Submitted:
14 November 2026
Posted:
16 November 2026
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Abstract
Audits reveal that excessive packaging is a major cause of PPP project stagnation, yet its attributes and dimensions remain unclear. Clarifying these dimensions is critical for mitigating behavioral risks and advancing standardized operations. Applying constructivist grounded theory, the study builds a multidimensional framework for excessive packaging behavior in PPP projects, based on 220 valid samples collected through literature retrieval, web crawling, and interviews, and analyzed via iterative initial, focused, axial, and theoretical coding. Six core dimensions emerge: project expected returns, project entities, contract descriptions, project debt, financing structure, and project nature. The findings further identify two behavioral characteristics: prominent public-private stakeholder heterogeneity and phased differential distribution across the project lifecycle. The study completes the systematic dimension construction of excessive packaging as a behavioral risk, providing a diagnostic basis for the early identification of inflated and distorted project risk sources and for improving PPP risk resilience and governance efficiency.
Keywords:
PPP projects
; Excessive packaging behavior
; Dimensions
; Risk
; Grounded theory
1. Introduction
One primary challenge in standardizing public-private partnership (PPP) development lies in the insufficient governance of risks associated with excessive project packaging. Tus Environmental Protection Company, for instance, was penalized for inflating revenues and profits in four PPP projects (Zhang, 2022), and Hulunbuir City illegally bundled PPP projects and added 688 million yuan of hidden debt (http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/20250418/146564c184f5410789971ae989eaeadc/c.html). The 2022 Audit Report on the Implementation of the Central Budget and Other Financial Revenues and Expenditures further attributes PPP suspensions to excessive packaging of revenue and expenditure responsibility indicators, the forced inclusion of inappropriate projects in PPP packages, and false declarations of construction and operation quality. what are the specific manifestations of this behavioral risk, what dimension-specific risk sources does it generate, and how can it be governed through targeted institutional arrangements? Relevant research remains scarce.
Existing scholarship on PPP risk governance has focused on over-commitment, tunneling and speculative behavior (Gao & Liu, 2020; Wang, Gao, & Liu, 2019), whereas excessive packaging, though widely observed in practice, remains largely unexamined as a distinct risk category and lacks clear conceptual definitions and analytical frameworks. Delineating its dimensions therefore clarifies where this risk originates and how it manifests, and provides a basis for risk identification, early warning and targeted correction in PPP decision-making and behavior governance.
2. Literature Review
Behavioral risks among PPP stakeholders are a key driver of objective risks and a primary cause of governance mechanism failure (Liu, Liu, Bu, Zhou, & He, 2022). Existing research, however, still focuses on objective risk management and project governance, devoting insufficient attention to multi-stakeholder behavioral risks which is a gap confirmed by a synthesis of PPP research hotspots and a review of behavioral studies.
2.1. Research on Risk Management and Project Governance
PPP governance research is predominantly categorized into two interrelated strands: lifecycle risk management and institutional governance arrangement. Within risk management research, scholars adopt multi-case analysis and data-driven empirical approaches to identify endogenous and exogenous risks running through full-cycle project delivery (Liu, Wang, Zhang, & Guo, 2025; Fatemeh, Pauline, Bambang, & Nader, 2025). Unlike traditional government procurement, rational risk allocation is the core competitive merit of PPP, dispersing risk and advancing infrastructure value-for-money performance (Guo, Liu, Chen, & Wang, 2025).
Institutional governance studies construct instruments covering contractual clauses, incentive regimes and phased decision-making to regularize project operation (Zhu, Chen, Jin, & Li, 2025; Wang et al., 2025), with sophisticated design underpinning standardized implementation and steady operation (Garcia & Casady, 2024; Xiong & Han, 2021). Against the backdrop of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality targets, emerging literature not only explores antecedents of PPP’s long-run sustainability and operational performance (Li, Liang, & Zhang, 2024; Jin, Chan, & Bai, 2025), but also delves into the green and low-carbon orientation of PPP development (Zhu, Shi, & Wang, 2024; Akomea-Frimpong, Agyekum, Amoakwa, Babon-Ayeng, & Pariafsai, 2023).
Despite this well-established framework of tangible risk mitigation and institutional design, scholarship prioritizes objective institutional and technical risks while largely ignoring subjective behavioral risks rooted in stakeholders' motivations; research on stakeholder behavioral risk, especially the excessive packaging phenomenon, remains insufficient.
2.2. Behavioral Risks and Excessive Packaging in PPP Projects
Research on subjective risk behaviors in PPP projects centers on three stakeholder anomalies, speculative conduct, adverse selection and escalation of commitment, with game theory and mathematical modeling as core paradigms (Li, Jin, Meng, & Chong, 2024; Zhou, Liu, Pu, & Ding, 2025). Relying on such quantitative approaches, scholars have formulated full-cycle governance strategies to curb PPP opportunism (Wang et al., 2019) and further clarified how project transfer mechanisms shape investors’ information disclosure quality and trigger moral hazard risks. Recent studies use sociological and psychological theories to unpack commitment escalation in complex PPP contexts (Liu et al., 2022; Liu, Liu, & Hu, 2024), while institutional analyses apply institutional isomorphism to explain recurrent abnormal behavioral patterns but neglect the multilateral interactions among heterogeneous stakeholders that determine behavioral decision-making (Love & Ika, 2026; Hung, Chang, & Hung, 2026). Overall, this literature concentrates on conventional risks such as opportunism, moral hazard and commitment escalation but ignores the prevalent, highly disruptive subjective risk of excessive packaging which a unique PPP phenomenon and a critical gap in existing theory.
