From Financial Autonomy to Local Accountability: Implementing Local Government Autonomy in Gombe State, Nigeria

1. Introduction

Local-government autonomy is central to decentralised governance because transferring public functions downward is expected to align public decisions with local preferences. Fiscal federalism provides the basis for allocating revenue and expenditure responsibilities across government levels according to their capacity to deliver services efficiently and respond to geographically differentiated needs (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972; Tiebout, 1956). Yet decentralisation does not necessarily produce autonomy: local governments may assume assigned responsibilities while retaining limited control over revenues, expenditure decisions and resource implementation (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Rodden, 2003, 2016). Meaningful autonomy therefore depends on both access to resources and the discretion and capacity to use them.

Research on local finance examines fiscal autonomy, revenue structures, spending performance, efficiency and accountability. Studies show variation in the ability of local governments to convert financial resources into expenditure and services, while own-source revenue may strengthen accountability to taxpayers depending on institutional conditions (Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Ambrosiano & Bordignon, 2006; Bamidele, 2025; Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Gadenne, 2017; Okorie et al., 2023; Pöschl & Weingast, 2013; Rodden, 2003). Comparative evidence further indicates that formal decentralisation can coexist with transfer dependence, administrative constraints and uneven local performance, including among governments operating within similar institutional arrangements (Dalimunthe et al., 2023; Inanga & Osei Wusu, 2004; Monkam, 2014; Treisman, 2006). Thus, greater financial responsibility does not automatically produce greater autonomy or better implementation.

This issue is particularly important in Nigeria, where local-government financial control and autonomy remain contested. The 2024 reform has renewed attention to the financial position of local governments and raises a central question: does greater financial access translate into substantive local autonomy? Increased resources may expand financial space without altering revenue dependence, budget implementation capacity or state–LGA relations. The effects may also differ across LGAs because of variation in own-source revenue, expenditure priorities and administrative capacity.

Despite extensive research on fiscal decentralisation and local-government performance, limited evidence examines the combined relationship between financial expansion, implementation performance, LGA-level heterogeneity and accountability during a specific reform transition. This is particularly relevant where formal autonomy is accompanied by continued dependence on statutory resources and uneven implementation capacity.

This study addresses this gap by examining all 11 LGAs in Gombe State during 2023–2024. It combines LGA-level financial records with semi-structured interviews to examine changes in financial capacity, budget implementation and expenditure allocation and the institutional mechanisms underlying variation across LGAs. Rather than treating autonomy as binary, the study conceptualises it as a progression from financial access to discretion, implementation and accountability, distinguishing increased financial resources from substantive capacity to control and implement them.

The study asks: (1) How did the financial resource base, budget implementation and expenditure structure of Gombe's LGAs change between 2023 and 2024? (2) To what extent were these changes associated with differences in financial autonomy and implementation across LGAs? (3) What institutional mechanisms shaped the translation of financial resources into local discretion and accountability? By combining quantitative and qualitative evidence, the study contributes empirically by documenting heterogeneous LGA responses to Nigeria's 2024 autonomy transition and conceptually by shifting attention from how much local governments receive to who controls resources, how they are implemented and how resulting decisions are held accountable.

The study addresses three questions: (1) How did the financial resource base, budget implementation and expenditure structure of Gombe's LGAs change between 2023 and 2024? (2) To what extent were these changes associated with differences in local financial autonomy and implementation across LGAs? and (3) What institutional mechanisms shaped the translation of financial resources into local discretion and accountability? By combining quantitative evidence on LGA financial performance with qualitative evidence on institutional processes, the study contributes to the decentralisation literature in two ways. Empirically, it provides LGA-level evidence on the heterogeneous financial response to Nigeria's 2024 local-government autonomy transition. Conceptually, it shifts the assessment of autonomy beyond how much money local governments receive toward the linked questions of who controls resources, how those resources are implemented, and how resulting decisions are held accountable.

2. Materials and Methods

2.1. Fiscal Decentralisation and the Foundations of Local Financial Autonomy

Fiscal decentralisation concerns the allocation of public revenue and expenditure responsibilities across government levels. Its theoretical foundation lies in fiscal federalism, particularly the proposition that some functions are more efficiently and responsively performed at lower levels when local preferences and information differ across jurisdictions (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972). Decentralisation can therefore improve allocative efficiency by bringing expenditure decisions closer to affected populations (Besley & Coate, 2003; Tiebout, 1956).

However, decentralisation does not necessarily imply meaningful autonomy. Fiscal decentralisation includes revenue assignment, expenditure responsibilities and the degree of discretion associated with them (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002). Rodden (2016) similarly shows that decentralised rule is shaped by arrangements governing revenue and intergovernmental transfers. The key issue is therefore who controls resources and expenditure decisions, and under what institutional constraints.

Formal financial decentralisation may produce limited practical change when higher levels retain influence over revenues, transfers or expenditure. Subnational governments can therefore occupy different positions along a continuum of fiscal discretion (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Rodden, 2016). Recent Nigerian research reinforces the distinction between legal authority and practical autonomy, highlighting continuing state influence and institutional constraints (Ajayi & Omotoso, 2024; Egwuagu et al., 2024; Okorie et al., 2023).

