Introduction
Ethiopia’s environmental governance has evolved through a series of policies, strategies, and legal frameworks aimed at mitigating land degradation, biodiversity loss, deforestation, and climate-related vulnerability (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2011). These include environmental impact assessment regulations, sectoral conservation strategies, and national development frameworks that integrate sustainability objectives. This policy expansion reflects a broad global trend in environmental governance, in which comprehensive regulatory and strategic instruments are widely adopted (Abebe et al., 2024; Genet et al., 2025). However, despite this policy proliferation, environmental outcomes on the ground remain uneven, and many ecosystems continue to degrade. This persistent disconnect between policy intent and practical outcomes highlights a central challenge: environmental policy implementation gaps (Bantider & Desta, 2022; Assele, 2019).
Implementation gaps, defined as the discrepancy between the formal existence of environmental policies and their sustained effective enactment in practice, highlight systematic challenges within the governance process (Van Meter & Van Horn, 1974). In Ethiopia, such gaps are amplified by the country’s rapid population growth, development pressures, and heavy dependence on natural resources for livelihoods and economic growth. These contextual conditions often create tensions between environmental protection objectives and competing socio-economic models that assume predictable policy outcomes (Genet et al., 2025; Abebe et al., 2024).
Despite a growing body of scholarship on environmental policy and governance in Ethiopia, much of the literature has focused on either policy design or isolated sectoral challenges. Few studies systematically examine how institutional, political, and capacity constraints interact to shape implementation dynamics across governance levels. As a result, the reinforcing and structural nature of implementation barriers remains insufficiently understood. Moreover, the implications of these persistent implementation gaps for the feasibility of adaptive environmental management, an approach increasingly advocated for managing complex socio-ecological systems, have received limited empirical attention (Addis et al., 2024; Assele, 2019).
This review, therefore, examines gaps in environmental policy implementation in Ethiopia across three interrelated dimensions: institutional, political, and capacity constraints. Institutional constraints concern organizational and procedural limitations; political constraints relate to competing priorities and shifting commitments; and capacity constraints involve shortages in expertise, resources, and data. Rather than treating these dimensions as isolated problems, this paper synthesizes existing evidence to show how their interactions influence environmental policy outcomes at federal, regional, and local governance levels. By synthesizing existing literature, the review aims to clarify how these interacting constraints contribute to implementation gaps and to assess the implications of these systemic challenges for adaptive environmental management. In doing so, it contributes to a more nuanced understanding of environmental governance in Ethiopia and offers insights that may be relevant for other low- and lower-middle-income countries facing similar implementation dilemmas.
Discussion
Institutional Constraints in Environmental Policy Implementation in Ethiopia
Institutional constraints in Ethiopia manifest in multiple, overlapping ways that collectively hinder effective policy implementation. Rather than isolated administrative weaknesses, these constraints reflect deeper structural features of Ethiopia’s governance system and developmental state model. Environmental authorities, such as the Environmental Protection Authority (EPA), are formally responsible for setting standards and overseeing compliance; however, their mandates remain institutionally subordinate to powerful sectoral ministries responsible for agriculture, water management, forestry, and infrastructure development (Kefale & Gebresenebt, 2014; Di Nunzio, 2015; Genet et al., 2025).
This subordination is not a technical oversight but a structural mechanism through which political priorities determine which policies can be enforced. Fragmented mandates generate ambiguity over decision-making authority and produce persistent conflicts between sectoral development objectives and environmental protection goals. For example, studies from the Lake Tana region show that forestry management initiatives often clash with agricultural expansion programs due to unclear delineation of authority, resulting in delayed enforcement and inconsistent application of policy directives that directly impede effective policy implementation (Genet et al., 2025; Birhan et al., 2025).
Another key challenge is sectoral fragmentation, which further impedes coordinated action by limiting agencies’ ability to work toward shared environmental priorities. In this sense, fragmentation functions as a barrier to learning: it prevents environmental feedback from being incorporated into decision-making, which is central to adaptive management (Pahl-Wostle, 2009; Armitage et al., 2008). In the Awash River Basin, efforts to control water pollution are hindered by the fact that regulatory authority is divided between water management agencies, regional governments, and industrial licensing authorities, with minimal formal mechanisms for coordination (Adane, 2023; Hailu & Tolossa, 2020). Consequently, even when policies are well-designed on paper, conflicting mandates prevent coherent implementation, allowing environmental degradation continue despite formal regulatory frameworks (Adane, 2023; CMP Ethiopia reviews, 2013; water governance capacity reports).
