From Waste to Value: Governance Pathways, Policy Frameworks, and Circular Economy Strategies for Mineral Waste Valorisation in Ghana’s E-Waste Sector

1. Introduction

Mineral waste valorisation — the transformation of discarded materials into productive economic and environmental resources — has emerged as a central challenge and opportunity in the global pursuit of circular economies (Forti et al., 2020; Awasthi et al., 2019). Nowhere is this challenge more acute than in Ghana’s e-waste sector, where a complex confluence of informality, governance fragmentation, ecological degradation, and untapped mineral resource potential creates both significant risk and significant opportunity. The e-waste stream flowing through Ghana’s urban hubs contains recoverable quantities of copper, aluminium, gold, silver, iron, and rare earth elements — secondary raw materials of considerable economic value — yet the dominant methods of extraction remain hazardous, ecologically destructive, and economically inefficient.

Ghana’s e-waste sector generates annual economic value estimated at US $105–$268 million and provides livelihoods for over 200,000 people across informal collection, dismantling, and recycling activities (Daum, Stoler & Grant, 2017; Kansuk & Agbley, 2023). The sector operates across multiple urban hubs: in Accra, at Agbogbloshie-Sodom, Mortuary Road, Ashaiman, and Tema; in Kumasi, along the Dagomba line, Akwatia line, and Suame Magazine line; and at emerging sites in Tamale, Sunyani, Ada, and Apedwa (Iddris et al., 2025). Despite decades of research, regulatory intervention, and development partner support, the transition from informal, hazardous mineral waste processing to systematic, safe, and circular valorisation remains elusive.

The barriers to this transition are not primarily technical. Appropriate technologies for e-waste processing exist; the economic case for mineral recovery is established; and the regulatory architecture, while imperfect, provides a legal foundation for action. The fundamental barriers are institutional and political-economic: a fragmented governance landscape in which policies remain disconnected from implementation realities; an economic environment in which informal actors are structurally disadvantaged relative to well-capitalised foreign buyers; and a social-ecological context in which the communities most dependent on e-waste livelihoods bear the greatest burden of ecological harm. These governance deficits — not technological or market failures alone — determine whether Ghana’s mineral waste streams are valorised sustainably or continue to be extracted through means that harm both people and ecosystems.

This paper addresses these deficits directly. Drawing on original empirical research involving 21 key informant interviews conducted across Ghana’s e-waste governance landscape — spanning government agencies, development partners, private sector actors, civil society organisations, and academia — alongside policy document review and field observation, we examine the governance architecture, social-ecological sustainability dynamics, and policy pathways shaping mineral waste valorisation in Ghana’s e-waste sector. Our analysis is structured around three questions: first, how do existing policy and regulatory frameworks enable or constrain mineral waste valorisation?; second, what social-ecological sustainability challenges and gaps characterise current interventions?; and third, what governance reforms and circular economy strategies are required to unlock Ghana’s mineral waste valorisation potential?

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines our conceptual framework, integrating Social-Ecological Systems theory with sociotechnical transitions perspectives. Section 3 describes our methodology. Section 4 presents findings across three interconnected dimensions: policy and regulatory governance; social and economic challenges; and ecological sustainability gaps. Section 5 develops our governance reform agenda, drawing on both empirical findings and stakeholder visioning. Section 6 concludes with implications for the conference themes of engineering innovation and policy advocacy.

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

2.1. Social-Ecological Systems and E-Waste Governance

This study applies a Social-Ecological Systems (SES) framework as its primary analytical lens (Ostrom, 2009). The SES framework conceptualises e-waste management as a dynamic system in which social (human) and ecological (biophysical) subsystems are inherently interdependent. Sustainable management of mineral waste streams requires approaches that simultaneously address the human dimensions — including livelihoods, health, labour rights, and equity — and the ecological dimensions, including pollution prevention, resource recovery, and long-term ecosystem health (Domptail, Easdale & Yuerlita, 2013).

