Submitted:
07 November 2024
Posted:
07 November 2024
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. The Concept of Blockchain Scalability
- The range approach involves dividing the database into ranges from which shards are formed. For example, records can be grouped by country or GDP level, but this approach can lead to uneven distribution of data.
- The key approach uses a hash function to distribute records between shards. This method provides a more even distribution of data.
- The directory approach is based on the creation of an intermediate table that determines which shard is responsible for certain data.
- Client-level routing requires the client to be aware of sharding, which increases the complexity of the client code.
- Proxy routing adds a proxy node between the client and the database, but creates a single point of failure and limits the ability to perform complex queries.
- Network sharding, which reduces network bandwidth requirements.
- Transactional sharding, which divides transactions between committees to achieve consensus.
- State sharding, which manages transactions between shards, which is necessary for complex applications such as NFTs and smart contracts.
- Transactional and state sharding;
- Network and transactional sharding;
- Network and state sharding;
- Simultaneous use of all three types of sharding.
2.2. Protocols
2.2.1. Elastico
2.2.2. OmniLedger
2.2.3. Pyramid
2.2.4. Repchain
2.2.5. SSchain
2.2.6. Brokerchain
2.2.7. Meepo
- Cross-epoch - during this time, all cross-calls caused by transactions between shards are combined for batch processing.
- Replay-epoch - during this time, erroneous transactions are removed from blocks and then re-executed. This ensures transaction atomicity.
- Shard flag. It is set by the transaction initiator.
- Stage flag. It is set by the contract developer. Each transaction is divided into several stages. Each stage is processed in different shards, thus converting inter-shard transactions into intra-shard transactions. This approach is also known as distributed transactions. A stage is executed in only one shard, and different stages of several transactions can be executed in parallel in different shards.
2.2.8. AHL
2.2.9. Benzene
2.2.10. CycLedger
2.3. Changing the Shard System
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Results
- Sharding and DAG are the most promising technologies for increasing the scalability of blockchains, allowing them to process a large number of transactions in parallel. For example, RapidChain in sharding reaches 4220 transactions per second, and CoDAG in DAG reaches 1151 transactions per second. However, these technologies face serious security threats. In sharding, the main threat is a 1% attack, in which an attacker can control one shard, compromising the entire system. In DAG, there is a risk of double spending due to probabilistic transaction confirmation methods.
- Segwit provide a smaller increase in scalability compared to sharding and DAG, but they significantly improve security. Segwit solves the problem of changing transaction identifiers (malleability), which makes the system more resilient, but its increase in block size partially solves the scalability problem
- Balance between scalability and security: Sharding and DAG offer solutions to significantly increase throughput, but require further development to address security risks. At the same time, Segwit and MAST offer robust solutions to improve security, but their scaling potential is limited. The choice of technology depends on the priority: if scalability is a key concern, then sharding and DAG will be preferable, but for projects with increased security requirements, Segwit and MAST may be the best choice.
3.1.1. PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance):
- This algorithm has shown high efficiency in conditions of a limited number of nodes, since it allows the network to operate even with up to a third of faulty nodes. PBFT provides fault tolerance and allows maintaining data consistency, which is critical for scalable systems. Its algorithmic structure allows processing a large number of transactions in a short period of time, which contributes to high network throughput.
3.1.2. PoAh (Proof of Authentication):
- Although this algorithm is aimed at low-power devices in IoT networks, its concept of trust levels and authentication mechanism allow for a significant reduction in resource consumption. This makes PoAh potentially suitable for scalable systems where it is necessary to take into account the diversity of nodes with different computing power. Its ability to adapt to changing network conditions and minimize computational costs also contributes to improving overall performance and efficiency.
