5. Lisbon Case Study: Distrust, and the Limits of Policy Activation
The Lisbon Metropolitan Area represents a critical test case for understanding the paradox of housing abundance amidst inaccessibility. Despite rising demand, thousands of residential units remain vacant, a phenomenon increasingly recognized by policymakers, but rarely unpacked from the perspective of the property owners themselves. Using data from multiple editions of the Barómetro da Confiança dos Proprietários (2020–2025), conducted by the ALP, this section analyzes the reasons landlords in Lisbon choose not to place their properties on the rental market.
5.1 Structural-Economic Factors: When Profitability is Not Enough
At first glance, the most straightforward explanation for why property owners refrain from renting might appear to be economic. The returns simply don’t justify the risk. However, in Lisbon, the situation is more nuanced. While affordability pressures have driven rents upwards and demand for housing remains consistently high, the rental market remains deeply unattractive to a significant segment of landlords, not necessarily because it offers no income, but because it offers the wrong kind of income, slow, uncertain, administratively burdensome, and emotionally taxing.
According to the ALP Barometers, only 15% of landlords ranked net rental yield as the most important factor in deciding whether or not to place a property on the market. Instead, an overwhelming 57.8% cited legislative predictability as the decisive variable, suggesting that the economic rationale for renting is continuously being overridden by other, less tangible concerns. While this might initially be interpreted as an institutional issue, and it is, in part, it also reveals something important about the structural fragility of rental income itself.
In Lisbon, many landlords are small-scale owners who acquired properties through inheritance rather than speculation. For them, real estate represents a store of value first, and a source of income second. In such a context, vacancy is not necessarily a sign of market dysfunction, but a form of asset stewardship. A way to avoid wear and tear, problematic tenants, potential legal entanglements, and the gradual erosion of control over one’s own property. This is particularly true in gentrifying neighborhoods, where property values are rising faster than the rate of rent increases. In such areas, it makes more sense, financially and psychologically, to hold onto the property until an opportune moment to sell, convert to short-term rental, or pass it on to a family member.
Indeed, some landlords have responded to the Mais Habitação policy package not by re-entering the rental market, but by withdrawing further. The VII Barometer (2024) recorded a 20% rise in rent increases that exceeded the legal indexation coefficient, not necessarily as a cash-grab, but as a hedge against anticipated regulation. Others have simply liquidated their rental assets: 9% of landlords reported having sold properties that were previously rented, and 6% transitioned their units from traditional leasing to short-term models like student housing or temporary rentals for foreign professionals.
This pattern suggests a deeper economic logic at work, one that prioritizes flexibility, control, and capital preservation over steady rental income. In effect, the structure of the rental market in Portugal, shaped by tax burdens, tenant protections, and opaque bureaucracies, has rendered rent not a reward, but a risk. The landlord, especially in Lisbon, must weigh not only the revenue potential of rent but the possibility of default, delays, legal costs, and the emotional toll of tenant conflict.
Seen in this light, vacancy becomes a form of risk management, a kind of informal insurance policy against an uncertain economic and institutional environment. It is a decision not rooted in short-term greed or negligence, but in a long-term calculus of security, autonomy, and asset optimization. Properties are held empty not because they are idle, but because they are active participants in a wider portfolio of life strategies, including retirement planning, inheritance management, and future speculation.
Thus, while financial profitability may seem like an obvious lever to unlock vacant housing, it is, paradoxically, not profitable enough, not in a landscape where risk is asymmetrical and policy is volatile. As long as the legal and financial costs of renting outweigh the modest gains it offers, many Lisbon landlords will continue to see vacancy as the least bad option.
5.2 Institutional and Legal Distrust: Opting out of an Unreliable System
While structural economic concerns help explain why renting is not particularly attractive in Lisbon, they do not fully account for the depth of resistance expressed by many property owners. A closer reading of survey data and landlord discourse reveals another, arguably more decisive force behind widespread vacancy: a profound and entrenched distrust in the institutions tasked with governing the housing market.
This distrust is not new. It has developed over decades of inconsistent policy, legal ambivalence, and perceived antagonism between property owners and the state. But recent years, particularly following the Mais Habitação package and pandemic-era rental protections, have intensified the fracture, transforming passive dissatisfaction into active disengagement. For many landlords, the rental market is no longer seen as a regulated space where agreements are enforced and rights respected. Instead, it has become what one might call a “grey zone” of legal uncertainty, where property rights feel contingent and where the rules appear vulnerable to sudden, ideologically driven change.
5.3 Sociocultural Dimensions: Patrimony, Identity, and the Right to Withhold
Beneath the economic calculus and legal hesitations that shape property owner behaviour in Lisbon lies a deeper, more intimate layer of motivation, one rooted not in profit or policy, but in cultural norms, affective attachments, and intergenerational logics of patrimony. For many landlords in Portugal, property is not merely an investment or a utility. It is a symbolic asset, woven into family identity, social status, and long-term life planning.