2.2. Fiscal Autonomy, Revenue Dependence and Local-Government Performance

Fiscal autonomy is generally stronger where subnational governments exercise meaningful control over revenues and expenditure rather than relying predominantly on higher-level resources (Boetti et al., 2012; Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002). Revenue composition therefore matters alongside total resources. Own-source revenue may strengthen incentives for efficiency and responsiveness because fiscal consequences are more closely linked to local taxpayers, whereas transfer dependence can weaken this connection (Gadenne, 2017; Gervasoni, 2010; Timmons, 2005). Recent Nigerian studies similarly identify weak local revenue generation as a constraint on practical fiscal autonomy (Amoako et al., 2024; Dalimunthe et al., 2023; Onuoha et al., 2021).

Empirical studies also show substantial differences in the ability of local governments to transform financial inputs into expenditure and services (Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Balaguer Coll et al., 2007; Benito Lopez et al., 2010; Boetti et al., 2012). Fiscal autonomy and performance are therefore related but not synonymous. An increase in total revenue may indicate greater financial capacity without demonstrating greater autonomy if resources remain externally determined or are not translated into implemented expenditure (Okorie et al., 2023).

This distinction provides the basis for examining Gombe's LGAs: the study treats financial autonomy and financial performance as analytically distinct, allowing resource expansion to be assessed alongside own-source revenue and implementation outcomes.

2.3. Decentralisation, Accountability and the Fiscal Relationship with Citizens

Fiscal decentralisation also has a political dimension because the source of public finance can shape accountability. Taxation forms part of a fiscal relationship between citizens and government, and locally generated revenue may strengthen incentives for responsiveness and oversight (Gadenne, 2017; Timmons, 2005).

These effects are conditional on institutional and political conditions. Decentralisation can create opportunities for participation and accountability without ensuring effective monitoring or influence by citizens (Crook & Manor, 1998). Fiscal institutions similarly shape whether decentralised resources generate effective governance (Careaga & Weingast, 2003). Recent Nigerian research reinforces the importance of these institutional conditions (Ajayi & Omotoso, 2024; Okorie et al., 2023).

Financial autonomy should therefore be evaluated alongside accountability. Greater discretion may strengthen responsiveness where citizens can observe and sanction performance, but its governance effects are weaker where information, oversight and institutional checks are limited (Crook & Manor, 1998; Gadenne, 2017).

2.4. Institutional Capacity and Uneven Decentralisation Outcomes

Decentralisation also produces uneven outcomes because administrative capacity, institutional quality and local conditions mediate fiscal arrangements. Research on local-government efficiency identifies substantial variation in the ability of municipalities to transform financial inputs into outputs (Afonso & Fernandes, 2008; Balaguer Coll et al., 2007; Monkam, 2014). Fiscal autonomy therefore does not remove the importance of organisational capacity.

The wider political and institutional environment also matters. Decentralised arrangements involve political incentives and distributional considerations (Lockwood, 2002), while governance effects depend on institutional conditions rather than following uniformly from decentralisation (Treisman, 2006). The fiscal relationship with higher levels of government can further shape political behaviour and institutional development (Gervasoni, 2010). Recent Nigerian research identifies state influence, regulation and institutional capacity as continuing constraints on local-government autonomy (Bamidele, 2025; Onuoha et al., 2021).

These findings make LGA-level heterogeneity analytically important. Although Gombe's 11 LGAs share a state-level institutional environment, they may differ in revenue mobilisation, budget implementation and expenditure allocation. The question is therefore not only whether decentralisation changes local finances on average, but how local governments respond differently to the same reform.

2.5. Research Gap and Analytical Perspective

The literature establishes that fiscal decentralisation can increase local discretion when revenue and expenditure responsibilities are meaningfully transferred, but revenue dependence, intergovernmental controls and institutional constraints can limit substantive autonomy (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Oates, 1972; Rodden, 2016). Fiscal autonomy is also connected to spending performance and accountability, although these relationships depend on institutional capacity and fiscal relations with citizens (Boetti et al., 2012; Gadenne, 2017). Recent Nigerian research extends these concerns to the contemporary autonomy debate (Bamidele, 2025; Egwuagu et al., 2024).

What remains less developed is an integrated examination of financial expansion, budget implementation, LGA heterogeneity and institutional accountability within the same reform process. This raises a central question: when local governments gain greater access to financial resources, does that access translate into effective discretion and improved implementation, and under what institutional conditions?

This study addresses that question through Gombe State. It conceptualises financial autonomy as a progression from financial access to effective discretion, implementation and accountability: resources create the opportunity for autonomy, discretion concerns their allocation, implementation concerns their translation into expenditure, and accountability concerns scrutiny of their use. This framework distinguishes expansion of local financial space from deeper substantive autonomy.

3. Materials and Methods

3.1. Research Design and Case Selection

This study adopts a mixed-methods case-study design to examine local-government financial autonomy in Gombe State during the 2023–2024 transition. Quantitative analysis examines revenue, budget implementation and expenditure allocation, while interviews examine the institutional mechanisms through which financial authority is translated into discretion and accountability.

Gombe was selected because its 11 local governments share a state-level institutional environment but differ in revenue generation, budget implementation and expenditure allocation. The analysis covers Akko, Balanga, Billiri, Dukku, Funakaye, Gombe, Kaltungo, Kwami, Nafada, Shongom and Yamaltu-Deba, producing 22 LGA-year observations.

The period captures the financial transition surrounding the 2024 autonomy reform. It is not treated as a conventional pre-/post-reform causal design because 2024 represents a reform-period environment rather than a clean post-intervention period. The comparison instead identifies changes in financial resources, implementation and expenditure during the transition (Bamidele, 2025; Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002).

