India, the world’s most populous country, is the world's third-largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs). Despite employing several energy sources, it still relies heavily on coal, its primary energy source. Given India’s swiftly rising energy demand, this challenges meeting emission reduction targets. India has significantly increased investments in renewables like solar and hydrogen in recent years. While commendable, these initiatives alone cannot meet the country's expanding energy demands. In the short term, India must rely on both domestic and imported fossil fuels, with natural gas being the most environmentally friendly option. In this context, this paper attempts to forecast energy consumption, natural gas production, and consumption in India till 2050 using both univariate and multivariate forecasting methods. For multivariate forecasting, we have assumed two alternative possibilities for GDP growth: the business-as-usual and the high-growth scenarios. Each of our forecasts indicates a notable shortfall in the projected production of natural gas compared to the expected demand, implying our results are robust. Our model predicts that nearly 30-50 percent of India’s natural gas consumption will be met by imports, mainly in the form of LNG. Based on these findings, this paper recommends that Indian government policies emphasize increasing domestic natural gas production, importing LNG, and expanding renewable energy resources.

Partially state-owned firms are common in both developed and developing countries and contribute around 10% of the world's GDP. This has led to a rich literature exploring various aspects of competition between such “mixed”-ownership firms. This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying the effects of mixed ownership on the intensity of competition in oligopoly markets. Our findings indicate that state ownership exerts an anti-competitive influence, with a higher state ownership share resulting in less aggressive behavior by firms in the product market. This result implies that industries with a higher proportion of state ownership yield lower total surplus. Further, when considering factors such as taxes, soft budget constraints, and weak property rights, the anti-competitive effects of state ownership are accentuated.