requires data governance policies |
| Granularity (Appliance Level) | Yes | Yes (inferred) | Yes |
| Granularity (User Level) | No | No | Yes (main feature) |
| Component | Model | Key Specifications | Rationale for Selection |
|---|---|---|---|
| Microcontroller | ESP8266 NodeMCU v2 - ESP12 | Integrated Wi-Fi, 11 GPIO pins, analog-to-digital converter | Low cost, wide availability, active development community, sufficient processing power for the application. |
| Energy Measurement Module | PZEM-004T | AC voltage measurement, current (up to 100 A), power. Serial communication. | Indirect measurement via current coil (non-invasive), ease of integration, and simple data interface. |
| Authentication Module | MFRC522 RFID Reader | 13.56 MHz frequency, supports MIFARE cards, SPI interface. | Market standard for token-based authentication, low cost, and mature software libraries. |
| Power Supply | Mini Hi-link 5V Power Supply | Bivolt input (100-240 VAC), 5 VDC output. | Compact and sealed, allows powering the circuit directly from the electrical outlet safely. |
| Environmental Sensor (ETH Model) | AM2302/DHT22 | Temperature and humidity measurement. | Allows correlation between energy consumption and environmental conditions, aiding in deeper efficiency analyses. |
| Model | Example JSON Data Payload |
|---|---|
| PlugID-E | { "Time":"2021-07-27T17:35:42", "ENERGY":{ "Total":0.008, "Power":12, "Voltage":128, "Current":0.168 } } |
| PlugID-E/AT | { "Time":"2021-07-27T18:08:29", "RC522":{ "UID":"9996E8B8", "Type":"MIFARE 1KB" } } (in addition to energy data) |
| PlugID-ETH | { "Time":"2021-07-27T17:35:42", "AM2301":{ "Temperature":29.2, "Humidity":48.5 }, "TempUnit":"C" } (in addition to energy data) |
| SM-3W Lite (AC) | {"variable":"PT", "value":79.33, "unit":"W"} {"variable":"IA", "value":6.92, "unit":"A"} |
| Threat Category | Specific Threat | Platform Vulnerability | Proposed Mitigation / Future Work |
|---|---|---|---|
| Communication Channel | Eavesdropping, Man-in-the-Middle | Interception of MQTT data in transit. | Implemented: Use of TLS to encrypt the MQTT channel, protecting data confidentiality and integrity. 18 |
| Device Authentication | Spoofing Attack | Cloning of RFID cards to gain unauthorized access. 14 | Future Mitigation: Implement Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA), such as RFID + PIN, or use more secure methods like smartphone-based authentication. |
| Physical Security | Node Tampering, Fake Node | An attacker with physical access can alter the PlugID's hardware/firmware or replace it with a malicious device. 11 | Mitigation: Implement cabinets with physical security seals. Future Work: Investigate the use of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for hardware attestation. |
| Availability | Denial of Service (DoS) | The centralized MQTT broker is a single point of failure and can be targeted by flooding attacks. 14 | Future Mitigation: Implement load balancing and traffic filtering mechanisms. Investigate decentralized or federated broker architectures. |
| Data Privacy | Activity Inference | Granular and authenticated consumption data can be used to monitor employee activities in detail. 16 | Mitigation: Implement strict data governance policies with access control to raw data. Future Work: Develop privacy-preserving aggregation and anonymization techniques for less granular analyses. |
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