Presidential Systems with Contingent Flexible Midterms

This paper proposes Scheme M, a new presidential design that evolves the American model by introducing flexibility in election timing while preserving executive stability. Its flexible elements draw inspiration from the post-2017 Turkish presidential system, where variable terms are enabled by early general elections. However, unlike Türkiye—where the Assembly can also trigger early presidential elections, creating perceived insecurity—Scheme M removes this reciprocal power, assigning sole responsibility to the president to identify, assess, and resolve executive-legislative deadlocks. The scheme adapts the established American practice of midterm elections by adding contingent, flexible-timing elements: the mechanism is triggered exclusively by presidential decree, limited to once per five-year term and only within the first three years. It keeps the president's fixed term secure while allowing strategic timing—or avoidance—of midterm legislative elections to refresh or realign parliament at low personal cost. Additional safeguards include a mixed SMDP-PR electoral system to prevent chronic presidential majorities, parliamentary confirmation for the vice-presidential nominee, narrowly defined decree powers, and robust term limits. The scheme has two variants: Scheme FM and Scheme VM. Scheme FM features fixed-time general elections, enhancing predictability, cost efficiency, and campaign depth. Scheme VM introduces variable terms, ensuring near-certain same-party succession, empowering a lame-duck president to renew both branches—avoiding paralysis or premature resignation—and allowing strategic general election timing akin to Westminster practices. Scheme M therefore offers a viable blueprint for stable yet responsive presidential governance.