3.2. Problems and Challenges
3.2.1. PoW-Based Node Selection
3.2.2. PoS-Based Node Selection
3.2.3. Consensus Within a Shard
- Reducing the complexity of communication within a shard. Reaching consensus within a shard requires several rounds of voting, which increases the load on the network and reduces efficiency with a large number of nodes. An important task is to reduce the communication complexity while maintaining security.
- Detection and replacement of malicious committees. Despite security measures, committees can be compromised. Future research should focus on mechanisms for detecting malicious committees through honest nodes and restoring or replacing them.
- Efficient mechanism for changing the leader. The process of changing the leader in a committee should be simplified, with a decrease in the volume of communications. Fair and rational approaches to the election of a new leader and the distribution of load among participants are also needed.
- Integration with sharding protocols. Intra-shard consensuses must be improved to handle inter-shard transactions. This requires more precise protocol design to ensure correct handling of different types of data
- 1% attack. In PoW-based sharding blockchains, an attacker can concentrate power on one shard and take over it with fewer resources than for a classic 51% attack. The problem requires the development of new solutions that prevent attacks while maintaining efficient distribution of computing and network resources.
- Complex processing of inter-shard transactions. Due to weak consistency in asynchronous sharding blockchains, transactions are not confirmed instantly, which complicates their processing. More research is needed to simplify the transaction confirmation process in such systems.
3.3. Cross-Shard Transactions
Client-Centric 2PC
- Malicious leader behavior. In the preparation phase, if the liveness certificate (proof of input correctness) is generated by a single leader, as in Omniledger, rather than by the BFT committee, the leader may provide false evidence or not respond at all. This may lead to a successful double-spend attack and compromise the integrity of the blockchain protocol.
- Blocked transaction input. If a client acts as a coordinator and then stops sending the required evidence to other shards, the transaction input may be blocked. This is especially critical for multi-inputs from different users, such as crowdfunding.
- Increased client load. The client must track the shard state and node IP addresses to communicate with the committee leader, which increases the storage and communication load. This is unacceptable for lightweight clients, such as those on mobile devices.
- Multiple BFT calls. To confirm a single transaction, the input and output committees must run the BFT algorithm multiple times, which increases the load on the nodes. Solutions need to be developed to handle multiple transactions in a single cycle.
- Attacks. Attacks such as a replay attack are possible, where an attacker uses a previously generated certificate to forge a proof. To prevent such attacks, it is necessary to bind the transaction identifier to the certificate. A transaction flooding attack is also possible, where an adversary creates multiple transactions for a single shard, disrupting the system.
- Malicious coordinator. If the coordinator in a shard-oriented approach turns out to be malicious, it can slow down or block the certificate collection process. Mechanisms for protecting against such actions are needed.
3.4. Conceptual Model
- Transaction Sharding: Dividing and distributing transactions across shard subgroups for parallel processing.
- State Sharding: Dividing the global blockchain state across shard subgroups to reduce the load on each individual node.
- Network Sharding: Dynamically distributing the node network into groups (shards) to reduce communication overhead and improve load balancing.
- Multi-level consensus: Consensus occurs at several levels - within the transaction shard, within the state shard, and within the network shard. This ensures a high degree of decentralization and security.
- Inter-shard consensus: For operations that require interaction between shards, a special mechanism is used to ensure the atomicity and integrity of data.