Figure 1. Study area showing the location of Gombe State and its 11 local government areas.

Figure 1. Study area showing the location of Gombe State and its 11 local government areas.

3.2. Data Sources and Data Preparation

The quantitative analysis uses LGA-level financial records for 2023 and 2024 from the Auditor General for Local Governments, Gombe State, through the Gombe State Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. The dataset covers statutory revenue, IGR, total revenue, budgeted and actual revenue, budgeted and actual expenditure, recurrent expenditure and capital expenditure, capturing financial capacity, budget implementation and expenditure structure (Boetti et al., 2012; Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002).

Records were organised as an LGA-year dataset and checked for missing observations, duplicate records and consistent LGA identifiers, producing 22 observations. The Ministry portal also identifies the Audited Accounts of the 11 LGAs Gombe State–2024 as an official entry point to the records.

Semi-structured interviews complemented rather than reproduced the financial data. They examined fund control, IGR administration, state–LGA financial relations, budget implementation, expenditure discretion, institutional constraints, transparency and perceived changes following the 2024 reform. These interviews provide mechanisms that financial records alone cannot establish.

Table 1. Data sources and analytical use of variables.

Data category	Variables	Period	Unit of analysis	Analytical use
Revenue	Statutory revenue; IGR; total revenue	2023–2024	LGA-year	Financial capacity
Revenue budget	Budgeted revenue; actual revenue	2023–2024	LGA-year	Revenue implementation
Expenditure budget	Budgeted expenditure; actual expenditure	2023–2024	LGA-year	Expenditure implementation
Expenditure structure	Recurrent expenditure; capital expenditure	2023–2024	LGA-year	Expenditure allocation
Derived indicators	IGR share; implementation rates; capital share	2023–2024	LGA-year	Financial autonomy and implementation
Change indicators	Revenue, IGR, expenditure and capital growth; percentage-point changes	2023–2024	LGA	Financial transition
Interviews	Semi-structured interview responses	Reform period	Participant	Institutional mechanisms

Note: Financial data were derived from the Report of the Auditor General for Local Governments, Gombe State (2024), published by the Gombe State Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.

Table 1. Data sources and analytical use of variables.

Data category	Variables	Period	Unit of analysis	Analytical use
Revenue	Statutory revenue; IGR; total revenue	2023–2024	LGA-year	Financial capacity
Revenue budget	Budgeted revenue; actual revenue	2023–2024	LGA-year	Revenue implementation
Expenditure budget	Budgeted expenditure; actual expenditure	2023–2024	LGA-year	Expenditure implementation
Expenditure structure	Recurrent expenditure; capital expenditure	2023–2024	LGA-year	Expenditure allocation
Derived indicators	IGR share; implementation rates; capital share	2023–2024	LGA-year	Financial autonomy and implementation
Change indicators	Revenue, IGR, expenditure and capital growth; percentage-point changes	2023–2024	LGA	Financial transition
Interviews	Semi-structured interview responses	Reform period	Participant	Institutional mechanisms

Note: Financial data were derived from the Report of the Auditor General for Local Governments, Gombe State (2024), published by the Gombe State Ministry of Finance and Economic Development.

3.3. Measures and Operational Definitions

The analysis distinguishes financial capacity, budget implementation, expenditure structure and financial change. Financial capacity is represented by statutory revenue, IGR, total revenue and IGR share; implementation by the extent to which budgeted revenue and expenditure were realised; expenditure structure by recurrent and capital spending; and change by year-on-year differences.

Derived indicators distinguish the size of the resource envelope from own-source revenue and implementation, allowing financial expansion to be assessed separately from financial autonomy and performance (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Oates, 1972).

The principal derived indicators were calculated as follows:

$$\mathrm{IGR}\mathrm{share}={\displaystyle \frac{\mathrm{IGR}}{\mathrm{Total}\mathrm{revenue}}}\times 100$$

$$\mathrm{Revenue}\mathrm{implementation}={\displaystyle \frac{\mathrm{Actual}\mathrm{revenue}}{\mathrm{Budgeted}\mathrm{revenue}}}\times 100$$

$$\mathrm{Expenditure}\mathrm{implementation}={\displaystyle \frac{\mathrm{Actual}\mathrm{expenditure}}{\mathrm{Budgeted}\mathrm{expenditure}}}\times 100$$

$$\mathrm{Capital}\mathrm{expenditure}\mathrm{share}={\displaystyle \frac{\mathrm{Capital}\mathrm{expenditure}}{\mathrm{Actual}\mathrm{expenditure}}}\times 100$$

For total revenue, IGR, actual expenditure and capital expenditure, percentage change between 2023 and 2024 was calculated as:

$$\mathrm{Growth}={\displaystyle \frac{X_{2024}-X_{2023}}{X_{2023}}}\times 100$$

Changes in IGR share, revenue implementation, expenditure implementation and capital expenditure share were expressed as percentage-point differences rather than percentage growth.

Together, these measures distinguish resource expansion from own-source revenue capacity and budget implementation, reflecting the literature's distinction between fiscal assignment, autonomy and performance (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Oates, 1972).

3.4. Analytical Strategy

Quantitative analysis proceeded in four stages: descriptive statistics, year-on-year change analysis, Pearson correlations and PCA.

Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum and coefficient of variation) established overall financial profiles and cross-LGA dispersion.