In project management, packaging can enhance operational standardization and risk mitigation through refined packaging plans or moderate contract packaging (Kumaraswamy, 1998; Harrison & Coolidge, 2011). When packaging content exceeds the project's true information, however, excessive packaging emerges: the "value" created deviates from actual project status, producing misleading information, exacerbating information asymmetry and generating "pseudo-PPP" projects that are ultimately withdrawn (Soomro & Zhang, 2013). As consumers generally oppose excessive packaging of goods and services (Ali, Irfan, & Salman, 2020), and given the long cycle and strong public nature of PPP projects, some local governments package feasibility and profitability indicators to attract social capital and avoid value-for-money arguments and risk assessments, occasionally obtaining illegal benefits through contractual loopholes (Kavishe, Jefferson, & Chileshe, 2018). Some regions over-package projects during design and proposal, or exaggerate them during planning and marketing, to attract private investment or meet government goals (Ampratwum, Osei-Kyei, & Tam, 2022). Such practices raise costs, blur benefit delineation, heighten failure risk, mislead investors and the public and undermine long-term sustainability. He, Chen and Zhang (2018) used evolutionary game theory to analyze the packaging behavior of commercial projects and the regulatory behavior of regulatory authorities. Their study provides advice on preventing commercial projects from being packaged as PPP projects for financing and eliminating pseudo-PPP projects. However, their research lacks exploration of the connotation of excessive packaging behavior and a deep induction of the specific manifestations of this behavior, which provides a research gap.
3. Research Object and Concept Definition
The conceptualization of packaging centers on its functional attributes and objectives. In commodity science, product packaging requires materials and technologies selected according to the product's inherent characteristics to meet physicochemical requirements. When design and implementation exceed these functional requirements, excessive void ratios, unnecessary layers and inflated costs arise, producing excessive packaging (Georgakoudis & Tipi, 2021). Such packaging transcends functional necessity and value-based rationality (Cicco, Zhao, Wijntjes, Pont, & Schifferstein, 2020). It contrasts with normal packaging and reflects market competition and differentiated competitive strategies.
In PPP projects, which serve as public goods, packaging enhances both commodity and utility value: the projects and their outputs are tradable and aimed at meeting public needs. Meanwhile, PPP projects are essentially a purchasing relationship established between the public sector and private capital through a contract. Therefore, analogous to product packaging in commercial contexts, packaging behavior manifests in multiple transactional dimensions of PPP projects, where the seller (i.e., the project’s responsible party) engages in packaging practices to enhance the project’s transactional value (Harrison & Coolidge, 2011; Halala & Fayek, 2019). However, when the content and scope of such packaging exceed the inherent rationality of the project (e.g., deviating from its actual scale, capacity, or operational needs), it may evolve into excessive packaging behavior. This behavior manifests as exaggerated, misleading, and commitment-based packaging that does not match the true state of the project, and it is an important cause of the emergence of pseudo-PPP projects and the stagnation of PPP projects (Flyvbjerg, 2021; Soomro & Zhang,2013).
In PPP practice, private capital and the public sector collaborate in constructing public infrastructure, leveraging their strengths to mitigate risk, reduce debt and improve performance (Ping, Levitt, Tsui, & Hsu, 2015). As rational economic agents, however, stakeholders may exploit informational or positional advantages to maximize private interests through excessive packaging such as falsifying data or sensationalizing descriptions under information asymmetry to conceal the project's true state (Zhou et al., 2025), diverting PPP projects from their intended functions, turning them into tools for profit, and ultimately shifting the resulting risk onto the public sector and taxpayers.
Notably, such excessive packaging manifests across different phases of the project lifecycle. Specifically, during the early project phase, private capital may exaggerate or embellish key elements in the project bid, including financing and investment plans, personnel management frameworks, and quality and safety protocols, to secure contract awards (Ping et al., 2015). In the construction phase, stakeholders may package fund use, project progress and quality status to create an illusion of good performance and evade inspections. In the operation phase, operators may embellish revenue streams, cost expenditures and operational quality to obtain higher performance-based subsidies and inflate the project's valuation at transfer, securing better repurchase terms. These behaviors detach projects from reality, hinder cooperating parties from accessing accurate information, exacerbate information asymmetry, and undermine project supervision, performance realization and cooperation sustainability (Hueskes, Verhoest, & Block, 2017).
Based on the above analysis, the study defines excessive packaging risk of PPP projects as stakeholders intentionally creating, exaggerating, and beautifying project information throughout the entire project lifecycle, thereby deviating project implementation from its actual operational status.
