Submitted:
05 January 2026
Posted:
06 January 2026
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
1.1. Quantum Encryption Paradigms: From Key Distribution to Direct Encryption
1.2. Phase Space: The Arena for Optical Quantum Encryption
- Phase Operators (): Implementing rotations , these operators form the basis of the original Quantum Public Key Envelope (QPKE) protocol [10]. The same physical principle—randomizing the phase of a coherent state—was subsequently adapted for symmetric-key physical-layer encryption, leading to the QEPS-p scheme. This adaptation has been extensively studied via simulation [11,12,13] and experimental demonstrations [14,15] for the QPKE scheme and experimental demonstration for QEPS-p symmetric encryption [13]. However, pure phase encryption exhibits an inherent limitation: while effective for phase-encoded data (e.g., PSK), it becomes partially vulnerable for modulation formats that encode information in both amplitude and phase, such as quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM), as amplitude information remains partially exposed.
- Displacement Operators (): To address this limitation, QEPS-d schemes were developed, employing the reduced displacement operator (defined by its action ) that translates coherent states across the entire phase space. This approach overcomes the amplitude-sensitivity of pure phase encryption by randomizing both quadratures, thereby enabling the secure encryption of arbitrary QAM formats [16,17]. Crucially, these reduced operators commute (), making QEPS-d practically implementable with standard coherent optical hardware while expanding the cipher space to include the full two-dimensional constellation plane [18].
- Dynamic Displacement Operators (DDOs): Building upon both preceding approaches, the most recent advancement combines displacement and phase operations in time-varying sequences, , yielding QEPS-dd. This dynamic framework creates a highly randomized and expansive cipher space through the continuous evolution of encryption parameters and according to cryptographic algorithms. By introducing temporal variability alongside spatial obfuscation, QEPS-dd offers enhanced security against advanced cryptanalytic techniques and adapts more robustly to evolving threat models [19,20].
1.3. Quantum Public-Key Encryption in Phase Space
1.4. The Broader Landscape of Optical Physical-Layer Security
1.5. Chaos-Based Optical Encryption: A Comparative Perspective
- Security Foundation: Chaos security relies on computational hardness—the difficulty of reconstructing nonlinear dynamics from intercepted signals. While sensitive to parameter mismatches, this security is not information-theoretic and can be vulnerable to advanced system identification or machine-learning attacks with sufficient intercepted signal length [39,40].
- Synchronization Requirement: Most chaos schemes require active synchronization between transmitter and receiver, either through common drive signals, matched parameters, or digital post-processing. This introduces a potential point of failure and added complexity, especially in dynamic or impaired channels [41,42].
- Dual-Channel Architecture: Many chaos synchronization schemes (particularly drive-response configurations) inherently require two optical channels or signals: one for the chaotic carrier and another for the encrypted message, or dedicated synchronization preambles. This increases system complexity and reduces spectral efficiency compared to single-channel approaches.
- Implementation Complexity: High-bandwidth chaos generation often involves specialized laser configurations, optical feedback loops, or careful parameter tuning, which can increase cost and reduce compatibility with standard telecom hardware [29].
- Single-Channel Operation: QEPS operates over a single optical channel—the same channel used for standard coherent communication. No separate drive signals, synchronization channels, or pilot transmissions are required. Encryption and decryption are performed entirely within the standard modulation and demodulation process.
- DSP Phase Synchronization as Cryptographic Control: In QEPS, the essential DSP function of carrier phase recovery (CPR) becomes cryptographically controlled. Authorized receivers use the shared secret to apply the inverse transformation before CPR, restoring a stable constellation that enables standard DSP to succeed. Unauthorized receivers cannot establish a phase reference, causing their CPR algorithms to fail and resulting in BER near 50%. Thus, QEPS transforms a routine DSP requirement into a cryptographic barrier.
- No Continuous Synchronization Needed: Unlike chaos systems requiring continuous dynamical synchronization, QEPS decryption is a deterministic inversion of a unitary transformation using a shared key sequence.
- Hardware Compatibility: QEPS transformations (phase shifts, displacements) are natively implemented using standard IQ modulators and coherent transceivers, ensuring seamless integration into existing optical networks.
- Security Based on Physical Law: Security arises from the quantum noise of coherent states and the fundamental inability to establish a phase reference without the secret—a physical limitation rather than a computational assumption.