Year-on-year changes identified common system-wide shifts and divergent LGA trajectories between 2023 and 2024.

Pearson correlations using the 22 LGA-year observations examined linear associations among IGR share, revenue implementation, expenditure implementation and capital expenditure share. Pearson correlation was selected to assess association rather than causal effects; results are therefore interpreted descriptively given the small sample and two-year period (Boetti et al., 2012; Treisman, 2006).

For multidimensional heterogeneity, financial variables were standardised and analysed using PCA to summarise dominant patterns across total revenue, IGR share, revenue implementation, expenditure implementation and capital expenditure share. PCA was used as an exploratory dimension-reduction technique rather than a causal model.

The analytical sequence moves from financial resources to implementation, expenditure allocation, heterogeneity and financial associations, reflecting the view that decentralisation depends on the capacity to exercise discretion and convert resources into expenditure (Oates, 1972; Treisman, 2006).

3.5. Qualitative Analysis and Integration

Interview data were analysed thematically and integrated with quantitative findings through an explanatory approach. The interviews identified institutional mechanisms underlying financial patterns rather than providing a separate account of local finances.

Coding covered fund control, revenue administration, state–LGA relations, budget implementation, expenditure discretion, institutional constraints, transparency and perceived reform effects. These themes were interpreted alongside quantitative differences in resources and implementation.

This integration distinguishes what changed financially from how institutional procedures and relationships mediated those changes, consistent with the distinction between formal fiscal arrangements and practical discretion (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; Rodden, 2016).

3.6. Methodological Framework

Figure 2. Analytical framework for assessing local-government financial autonomy in Gombe State.

Figure 2. Analytical framework for assessing local-government financial autonomy in Gombe State.

4. Results

4.1. Financial Resources and Revenue Structure Across Local Governments

Gombe's local governments experienced substantial financial expansion between 2023 and 2024 alongside continued dependence on statutory revenue. Mean total revenue increased from 3,423.14 to 5,126.46, while mean IGR rose from 36.60 to 53.16; however, IGR's share of total revenue changed only from 1.02% to 1.04% (Figure 1a–b; Table 1).

Figure 1. Financial resource structure across Gombe LGAs, 2023–2024. (a) Total revenue; (b) IGR share; (c) revenue growth; (d) change in revenue composition.

Figure 1. Financial resource structure across Gombe LGAs, 2023–2024. (a) Total revenue; (b) IGR share; (c) revenue growth; (d) change in revenue composition.

The expansion was therefore driven predominantly by statutory revenue rather than a structural strengthening of own-source capacity. The persistently small IGR share indicates that the LGA resource base remained strongly transfer-dependent during the reform period.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of LGA financial indicators, 2023–2024.

Year	Indicator	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	CV (%)
2023	Statutory revenue	3331.46	426.89	2803.95	4262.37	12.8
	IGR / independent revenue	36.60	29.44	5.37	104.55	80.4
	Total revenue	3423.14	460.58	2845.10	4357.11	13.5
	Budgeted revenue	4306.07	661.62	3313.20	5569.00	15.4
	Actual revenue	3423.14	460.58	2845.10	4357.11	13.5
	Budgeted expenditure	4306.07	661.62	3313.20	5569.00	15.4
	Actual expenditure	3085.93	452.24	2368.56	4130.02	14.7
	Recurrent expenditure	2632.54	486.92	1917.67	3772.75	18.5
	Capital expenditure	274.79	277.63	86.64	952.39	101.0
	IGR share of total revenue	1.02	0.76	0.19	2.87	74.5
	Revenue implementation	80.44	11.55	61.98	105.44	14.4
	Expenditure implementation	72.55	11.31	51.59	97.30	15.6
	Capital expenditure share	8.86	9.00	3.16	31.54	101.6
	Recurrent expenditure share	85.34	8.92	63.51	91.35	10.5
2024	Statutory revenue	4962.96	609.93	4225.35	6287.36	12.3
	IGR / independent revenue	53.16	42.15	12.96	145.51	79.3
	Total revenue	5126.46	618.74	4379.33	6448.10	12.1
	Budgeted revenue	7889.42	847.15	6601.21	9112.38	10.7
	Actual revenue	5126.46	618.74	4379.33	6448.10	12.1
	Budgeted expenditure	8021.17	845.46	6712.51	9599.99	10.5
	Actual expenditure	4716.27	775.04	3883.90	6154.85	16.4
	Recurrent expenditure	3832.59	546.95	2990.43	5008.85	14.3
	Capital expenditure	731.04	711.75	115.31	2229.72	97.4
	IGR share of total revenue	1.04	0.80	0.30	2.71	77.5
	Revenue implementation	65.64	10.29	50.19	82.57	15.7
	Expenditure implementation	59.07	9.44	46.70	74.41	16.0
	Capital expenditure share	14.37	12.45	2.80	36.23	86.6
	Recurrent expenditure share	82.37	12.04	61.04	94.23	14.6

Note: Revenue and expenditure amounts are reported in the original financial units. CV = coefficient of variation.

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of LGA financial indicators, 2023–2024.