4. Research Process
To explore the dimensional composition of PPP excessive packaging, this study employs Charmaz's constructivist grounded theory, a qualitative methodology supporting systematic theories grounded in empirical data (Charmaz et al., 2003). This method adopts a standardized four-step coding procedure, namely initial coding, focused coding, axial coding, and theoretical coding. The overall research process is divided into four phases: problem identification, data collection, data analysis, and result discussion (Shi, Wen, Fang, Niu, & Tang, 2022).
4.1. Problem Identification
Audits of PPP projects reveal that excessive packaging significantly contributes to project stagnation. However, these findings lack a clear definition of the risks associated with such behavior. Through interviews and a comprehensive review of relevant literature, it is evident that excessive packaging is a critical yet underexplored phenomenon in PPP projects. Grounded theory, which emphasizes deriving concepts from empirical data like literature, case studies, and expert insights, provides a suitable framework for this investigation. Therefore, employing qualitative research methods rooted in grounded theory is appropriate for constructing the theoretical connotation of excessive packaging behavior in PPP projects. This approach aims to uncover its primary manifestations, thereby establishing a theoretical foundation for identifying and mitigating the risks linked to this behavior risk.
4.2. Data Collection
Grounded theory adopts a bottom-up approach, deriving concepts that reflect a phenomenon's essential characteristics from raw data without pre-established assumptions. To capture data on PPP excessive packaging comprehensively, the research team first conducted multi-source collection through literature review, news media reports and online comments, etc.
Literature Review: A systematic review of academic literature identified 44 cases of excessive packaging behavior in PPP projects, with key references including Soomro and Zhang (2015), Kumaraswamy (1998), and Wang (2020), which offered conceptual insights into packaging behaviors.
Online Data: Platforms such as Baidu (https://www.baidu.com/), Zhihu (https://www.zhihu.com/), the WeChat Public Platform were searched using keywords such as PPP, PPP project packaging and excessive packaging, yielding 40 comments and articles plus 12 news reports on excessive packaging behaviors.
Policy and Case Analysis: Official PPP-related documents, policies and reports were collected from public sector websites, including the National Development and Reform Commission (https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/) and the Ministry of Finance (http://www.mof.gov.cn/index.htm), identifying 25 policy documents and 9 PPP packaging cases.
Data Coding and Organization: Data sources were systematically coded for analysis:
Chinese literature: Code A; English literature: Code B; Policy documents and reports: Code C; Online comments and discussions: Code D; Expert opinions: Code E; News reports: Code F; Practical cases: Code G.
This structured approach ensured comprehensive analysis by integrating diverse data sources. Based on the literature, cases and comments above, 220 effective terms on PPP excessive packaging behavior were compiled.
4.3. Data Analysis
Following constructivist grounded theory procedures, the study conducted four-level coding to explore the characteristic structure and formation mechanisms of PPP excessive packaging, using Nvivo 11 Plus for coding and Excel for recording. Validity was ensured through feedback loops, participant validation and extensive primary data sources (Shi et al., 2022).
(1) Initial encoding
Prior to formal coding, 10 samples were randomly selected and reserved for theoretical saturation testing. The remaining materials including academic literature, policy documents and online comments were decomposed into semantic units’ sentence by sentence, and expressions concerning project packaging, information distortion, inflated tender parameters, falsified construction costs and exaggerated operational performance were extracted, yielding 220 valid initial codes. Sample codes are presented in Appendix A.1.
(2) Focus coding
Focused coding was implemented based on constructivist grounded theory with the constant comparative method as the core analytical tool. Initial codes were sorted, streamlined and conceptualized, and codes with high occurrence frequency (refers to the number of times a corresponding code is mentioned across all original textual data) and strong representativeness were prioritized for category aggregation. 55 invalid codes irrelevant to the connotation of excessive packaging in PPP projects were eliminated. The remaining codes were cross-compared, and items with similar core meanings but different expressions were consolidated, generating 24 preliminary candidate codes.
To verify the relevance and validity of coded items, four PPP specialists from Southwest Jiaotong University, Jiangnan University and Shandong Jiaotong University were invited to conduct preliminary review after receiving explanations of research background and the definition of excessive packaging. Each code was examined for relevance, definitional accuracy and discriminability, and items with low frequency or inconsistent with the theme were deleted (Shi et al., 2022), leaving 20 codes.
For further validity improvement, a verification questionnaire consisting of the 20 reserved codes was distributed again to the four experts. A five-point Likert scale was adopted, where higher scores indicate higher practical prevalence of the corresponding excessive packaging practice. Meanwhile, experts were consulted to supplement missing forms of excessive packaging, and their feedback was used to improve the reliability and validity of the coding framework. Three codes (I21, I22, I23) have been added for the excessive packaging of project justification results, subject credit, and bidding proposals. Items with an average expert score below 3 were removed, and the final focused coding outcomes are shown in Table 1.
(3) Axis code
Following conceptual refinement and item screening via initial and focused coding, axial coding was subsequently carried out in this study. In the first step, criteria for core and subcategory classification were defined. Core categories are derived from codes with higher original citation frequency, close relevance to excessive packaging in PPP projects and superior abstraction to govern subordinate concepts. By contrast, general categories feature lower citation frequency and weaker explanatory power, serving as supplementary groups dependent on core categories.