- Chaos Encryption: Embeds data within a complex, noise-like analog waveform; requires synchronization mechanisms; often uses dual channels; security based on computational hardness of dynamics reconstruction.
- QEPS: Denies signal recovery by cryptographically controlling phase synchronization; operates over a single channel; requires no additional synchronization; security based on physical impossibility of phase reference establishment without the secret key.
1.6. Scope and Contribution of This Review
2. Theoretical Foundations: Coherent States and Phase-Space Dynamics
2.1. Coherent States: Bridging Classical and Quantum Optics
- Minimum Uncertainty: Coherent states saturate the Heisenberg uncertainty principle with equal uncertainties in the two field quadratures ( in appropriate units). This makes them the closest quantum mechanical analogue to a stable classical electromagnetic wave.
- Poissonian Photon Statistics: The photon number distribution is Poissonian, , with mean photon number . This matches the statistical behavior of an ideal laser operating well above threshold and underpins the signal-to-noise characteristics in coherent optical systems.
- Overcompleteness: Coherent states form an overcomplete basis, satisfying the resolution of identity . This property allows any optical quantum state to be expressed as a superposition of coherent states, providing a powerful representation for calculations.
-
Displacement Property and its Simplification: The action of a displacement operator is given by . This reveals two distinct effects: a translation in phase space from to , and an overall global phase factor. Since global phases are unobservable in physical measurements, the core action can be captured by a reduced displacement operator defined by its action:This simplified operator retains the additive property and, critically, commutes: . As established in QEPS-d [16], this commutativity is a key enabler for practical implementation, allowing encryption and decryption sequences to be applied without concern for operator ordering, thus facilitating direct realization with standard in-phase/quadrature (IQ) modulators.
2.2. Phase-Space Formalism: Visualizing Quantum Encryption
2.3. Key Operator Transformations in Phase Space
2.3.1. Phase Operators: Phase-Space Rotations
2.3.2. Displacement Operators: Phase-Space Translations
2.3.3. Dynamic Displacement Operators: Combined Transformations
2.3.4. Non-Commutativity: The Quantum Mechanical Heart of Security
3. The QEPS Framework: Principles and Mechanisms
3.1. Core Encryption Protocol Architecture
- QEPS-p (Phase-based): Uses only phase shift operators, rotating constellation points around the origin:where is derived from the secret key.
- QEPS-d (Displacement-based): Uses only displacement operators, shifting the entire constellation in phase space:where is derived from the secret key.
- QEPS-dd (Dual Displacement Operator): Combines both operators in sequence:where both and are derived from the secret key. The dynamic nature arises because the combined transformation creates an effective displacement that depends on , making the encryption state-dependent and enhancing security.
3.2. Channel Normalization via Digital Signal Processing
- Source data undergoes QAM Mapping to generate complex symbols , which correspond mathematically to coherent states .
- The Encryption Operator (specific to the QEPS variant) applies the encryption. For QEPS-d: ; for QEPS-p: ; for QEPS-dd: .
- The encrypted complex waveform then enters the standard Transmitter DSP routine: pilot symbols are inserted for synchronization, the signal is up-sampled, pulse-shaped, re-sampled to the DAC rate, and finally undergoes clipping and quantization before optical modulation.
- Synchronization aligns the signal using inserted pilots.
- Matched filtering optimizes the signal-to-noise ratio.
- The Adaptive equalizer compensates for linear channel impairments (e.g., chromatic and polarization-mode dispersion).
- Down-sampling reduces the data to one sample per symbol.
- Carrier phase recovery corrects for laser phase noise and frequency offset.
- The Inverse Encryption Operator is applied using the shared key. This crucial decryption step restores the original constellation point .
- Finally, QAM de-mapping recovers the bit stream for BER calculation.
- Without the secret key, the Inverse Encryption Operator cannot be applied correctly. Any attempt at inversion (including skipping it entirely) leaves the signal in a scrambled state.
- When this scrambled signal reaches QAM de-mapping, it no longer corresponds to valid constellation points, preventing meaningful data recovery.
- The encryption’s effect is thus not to prevent initial DSP convergence, but to ensure that the signal presented to the decision circuitry remains indistinguishable from noise after all channel compensation has been applied.
- Even with brute-force key search, each trial would require complete QAM demapping and error evaluation, as the DSP chain up to carrier recovery may still execute on incorrectly decrypted signals without obvious failure cues.