Social-ecological sustainability in the e-waste context means the ability of the governance system to provide for current livelihoods and ecological needs without foreclosing the options of future generations (Araral, 2013; Folke, 2006). It requires attending simultaneously to the social dimension — occupational health and safety, fair labour practices, equitable distribution of benefits, and community well-being — and the ecological dimension — pollution control, resource recovery, prevention of soil, water, and air contamination, and the promotion of circular material flows (Pickren, 2014; Binder et al., 2013). A governance approach that addresses one dimension without the other will produce outcomes that are neither socially just nor ecologically sustainable.

2.2. Sociotechnical Transitions and Circular Economy

Complementing the SES framework, we draw on sociotechnical transitions theory (Geels, 2002, 2019) to analyse the pathways and barriers to a circular e-waste economy in Ghana. The multi-level perspective (MLP) distinguishes between niche innovations (emerging practices and technologies operating outside the dominant regime), the sociotechnical regime (the established configuration of technologies, institutions, policies, and cultural practices), and the sociotechnical landscape (broader structural forces exerting pressure on the regime).

In Ghana’s e-waste sector, informal recycling practices, incentive-based collection schemes, and community-owned valorisation initiatives represent niche-level innovations with potential to catalyse systemic change. The dominant regime — characterised by fragmented regulation, informal market dominance, and hazardous processing methods — exhibits significant lock-in despite mounting landscape pressures from international circular economy norms, donor programmes, and public health imperatives. Sustainable valorisation requires not merely technological substitution but coordinated changes across all levels: niche, regime, and landscape.

The circular economy framework provides the normative direction for this transition, framing e-waste as a “mine” of secondary raw materials — copper, aluminium, gold, iron, plastics — that can re-enter the production system and reduce dependence on virgin mineral extraction (Fivaz et al., 2024; Reike, Vermeulen & Witjes, 2018). Achieving this requires “bending the curve” through end-of-life product recovery, safe material disassembly, resource recovery technologies, and sustained public education (Ogunseitan, 2022). These mechanisms are not independent of governance: their effectiveness depends entirely on the regulatory, institutional, and economic conditions within which they operate.

3. Research Methodology

This study employed a qualitative case study design, enabling in-depth analysis of context-bound practices, stakeholder dynamics, and governance processes across Ghana’s multi-sited e-waste landscape (Yin, 2014; Sarantakos, 2021). The case study approach is appropriate for examining complex, evolving systems where the boundaries between policy, practice, and ecology are blurred and where generalisation requires thick description of local conditions.

Data collection proceeded through three instruments. First, we conducted 21 semi-structured key informant interviews (KIIs) between March and April 2024, with participants drawn from five stakeholder categories: government and policymakers (n=5, including EPA, MESTI-PIU, E-waste Fund Secretariat, and Accra Metropolitan Assembly); civil society groups and associations (n=4, including Green Advocacy Ghana, ESPA, and Gbewah Scrap Dealers Association); development partners (n=3, including GIZ, AEHPMP Secretariat, and Sustainable Recycling Industries); private sector actors (n=4, including Electro Recycling Ghana, AppCyclers Ghana, City Waste Recycling, and Jekora Ghana); and research and academia (n=4, from University of Ghana, CSIR, and Mountain Research Institute). Interviews lasted 45–60 minutes each.

Table 1. Sample respondents and stakeholder categories.

Participant Category	Organisations	Sample (n)
Government & Policymakers	EPA, MESTI-PIU, E-waste Fund Secretariat, AMA	5
Civil Society & Associations	Green Advocacy Ghana, ESPA, GASDA	4
Development Partners	GIZ, AEHPMP Secretariat, SRI Secretariat	3
Private Sector	Electro Recycling Ghana, AppCyclers, City Waste Recycling, Jekora Ghana	4
Research & Academia	University of Ghana, CSIR, Mountain Research Institute	4
TOTAL		21

Table 1. Sample respondents and stakeholder categories.