Weak horizontal and vertical coordination further compounds these challenges. Horizontal coordination between ministries is largely ad hoc, relying on informal networks rather than structured institutional procedures, while vertical coordination across federal, regional, and local offices is limited by insufficient guidance, resources, and authority (Bantider & Desta, 2022). Evidence of these coordination gaps can be seen in urban climate adaptation initiatives in Addis Ababa, which demonstrate that transport, land-use planning, and water resource management operate in silos, leading to disjointed implementation of climate policies and reducing the effectiveness of regulatory oversight (Addis et al., 2022). Similarly, in rural areas, local offices frequently struggle to reconcile federal directives with community needs, as centralized reporting structures and limited discretionary authority prevent locally generated environmental feedback from influencing implementation decisions, thereby blocking adaptive learning and constraining the enforcement of locally relevant environmental policies (Kassahun et al., 2021).
Limited enforcement capacity exacerbates institutional gaps, undermining the ability of agencies to ensure compliance with environmental regulations. Monitoring, inspection, and compliance checks are chronically under-resourced, both financially and technically (Assele, 2019; Gebremariam et al., 2020), which reduce their effectiveness. Consequently, critical tools for environmental oversight, such as Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs), are often conducted superficially, with limited follow-up on mitigation measures. This weak enforcement is evident in industrial zones near Addis Ababa, where several companies received initial approval for projects but were not held accountable for non-compliance with pollution regulations due to weak monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, directly preventing policies from achieving their intended environmental outcomes (Bantider & Desta, 2022; Genet et al., 2025).
Organizational instability is another key factor affecting the implementation of environmental policies in Ethiopia. Frequent restructuring, unclear role definitions, and a mismatch between mandates and available resources reduce institutional effectiveness (Yimam et al., 2024). These changes are often politically driven, reinforcing central control while eroding institutional memory and local adaptive capacity. In addition, many agencies lack sufficient technical expertise or data management capacity to implement complex policies, such as climate-resilient land management or biodiversity monitoring programs (Genet et al., 2025). Together, these shortcomings demonstrate that institutional capacity limitations directly compromise the enforcement of environmental policies, allowing non-compliance to persist despite existing legal frameworks.
Political Constraints in Environmental Policy Implementation in Ethiopia
Political dynamics in Ethiopia significantly influence environmental policy implementation, shaping both prioritization and execution of environmental actions within the broader development agenda. Although formal environmental policies and strategies exist, their domestic implementation is often weakened by the low political priority accorded to environmental protection relative to economic growth objectives. Empirical studies consistently show that political interest tends to favor rapid agricultural expansion, large infrastructure projects, and industrial growth, often at the expense of environmental safeguards (Mebrahtu, 2021; Yimam et al., 2024).
When environmental protection is treated as a secondary concern, this perception translates directly into delayed approvals, selective enforcement, and the sidelining of monitoring results whenever environmental requirements conflict with development timelines (Yimam et al., 2024). National development policies and strategic programs prioritize poverty reduction and economic growth in ways that systematically marginalize environmental requirements during project design and execution, leading to the approval and implementation of development initiatives without effective incorporation of ecological safeguards (Dejenie & Kakiso, 2023).
Policy inconsistency across political transitions further compounds implementation challenges. Scholars point to leadership changes and shifting sectoral agendas that drive frequent changes in emphasis, funding, and institutional arrangements for environmental programs, disrupting sustained implementation (Assele, 2019; Hadis et al., 2019). Such shifts prevent agencies from establishing stable and predictable operational cycles, hindering the continuity of environmental programs over time. An analysis of environmental governance since 1991 shows that policy gaps, institutional dissonance, and limited political commitment have hindered the translation of high-level environmental goals into effective actions, despite government advocacy of environmental objectives internationally (Hadis et al., 2019).
Stakeholder engagement in environmental decision-making is often symbolic rather than substantive, meaning that local communities, civil society, and non-governmental organizations are formally consulted but lack the authority to influence regulatory decisions, enforcement actions, or project approvals. Studies of urban climate governance in Addis Ababa document weak participation by NGOs, communities, and businesses in regulatory implementation, and note that non-compliant actors frequently avoid sanctions, reflecting both inadequate political support for enforcement and limited institutional accountability (Addis, Simane, & Zeleke, 2022). However, in the absence of clear consultation platforms and enforceable accountability mechanisms, stakeholders are unable to meaningfully influence regulatory reviews, compliance checks, or policy adjustments during implementation (Addis et al., 2022; Abdeta et al., 2025).