In the second step, independent coding was implemented to ensure objectivity. To avoid subjective bias from pre-set assumptions, all coders worked separately without mutual communication. Combining practical manifestations of PPP excessive packaging, they classified the remaining 20 valid codes from focused coding and assigned corresponding category names.
In the third step, classification outcomes were reviewed and finalized through group discussion. Six core categories and eight general categories were summarized from the 20 codes. The core categories consist of J2, J5, J7, J9, J11 and J14, while the generic categories cover J1, J3, J4, J6, J8, J10, J12 and J13. The complete axial coding results are detailed in Table 2.
(4) Theoretical coding
By integrating the core and general categories, the study conducted theoretical coding of excessive packaging behavior in PPP projects, identify the central main categories (Glaser, 1978). This process integrated core and general categories, using the 14 axial coding categories as a foundation, and conducting repeated comparative and inductive analyses with original empirical data and prior coding results to ensure conceptual consistency and alignment with PPP project governance logic. The merging of categories into six core dimensions (M1-M6) was rooted in three explicit theoretical and empirical bases, with specific rules and rationales as follows:
1) Logical integration based on conceptual connotation and thematic coherence. Consistent with Glaser's (1978) emphasis on category saturation and thematic relevance, categories with the same basic attributes of over packaging have been consolidated. The project revenue (J2), project operational capacity (J1), revenue sources (J3), and promised returns (J4) were merged into the packaging of project expected returns (M1). This integration is reasonable because they jointly focus on exaggerating or distorting the economic prospects of PPP projects, which is a core attribute for stakeholders to attract investment or obtain approval, consistent with the core connotation of expected return in PPP financial governance.
2) Logical fusion based on concept subordination and functional association. Categories with clear subordination relationships (i.e. one category as a specific manifestation of another category) are integrated together to reflect a hierarchical conceptual structure consistent with PPP contracts and operational governance frameworks. The category of construction content (J6), as a specific component of the contract terms, is classified as a subcategory of the contract language (J7) and merged into the packaging of the project contract description (M3). This consistency reflects the actual logic of PPP contracts, where the construction content is the core element described in the contract, and excessive packaging of the former directly constitutes excessive packaging of the latter.
3) Consolidation logic based on the PPP financial or institutional risk governance framework. The categories related to the same financial or institutional dimensions as PPP projects are merged to align with industry-specific governance priorities (such as debt management, financing structure, stakeholder qualifications):
The actual local debt (J8), project expenditure cost (J9), and local fiscal capacity (J10) have been merged into packaging of project debt (M4). These categories are all related to concealing or distorting financial obligations and fiscal sustainability, which are key risk points in PPP debt governance. Therefore, integrating these categories is crucial for comprehensively capturing excessive packaging related to debt.
The financing channels (J11), financing through local financing platforms (J12), and equity financing (J13) have been integrated into the packaging of the project financing structure (M5). This reflects the fact that all three categories are related to the exaggeration or distortion of how projects obtain capital, and capital is the core dimension of PPP financial structure governance.
Stakeholder selection (J5) has been designated as the packaging for project entities (M2) because it directly addresses false statements about stakeholder qualifications (such as exaggerating the capabilities of private partners), which is a key aspect of project entity governance in PPP.
The non-public project packaging (J14) is classified as project nature packaging (M6) because it focuses on distorting the public service orientation of PPP projects (e.g. reclassifying non-public commercial projects as public infrastructure), which directly changes the nature of PPP initiatives as public-private partnership public products.
The detailed merging results are presented in Table 2. This theoretically grounded categorization establishes a rigorous, transparent analytical framework for unpacking the multifaceted manifestations of excessive packaging behavior, laying a solid foundation for the systematic exploration of its underlying formation mechanisms and practical implications for PPP project governance.
A theoretical saturation test was performed on the categorized dimensions of PPP excessive packaging behaviors to guarantee research reliability. Analyses of 10 reserved data records yielded no new concepts, subcategories or main categories, confirming theoretical saturation of the established categories.
Two rounds of external validation were carried out to examine the rationality and applicability of the dimensional framework. First, five PPP research postgraduates uninvolved in prior coding independently sorted all 20 coding items into six core dimensions after receiving standardized research background, coding items and category definitions. Full consistent matching results were obtained across all examiners. Second, three field interview respondents were invited for follow-up discussions. Drawing on their PPP practical and research experience, they matched the six core categories with real project scenarios, proving alignment between theoretical classification and on-site governance practice. After verification and saturation testing, this study ultimately determined that the six core dimensions of PPP over packaging behavior have certain practical explanatory power.
5. Discussion
5.1. Six Dimensions of Excessive Packaging Risk
(1) Excessive packaging of project expected returns
Excessive packaging of project expected returns refers to stakeholders’ deliberate exaggeration of projected returns, operational capacity and market demand to promote PPP project initiation. Driven by policy incentives and performance pressures, public departments often inflate project revenue indicators to help unviable projects obtain approval, causing significant deviations between projected and actual project income and impairing public sector credibility. Meanwhile, private investors and operators tend to overstate profit potential and conceal operational risks to gain bidding advantages and maximize economic benefits, further distorting project viability assessment. As a typical ex-ante opportunistic behavior arising from information asymmetry in the early project stage, such profit beautification differs from traditional financial dressing and constitutes a risk source that is locked in once the project reaches financial close. It triggers cash flow shortages, unsustainable operations and implicit debt risks, damages government-social capital trust, disrupts market expectations, and hinders the standardized and high-quality development of the PPP industry.