Participant Category	Organisations	Sample (n)
Government & Policymakers	EPA, MESTI-PIU, E-waste Fund Secretariat, AMA	5
Civil Society & Associations	Green Advocacy Ghana, ESPA, GASDA	4
Development Partners	GIZ, AEHPMP Secretariat, SRI Secretariat	3
Private Sector	Electro Recycling Ghana, AppCyclers, City Waste Recycling, Jekora Ghana	4
Research & Academia	University of Ghana, CSIR, Mountain Research Institute	4
TOTAL		21

Second, we reviewed approximately 15 policy and regulatory documents, including Act 917, LI2250, the National Environmental Policy (2012), the National Environmental Sanitation Policy (2010), GIZ and World Bank project reports, and technical guidelines. Third, field observations were conducted at Agbogbloshie, the GAEC holding centre, and Electro Recycling Ghana’s facility, providing experiential grounding for interview data. Data analysis employed NVivo-supported inductive qualitative content analysis (QCA), producing 101 initial codes distilled into nine core themes through iterative rounds of coding and cross-checking with two independent qualitative research experts. Member-checking with five key respondents enhanced analytical credibility.

4. Findings

4.1. Policy and Regulatory Governance: Frameworks, Gaps, and Agenda-Setting

Ghana’s regulatory architecture for mineral waste governance is anchored by the Hazardous and Electronic Waste Control and Management Act 2016 (Act 917) and its accompanying regulation LI2250. Act 917 establishes the Electrical and Electronic Waste Management Fund (EEWMF), financed through eco-levies on imported electronic equipment, and provides mechanisms for prohibiting hazardous waste transportation, unsafe disposal, and unregulated dismantling. The eco-levy scope has expanded significantly, from 65 items in 2017 to 365 items by 2021, reflecting growing governmental commitment to the sector. Ghana’s regulatory framework is further underpinned by its participation in the Basel Convention on transboundary hazardous waste movements, the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants, and ILO Convention No. 170 on chemical safety in the workplace.

Despite this architecture, institutional actors consistently identified a critical governance deficit: the absence of a comprehensive e-waste management policy that should have preceded and guided the legislative instruments. As one EPA official stated:

“Act 917 and its accompanying regulation LI2250 comprehensively govern every aspect of e-waste management in Ghana. This legal framework aligns with our international obligations under conventions such as the Basel and Stockholm Conventions. While the law and regulations are in place, their effectiveness hinges on the diligence of the institutions tasked with enforcement. However, it’s regrettable that the e-waste management policy lags behind, as ideally it should have preceded both the Act and the LI.” (Interview with EPA, March 21st, 2024)

This policy sequencing failure — regulations without a unifying strategic policy — creates coordination challenges across the multiple agencies involved in mineral waste governance, including EPA, MESTI, Ministry of Sanitation and Water Resources, Local Government, Energy, and Finance ministries. Inter-ministerial fragmentation is not merely procedural; it directly affects the coherence, resourcing, and enforcement of e-waste valorisation efforts.

The agenda-setting process for e-waste policy operates through three intersecting pathways. A problem-driven approach involves analysing root causes of e-waste generation and developing targeted interventions. A stakeholder-driven approach engages government agencies, private industry, civil society, and local communities in participatory decision-making. A bilateral government-to-government approach, exemplified by the Ghana-Germany programme implemented through GIZ, operates through annual intergovernmental programme agreements. As a GIZ official explained:

“The agenda for policy formulation and development is a government-to-government program. The Ghanaian government, in collaboration with the German government, annually convenes to agree on the programmes to implement. While MESTI oversees policy formulation, Parliament also plays a pivotal role. Effective inter-ministerial collaboration is crucial for successful policy formulation. Ultimately, policy implementation occurs at the local level through the MMDAs.” (Interview with GIZ, March 28th, 2024)

Despite these multi-pathway approaches, significant implementation gaps persist. The EEWMF, despite collecting eco-levies since 2017, had disbursed limited funds for infrastructure development as of the study period. A researcher from the University of Ghana Economics Department observed: “The act itself is commendable, but as is often the case in Ghana, implementation poses challenges. It’s concerning when funds have been collected for three years without being disbursed, especially when the delay is attributed to the development of guidelines for disbursement” (Interview, March 26th, 2024). This disbursement delay represents a systemic failure to translate fiscal resource mobilisation into valorisation infrastructure.

