Submitted:
24 April 2025
Posted:
25 April 2025
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Basic Terms
2.2. NIS360 [9]
- Energy
- Transport
- Finance
- Health
- Drinking and waste water
- Digital infrastructure
- ICT service management
- Public administrations
- Space
- ICT Service Management
- Space
- Public Administration
- Maritime
- Health
- Gas
2.3. NIS2
- The manage cybersecurity-related risks.
- The reporting of cyber incidents.
- The minimum compliance with cybersecurity standards.
2.4. Cyber Events Database—European Repository of Cyber Incidents (EuRepoC) [10]
- Incident Description: The text provides a detailed account of the event, offering a comprehensive narrative that captures the essence of the occurrence.
- Type of Incident: These threats are classified into various subtypes, including data breaches, ransomware, denial-of-service attacks, and phishing attempts.
- Sector Affected: The following sectors have been identified as being impacted by the incident: public, healthcare, finance, and information technology.
- Geographical Location: The region or country in which the incident was registered is specified, thereby enabling geographically focused analysis of cyber threats.
- Date and Time of Incident: The documentation of the incident is imperative for conducting a trend analysis.
- Impact Assessment: The evaluation process is intended to ascertain the consequences of the incident on affected entities. Such consequences may include financial losses and operational disruption.
- Mitigation Efforts: The following information is provided for the purpose of elucidating the responses to the incident: updates to security measures, public disclosures, and alterations to policy.
- Malware Attacks: This encompasses a range of malicious software, including viruses, worms, and Trojan horses, which are designed to compromise the integrity of the system.
- Phishing Attacks: In the realm of cybersecurity, incidents involving the masquerade of attackers as legitimate entities to obtain sensitive information are of particular concern.
- Data Breaches: The phenomenon of events involving unauthorized access to confidential data, which frequently encompasses sensitive personal data, is of particular concern.
- Denial-of-Service: The phenomenon of service unavailability, often characterized by an excessive influx of requests directed towards a particular system, is a salient example of this phenomenon.
- Insider Threats: Incidents stemming from actions taken by individuals within the organization, whether intentionally or not, that result in harm.
- Data-Driven Insights: EuRepoC plays a pivotal role in this endeavor by aggregating diverse incident data, thereby facilitating research into patterns and trends within the cybersecurity landscape in Europe.
- Policy Formulation: is the process of establishing guidelines and regulations for the governance of an organization, institution, or system. It is evident that policymakers have the capacity to employ the findings from EuRepoC in order to formulate regulations that are intended to fortify cyber defenses on a sector-wide basis.
- Security Awareness: Organizations can utilize this database to assess their vulnerability to prevalent cyber threats, facilitating the implementation of proactive rather than reactive strategies.
- International Collaboration: EuRepoC, a European-centered initiative, fosters collaboration and information sharing among member states, ultimately enhancing collective cybersecurity measures.
2.5. Cyber Events Database—University of Maryland [11,12,13]
Event Date and Year
Actors Involved
- Criminal: Organizations engaging in illicit activities for financial profit.
- Nation-State: Entities affiliated with government bodies or militaries.
- Terrorist: Non-state actors employing violence or intimidation for political objectives.
- Hacktivist: Groups or individuals conducting cyber-attacks for political or social causes.
- Hobbyist: Individuals acting out of curiosity or interest rather than for financial gain.
Target Organization Details
Motives of the Actors
- Protest: Activities aimed at causing service disruptions to convey political messages.
- Sabotage: Actions leading to the irreversible destruction of information or networks.
- Espionage: The act of improperly accessing networks to acquire intelligence.
- Financial: The exfiltration of sensitive data for economic gain.
Event Type Classification
- Disruptive: Events that disrupt normal operations.
- Exploitive: Events that entail stealing sensitive information.
- Mixed: Uniting both disruptive and exploitative elements, exemplified by ransomware attacks.
Event Sub-Types
- Message Manipulation: Tampering with organizational messages, affecting communication accuracy.
- External Denial of Services: Attacks executed from external networks to halt communication.
- Internal Denial of Services: Disruptions instigated from within the organization’s infrastructure.
- Data Attack: Actions aimed at damaging, encrypting, or manipulating data.
- Physical Attack: Direct manipulation of IT components affecting physical systems.
- Exploitation of Sensors: Data theft from peripheral devices.
- Exploitation of End Host: Information theft from individual user devices.
- Exploitation of Network Infrastructure: Theft accomplished via direct access to network devices.
- Exploitation of Application Server: Gaining access to data through application vulnerabilities.
- Exploitation of Data in Transit: Theft of information while in transit between devices.
Additional Information
- Event Description (description): A concise narrative detailing the event, typically ranging from one to three sentences.
- Source URL (source_url): A direct link to the information source utilized in compiling the data.
- Target Country (targeted_country): An ISO three-letter code identifying the country where the target organization is located.
- Actor Country (actor_country): A corresponding ISO three-letter code for the location of the actor.
- Trend Analysis: It is imperative for users to engage in the analysis of data to identify trends in cyber incidents. Such trends may include the increasing prevalence of ransomware attacks or targeted attacks against critical infrastructure, which have escalated in recent years.
- Sector Vulnerabilities: By examining the database’s categorization of incidents, researchers can identify sectors that are particularly vulnerable to cyber threats. This information can then inform risk assessments and resource allocation.
- Impact Assessment: The database facilitates the evaluation of the impact of specific incidents on organizations and broader societal implications, including economic repercussions and effects on national security.
- Policy Development: It is imperative that policymakers take advantage of the findings from the database in order to formulate cybersecurity legislation and frameworks that are informed and take into account the most prevalent threats and vulnerabilities present in various sectors.
- Historical Context: The historical documentation of cyber incidents provides a context for understanding contemporary threats and the evolution of cybersecurity strategies from both organizational and governmental perspectives.
2.6. Methodology
- The Actors and the Cyber incidents
- The Industry sectors and the Cyber incidents
- Criminal
- Nation-State
- Terrorist
- Hacktivist
- Hobbyist
- Disruptive
- Exploitive
- Mixed
3. Results
- H0: The null hypothesis posits that “Actor Type is independent of Event Type”.
- H1: The alternative hypothesis posits that “Actor Type is not independent of Event Type”.



| Symmetric Measures | |||
| Value | Approximate Significance | ||
| Nominal by Nominal | Phi | .405 | <.001 |
| Cramer’s V | .234 | <.001 | |
| N of Valid Cases | 14041 | ||
- The expected cell frequencies all met the required conditions (80% of the cells are greater than or equal to 5).
- The categories of the categorical variables are more than two.
- The sample size is large.
- H0: The null hypothesis posits that “ Industry is independent of Event Type”.
- H1: The alternative hypothesis posits that “ Industry is not independent of Event Type”.


- The expected cell frequencies all met the required conditions (80% of the cells are greater than or equal to 5).
- The categories of the categorical variables are more than two.
- The sample size is large.
4. Discussion
5. Conclusions
References
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/1148/oj/eng.
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj.
- https://www.enisa.europa.eu/.
- https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/2024-report-on-the-state-of-the-cybersecurity-in-the-union.
- https://cissm.umd.edu/research-impact/publications/cyber-events-database-home.
- https://eurepoc.eu/database/.
- https://libguides.library.kent.edu/spss/chisquare.
- https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2019/881/oj/eng.
- https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/enisa-nis360-2024.
- https://eurepoc.eu/.
- https://cissm.umd.edu/cyber-events-database.
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