Year	Indicator	Mean	SD	Minimum	Maximum	CV (%)
2023	Statutory revenue	3331.46	426.89	2803.95	4262.37	12.8
	IGR / independent revenue	36.60	29.44	5.37	104.55	80.4
	Total revenue	3423.14	460.58	2845.10	4357.11	13.5
	Budgeted revenue	4306.07	661.62	3313.20	5569.00	15.4
	Actual revenue	3423.14	460.58	2845.10	4357.11	13.5
	Budgeted expenditure	4306.07	661.62	3313.20	5569.00	15.4
	Actual expenditure	3085.93	452.24	2368.56	4130.02	14.7
	Recurrent expenditure	2632.54	486.92	1917.67	3772.75	18.5
	Capital expenditure	274.79	277.63	86.64	952.39	101.0
	IGR share of total revenue	1.02	0.76	0.19	2.87	74.5
	Revenue implementation	80.44	11.55	61.98	105.44	14.4
	Expenditure implementation	72.55	11.31	51.59	97.30	15.6
	Capital expenditure share	8.86	9.00	3.16	31.54	101.6
	Recurrent expenditure share	85.34	8.92	63.51	91.35	10.5
2024	Statutory revenue	4962.96	609.93	4225.35	6287.36	12.3
	IGR / independent revenue	53.16	42.15	12.96	145.51	79.3
	Total revenue	5126.46	618.74	4379.33	6448.10	12.1
	Budgeted revenue	7889.42	847.15	6601.21	9112.38	10.7
	Actual revenue	5126.46	618.74	4379.33	6448.10	12.1
	Budgeted expenditure	8021.17	845.46	6712.51	9599.99	10.5
	Actual expenditure	4716.27	775.04	3883.90	6154.85	16.4
	Recurrent expenditure	3832.59	546.95	2990.43	5008.85	14.3
	Capital expenditure	731.04	711.75	115.31	2229.72	97.4
	IGR share of total revenue	1.04	0.80	0.30	2.71	77.5
	Revenue implementation	65.64	10.29	50.19	82.57	15.7
	Expenditure implementation	59.07	9.44	46.70	74.41	16.0
	Capital expenditure share	14.37	12.45	2.80	36.23	86.6
	Recurrent expenditure share	82.37	12.04	61.04	94.23	14.6

Note: Revenue and expenditure amounts are reported in the original financial units. CV = coefficient of variation.

IGR remained highly heterogeneous, ranging from 5.37–104.55 in 2023 and 12.96–145.51 in 2024, with a coefficient of variation of about 80% in both years. This was substantially greater than variation in statutory and total revenue, indicating uneven own-source capacity.

While Shongom, Nafada, Kaltungo and Kwami recorded substantial IGR increases, others declined (Figure 1b–d; Table 3). The reform-period resource expansion therefore did not produce uniform fiscal self-reliance.

Statutory and total revenue had relatively low dispersion, whereas IGR, capital expenditure and capital expenditure share were much more variable (Table 1).

The baseline is therefore clear: LGAs had substantially more nominal resources but remained transfer-dependent and uneven in own-source revenue generation.

4.2. Budget Implementation and Expenditure Allocation

Mean revenue implementation fell from 80.44% in 2023 to 65.64% in 2024, while expenditure implementation fell from 72.55% to 59.07% (Figure 2a; Table 1). Thus, budget realisation weakened as the resource envelope expanded.

At the same time, actual expenditure increased from 3,085.93 to 4,716.27 and capital expenditure from 274.79 to 731.04, raising the mean capital share from 8.86% to 14.37% (Table 1; Figure 2b). LGAs therefore spent more in absolute terms while implementing a smaller proportion of their budgets.

The decline in implementation should consequently be distinguished from absolute spending capacity: the main change was a wider gap between planned and realised financial activity (Figure 2a,c).

Capital expenditure also changed unevenly: Funakaye increased by 276.6%, Kwami by more than 1,000% and Dukku by 198.94%, whereas Billiri, Gombe and Nafada recorded declines (Figure 2d; Table 3).

Figure 2. Budget implementation and expenditure allocation across Gombe LGAs, 2023–2024 (a) Budget implementation; (b) expenditure composition; (c) implementation change; (d) capital expenditure change.

Figure 2. Budget implementation and expenditure allocation across Gombe LGAs, 2023–2024 (a) Budget implementation; (b) expenditure composition; (c) implementation change; (d) capital expenditure change.

Actual expenditure increased, but implementation weakened and capital expansion was concentrated in particular LGAs rather than evenly distributed across the state (Figure 2).

Table 2. LGA-level financial performance and budget implementation, 2023–2024.