A second critical gap is the limited reach of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) mechanisms. Ghana’s import-dominated electronics market creates structural challenges for EPR, as most electronic products enter through commercial channels without direct producer accountability:

“During the implementation of Extended Producer Responsibility, we encountered challenges in tracking levies from dealers who sell mobile phones, TVs, and other electronics as they often do not have direct ties to manufacturers. This difficulty hampers the collection of funds earmarked for waste management.” (Interview with EPA, March 21st, 2024)

A researcher at the Mountain Research Institute further identified coordination failures at the import-governance interface: “The key challenges facing the sector include policymakers’ lack of involvement with the informal sector, the absence of standardised quality for electrical and electronic products entering the country, unregulated borders, weak coordination among stakeholders, waste segregation issues, and poor reporting systems at the port” (Interview with MRI, March 27th, 2024).

4.2. Social and Economic Challenges: Informal Actors, Market Dynamics, and Livelihoods

Informal actors form the backbone of Ghana’s mineral waste recovery system. The sector employs over 200,000 people nationally (Daum et al., 2017; Kansuk & Agbley, 2023), and informal collection, dismantling, and primary processing accounts for the vast majority of e-waste material flows. However, these actors operate without adequate regulatory protection, facing serious occupational health hazards including exposure to lead, mercury, cadmium, and toxic organic compounds released through open cable burning. The social-ecological sustainability framework demands that valorisation strategies address both the ecological harm and the livelihood dependency simultaneously — a tension that interventions have not yet adequately resolved.

The government’s demolition of the central Agbogbloshie scrapyard in 2021 significantly disrupted the informal sector’s social fabric and governance capacity. Informal actors, previously concentrated in a single hub that afforded collective bargaining power and network density, were dispersed across multiple smaller sites including Agbogbloshie-Sodom, Mortuary Road, Dzorwulo, Nungua, Tema, Ashaiman, Amasaman, and Kasoa. The consequences extended beyond logistics. A GIZ official stated: “The demolition, carried out without proper consultation, has not only disrupted ongoing GIZ initiatives but has also made the German government wary of investing further in the informal e-waste sector” (Interview, March 28th, 2024). This chilling effect on international investment illustrates how unilateral governance decisions — absent stakeholder engagement — undermine the very valorisation infrastructure they claim to advance.

The most significant economic barrier to effective valorisation is the structural pricing asymmetry between formal incentive systems and informal market rates, driven by the dominance of well-capitalised foreign buyers — particularly Lebanese-owned trading firms — in Ghana’s secondary mineral market. The leader of the Gbewah Scrap Dealers Association (GASDA) articulated the dilemma clearly:

“We don’t oxidize cables and e-waste willingly because we understand the health risks involved. However, without alternatives, oxidizing becomes the only option. While they introduced an alternative with the incentive-based system in partnership with Green Advocacy Ghana, pricing remains a significant issue. Their prices are much lower compared to earnings from oxidizing and selling. For example, if oxidizing yields GHC200, selling to the programme might only fetch GHC80 to GHC100. Considering the labour involved, this often results in losses or minimal returns.” (Interview with GASDA, March 23rd, 2024)

An official from Green Advocacy Ghana elaborated on the scale of this market distortion:

“The informal actors do not account for and appreciate the environmental or ecological benefits of not oxidising the raw materials. We have registered about 8,000 informal e-waste actors for the incentive-based programme. However, convincing these informal actors to bring their goods into the initiative is particularly challenging due to disparities in pricing. Our prices are lower than the market rate. Major players in the economy such as the Lebanese-owned firms are causing a lot of problems for the project — there are instances where we purchase a ton for GHC14,000 while they purchase it for GHC40,000.” (Interview with Green Advocacy Ghana, April 4th, 2024)

This pricing gap is not simply a market imperfection; it reflects a political economy of mineral waste in which foreign trading networks, integrated into global secondary commodity markets and financed by external capital, can consistently outbid domestically capitalised valorisation programmes. The informal sector’s rational economic response — continuing to burn and sell to the highest bidder — is not irresponsible behaviour but a logical adaptation to incentive structures that governance has failed to correct.