The ALP Barometers consistently reveal that most landlords in Lisbon are not corporate entities or large-scale investors, but older individuals managing inherited property. Over 60% of respondents are aged 55 and above, and a large proportion own between one and five units, often buildings passed down through generations, concentrated in the same neighbourhoods where they themselves live or grew up. These landlords operate not within the rationalist frameworks of institutional investors, but within what might be described as a “familiar moral economy”, where the use of property is embedded in kinship obligations, emotional continuity, and informal inheritance strategies.
Within this worldview, vacancy is not necessarily wasteful. It is often strategic and value-laden. An empty apartment may be reserved for a child or grandchild not yet ready to leave home. It may be kept unrented to avoid disputes, wear-and-tear, or conflicts that could tarnish a family asset. In other cases, it is simply held in stasis, neither sold nor leased, because it represents something more than shelter or income: it represents control, memory, dignity, and future security.
This “withholding” behavior aligns with a broader Southern European pattern, where homeownership has historically functioned as a substitute for underdeveloped welfare regimes. In Portugal, owning property is often a form of private social insurance. It provides backup housing in times of crisis, serves as a fallback pension, and enables parents to offer their children a foothold in increasingly unaffordable urban markets. As Vrantsis (2025) argues in the Greek context, but equally applicable here, real estate is often the most reliable asset in a context of institutional fragility and market volatility, and its symbolic value can eclipse any potential rental yield (Vrantsis, 2025).
This patrimonial logic also interacts with affective economies of risk. Older landlords, especially those with few properties, often describe themselves as emotionally unprepared for the strain of dealing with problematic tenants, eviction proceedings, or public bureaucracy. Many express a preference for “peace of mind” over income, and a strong desire to maintain full control over how, when, and to whom their property is leased. In this sense, leasing is not just a financial transaction, it is a relational exposure, one that many would prefer to avoid altogether.
Such choices are further reinforced by a moral narrative of responsibility. Contrary to stereotypes of landlord greed, many Lisbon owners describe themselves as careful, even paternalistic stewards of their properties. Some deliberately refrain from raising rents, even in the face of inflation, out of loyalty to long-term tenants. Others refuse to enter public programs because they believe the state would assign tenants they cannot vet personally, thereby compromising the integrity of the housing relationship. For these actors, rental decisions are guided not only by rational interest, but by reputational, familial, and emotional considerations.
Seen from this perspective, vacancy is neither passive nor antisocial. It is an active form of management, one that privileges long-term family strategies, personal autonomy, and asset preservation over short-term profit or public interest. It is, in effect, a cultural practice, shaped by generational memory, neighbourhood identity, and a deep scepticism of formal institutions.
As such, any policy that seeks to mobilize these vacant units must contend not only with legal and financial barriers, but also with these non-economic meanings of property. Designing effective interventions will require more than tax breaks or subsidies; it will demand culturally sensitive engagement with landlords’ values, identities, and lifeworld’s, and an acknowledgment that for many, renting out a home is not a business decision, but a deeply personal one.
This perception is not limited to rhetoric. It is grounded in concrete experience. Successive legislative shifts have altered the terms of leasing with little warning: rent freezes were reinstated after partial liberalization, eviction moratoria were introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic with minimal compensatory mechanisms, and the proposal for arrendamento coercive, forced leasing of vacant properties by municipalities, was interpreted by many as a direct threat to the sanctity of ownership itself. Such policies, even when temporary or largely symbolic, send a clear message to landlords: your property is not entirely yours.
The data from the ALP Barometers is unequivocal. In 2024, 96% of surveyed property owners stated they would not participate in state-run rental programs, even those offering favorable conditions or tax benefits. Equally striking, 92.7% said they would pursue legal action if their vacant property were requisitioned for public use under new legislation. These are not marginal sentiments. They represent a near-consensus among a critical mass of active landlords in Lisbon.
Distrust also extends beyond specific policies to broader institutional arrangements. Courts are seen as slow and unpredictable; tax regimes are viewed as punitive and retroactive; rental contract frameworks are considered biased in favor of tenants. Eviction processes, in particular, are cited repeatedly as a deterrent. While not always statistically common, the perception of “nightmare scenarios”, where non-paying tenants occupy properties for months or even years without resolution, carries extraordinary symbolic weight, especially among older landlords or those with limited financial buffers. In this sense, the fear of legal entrapment often outweighs the financial benefits of occupancy.
Importantly, this climate of mistrust is not only institutional but relational and cultural. Landlords often report feeling politically vilified, portrayed in public discourse as profiteers, speculators, or hoarders, rather than as contributors to urban housing ecosystems. This symbolic delegitimization further entrenches their resistance to state programs. As the ALP barometers reveal, many owners do not merely opt out of government schemes because they are inefficient; they do so because they feel fundamentally misrecognized by them.