3.5. Testing of Conceptual Model
4. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
References
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| Algorithm | Operating principle | Scalability | Security | Support for cross-shard transactions | Consensus algorithm | Disadvantages |
| Elastico | Permissionless sharding. Nodes are distributed among committees that use PoW for validation. Time is divided into epochs. | Good. Allows transactions to be processed in parallel across different shards, increasing throughput. | Limited. The lack of intershard transactions reduces overall security, as funds may be blocked. | Not supported | Proof of Work (PoW) to create unique node identifiers. | No support for cross-shard transactions. Nodes must maintain a global ledger, which reduces performance. |
| OmniLedger | An improved version of Elastico with dynamic node selection for new epochs and the Atomix protocol for handling cross-shard transactions. | Very good. Parallel transaction processing and dynamic node configuration improve scalability. | High. Atomix provides atomic and secure cross-shard transactions | Supported via Atomix protocol | Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) combined with Atomix for cross-shard transactions | Complex coordination between nodes requires significant computing resources. |
| Pyramid | Multi-level sharding: i-shards process transactions, b-shards coordinate inter-shard transactions. | High. The multi-tier structure improves the processing of complex transactions and increases throughput. | Moderate. High resource requirements for b-shards, which may reduce security when they are overloaded | Supported. Transactions are coordinated via b-shards. | Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT) in i-shards, coordination via b-shards. | Static shard configuration reduces network flexibility. B-shards require significant resources. |
| RepChain | Nodes are assigned a shard ranking based on their contribution to consensus. Each shard has leaders. Two chains are used: transaction and reputation. | Moderate: The reputation system improves resource allocation, but requires effective management. | High: The reputation system motivates nodes to behave honestly, but may be vulnerable to slow adaptation attacks. | Limited. Shard leaders coordinate inter-shard operations. | Raft for intra-shard consensus and CSBFT (Consensus State Byzantine Fault Tolerance) for transaction confirmation. | Vulnerability to attacks on shard leaders. The reputation system can be slow to adapt to changing conditions. |
| SSchain | Two-tier architecture. The root chain verifies transactions created in shards, creating a DAG structure. | Good. Improves efficiency with two-tier architecture and parallel transaction processing | High. The main chain verifies transactions, preventing double-spend attacks. | Supported at the root chain level. | Proof of Work (PoW) in shard networks, verification at the main chain level. | Requires storing full data on the main chain, which creates a load on the network |
| Brokerchain | Load balancing and transaction pruning across shards to address hot shard congestion. | High. Load balancing strategy and the ability to have one account in multiple shards improves performance. | High: Using a two-phase locking protocol for cross-shard transactions improves security. | Supported. Two-phase locking (2PL) protocol is used. | Two-Phase Locking (2PL) for reconciling cross-shard transactions. | The locking protocol creates a delay for confirming intershard transactions |
| Meepo | Some nodes in the consortium store the full state of the blockchain, but transactions are only processed in their assigned clusters. | Moderate. Increased performance due to trust relationships between nodes in the same cluster. | Moderate: Trust relationships between nodes reduce the cost of verification, but limit security. | Limited. Intershard transactions are processed in stages. | Proof of Authority (PoA) for internal operations in clusters | Not a full-fledged sharding system. Depends on trust between nodes in the same cluster. |
| AHL | Full sharding based on Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Nodes are distributed randomly | High. Random distribution of nodes improves scalability and performance. | Moderate: Probabilistic security, not absolute, which limits protection against attacks | Supported | Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT), with Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) for node randomization | Does not provide absolute security as it relies on probabilistic models. |
| Benzene | Dual chain (proposal chain and voting chain) to separate transactions and consensus | High. Separation of consensus and transactions allows for higher throughput. | High. Requires control of more than half of the shards for a successful attack. | Supported. Two-phase locking protocol validates cross-shard transactions. | Two-Phase Locking (2PL) for processing intershard transactions, SGX for block validation. | High latency for cross-shard transaction confirmations (over 300 seconds). Memory limitation for large states. |
| CycLedger | Reputation-based sharding using randomized leader election and a partial node system to monitor leaders. | Moderate. The reputation system motivates nodes to behave honestly, but makes it difficult to manage leaders. | High: The partial node and reputation system improves security by monitoring the actions of leaders. | Limited. Partial nodes can replace leaders in case of protocol violation. | VRF (Verifiable Random Function) for random leader selection and Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) for consensus | Vulnerability to attacks on leaders. Incomplete separation of the consensus process and the recording of transactions |
| Technology | Scalability | Security |
| Sharding |
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| DAG |
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| Segwit |
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