A second economic challenge is the high capital barrier to formal sector entry. As one private sector actor noted: “The e-waste sector presents significant capital challenges, with high upfront costs necessary for establishing qualified facilities to facilitate safe and efficient collection. Additionally, broken value chains with unclear collection channels and a lack of alignment among key stakeholders further complicate operations in this emerging industry” (Interview with AppCyclers Ghana, March 25th, 2024). The combination of capital intensity and value chain fragmentation creates a sector characterised by coordination failures that prevent the scale economies necessary for viable formal valorisation.

A third dimension concerns informal sector workers’ relationship to governance institutions. Workers’ trust in government has been severely damaged by the Agbogbloshie demolition, and this trust deficit undermines the collaborative governance arrangements necessary for sustainable valorisation. The AMA official acknowledged: “Protecting and improving the livelihoods of informal sector workers is crucial, considering that they play a significant role in e-waste management. This includes ensuring their safety, enhancing working conditions, and providing capacity-building opportunities. In the short term, the informal sector remains essential, but efforts are needed to integrate them into formalised systems” (Interview with AMA, March 11th, 2024). The gap between this acknowledgement and the demolition decision illustrates the governance inconsistency that informal actors experience.

Foreign competition from regional traders further compounds informal actors’ vulnerability. The GASDA leader observed: “The primary challenge of the informal sector lies in the lack of control over pricing, as buyers through agents dictate terms without our input. Additionally, the influx of foreign competitors, particularly from Nigeria, Togo, and Burkina Faso, compounds our challenges, blurring boundaries in the informal sector and intensifying competition. While laws restrict foreigners to wholesale roles, they encroach on retail nodes, triggering calls for stricter enforcement” (Interview, March 23rd, 2024).

4.3. Ecological Challenges and Sustainability Gaps

The ecological dimensions of Ghana’s mineral waste governance reveal persistent gaps between regulatory intent and on-the-ground environmental conditions. Open cable burning to recover copper — the most visible and harmful form of informal mineral extraction — continues despite enforcement efforts, releasing toxic fumes including polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), and heavy metal particulates that contaminate soil, air, and water across e-waste processing sites. Our field observations at Agbogbloshie, Mortuary Road, and Kumasi sites confirmed the persistence of these practices alongside emerging examples of safer dismantling.

A critical structural gap is the absence of adequate land allocation for e-waste activities, which forces informal actors into ecologically sensitive areas. As an EPA official explained:

“Many collectors lack allocated land with the necessary permits, leading to occupation of inappropriate areas like under pylons and green spaces, posing environmental risks. Climate change exacerbates these challenges, as e-waste handlers are increasingly exposed to adverse weather conditions, impacting their health and contributing to emissions and global warming.” (Interview with EPA, March 21st, 2024)

This land governance gap intersects with climate vulnerability in ways that are poorly understood and inadequately addressed in Ghana’s e-waste policy architecture. Workers operating in flood-prone informal settlements face compound risks: the ecological hazards of e-waste processing and the physical hazards of climate-intensified flooding, heat, and extreme weather. Governance of mineral waste valorisation cannot be divorced from broader urban land governance and climate adaptation frameworks.

The demolition of Agbogbloshie has produced a fragmentation of e-waste processing sites that compounds ecological governance challenges. As the E-waste Fund Secretariat observed: “Our initiatives are limited to Accra, and there’s a pressing need to expand them to other regions. While we’ve been piloting our efforts in Accra for about three years, the lack of nationwide coverage remains a concern. Additionally, the demolition of Agbogbloshie has led to the emergence of smaller e-waste sites, exacerbating ecological issues. This highlights a critical gap in intergovernmental and intragovernmental collaboration” (Interview, March 20th, 2024).