Short-term political incentives further undermine enforcement by discouraging regulators from applying sanctions, suspending projects, or requiring costly mitigation measures that could delay politically supported investments (Hadis et al. 2019). Large-scale infrastructure developments, including investments in dams and irrigation schemes, are often politically backed despite evidence of environmental trade-offs, and environmental regulations are either enforced or sidelined in the implementation of these projects (Mebrahtu, 2021; Yimam et al., 2024). These dynamics suppress feedback mechanisms, preventing monitoring results, public complaints, and evaluation findings from influencing enforcement or policy adjustment (Mebrehatu, 2021; Yimam et al., 2024; Abdeta et al., 2025).
Capacity Constraints in Environmental Policy Implementation in Ethiopia
Capacity limitations represent a critical barrier to effective environmental policy implementation in Ethiopia. Even where institutional frameworks exist and political commitment is articulated, inadequate technical expertise, limited financial resources, and insufficient environmental data impede the translation of policy into practice. These constraints operate across federal, regional, and local levels and interact with institutional and political factors to exacerbate implementation gaps (Folke et al., 2005).
One of the key aspects of these capacity limitations is the shortage of skilled personnel within environmental agencies. Federal and regional offices often lack specialists in ecology, natural resource management, climate adaptation, and environmental monitoring (Bantider & Desta, 2022; Kefale & Gebresenebt, 2014). For example, watershed management programs in the Blue Nile Basin have been delayed due to insufficient trained staff to conduct assessments, coordinate stakeholders, and implement monitoring protocols (Genet et al., 2025; Adane, 2023). These human resource gaps are reinforced by political and institutional incentives that limit support for adaptive and learning-oriented activities. High staff turnover, uneven training opportunities, and limited professional development further erode institutional memory, weakening agencies’ ability to maintain continuity and effectiveness in environmental programs.
Financial constraints emerge in the literature as a major barrier to environmental policy implementation in Ethiopia, compounding human resource limitations. Addis et al. (2022) and Assele (2019) report that many federal and regional agencies operate on restricted budgets that cover only a fraction of monitoring, enforcement, or community engagement activities. For instance, regional forestry offices responsible for reforestation initiatives often cannot complete their programs due to insufficient funding, which undermines national environmental objectives (FAO, 2009). These funding limitations are unevenly distributed: politically prioritized sectors tend to receive the majority of resources, while areas requiring adaptive interventions to challenge centralized control remain chronically underfunded. As a result, these offices lack access to essential tools such as GIS mapping systems, water quality testing equipment, and biodiversity monitoring devices, reducing their ability for evidence-based management (FAO, 2009; EBI, 2024).
Data scarcity further limits adaptive implementation. Studies in Oromia and Amhara indicate that inconsistent satellite data and fragmented monitoring networks hinder accurate assessment of deforestation rates and environmental degradation (Bantider & Desta, 2022; Adane, 2023). Limited mechanisms for sharing environmental information across federal and regional agencies prevent critical data from informing decision-making cycles, leaving agencies unable to evaluate policy effectiveness or adjust interventions in response to emerging conditions (Kassahun et al., 2021; Genet et al., 2025).
Collectively, these capacity constraints, spanning human resources, finance, and data, significantly weaken environmental policy implementation in Ethiopia. The reviewed studies suggest that these limitations are not isolated technical failures but are embedded within a broader political-institutional system that prioritizes sectoral dominance and centralized control over sustained investment in environmental governance (Assele, 2019; Yimam et al., 2024; Dejene & Kakiso, 2023). Consequently, even well-designed policies often fail to achieve measurable improvements in ecosystem health, biodiversity conservation, or climate resilience (Addis et al., 2022).
Structural Interaction of Institutional, Political, and Capacity Constraints
Across federal, regional, and local governance levels, the constraints identified in this review do not operate independently. Instead, they interact in ways that undermine environmental policy implementation and limit the ability of agencies to apply adaptive environmental management in Ethiopia. Political prioritization emerges as the dominant driver, shaping institutional authority and determining how financial, human, and informational capacities are allocated (Hadis et al., 2019). Political support for large-scale agricultural expansion, infrastructure development, and industrialization results in environmental agencies operating within fragmented institutional arrangements, with limited enforcement authority and chronic resource constraints. As documented in the Lake Tana and Awash River Basin Cases, environmental mandates are routinely subordinated to sectoral objectives, resulting in delayed enforcement, inconsistent application of regulations, and continued environmental degradation despite the existence of formal policy frameworks (Adane, 2023; Genet et al., 2025; Bantider & Desta, 2022).