Year	LGA	Total revenue	IGR	IGR share (%)	Revenue implementation (%)	Expenditure implementation (%)	Actual expenditure	Capital expenditure	Capital share (%)
2023	Akko	4357.11	52.74	1.21	78.24	74.16	4130.02	130.41	3.16
2023	Balanga	3312.67	20.59	0.62	89.71	81.69	3016.64	153.77	5.10
2023	Billiri	3279.33	16.68	0.51	90.33	79.63	2890.97	116.72	4.04
2023	Dukku	3493.43	24.98	0.72	105.44	97.30	3223.78	453.63	14.07
2023	Funakaye	3644.15	104.55	2.87	76.42	67.61	3224.22	592.06	18.36
2023	Gombe	3833.86	73.22	1.91	79.50	68.53	3304.72	173.12	5.24
2023	Kaltungo	2975.79	29.25	0.98	77.81	67.40	2577.59	95.50	3.71
2023	Kwami	3233.42	23.15	0.72	76.00	69.08	2938.85	110.55	3.76
2023	Nafada	2887.34	5.37	0.19	68.75	71.89	3019.24	952.39	31.54
2023	Shongom	2845.10	15.39	0.54	61.98	51.59	2368.56	86.64	3.66
2023	Yamaltu-Deba	3792.36	36.70	0.97	80.66	69.14	3250.66	157.93	4.86
2024	Akko	6448.10	37.85	0.59	78.97	64.92	5481.31	255.66	4.66
2024	Balanga	4995.95	29.41	0.59	64.26	50.12	3887.57	250.54	6.44
2024	Billiri	4962.61	16.79	0.34	64.72	51.39	4114.81	115.31	2.80
2024	Dukku	5213.44	20.46	0.39	77.10	74.41	5049.41	1356.08	26.86
2024	Funakaye	5365.97	145.51	2.71	58.89	64.11	6154.85	2229.72	36.23
2024	Gombe	5686.55	105.43	1.85	82.57	72.62	4874.41	142.27	2.92
2024	Kaltungo	4525.29	59.53	1.32	56.26	50.30	3883.90	158.47	4.08
2024	Kwami	4870.95	43.12	0.89	56.30	58.96	4955.88	1226.98	24.76
2024	Nafada	4379.33	12.96	0.30	66.34	53.49	4043.30	939.42	23.23
2024	Shongom	4411.90	84.47	1.91	50.19	46.70	4022.38	124.58	3.10
2024	Yamaltu-Deba	5530.95	29.18	0.53	66.42	62.72	5411.19	1242.44	22.96

Note: IGR = internally generated revenue.

Table 2. LGA-level financial performance and budget implementation, 2023–2024.

Year	LGA	Total revenue	IGR	IGR share (%)	Revenue implementation (%)	Expenditure implementation (%)	Actual expenditure	Capital expenditure	Capital share (%)
2023	Akko	4357.11	52.74	1.21	78.24	74.16	4130.02	130.41	3.16
2023	Balanga	3312.67	20.59	0.62	89.71	81.69	3016.64	153.77	5.10
2023	Billiri	3279.33	16.68	0.51	90.33	79.63	2890.97	116.72	4.04
2023	Dukku	3493.43	24.98	0.72	105.44	97.30	3223.78	453.63	14.07
2023	Funakaye	3644.15	104.55	2.87	76.42	67.61	3224.22	592.06	18.36
2023	Gombe	3833.86	73.22	1.91	79.50	68.53	3304.72	173.12	5.24
2023	Kaltungo	2975.79	29.25	0.98	77.81	67.40	2577.59	95.50	3.71
2023	Kwami	3233.42	23.15	0.72	76.00	69.08	2938.85	110.55	3.76
2023	Nafada	2887.34	5.37	0.19	68.75	71.89	3019.24	952.39	31.54
2023	Shongom	2845.10	15.39	0.54	61.98	51.59	2368.56	86.64	3.66
2023	Yamaltu-Deba	3792.36	36.70	0.97	80.66	69.14	3250.66	157.93	4.86
2024	Akko	6448.10	37.85	0.59	78.97	64.92	5481.31	255.66	4.66
2024	Balanga	4995.95	29.41	0.59	64.26	50.12	3887.57	250.54	6.44
2024	Billiri	4962.61	16.79	0.34	64.72	51.39	4114.81	115.31	2.80
2024	Dukku	5213.44	20.46	0.39	77.10	74.41	5049.41	1356.08	26.86
2024	Funakaye	5365.97	145.51	2.71	58.89	64.11	6154.85	2229.72	36.23
2024	Gombe	5686.55	105.43	1.85	82.57	72.62	4874.41	142.27	2.92
2024	Kaltungo	4525.29	59.53	1.32	56.26	50.30	3883.90	158.47	4.08
2024	Kwami	4870.95	43.12	0.89	56.30	58.96	4955.88	1226.98	24.76
2024	Nafada	4379.33	12.96	0.30	66.34	53.49	4043.30	939.42	23.23
2024	Shongom	4411.90	84.47	1.91	50.19	46.70	4022.38	124.58	3.10
2024	Yamaltu-Deba	5530.95	29.18	0.53	66.42	62.72	5411.19	1242.44	22.96

Note: IGR = internally generated revenue.

Overall, the 2024 period combined greater nominal resources and actual expenditure with lower budget implementation and a higher but uneven capital expenditure share.

4.3. Heterogeneity in Local-Government Financial Responses

Total revenue increased in all 11 LGAs, ranging from 45.84% in Yamaltu-Deba to 55.07% in Shongom, but IGR growth varied sharply: it declined in Akko, Dukku and Yamaltu-Deba, while rising 448.86% in Shongom and 141.34% in Nafada (Figure 3c; Table 3).

Thus, relatively uniform total-revenue growth did not produce a common trajectory of fiscal self-reliance.

Implementation was also heterogeneous. Revenue implementation fell by 25.45 percentage points in Balanga and 28.34 in Dukku but rose 3.06 points in Gombe. Capital-share changes ranged from +21.00 points in Kwami and +17.86 in Funakaye to −8.31 in Nafada (Table 3).

The standardised profiles and PCA show distinct combinations of own-source revenue capacity, implementation and expenditure allocation rather than a common LGA response (Figure 3a–d).

The multidimensional evidence confirms differentiated financial trajectories within a common institutional environment; Table 3 reports the magnitude and direction of change for each LGA.

Table 3. Changes in LGA financial performance between 2023 and 2024.