(2) Excessive packaging of project entities
Excessive packaging of project entities reflects prevalent irregular and opportunistic behaviors in PPP bidding and authorization stages. A typical manifestation is qualification collusion, in which bidders form consortia with high-qualified enterprises to meet bidding thresholds and win contracts, while assigning actual construction and operational tasks to low-qualified cooperative entities. In addition, administrative intervention occasionally distorts normal market competition, as superior authorities may adopt irregular approaches to grant project implementation rights to underqualified social capital providers. Different from economic indicator manipulation, such entity-level packaging essentially distorts the market-oriented selection mechanism of PPP projects. Such violations disrupt fair bidding, trigger construction and operational quality risks and management gaps, and impair optimal resource allocation. In the long run, they distort the PPP market, degrade project performance and lower the efficiency and sustainability of public services. Because the risk originates in selection rather than in execution, it cannot be corrected by ex-post supervision alone.
(3) Excessive packaging of contract descriptions
Excessive packaging of contract descriptions refers to the deliberate embellishment and over-optimization of contractual clauses covering project financing structures, personnel management systems, quality standards, procurement procedures, and safety and environmental specifications, even though such rigid provisions are impractical and difficult to implement throughout the project lifecycle. Meanwhile, PPP contracts may contain logically conflicting content, ambiguous boundary definitions and clauses that excessively favor private stakeholders. Unlike ex-ante economic or entity packaging, this behavioral dimension focuses on institutional camouflage at the contractual governance level. Such superficial and unreasonable contractual design breaks the balance of rights and obligations between the government and social capital. It not only triggers subsequent implementation deviations and clause non-compliance problems but also aggravates bilateral collaborative frictions and opportunistic disputes. Ultimately, defective contractual constraints weaken the binding force of formal governance rules, leave residual risk unallocated and therefore absorbed by the public sector, hinder standardized project operation, and seriously undermine the stability and effectiveness of long-term PPP partnership governance.
(4) Excessive packaging of project debt
Excessive packaging of project debt manifests as the strategic underestimation of project costs and deliberate misrepresentation of fiscal conditions by public sector authorities to promote PPP project approval. Rather than utilizing PPP mechanisms to realize genuine public expenditure optimization and debt reduction, local governments deliberately lower projected investment costs and beautify fiscal revenue and expenditure indicators for political achievement purposes. Although such deceptive practices can superficially reduce explicit public debt and present a standardized fiscal status in the short term, they essentially shift fiscal pressure to the future and accumulate substantial hidden government liabilities. This form of fiscal camouflage represents a typical institutional opportunistic behavior at the governmental governance level. It distorts the true fiscal affordability of local governments, amplifies cumulative systemic debt risks, and breaks the intertemporal balance of public fiscal responsibility. Disguised debt accumulation weakens the government’s capacity to supervise project operation and safeguard public user interests, aggravating latent fiscal risks and undermining the sustainable and standardized development of regional PPP projects.
(5) Excessive packaging of project financing structures
Excessive packaging of project financing structures mainly refers to the unreasonable financing restructuring behaviors adopted by public sectors for intrinsically non-viable PPP projects that cannot achieve self-sustaining operation relying solely on user fees and fiscal subsidies. To ensure project launch and continuous capital supply, local governments tend to actively leverage diversified financing channels including equity financing and local financing platform loans to supplement project funds. Although such leveraged financing strategies can alleviate short-term capital shortages and maintain project progress, they substantially increase the long-term financial burden and implicit debt pressure on public sectors. This financing camouflage violates the original design intention of PPP models for rational risk allocation and fiscal burden optimization. It breaks the fiscal sustainability of project operation, induces cumulative financial risks through excessive leverage, converts a project-level financing problem into a systemic leverage risk, and deviates from the standardized risk-sharing mechanism of modern PPP project governance.
(6) Excessive packaging of project nature
Excessive packaging of project nature is essentially the improper categorization and attribute distortion of project types by public sectors, which seriously violates the core institutional principles of standard PPP governance. In practice, a few purely public welfare projects that should rely on full fiscal appropriation, as well as traditional commercial and engineering projects ineligible for PPP adoption, are artificially packaged and incorporated into the PPP project system. Such misclassification degenerates the standardized PPP governance mechanism into a simple off-balance-sheet financing tool for local governments. It allows numerous unqualified projects to be launched under the guise of PPP institutional frameworks, severely damaging the normative boundary and institutional integrity of the PPP mechanism. Ultimately, this behavioral disorder distorts the functional positioning of PPP public service governance and hinders the healthy and standardized development of the entire PPP industry.