Inadequate material quality assurance presents another ecological and economic challenge. The incentive-based collection system, which channelled its first batch of 60 tonnes to Electro Recycling Ghana for formal recycling in 2023, encountered quality verification problems: some cables collected and paid for by weight contained no recoverable metal, undermining both the economic viability of the system and confidence in formal recycling pathways. An officer from Green Advocacy Ghana disclosed: “We need a technology to be able to assess the quality of materials that they are bringing to us. These are lessons, because eventually this is going to be a whole national thing. The E-waste Fund is going to take over. These are valuable lessons so that it will be value for money” (Interview, April 4th, 2024).

Household e-waste collection represents a further gap. The AEHPMP Secretariat noted challenges including “collecting e-waste from households due to lack of segregation, slow private sector participation, and changing behaviours within the informal sector” (Interview, April 15th, 2024). Public awareness among end-users remains low, with an E-waste Fund Secretariat official acknowledging: “For the general public, awareness remains relatively low. This is primarily because infrastructure for proper disposal and recycling isn’t widely available yet” (Interview, March 20th, 2024).

4.4. Emerging Interventions: What is Working and Why it is Not Yet Enough

Amidst these governance deficits, a set of promising interventions has demonstrated the viability of alternatives to hazardous informal valorisation. The Incentive-Based Collection System (IBCS), operated by MESTI-PIU in partnership with Green Advocacy Ghana and financed through KfW, has registered approximately 8,000 informal e-waste actors and collected over 400 tonnes of e-waste since 2020. A mobile money payment system at the Agbogbloshie collection point enables rapid compensation for materials delivered. MESTI-PIU conducted an impact assessment revealing significant positive changes: improved financial stability among participating workers, reduced hospital visits attributable to decreased burning, and growing environmental consciousness among scrap dealers.

The Human Capacity Development (HCD) Programme, implemented by GIZ in partnership with the Mountain Research Institute, has trained 136 environmental health officers across MMDAs on sustainable social-ecological e-waste management, with an innovative extension into Schools of Hygiene in Accra, Tamale, and Ho. GIZ has also facilitated four integrated Public-Private Partnership programmes focused on thermoplastic valorisation and is in advanced negotiations with four companies for battery recycling initiatives. These programmes represent a shift from site-specific interventions toward value-chain-wide integration. The World Bank’s AEHPM Project has advanced infrastructure development, completing a holding centre at GAEC in Accra and planning three holding centres and ten collection centres in Accra, Kumasi, and Tamale. An e-waste inventory assessment under the project has begun replacing assumption-based estimates with empirical data, correcting what researchers have described as “academic myths” including the widely circulated but inaccurate characterisation of Accra as “the world’s largest e-waste dumpsite” (Grant et al., 2024).

However, each of these interventions faces constraints that limit their transformative potential. The IBCS is undermined by pricing disparities that make formal collection economically irrational for many informal workers. The HCD programme is compromised by MMDA transfer systems that remove trained officers before they can apply their skills. Infrastructure development remains geographically concentrated in Accra. And the institutional landscape remains fragmented, with limited coordination between GIZ, World Bank, EPA, MESTI, and the E-waste Fund Secretariat. As the Technical Guidelines document (2016) observed, “cross-sectoral coordination remains a significant challenge in implementing sustainable e-waste practices” — an assessment our findings confirm and extend.

5. Towards a Governance Reform Agenda for Mineral Waste Valorisation

5.1. A Unified Policy Framework

The most urgent governance reform needed is the development of a comprehensive national e-waste management policy that precedes and guides all legislative instruments, regulatory frameworks, and programme interventions. This policy should explicitly frame e-waste as a mineral resource stream — positioning valorisation as a national economic and environmental priority — and establish clear responsibilities, coordination mechanisms, and accountability systems across all relevant ministries. As the EPA stated: “The absence of a comprehensive e-waste management policy necessitates the development of a strategic framework that harmonises existing legislation, including the Act and LI, to ensure effective coordination within the system” (Interview, March 21st, 2024).