What emerges from this data is not just a market failure, but a failure of mutual recognition between the state and a key class of urban stakeholders. While public authorities frame vacancy as a policy problem to be corrected, many owners experience it as a last refuge of autonomy in an environment where other rights, contractual, fiscal, reputational, have been gradually eroded.
Vacancy, in this light, becomes a political stance as much as a market behavior. It is a way for owners to assert control, to resist participation in systems they no longer trust, and to insulate themselves from what they see as an unstable and ideologically shifting legal terrain. This dynamic fundamentally alters how policymakers must approach the problem: no amount of financial incentive will succeed unless it is accompanied by a restoration of trust, legal predictability, and symbolic legitimacy.
5.4. The evolution of Landlord Confidence (2020–2025)
The trajectory of landlords' confidence over the five years covered by the ALP Landlords' Confidence Barometer (
Table 1) offers us a suggestive longitudinal dimension to the conclusions discussed above. Taken together, these barometers do not show inconsistent variations, but rather a constant and cumulative process of withdrawal and mistrust. What began in 2020 as a reaction to the pandemic and emergency legislation has gradually consolidated into a structural feature of the rental landscape in Portugal: a widespread belief that the institutional environment is unpredictable and that the safest response is disengagement.
Since the first edition, following the COVID-19 moratorium, more than half of landlords reported serious delays in rent payments and more than sixty per cent said they had lost confidence in the government's handling of the housing crisis. Five years on, the same scepticism dominates the responses, even though the context has changed. The 2025 Barometer shows that 57.8% of landlords now identify legal and legislative stability as the decisive factor determining their participation in the rental market, far surpassing profitability or taxation as reasons for acting. This is perhaps the most direct statistical confirmation to date of the argument put forward in this research. In concrete terms, the main barrier to the mobilisation of private housing is not economic in nature, but institutional and symbolic. Once eroded, trust does not return with tax incentives, as it requires the rebuilding of predictability and respect.
Over the course of half a decade, this erosion accelerated under the weight of political controversy. The 2023 More Housing package, designed to expand the supply of rentals, had the opposite effect. According to ALP data, two in ten landlords sold previously rented properties, while another in ten increased rents or converted them to short-term rentals. More tellingly, 96% of respondents said they would not rent to the state under any circumstances, and over 92% said they would go to court if faced with compulsory leases. The package, designed to engage landlords, ended up reinforcing the perception that government policy was volatile and contradictory. In subsequent editions, this sentiment did not diminish, as in 2024, about a quarter of landlords still reported delays in rent payments and more than half said they expected the situation to worsen.
The profile of landlords remained stable throughout this period. Each barometer confirms that the Portuguese rental market continues to be dominated by elderly, small-scale landlords (around 60% are over 55 years old and half have inherited their properties rather than buying them as an investment). The 2025 Barometer makes this dynamic explicit, noting that 44% of landlords are between 65 and 85 years old and that 58% did not even apply for the state compensation available for frozen rents, largely because they considered the process bureaucratically exhausting or unreliable. These details lend empirical depth to the argument developed earlier in this article, that the apparent “inertia” of landlords is in fact a culturally rooted strategy of protection and continuity.
Over these five years, the data reveal a consistent pattern of mainly defensive rationality. Landlords report similar levels of rent arrears (ranging from 20 to 30 per cent of respondents) and an almost unchanged refusal to participate in public programmes (over 90 per cent in all editions). Even with the change in the political landscape (from the socialist majority of the pandemic era to the new centre-right coalition in 2025), the feeling of mistrust persisted. As the latest Barometer concludes, most respondents do not believe that the current government's tax reforms or “housing shock” initiatives will change their behaviour. Half say they will not put additional units on the market, and most will limit rent increases to the legal indexation coefficient.
Taken together, these successive surveys over the past five years transform what might appear to be a one-off dissatisfaction into a measurable continuity. The data reveals a class of small property owners who have learned to live defensively, conserving their property, avoiding involvement with state programmes and considering the legal framework as an unpredictable risk. In this sense, the housing crisis in Lisbon is not a temporary distortion of market dynamics, but the external symptom of long-term institutional fatigue. The lack of trust documented in the ALP Barometers for 2020-2025 reveals a housing system mired in mutual suspicion, where private landlords no longer expect the state to be a “person of good faith” and where public policies oscillate between dependence and hostility towards them. The challenge for the coming years will not only be to legislate differently, but to rebuild a relationship of trust, without which no incentive, however generous, will be able to transform empty houses into homes for families to live in.
The case studied suggests that the mechanisms underpinning vacancy are not isolated acts of resistance or purely cultural reflexes (
Figure 1). They are reproduced by a political environment that alternates between over-regulation and crisis management. Before proposing solutions, it is necessary to recognise that the governance structure itself has become a generator of risk perception.