Submitted:
16 December 2025
Posted:
17 December 2025
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Abstract

Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Background: Consciousness, Information, and Ontological Tensions
2.1. Classical vs. Quantum Ontologies
2.2. Predictive Processing and the Construction of Experience
2.3. Bohm’s Implicate Order and Its Limitations
- it accommodates quantum non-locality without abandoning realism,
- it reconceptualizes the relationship between parts and wholes,
- it provides an ontological substrate for coherence phenomena.
3. A Post-Bohmian Rendering Ontology
3.1. Defining Ontological Rendering
- In quantum measurement, systems remain in superposition until contextual interactions determine specific outcomes (Wheeler & Zurek, 1983; Leggett, 2002).
- In predictive processing, perception emerges from active inference rather than passive registration (Friston, 2010; Hohwy, 2013).
- In computational graphics, virtual environments exist as code and are rendered only where needed to conserve processing resources (Chalmers & McCollum, 2021).
3.2. Divergence from Bohm: Potentials, Not a Fully Enfolded Substrate
- The implicate order is reconceived not as an already-determinate blueprint but as a field of informational potentials whose instantiation depends on conscious interaction.
- Bohm distinguishes between implicate and explicate orders but does not provide a detailed mechanism for how experience selectively arises. The rendering model identifies such mechanism in attention, inference, and collapse.
- Biological evolution and cognitive architecture show clear constraints on information processing. A globally instantiated reality would waste energy and complexity; rendering aligns with efficiency principles observed across physics and biology (Barrow & Tipler, 1986; Laughlin & Sejnowski, 2003).
3.3. Formal Principles of the Rendering Model
4. Consciousness, Collapse, and Information
4.1. Consciousness as an Active Process
4.2. Collapse of Potentials Under Attention
4.3. Qualia as “Query Acts”
- the organism’s sensory limits (Umwelt),
- its predictive priors,
- its attentional focus,
- the latent structure of the informational field.
5. The Avatar and the Interface: A Multi-Level Ontology of the Self
5.1. The Minimal Self and the Narrative Self
- The minimal self (Gallagher, 2000): the immediate sense of embodied first-person presence, grounded in sensorimotor contingencies, bodily ownership, and proprioception.
- The narrative self (Dennett, 1991; Schechtman, 1996): a temporally extended, autobiographical model assembled from memory, social interaction, and linguistic structures.
5.2. The Self as Interface (Avatar Model)
5.3. Predictive Processing and the Construction of the Self
- Bodily ownership illusions (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998) arise when prediction priors can be temporarily renegotiated.
- Dissociation reflects a breakdown in the integration of hierarchical priors, where parts of the self-model lose synchrony with global inference.
- Ego dissolution in meditation or psychedelic states (Millière, 2017) occurs when high-level priors governing the narrative and minimal self lose precision, allowing consciousness to access unfiltered states without the avatar constraints.
5.4. The Self as Locality Constraint
- Neuroscience of embodiment, which shows that self-location is constructed through multisensory integration (Blanke, 2012).
- Philosophy of enaction, which views selfhood as the organism’s operational closure (Thompson, 2007).
- Computational models of agency, where the sense of control arises from the match between predicted and actual sensory consequences (Friston, 2011).
6. Multi-Scale Rendering: From Sensory Filters to Collective Coherence
6.1. Sensory Filtering as Computational Efficiency
6.2. Neural Rendering: From Raw Inputs to Phenomenal Structure
- generating predictions across multiple timescales,
- comparing sensory input with expected patterns, and
- updating internal models to minimize prediction error.
- Neural circuitry constitutes the mid-level renderer, transforming environmental potentialities into coherent, actionable percepts.
- Phenomenological categories (color, sound, texture) arise from internally generated qualia models that map efficiently onto the sensory manifold.
- Experience is thus the interface output of a multi-scale computational stack: informational substrate → sensory filter → neural generator → phenomenal field.
6.3. Collective Rendering and the Phenomenology of Consensus
- Individuals with similar sensory capacities and evolutionary pressures develop comparable renderings of the environment.
- Language, norms, and shared practices generate collective priors that constrain individual interpretation (Clark, 1997; Gallagher, 2020).
- Joint attention, coordination, and interpersonal coupling align perceptual fields across individuals (De Jaegher & Di Paolo, 2007).
- The informational substrate provides a consistent structure (Bohm’s implicit order).
- Organisms render local instantiations of this structure through shared biological and cultural constraints.
- Interaction dynamically updates internal models to maintain cross-person alignment.