3.3. Cipher Space and Key Space Characterization
3.4. Dynamical Evolution and Security Enhancement
3.5. Practical Implementation and Experimental Validation
- Transmitter: Laser diode, IQ-MZM modulator driven by DACs, DSP for pulse shaping and pilot insertion, with QEPS encryption integrated into the modulation process.
- Receiver: Coherent detector with local oscillator, ADC, QEPS decryption module, followed by standard DSP for channel compensation.
4. Physical-Layer Security Principle: Phase Synchronization Barrier
4.1. The Phase Synchronization Imperative in Coherent Detection
- Active phase recovery (e.g., blind phase search, decision-directed phase-locked loops) estimates and compensates phase drift using known statistical or structural properties of the transmitted symbols.
- Passive phase mitigation (e.g., differential encoding, phase-diverse reception) reduces sensitivity to phase noise through signal design without explicit feedback.
4.2. The Phase Synchronization Barrier: Core Mechanism
4.3. Core Security Rationale: Basis Randomization and Restoration
- Scope: Operates at the physical waveform level rather than the digital bit level.
- Secret Nature: Utilizes a continuously evolving parameter stream rather than a fixed-length cryptographic key.
- Security Consequence: Creates physical undecodability rather than computational hardness.
4.4. Security Evolution Across QEPS Variants
4.4.1. QEPS-p: Phase-Only Encryption
4.4.2. QEPS-d: Displacement-Based Encryption
4.4.3. QEPS-dd: Dynamic Displacement Operator Encryption
4.5. Contrast with Classical Digital Encryption
4.6. The Nature of Secrecy and Attack Considerations
4.7. Assessment of Security Analysis in QEPS Literature
4.8. Summary: The Phase Synchronization Barrier in Perspective
- Physical rather than computational: Security stems from signal properties, not mathematical hardness.
- Operationally validated: Eavesdroppers’ BER approaches 50% in experimental demonstrations.
- Compatible with existing infrastructure: Implemented using standard coherent transceivers and DSP.
- Inherently quantum-resistant: Immune to attacks from both classical and quantum computers, as it does not rely on computational assumptions vulnerable to quantum algorithms.
5. Experimental Review
5.1. QPKE: Quantum Public Key Encryption via Round-Trip Architecture
- Bob (initiator) generates a random phase sequence using a Quantum Permutation Pad (QPP) and applies it to a continuous-wave (CW) laser via a phase modulator (PM), creating an encrypted "envelope" signal.
- This phase-randomized carrier is transmitted to Alice over an 80 km standard single-mode fiber link with Erbium-Doped Fiber Amplifier (EDFA) compensation.
- Alice receives the scrambled carrier and modulates her secret data (at 56 Gbps) onto it using an IQ modulator, effectively "hiding" her information within Bob’s phase randomization without learning or storing the phase sequence.
- The doubly-modulated signal returns to Bob over another 80 km link. Bob possesses the original phase sequence and applies the inverse phase transformation via synchronized QPP before coherent detection using a 90° hybrid and local oscillator, followed by digital signal processing (DSP).
5.2. QEPS-p: Experimental Demonstration of Phase Mask Encryption
5.3. QEPS-d: Experimental Validation Using Displacement Operator Encryption
5.4. Summary of Experimental Performance and Achievements
- All QEPS variants successfully enforce a phase synchronization barrier at the physical layer, causing unauthorized receivers to experience a bit error rate (BER) near the theoretical maximum of 50%, equivalent to random guessing.
- Authorized receivers with the correct secret (or, in the case of QPKE, with the ability to apply the inverse transformation) achieve BER performance comparable to unencrypted coherent links, typically below the forward error correction (FEC) threshold ( for hard-decision FEC).
- The implementations support high-speed transmission (up to 200 Gb/s in experiments) over standard single-mode fiber spans of 80 km, confirming compatibility with existing optical infrastructure.
- Security does not depend on computational complexity but on the physical-layer denial of a stable phase reference, making it inherently resistant to advances in computing power, including quantum computing.
- The framework is versatile, supporting multiple cryptographic models: from public-key emulation (QPKE) that requires no pre-shared secret, to symmetric encryption (QEPS-p, QEPS-d) with enhanced randomness through displacement operators.
6. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
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| Variant | Architecture | Auth. BER | Unauth. BER |
|---|---|---|---|
| QPKE | Round-trip, PK-like | ||
| QEPS-p | Symmetric phase key | ||
| QEPS-d | Symmetric displacement key | 48–49% |
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