Institutional fragmentation, often framed as an adaptive weakness, functions politically to prevent learning and accountability. Overlapping mandates, unclear authority, and weak horizontal and vertical coordination block the transmission of environmental feedback from monitoring systems to higher-level decision-making arenas. Consequently, ecological evidence generated at local or basin levels fails to influence federal policy priorities, preventing iterative adjustment and locking policies into static implementation pathways. Organizational instability, manifested through frequent restructuring, shifting mandates, and unclear role definitions, further erodes institutional memory and undermines the development of long-term implementation strategies (Yimam et al., 2024).
Capacity constraints both result from and reinforce these political-institutional arrangements. Persistent shortages of skilled personnel, inadequate financing, and fragmented data systems reflect political incentives that maintain weak environmental agencies where adaptive intervention could challenge centralized control. Together, these dynamics link political prioritization, institutional fragmentation, and capacity limitation into a self-reinforcing governance pattern.
These interactions produce a hierarchical constraint structure: political priorities restrict institutional authority and enforcement space, limiting what environmental agencies can implement; institutions reproduce political logic through fragmented mandates and weak coordination; and capacity deficits limit agencies’ access to the tools, expertise, and data required to implement adaptive responses independently. As illustrated in
Figure 2, these dynamics not only generate environmental policy implementation gaps as emergent properties of the governance system but also structurally block adaptive management. This synthesis clarifies why adaptive environmental management remains structurally blocked in Ethiopia. Even well-designed policies, improved monitoring frameworks, or targeted capacity-building initiatives cannot generate meaningful change without addressing the underlying political and institutional drivers that suppress learning, flexibility, and responsiveness, setting the stage for the implications discussed in the following section.
Implications for Adaptive Environmental Management
The findings of this review indicate that adaptive environmental management in Ethiopia is not merely weak or underdeveloped, but structurally constrained by the interaction of political priorities, institutional arrangements, and capacity allocation. Adaptive management depends on iterative learning, feedback integration, flexibility in decision-making, and responsiveness to environmental change (Folke et al., 2005). Yet the prevailing governance system systematically neutralizes each of these mechanisms during policy implementation.
First, political prioritization of short-term development objectives directly undermines adaptive learning by insulating decision-making from environmental feedback. When large-scale agricultural expansion, infrastructure projects, and industrial investments are politically protected, evidence generated through environmental monitoring is unable to influence regulatory enforcement or project continuation. Monitoring results may be produced, but they do not trigger sanctions, policy revision, or corrective action. As a result, adaptive management fails at its core premise: learning from outcomes and adjusting interventions. Feedback becomes informational rather than consequential, rendering monitoring and evaluation exercises largely symbolic.
Second, institutional fragmentation and centralized, top-down decision-making prevent adaptive processes from operating across governance levels. Overlapping mandates, unclear authority, and weak horizontal and vertical coordination obstruct the transmission of environmental information from local monitoring systems to higher-level policy arenas. The absence of a structured consultation platform further limits the integration of local knowledge and stakeholder experience into policy revision. This disconnect blocks the formation of iterative environmental policies, static even as ecological conditions deteriorate. In practice, institutional design functions to suppress learning rather than enable it.
Third, capacity constraints, human, financial, and informational, disable the operational tools required for adaptive management. Shortages of skilled personnel, chronic underfunding of monitoring and enforcement functions, and a fragmented or outdated environmental data systems limit agencies’ ability to evaluate policy effectiveness or experiment with alternative interventions. These capacity deficits are not neutral technical shortcomings; they are produced and maintained by political and institutional arrangements that divert resources toward politically prioritized sectors while underfunding functions that could challenge established development trajectories.
Crucially, these constraints are mutually reinforcing. Political priorities shape institutional design, institutional design governs capacity allocation, and capacity deficits ensure that environmental evidence cannot contest dominant development narratives. Institutional fragmentation shields political decisions from environmental accountability, while limited monitoring capacity prevents the generation of credible, adaptive management is not simply under-resourced; it is structurally incompatible with prevailing governance logics.
The implication is clear: adaptive environmental management in Ethiopia cannot be achieved through technical fixes alone. Capacity-building initiative, improved data systems, or institutional restructuring will remain performative unless political incentives are realigned to allow environmental feedback to influence enforcement decisions and policy outcomes. Without reforms that embed learning, uncertainty, and long-term ecological considerations into political decision-making processes, adaptive management will remain theoretically endorsed but practically unattainable.