5.2. General Characteristics of Six Dimensions
Grounded in the theoretical coding and dimensional construction, this study finds that manifestations of PPP excessive packaging vary substantially across lifecycle stages and stakeholders. To clarify this differential distribution, all valid coding entries were categorized by project stage and responsible entity, as illustrated in Table 3. Based on the intrinsic characteristics of the six dimensions, the study summarizes three core heterogeneity features that determine how this behavioral risk is distributed.
First, excessive packaging behavior exhibits prominent stakeholder heterogeneity concentrated in the public and private sectors. As rational economic actors, public departments and private capital participants rely on their respective information advantages and status privileges to implement differentiated excessive packaging behaviors, which correspond to different dimensional manifestations of the six core categories. On the public sector side, driven by political performance assessment and fiscal regulation constraints, excessive packaging is mainly reflected in macro and institutional-level behavioral distortions, including the misclassification of project public welfare attributes (project nature packaging), deliberate underestimation of fiscal debt pressure and falsification of fiscal capacity (project debt packaging), and unreasonable optimization of project financing structures to evade fiscal supervision. For private capital represented by investors and contractors, opportunistic behaviors focus on micro-project operational and participatory packaging, such as exaggerating project expected returns and operational prospects to obtain bidding qualifications (expected return packaging) and relying on qualification collusion and entity replacement to participate in project construction (project entity packaging). In addition, both parties may jointly participate in contractual clause beautification and ambiguous term setting (contract description packaging). Although the behavioral dimensions adopted by public and private sectors differ, all such practices essentially cover up real project information and aggravate information asymmetry, forming a multi-subject collaborative distortion system that erodes the informational basis of PPP risk governance.
Second, excessive packaging behavior presents phased differentiation and full-lifecycle penetration across PPP project stages. Consistent with the ex-ante oriented and lifecycle-pervasive characteristics of the six-dimensional excessive packaging system, different types of packaging behaviors show distinct stage concentration in the five core stages of PPP projects. The project identification and preparation stages are the high-incidence periods of public sector institutional packaging, mainly involving the distortion of project nature, whitewashing of fiscal debt status, and beautification of financing structures, which lay institutional hidden dangers for subsequent project operation. The project procurement stage is dominated by private capital entity packaging and return expectation packaging, where bidders exaggerate technical capabilities and project benefits to win bids. The project execution and transfer stages focus on contractual description packaging and operational benefit packaging. Stakeholders exploit imperfect contractual clauses and exaggerated operational performance to obtain continuous excess benefits. Despite the phased differences in behavioral forms, all packaging behaviors share the core characteristic of ex-ante risk embedding, and the accumulated distortions are transmitted along the project lifecycle, continuously eroding the whole-cycle risk governance effectiveness of PPP projects.
Third, all dimensional excessive packaging behaviors are fundamentally driven by self-interest maximization motivation. Consistent with the classic economic man hypothesis, all excessive packaging practices embodied in the six core dimensions originate from stakeholders’ inherent pursuit of utility maximization (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Specifically, public sectors implement institutional and fiscal-oriented packaging behaviors, including the packaging of project nature, debt status, and financing structures, to cater to political performance assessment and transfer implicit fiscal risks. By contrast, private capital prioritizes economic benefits and market advantages, adopting excessive packaging of project expected returns, implementation entities, and contractual contents to secure bidding qualifications, obtain excess profits, and accumulate long-term industrial resources. Guided by differentiated interest demands, stakeholders break standardized PPP governance norms and conduct targeted opportunistic packaging across multiple project dimensions. This universal self-interested essence forms the core driving logic of all six types of excessive packaging and fundamentally accounts for the prevalent governance distortions in PPP projects, which can be further investigated in future targeted empirical research.
6. Conclusions
Applying constructivist grounded theory and multi-source data (literature, news, public comments and semi-structured interviews), this study implements standardized four-stage coding and establishes a six-dimensional framework for PPP excessive packaging: expected returns, entity qualifications, contract description, project debt, financing structure and project nature. This framework systematically unpacks multilayered deceptive practices from benefit manipulation and qualification forgery to contractual and fiscal distortion, offering a fresh analytical lens for behavioral risk governance in PPP projects.
Heterogeneity analysis confirms that such opportunistic acts follow distinct stakeholder and project lifecycle patterns shaped by rational self-interest. Governments pursue political performance and fiscal risk relief via fiscal and institutional packaging in the preliminary identification phase; private capital chases profits and market resources through benefit and qualification manipulation during procurement, construction and transfer. These divergent stage-specific misdeeds collectively form a multi-layered risk structure in which distortions generated at one stage are transmitted to, and amplify, those at later stages.
The results advance the theoretical research on PPP risk governance and stakeholder opportunism, and offer targeted operable countermeasures to standardize participants’ behaviors, restrain irregular project packaging, and facilitate the standardized and sustainable development of PPP under the new regulatory framework.
Contribution, Limitations and Future Research:
This study yields targeted theoretical and practical contributions to PPP behavioral governance research. Theoretically, it addresses the gap of lacking systematic dimensional cognition of PPP excessive packaging behavior, clarifies the structural composition of excessive packaging and verifies its heterogeneous distribution across public and private stakeholders and lifecycle stages, deepening micro-level theoretical cognition of differentiated opportunistic behaviors and providing a dimension-level analytical framework for subsequent behavioral risk identification and assessment.