LGA	Revenue growth (%)	IGR growth (%)	Actual expenditure growth (%)	Capital expenditure growth (%)	IGR share change (pp)	Revenue implementation change (pp)	Expenditure implementation change (pp)	Capital share change (pp)
Akko	47.99	−28.23	32.72	96.04	−0.62	0.73	−9.24	1.51
Balanga	50.81	42.84	28.87	62.93	−0.03	−25.45	−31.57	1.35
Billiri	51.33	0.66	42.33	−1.21	−0.17	−25.61	−28.24	−1.24
Dukku	49.24	−18.09	56.63	198.94	−0.32	−28.34	−22.89	12.78
Funakaye	47.25	39.18	90.89	276.60	−0.16	−17.53	−3.50	17.86
Gombe	48.32	43.99	47.50	−17.82	−0.06	3.06	4.09	−2.32
Kaltungo	52.07	103.52	50.68	65.94	0.33	−21.55	−17.10	0.38
Kwami	50.64	86.26	68.63	1009.89	0.17	−19.70	−10.12	21.00
Nafada	51.67	141.34	33.92	−1.36	0.11	−2.41	−18.41	−8.31
Shongom	55.07	448.86	69.82	43.79	1.37	−11.78	−4.89	−0.56
Yamaltu-Deba	45.84	−20.49	66.46	686.70	−0.44	−14.24	−6.42	18.10

Note: pp = percentage points.

Table 3. Changes in LGA financial performance between 2023 and 2024.

LGA	Revenue growth (%)	IGR growth (%)	Actual expenditure growth (%)	Capital expenditure growth (%)	IGR share change (pp)	Revenue implementation change (pp)	Expenditure implementation change (pp)	Capital share change (pp)
Akko	47.99	−28.23	32.72	96.04	−0.62	0.73	−9.24	1.51
Balanga	50.81	42.84	28.87	62.93	−0.03	−25.45	−31.57	1.35
Billiri	51.33	0.66	42.33	−1.21	−0.17	−25.61	−28.24	−1.24
Dukku	49.24	−18.09	56.63	198.94	−0.32	−28.34	−22.89	12.78
Funakaye	47.25	39.18	90.89	276.60	−0.16	−17.53	−3.50	17.86
Gombe	48.32	43.99	47.50	−17.82	−0.06	3.06	4.09	−2.32
Kaltungo	52.07	103.52	50.68	65.94	0.33	−21.55	−17.10	0.38
Kwami	50.64	86.26	68.63	1009.89	0.17	−19.70	−10.12	21.00
Nafada	51.67	141.34	33.92	−1.36	0.11	−2.41	−18.41	−8.31
Shongom	55.07	448.86	69.82	43.79	1.37	−11.78	−4.89	−0.56
Yamaltu-Deba	45.84	−20.49	66.46	686.70	−0.44	−14.24	−6.42	18.10

Note: pp = percentage points.

All LGAs gained total revenue, but differed substantially in own-source revenue growth, implementation and expenditure allocation. The reform-period change was therefore characterised by differentiated local responses rather than a common financial trajectory.

4.4. Financial Autonomy and Implementation Outcomes

The analysis next examines whether greater own-source financial capacity was associated with implementation and expenditure outcomes.

IGR was strongly correlated with its share of total revenue (r = 0.954, p < 0.001), as expected from their mathematical relationship. More substantively, revenue and expenditure implementation were strongly and positively associated (r = 0.905, p < 0.001; Table 4).

IGR share was not significantly associated with revenue implementation (r = −0.151, p = 0.503), expenditure implementation (r = −0.056, p = 0.804) or capital share (r = 0.066, p = 0.771). Total revenue was also not significantly associated with revenue implementation (r = −0.278, p = 0.211) or expenditure implementation (r = −0.279, p = 0.208).

Figure 4 shows the strong co-movement of revenue and expenditure implementation and the weak relationships involving IGR share.

The strongest substantive relationship was therefore between revenue and expenditure implementation, not own-source revenue capacity. This suggests that budget execution is an interconnected financial process, while greater IGR share alone does not imply stronger implementation.

The quantitative evidence provides limited support for a direct relationship between financial autonomy and implementation. It identifies financial patterns but cannot establish whether constraints arise from administrative capacity, procedures, political control, transfer timing or other mechanisms.

4.5. Institutional Mechanisms Underlying Financial Autonomy and Accountability

Interviews were used to explain why greater financial resources did not necessarily correspond to stronger implementation outcomes.

Three recurring mechanisms linked formal autonomy to practical discretion: the distinction between formal and effective control over resources; administrative procedures affecting conversion of resources into expenditure; and accountability and oversight surrounding discretionary use.

These mechanisms help explain the divergence between resource expansion and budget implementation (Table 5): possession of resources does not necessarily equal effective discretion.

The qualitative evidence therefore shifts attention from whether LGAs received more resources to whether they acquired effective discretion over those resources, providing the institutional interpretation of the quantitative findings

5. Discussion

5.1. Financial Expansion Does Not Necessarily Produce Substantive Local Autonomy

The central finding is that financial expansion did not translate proportionately into substantive fiscal autonomy. Mean total revenue rose from 3,423.14 to 5,126.46 and actual expenditure from 3,085.93 to 4,716.27, yet IGR remained about 1% of total revenue and revenue and expenditure implementation declined from 80.44% to 65.64% and 72.55% to 59.07%, respectively. Greater access therefore expanded financial space without necessarily increasing local control over financial priorities.