This unified framework should incorporate circular economy principles explicitly, adopting a reflexive policy approach that incorporates lessons from implementation successes and failures. Ghana’s existing legal framework — Act 917, LI2250, the NEP, and NESP — provides a sound foundation; what is required is the strategic architecture to connect these instruments into a coherent valorisation system.

5.2. Incentive Reform and Market Regulation

Addressing the pricing asymmetry between formal incentive systems and informal market rates is essential for making sustainable valorisation economically viable for informal actors. This requires a multi-pronged approach: increasing IBCS compensation rates to compete with open-market prices; establishing price transparency mechanisms that expose the pricing practices of dominant foreign buyers; and enforcing existing regulations restricting foreign traders to wholesale activities. As the EPA envisions: “The overarching goal is to achieve effective and efficient management of e-waste in Ghana, ultimately leading to a pollution-free environment. We envision a comprehensive system encompassing holding centres across all regions, supported by reliable data, sustainable management practices, and circular economy principles that prioritise responsible production, consumption, and recycling” (Interview, March 21st, 2024).

Additionally, the current eco-levy structure requires reform. Eco-levy rates are widely regarded as insufficient, and the EPR mechanism does not adequately reach the import-dominated electronics supply chain. Exploring supplementary financing mechanisms — including international climate finance linkages, given the carbon reduction benefits of secondary material recovery — and accelerating EEWMF disbursement are critical near-term priorities.

5.3. Informal Sector Integration and Social Protection

No valorisation strategy can succeed without the genuine integration of the over 200,000 informal actors who constitute the sector’s operational backbone. Integration does not mean forced formalisation; it means creating conditions in which informal actors can participate in regulated valorisation pathways while protecting their livelihoods. This requires: formalising land tenure for e-waste collection and processing sites, providing security of place that currently does not exist; building worker organisations’ capacity and legal standing; designing benefit-sharing mechanisms that direct a share of valorisation revenues back to collection communities; and ensuring that health and safety improvements are accompanied by economic improvements, not delivered at the cost of income.

The government should avoid repeating the Agbogbloshie demolition approach, which prioritised physical clearance over community transition support and set back both valorisation infrastructure and worker trust by years. Future urban governance decisions affecting e-waste processing sites must be preceded by meaningful consultation and accompanied by credible livelihood transition plans.

5.4. Spatial Circularity and Infrastructure Development

Circular economy implementation in Ghana’s mineral waste sector must be “territorialised” — embedded within the specific spatial contexts of urban processing hubs across the country rather than designed as a generic national programme (Iddris et al., 2025). Each hub — Agbogbloshie-Sodom, Suame Magazine, Tamale Metro sites, and emerging sites in Ada and Sunyani — has distinct value chain configurations, waste material compositions, governance relationships, and community contexts that require spatially sensitive approaches. Infrastructure investment should prioritise: collection and holding facilities strategically located within or adjacent to existing informal processing areas; sorting and material quality assessment technology to address the quality assurance gap identified in the IBCS; safe dismantling facilities that provide alternatives to burning; and transport and logistics systems connecting dispersed collection sites to formal recycling facilities.

The AEHPMP Secretariat’s integrated scheme vision is instructive: “The key initiative we are focusing on is the integrated scheme, which aims to integrate the entire e-waste value chain, from import to disposal, and delineate responsibilities within the scheme. We are actively engaged with the Ghana Electronics Association to prolong the life of electronic items by exploring options for refurbishment and repair, thus reducing the generation of e-waste” (Interview, April 15th, 2024).

5.5. Government-Led Institutionalisation

Development partner interventions, however well-designed, cannot substitute for government-led and government-owned valorisation systems. GIZ has explicitly advocated for a shift toward government-led e-waste management, as expressed by one of their officials: “Now, GIZ is advocating for a shift towards government-led e-waste management initiatives, aiming for long-term permanence and institutionalisation. Unlike projects from NGOs and donor agencies which typically have finite durations, this initiative is here to stay. As efforts expand to a national scale, with initiatives such as the GIZ-EPA’s integrated waste management scheme, a comprehensive approach ensures sound and safe practices” (Interview with GIZ, March 28th, 2024).