Practically, the six-dimensional behavioral system and its stage-stakeholder differential characteristics provide public administrators with clear, operable criteria and tools for identifying excessive packaging behaviors. The conclusions help rectify information distortion in project approval, bidding, construction and handover; support differentiated regulatory strategies for public institutional and private benefit-oriented packaging, standardize multi-stakeholder behavioral norms across the lifecycle, curb fiscal risks and quality hazards caused by excessive packaging, and facilitate the standardized, high-quality operation of PPP projects.
This study has several limitations that point to future research avenues. First, limited data and sample coverage mean the summarized manifestations of excessive packaging may omit certain scenarios. Follow-up work can introduce cross-region, cross-industry or international PPP samples to enrich the theoretical framework’s completeness and generalizability. Second, this paper merely identifies six core behavioral dimensions without comparing their differentiated governance effects. Future research may adopt quantitative or case methods to examine how each dimension heterogeneously affects cost overruns, schedule delays and partnership conflicts, alongside their boundary conditions. Third, this research centers on dimensional construction and behavioral features, with inadequate exploration of formative mechanisms. Mixed-method designs can be deployed to unpack multi-level driving pathways behind excessive packaging.
Author Contributions
Conceptualization, Liu J. Q., and Wang D. M.; Methodology, Liu H. D., Software, Liu H. D.; Validation, Liu J. Q. and Wan N. N.; Formal Analysis, Liu H. D.; Investigation, Liu H. D. and Wang D. M.; Resources, Liu J. Q.; Data Curation, Liu H. D.; Writing – Original Draft Preparation, Liu H. D.; Writing – Review & Editing, Liu J. Q. and Wang D. M.; Visualization, Liu H. D.; Supervision, Liu J. Q. and Wan N. N.; Project Administration, Liu J. Q.; Funding Acquisition, Liu J. Q. and Wang D. M. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding
This research was funded by the Major Program of National Fund of Philosophy and Social Science of China, grant number 25&ZD100; and National Natural Science Foundation of China, grant number 72601328.
Data Availability Statement
Data Availability Statement: The data presented in this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The raw qualitative data (interview transcripts and web-crawled texts) contain detailed information currently being utilized for an ongoing follow-up study on factor extraction. Sharing the full dataset at this stage may compromise the originality of the unpublished derivative research. However, the processed data and coding results supporting the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to the four PPP specialists from Southwest Jiaotong University, Jiangnan University, and Shandong Jiaotong University for their valuable time and professional insights in reviewing the coded items and ensuring the relevance and validity of this research. During the preparation of this manuscript, the authors used DeepSeek-V4.1-Flash for the purposes of language polishing and improving the readability of the text. The authors have reviewed and edited the output and take full responsibility for the content of this publication.
Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
| PPP | Public-private partnership |
Appendix A
Appendix A.1
Table A1.
Initial coding of the characteristics of excessive packaging behavior in PPP projects.
| Source | Code | Items |
| Chinese Literature | A1 | Packaging of PPP to facilitate project implementation |
| A2 | Packaging of PPP as a disguised form of borrowing | |
| A3 | Methods of PPP packaging | |
| …… | …… | |
| A83 | Negative government regulation and low efficiency | |
| A84 | Government caters to policies by packaging PPP in large quantities | |
| A85 | Government falsifies PPP under external factors | |
| A86 | Poor government execution, poor system, turning a blind eye | |
| English Literature | B1 | Risks in packaging PPP to gain confidence from financiers |
| B2 | Weak review and concessionaire selection procedures are drivers of failure | |
| …… | …… | |
| B11 | Advanced packaging can improve project efficiency and reduce costs | |
| B12 | The terms of the agreement are contradictory, biased towards its private partners, and subject to double standards | |
| B13 | policy and regulatory framework cannot be implemented | |
| Policy Reports | C1 | PPP not being registered or timely updated to evade supervision |
| C2 | High cost of PPP and equity disguised as debt | |
| C3 | PPP stimulates the vitality of private investment | |
| C4 | PPP project packaging promotion project construction | |
| …… | …… | |
| C41 | government funded projects are packaged as feasibility gap subsidy projects, and project revenue remains as fiscal funds | |
| C42 | Publicly funded projects packaged as user-funded projects | |
| C43 | government defaults on debt and transfers it to state-owned enterprises | |
| Comments & Discussion | D1 | Packaging PPP as availability payment content |
| D2 | Irregularities in PPP can lead to waste and fiscal default risks | |
| …… | …… | |
| D21 | The government should not promise returns, guarantee guarantees, repurchase arrangements, or explicit stock and actual bonds | |
| D22 | Public sector platform companies masquerading as market-oriented enterprises to undertake PPP | |
| D23 | Public sector investments packaged as PPP with public sector's bottom-line responsibility and illegal borrowing | |
| Expert Opinions | E1 | BT projects packaged as PPP increase public sector debt |
| E2 | PPP projects require packaging multiple revenue-generating industries | |
| …… | …… | |
| E20 | Beautify PPP Project Value, Scheme, Revenue and Other Indicators | |
| E21 | High qualification consortium participates in bidding, with low qualification capital as the project subject | |
| E22 | exaggerates and beautifies the management and safety plans of the bidding documents | |
| News Reports | F1 | Malicious low-price bidding in PPP |
| F2 | Sustainable development requires standardization of PPP | |
| F3 | Control the scope of PPP use and prohibits commercial and engineering projects from being packaged as PPP financing | |
| …… | …… | |
| F17 | Government fabricates fiscal data to package PPP | |
| F18 | Government should not excessively give benefits to social capital when using PPP | |
| F19 | Government seeks funding from higher authorities and obtains tilted loans to package PPP | |
| Case Studies | G1 | PPP investment totals are exaggerated and detached from reality |
| G2 | Standards should be established for PPP project packaging | |
| G3 | PPP requires careful packaging and planning | |
| …… | …… | |
| G12 | Government payment, no clear user, payment source from budget | |
| G13 | Public sector pays for operation with public sector backstop | |
| G14 | Public sector buyback backstop | |
| Note: The expert opinions in the table include online articles, reports, or messages from experts in the field of PPP research, as well as expert interview. | ||
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Table 1.