This finding is consistent with Nigerian research identifying restricted revenue rights, fiscal dependence and institutional constraints as limits on local financial autonomy (Ajayi & Omotoso, 2024; Onuoha et al., 2021). The Gombe evidence extends this argument by showing that dependence can persist even as the nominal resource base expands.

The very low IGR share is especially important: although statutory transfers remain essential, heavy dependence on them limits control over the size and structure of the local resource base. Recent Nigerian scholarship similarly highlights weak local revenue capacity and the gap between formal autonomy and practical discretion (Ajayi & Omotoso, 2024; Bamidele, 2025; Egwuagu et al., 2024; Onuoha et al., 2021).

5.2. Greater Financial Space was Accompanied by Uneven Implementation Capacity

The second finding is substantial variation in LGA responses. Although total revenue increased everywhere, IGR, implementation and expenditure allocation changed differently across LGAs. Capital expenditure illustrates this variation particularly clearly. A common reform environment therefore did not generate a uniform local-government response.

This is consistent with decentralisation research showing that institutional reforms are mediated by administrative capacity and intergovernmental controls. Recent Nigerian studies likewise emphasise regulatory constraints, state influence and institutional capacity (Dalimunthe et al., 2023; Modibbo & Chukkol, 2025).

Revenue and expenditure implementation were strongly correlated, whereas IGR share was not significantly associated with either. Budget execution therefore appears to depend on a broader process involving resource availability, budget preparation, administrative procedures and expenditure execution rather than own-source revenue alone.

Interview evidence reinforces this interpretation: administrative capacity, procedures and financial controls can constrain implementation even when financial resources increase. Decentralisation creates the opportunity for autonomy, but institutional capacity shapes how far it is realised (Bamidele, 2025).

5.3. The Reform Expanded Local Financial Space Without Eliminating State–LGA Dependence

The reform also appears to have expanded financial space without completely removing state-level influence. Interviews indicate greater access to resources alongside continuing state influence over aspects of local financial administration and decision-making. Autonomy is therefore multidimensional: financial access may increase while effective discretion remains constrained by intergovernmental relationships.

This interpretation is consistent with evidence that state–local financial arrangements shape the practical scope of autonomy (Okorie et al., 2023). The Gombe findings suggest that the reform is better understood as a reconfiguration of state–LGA financial relations than as a complete withdrawal of state influence.

5.4. Greater Autonomy Increases the Importance of Accountability

Greater financial discretion also increases the importance of accountability. Interview evidence indicates continuing challenges in reporting, oversight and administrative capacity, showing that greater access to resources has not automatically produced stronger accountability. Decentralisation likewise does not by itself guarantee effective monitoring or governance (Bamidele, 2025).

Autonomy and accountability should therefore be treated as complementary. Greater discretion creates greater responsibility for financial decisions, requiring reliable information, reporting and oversight, particularly where budget implementation remains weak.

5.5. From Formal Autonomy to Substantive Local Autonomy

The findings distinguish formal autonomy, substantive autonomy and accountable autonomy. Formal autonomy concerns authority established through reform; substantive autonomy concerns meaningful discretion over resources; accountable autonomy adds the capacity to justify and be scrutinised for those decisions.

These dimensions did not advance at the same pace in Gombe: resources expanded, statutory revenue remained dominant, implementation declined and local responses diverged. Financial autonomy is therefore better understood as the capacity to control resources, translate them into locally determined expenditure and remain accountable for their use (Okorie et al., 2023).

The Gombe case shows that the 2024 reform expanded the opportunity for local financial discretion without fully establishing the institutional conditions required for substantive autonomy.

5.6. Implications for Decentralisation Policy

Financial transfer should therefore be treated as a means rather than the endpoint of decentralisation. Direct access should be accompanied by stronger local revenue administration, financial-management capacity, budget implementation and reporting; the very low IGR share indicates that financial access alone will not remove structural dependence on statutory transfers (Ajayi & Omotoso, 2024).

The decline in implementation despite revenue growth further shows the need for administrative systems supporting budget execution, expenditure control and transparent reporting. Decentralisation outcomes depend on the institutional conditions under which local responsibilities are exercised (Boetti et al., 2012).

Ultimately, greater autonomy should be matched by stronger accountability. For Gombe, effective decentralisation requires financial authority to be accompanied by the capacity and oversight mechanisms needed to exercise that authority effectively and transparently.

6. Conclusions

The findings show that Gombe's implementation of local-government autonomy created greater financial space without automatically producing substantive fiscal autonomy. Resources expanded while statutory revenue remained dominant, budget implementation declined and LGA responses diverged. Financial access alone is therefore insufficient for effective local decision-making.

Autonomy is shaped by the institutional conditions surrounding resources. Differences in implementation and expenditure responses, together with interview evidence, indicate that administrative capacity, financial procedures and intergovernmental relationships mediate practical discretion. Autonomy is best understood as a process connecting financial access, discretion, implementation and accountability.

For Nigeria's autonomy reforms, greater financial access should be accompanied by stronger local revenue administration, budget execution, financial-management capacity and transparent oversight. Greater discretion should also carry clearer accountability so that responsibility for financial decisions is matched by effective scrutiny.

Future research should extend beyond the two-year transition, compare states and link financial autonomy to service delivery and citizen accountability to assess whether greater local discretion produces sustained governance improvements.