Submitted:
06 April 2026
Posted:
07 April 2026
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
- Proposal of a system-oriented DDC-based integrated control architecture.
- System-level implementation and industrial validation in a pilot plant.
- System performance evaluation from scalability and maintainability perspectives.
- Establishment of a system-of-systems framework for future smart plant evolution.
2. System Requirements of Unconventional Oil Production Plants
2.1. Environmental and Process System Requirements
- Thermal robustness of system components
- Dynamic stability under transient conditions
- Fault-tolerant sensing and actuation
- Resilience to signal degradation and noise
2.2. Structural System Requirements for Modular Plants
- Plug-and-play module integration
- Preservation of system integrity during topology changes
- Minimal re-engineering during system expansion
- Consistent system behavior under subsystem additions
2.3. Electrical Subsystem Integration Requirements
- Coordinated electrical-process fault diagnosis
- Improved power reliability and energy efficiency
- Reduction of unplanned downtime
2.4. Instrumentation Subsystem Requirements
- Redundant measurement structures
- Voting logic for safety-critical variables
- Self-diagnostic and validation functions
- System-level data consistency management
2.5. Safety as a System Property
2.6. Operational and Maintenance System Requirements
2.7. Summary of System-Level Requirements
- Distributed system architecture
- Modular adaptability
- Integrated subsystem management
- Evolutionary scalability
- Emergent safety and reliability
3. Limitations of Conventional Control System Architectures

3.1. Centralized DCS Architectures
- Scalability limitation: Modular expansion requires significant re-engineering of I/O allocation and control logic.
- Wiring complexity: Long-distance signal cabling increases installation cost and signal integrity risks.
- System rigidity: Centralized logic structures restrict flexible reconfiguration of control topology.
- Maintenance impact: Fault isolation often propagates across multiple subsystems, increasing downtime.
3.2. Limitations of PLC-Based Architectures
- Fragmented system integration: Multiple PLC islands require complex middleware and communication mapping.
- Heterogeneous control environments: Vendor-specific implementations complicate system harmonization.
- Limited system transparency: Unified system monitoring and historization become difficult to maintain.
- Scalability degradation: Communication load increases disproportionately with system expansion.
3.3. Electrical and Instrumentation Subsystem Separation
- Inconsistent system data models
- Delayed fault diagnosis across subsystem boundaries
- Redundant maintenance workflows
- Reduced system-level situational awareness
3.4. System-Level Consequences of Subsystem Separation
- Reduced system adaptability
- Increased lifecycle engineering cost
- Limited support for modular plant evolution
- Degraded fault management efficiency
- Inhibited system-of-systems integration
3.5. Summary of Architectural Limitations
| Aspect | DCS-Based Architecture | PLC-Based Architecture |
|---|---|---|
| Scalability | Limited by centralized I/O structure | Limited by communication fragmentation |
| Subsystem Integration | Electrical and instrumentation separation | Heterogeneous PLC integration complexity |
| Wiring Complexity | Extensive centralized cabling | Distributed but unstructured wiring |
| Fault Diagnosis | Centralized diagnosis delays isolation | Decentralized diagnosis lacks system view |
| System Evolution | Poor adaptability to modular expansion | High engineering effort for expansion |
3.6. System Architecture Implication
4. Proposed DDC-Based Integrated System Architecture
4.1. Architectural Design Philosophy
- Distributed autonomy: Each field controller operates as an autonomous system node.
- System interoperability: Electrical and instrumentation subsystems share a unified data and communication structure.
- Evolutionary scalability: System expansion is achieved without structural redesign.
- System resilience: Fault tolerance and redundancy are embedded at the architectural level.
4.2. Overall System Architecture
- Field DDC Layer
- Control Network Layer
- Supervisory Layer
- Information Layer

4.3. Field-Level DDC Node Structure
- Instrument signal acquisition
- Control logic execution
- Electrical equipment monitoring
- Local safety interlock processing
- Network communication
4.4. Electrical and Instrumentation Integration Mechanism
- Unified fault diagnosis
- Coordinated control actions
- Cross-domain data consistency
- System-level situational awareness
4.5. System-of-Systems Perspective
- Process control subsystem
- Electrical management subsystem
- Instrumentation sensing subsystem
- Safety supervision subsystem
- Operation and maintenance subsystem
4.6. Architectural Comparison
| Aspect | Conventional DCS | Conventional PLC | Proposed DDC Architecture |
|---|---|---|---|
| System topology | Centralized | Fragmented | Distributed integrated |
| Subsystem Integration | Limited | Partial | Unified |
| Scalability | Low | Medium | High |
| Modular adaptability | Poor | Medium | Excellent |
| System-of-systems support | No | Partial | Full |
4.7. Architectural Advantages
- Reduced wiring complexity
- Improved system scalability
- Enhanced subsystem interoperability
- Improved fault isolation capability
- Support for modular plant evolution
4.8. Architectural Implication
5. Electrical and Instrumentation Integration Methodology
5.1. Integration Philosophy
- Unified communication structure
- Common data modeling
- Cross-domain event correlation
5.2. Communication Integration
- IEC 61850 for electrical protection and monitoring
- Modbus TCP/IP for field devices
- OPC UA for supervisory and information layers
5.3. Data Model Harmonization
- Consistent naming conventions
- Unified alarm classification
- Cross-domain data correlation
5.4. Coordinated Control and Diagnosis
- Electrical fault impact on process variables to be automatically correlated
- Process disturbances to be traced back to electrical root causes
- Maintenance recommendations to be generated based on system-wide behavior
| Aspect | Conventional Approach | Proposed Method |
|---|---|---|
| Data structure | Separated | Unified |
| Fault diagnosis | Subsystem-level | System-level |
| Alarm management | Independent | Correlated |
| Maintenance support | Reactive | Predictive |
6. Safety and Reliability Framework
6.1. Safety as a System Property
- Basic process control system
- Electrical protection system
- Safety instrumented system
- Fire and gas system
- Human–machine interface
6.2. Functional Independence and System Coordination
- Context-aware operator response
- System-wide emergency coordination
- Improved post-event analysis
6.3. Reliability and Redundancy Strategy
- Network redundancy (dual Ethernet rings)
- Controller redundancy
- Power supply redundancy
| Layer | Redundancy Strategy |
|---|---|
| Network | Dual ring Ethernet |
| Controller | Hot standby |
| Power | Dual power supply |
| Data | Historian mirroring |
6.4. System Resilience
7. Pilot Plant Validation
7.1. Pilot Plant Description
- FWKO, heater treater, separators
- Steam generation and injection systems
- Produced water treatment units

7.2. System Configuration
- DDC nodes: 24
- Total I/O points: 1,150
- Control loops: 280
- Network: Redundant Ethernet ring
7.3. Performance Evaluation Metrics
- Wiring reduction
- System expansion effort
- Maintenance response time
- System availability
| Metric | Conventional DCS | Proposed DDC |
|---|---|---|
| Wiring length | 100% | 62% |
| Expansion time | 100% | 55% |
| Maintenance downtime | 100% | 68% |
| System availability | 98.2% | 99.4% |
7.4. Validation Results
- The proposed architecture supports modular expansion without system restructuring.
- Integrated fault diagnosis reduces troubleshooting time.
- System availability improves due to distributed autonomy
7.5. Discussion of Practical Implications
8. Conclusions and Future Work
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
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