Focused coding on the excessive packaging in PPP projects.
| Code | Item | Freq. | Score |
|---|---|---|---|
| I3 | Stakeholders falsely report project expenditure costs | 12 | 3.83 |
| I4 | Stakeholders exaggerate expected revenues | 12 | 4.67 |
| I5 | Public sector's commitment packaging to private capital | 9 | 3.67 |
| I6 | Public financing platforms entering PPPs causing debt disguised as equity | 5 | 3.67 |
| I7 | Public sector packages equity leading to debt disguised as equity | 10 | 4.33 |
| I8 | Public sector exaggerates fixed returns to attract private capital | 7 | 4.67 |
| I9 | Public sector promotes PPPs by packaging market-oriented projects, leading to pseudo-PPPs | 10 | 4.17 |
| I10 | Public sector hides true debts to facilitate PPP | 12 | 4.00 |
| I11 | Public sector packages PPPs with income still being fiscal funds | 9 | 3.67 |
| I12 | Public sector pursues quantity by bundling unrelated assets and operational performance into PPPs | 10 | 4.17 |
| I13 | Stakeholders package various contract contents of projects to evade inspections | 5 | 4.50 |
| I14 | Public sector packages commercial projects and pure engineering as PPPs for convenience and regulatory circumvention | 18 | 3.67 |
| I16 | Public sector forcibly initiates pseudo-PPP without genuine operational revenue | 8 | 3.50 |
| I17 | Public sector starts PPP projects without secured financing channels | 6 | 3.67 |
| I18 | Public sector initiates projects that are beyond fiscal capacity | 6 | 4.17 |
| I19 | Public sector selects non-compliant social capital to undertake work in the implementation of PPP | 8 | 4.17 |
| I20 | Public sector packages projects that cannot be implemented by traditional methods as PPPs | 5 | 3.50 |
| I21 | Public sector beautifies the results of project feasibility studies | - | - |
| I22 | Stakeholders participate in bidding to increase qualifications or credit, while the actual implementing entity's qualifications are average | ||
| I23 | Stakeholders exaggerate or embellish investment and financing designs, personnel management plans, etc., in project bids | ||
| Note: Items I1, I2, I15 have mean values less than 3 and are not included in the final focused coding; items I21, I22, I23 are based on expert interviews. | |||
Table 2.
Axial coding, and theoretical coding of excessive packaging behavior.
| Axial Coding | Theoretical Coding |
|---|---|
| J1 Project operation capability (I3、I4) | M1 Packaging of project expected returns |
| J2 Project revenue (I4、I8) | M2 Packaging of project entities |
| J3 Revenue sources (I11) | M3 Packaging of contract descriptions |
| J4 Promised returns (I5、I8) | M4 Packaging of project debt |
| J5 Selection of stakeholders (I19、I22) | M5 Project financing structure |
| J6 Construction content (I13) | M6 Packaging of project nature |
| J7 Contract language (I13、I23) | |
| J8 Actual local debt (I10) | |
| J9 Project expenditure costs (I3、I10、I18) | |
| J10 Local fiscal capacity (I18) | |
| J11 Financing channels (I6、I7、I17) | |
| J12 Financing through local financing platforms (I6) | |
| J13 Equity financing (I7) | |
| J14 Packaging of non-public projects (I9、I12、I14、I16、I20) | |
| Note: Codes in parentheses represents the focus code corresponding to the axis code | |
Table 3.
Differences in stages and subjects of excessive packaging behavior.
| Stage | Public Sector | Private Capital |
| Project Identification | I3, I4, I5, I6, I7, I8, I9, I11, I12, I13, I14, I16, I17, I18, I19, I20, I21, I23 | - |
| Project Preparation | I3, I4, I5, I8, I10, I11, I13, I16, I17, I18, I19, I21, I23 | - |
| Project Procurement | - | I13, I22, I23 |
| Project Execution | - | I13, I22 |
| Project Transfer | I19 | I3, I4, I22 |
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