Achieving this requires the E-waste Fund to become an operationally effective and financially credible institution, disbursing collected levies rapidly, transparently, and in accordance with a clear national valorisation strategy. It also requires the government to establish a dedicated e-waste coordination agency or mechanism that brings together EPA, MESTI, the E-waste Fund, and municipal assemblies in a structure with clear mandates, shared data systems, and mutual accountability.

6. Discussion: Engineering Innovations Require Governance Foundations

The conference theme of “Valorising Mineral Waste through Engineering Innovations and Policy Advocacy” reflects a productive tension at the heart of mineral waste governance: technical solutions exist, but they cannot be deployed, sustained, or scaled without governance foundations that create enabling conditions for their adoption. Our findings speak directly to this tension.

Ghana’s e-waste sector contains significant engineering innovation — incentive-based collection systems, formal recycling infrastructure, mobile money payment systems, and emerging battery and thermoplastics recycling partnerships. These are not trivial achievements; they represent hard-won progress in a sector characterised by complexity and informality. Yet their transformative impact has been limited, not by technological inadequacy, but by the governance failures that surround them: pricing systems that make formal recycling economically irrational; land governance that denies informal actors secure processing sites; institutional fragmentation that prevents coordinated value chain integration; and policy sequencing failures that have produced regulations without the strategic framework to align them.

This finding aligns with the SES framework’s insight that social-ecological systems require coordinated governance across multiple levels and dimensions simultaneously. Addressing the ecological dimension of mineral waste — reducing pollution, recovering secondary materials, embedding circular economy principles — requires concurrent progress on the social dimension: livelihoods, equity, participation, and trust. And both require the institutional dimension: unified policy architecture, enforceable regulatory standards, accountable financing systems, and governance processes that include rather than exclude the informal actors who make the system work.

The sociotechnical transitions framework further illuminates why change has been slow. Niche innovations like the IBCS and HCD programme encounter regime-level resistance from established informal market structures, bureaucratic inertia, and policy fragmentation. Landscape pressures — international circular economy norms, donor programmes, public health imperatives — create windows of opportunity, but these windows close when governance fails to convert pressure into sustained institutional change. The Agbogbloshie demolition illustrates precisely this dynamic: a landscape-level pressure (urban redevelopment, political positioning) overrode niche-level progress without creating alternative regime-level pathways, setting back the transition.

7. Conclusion

Ghana’s mineral waste streams represent a significant economic and ecological opportunity. The secondary materials locked in informal e-waste processing — copper, aluminium, gold, iron, plastics, and rare earth elements — are of genuine national and global value. Their recovery through safe, equitable, and circular processes is both technically achievable and economically viable. What stands between the current reality and that potential is not engineering capacity but governance will and design.

This paper has identified three interlocking governance challenges: a policy architecture that is regulatory without being strategic; an economic environment that structurally disadvantages sustainable valorisation relative to hazardous informal markets; and a social-ecological governance deficit that fails to align ecological protection with livelihood security. Addressing these requires the reforms outlined in Section 5: unified policy frameworks, incentive reform and market regulation, informal sector integration, spatial circularity, and government-led institutionalisation.

Two crosscutting principles should govern Ghana’s approach. First, valorisation must be understood as a social-ecological project, not merely an engineering one. The communities whose livelihoods depend on e-waste collection and processing are not obstacles to valorisation; they are its essential foundation. Governance that excludes, displaces, or economically marginalises these communities will fail, regardless of its technical sophistication. Second, circular economy implementation must be reflexive and adaptive: learning from both successes and failures, adjusting incentive structures in response to market dynamics, and building feedback mechanisms that connect policy to practice. Ghana has enough experience, enough institutional capacity, and enough development partner support to succeed. What it requires is the governance architecture to make that success systemic and sustainable.