Version 1
: Received: 16 November 2023 / Approved: 16 November 2023 / Online: 17 November 2023 (08:41:47 CET)
How to cite:
Ruimin, M.; Lifei, Y. Evolution and Equilibrium of a Low Carbon E-commerce Closed-Loop Supply Chain Recycling System: An Evolutionary Game Approach. Preprints2023, 2023111093. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202311.1093.v1
Ruimin, M.; Lifei, Y. Evolution and Equilibrium of a Low Carbon E-commerce Closed-Loop Supply Chain Recycling System: An Evolutionary Game Approach. Preprints 2023, 2023111093. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202311.1093.v1
Ruimin, M.; Lifei, Y. Evolution and Equilibrium of a Low Carbon E-commerce Closed-Loop Supply Chain Recycling System: An Evolutionary Game Approach. Preprints2023, 2023111093. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202311.1093.v1
APA Style
Ruimin, M., & Lifei, Y. (2023). Evolution and Equilibrium of a Low Carbon E-commerce Closed-Loop Supply Chain Recycling System: An Evolutionary Game Approach. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202311.1093.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Ruimin, M. and Yao Lifei. 2023 "Evolution and Equilibrium of a Low Carbon E-commerce Closed-Loop Supply Chain Recycling System: An Evolutionary Game Approach" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202311.1093.v1
Abstract
The rapid advancement of technology has led to increased electronic consumption and a corresponding rise in e-waste generation. To address this issue, this study develops a low-carbon e-commerce closed-loop supply chain (LCE-CLSC) system with remanufacturer, platform, and the government as key stakeholders. An evolutionary game approach is employed to investigate the system's dynamics, analyzing the impact of stakeholder strategies on system equilibrium. Numerical simulations reveal important findings: Firstly, government initiatives promoting recycling, carbon taxes on traditional products, can incentivize remanufacturers to produce low-carbon items and encourage platform investment in recycling services. Secondly, higher sales revenues motivate remanufacturers to produce low-carbon products. Thirdly, consumer sensitivity to recycling services strengthens waste recovery when platforms increase investments in these services, leading to remanufacturers choosing low-carbon production. Lastly, government subsidies may become ineffective if the cost of remanufacturers' carbon reduction and platforms' recycling services exceeds their affordability. These findings offer insights for the sustainable development of obsolete electronic product recycling systems.
Keywords
Low carbon; remanufacturing; E-commerce platform; Closed-loop supply chain; evolutionary game
Subject
Business, Economics and Management, Business and Management
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