6.4. Decoherence, Stability, and the Limits of the Render
- Ambiguous stimuli, where sensory input supports multiple interpretations (e.g., the Necker cube), reveal the competitive dynamics of predictive inference.
- Hallucinations and dream states demonstrate the autonomy of internal generative models when sensory anchors weaken.
- Collective delusions or socially reinforced beliefs show how rendering can be biased by top-down cultural priors.
7. Quantum Coherence, Non-Locality, and the Rendering Substrate
7.1. Bohm’s Implicate Order as a Substrate of Potential Rendering
- The implicate order corresponds to an informational potential field, analogous to an uncollapsed state space.
- The explicate order corresponds to rendered states, stabilized through interaction with observers (biological or instrumental).
- Unfolding and enfolding become the rendering and unrendering cycles, modulated by attention, measurement, or environmental entanglement.
7.2. Coherence as a Precondition for Rendering
- uncollapsed,
- non-local,
- reversible,
- and potentially infinite in detail.
7.3. Non-Locality as the Native Architecture of the Field
- Spatial separation is a property of the rendered world, not of the substrate itself.
- The substrate (analogous to Bohm’s holomovement) is non-local by definition.
- Rendered distance is a local constraint applied after instantiation, not before.
7.4. The Brain as a Coherence-Sensitive System
7.5. Rendering as Decoherence Guided by Consciousness
7.6. From Quantum Potential to Phenomenal Instantiation
8. Rendering Across Scales: Biological, Cognitive, and Collective Dynamics
8.1. Biological Substrates as Local Render Engines
- rendering is biologically parameterized
- the quantum informational potential (Bohmian implicate order) becomes instantiated through the sensory architecture of each organism
- perceptual diversity reflects heterogeneous “render pipelines” rather than competing ontologies
8.2. Cognitive Rendering as Predictive Inference
- the predictive brain does not render into a pre-given physical world
- rather, it selects and stabilizes one out of many quantum-informational potentials
- attention acts as a “collapse operator” for actionable reality
- qualia are not intrinsic properties but resolution modes of the render pipeline
8.3. Collective Rendering and Shared Realities
- each individual consciousness collapses a local portion of potential
- coherence across systems arises through consensus-driven rendering
- shared attention (e.g., joint attention) amplifies rendering stability
- scientific paradigms and cultural schemas operate as “collective filters”
8.4. Multiscale Rendering as a Unified Principle
9. Implications for Consciousness Science: A Unified Ontological Model
9.1. Toward a Unified Ontology of Mind and World
- Quantum ontology describes the structure of potentials.
- Predictive processing describes the mechanism of resolution.
- Phenomenology describes the resulting experiential manifestation.
9.2. Rethinking the “Hard Problem”
- Qualia are not intrinsic physical properties.
- They are instantiations produced when consciousness queries the informational field via a specific biological interface.
9.3. Consciousness as a Constraint, Not an Emergent Epiphenomenon
- emergent,
- derivative,
- or biologically contingent.
- which potentials become instantiated;
- how perceptual hypotheses collapse;
- how stable reality emerges across coordinated observers.
9.4. Relevance to Ongoing Empirical Debates
10. Discussion: Limitations and Empirical Prospects
10.1. Conceptual Limitations
10.1.1. Ontological Neutrality of the Informational Field
- a physical substrate in the quantum sense,
- a computational medium,
- a relational structure (e.g., Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics; Rovelli, 1996), or
- a phenomenological field akin to Husserlian “hyletic data” (Williford, 2013).
10.1.2. Consciousness as Operational Constraint
10.2. Empirical Limitations
10.2.1. Indirect Observability
- behavioral signatures of prediction error minimization,
- neurophysiological markers of attentional collapse,
- and coherence/disruption patterns under altered states of consciousness.
10.2.2. Quantum–Cognitive Bridging Problem
10.3. Empirical Prospects
10.3.1. Precision Modulation Hypothesis
10.3.2. Cross-Species Rendering Differences
10.3.3. Collective Rendering and Intersubjective Stabilization
10.3.4. Altered States as Relaxed Rendering Regimes
11. Conclusion: Toward a Unified Rendering Ontology
- Quantum Ontology: Suggests physical systems exist as probabilistic potentials prior to measurement (Bohm’s Implicate Order).
- Predictive Cognitive Neuroscience: Models perception as hierarchical inference constrained by attention, precision, and expectation.
- Phenomenology: Emphasizes the constitutive role of consciousness in disclosing the world as meaningful presence.
Author Contributions
Funding
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
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