Submitted:
11 October 2024
Posted:
14 October 2024
You are already at the latest version
Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
- How may we detect and predict the occurrence of DDoS attacks?
- How we can analyze the behavior of the network during a DDoS attack?
- What are the impacts of a DDoS attack over the M2M traffic?
2. Literature Review
3. DDoS Attack Impact over LTE-M
- A Resource Element (RE) refers to a narrow channel with a spacing of 15 KHz in frequency domain and 0.5/7 ms in the time domain.
- A Resource Block (RB) consists of 15 KHz x 12 sub-carriers = 180 KHz in frequency domain and 0.5 ms in the time domain.
- A Physical Resource Block (PRB) is the smallest allocation block that could be assigned to a single User Equipment (UE) for scheduling purposes. It consists of 15 KHz x 12 sub-carriers = 180 KHz in frequency domain and 0.5 ms x 2 = 1 ms in the time domain.
4. Markov Detection and Prediction (MDP) Model
4.1. Authentic, Suspicious and Malicious Requests
- Authentic requests: refers to accurate, reliable, and trustworthy information that has not been manipulated, fabricated, or altered in any way. This type of data reflects the true state of actions without bias or distortion for example a sensor that sends 8 messages per day.
- Suspicious requests refers to the type of information that raises doubts about its accuracy, reliability, or legitimacy due to inconsistencies, anomalies, or unusual patterns. It may indicate potential errors, manipulation, or deceptive practices for example a sensor that exceeds its normal data-rate by sending more than 8 messages per day.
- Malicious requests refers to intentionally crafted or manipulated information designed with harmful intent, with the aim to cause damage, compromise security, or deceive individuals or systems (e.g., a hacker trying to delete some data or a sensor that sends massive data while exceeding a certain threshold).
4.2. MDP Model
- Defining states using Markov chains.
- Generating equilibrium equations.
- Solving the linear system.
4.2.1. Defining States Using Markov Chains
-
State Space: The set of all possible states that the system could resides in. Actually, the system might be in one of the following four phases:
- -
- Initial phase ().
- -
- Authentic phase ().
- -
- Suspicious phase ().
- -
- Malicious phase () or ().
- Transition Probabilities: For each pair of states, there is a probability of transitioning from one state to another in one time step.
- Balance equations, also known as the equilibrium equations or steady-state equations. These equations are based on the principle that the inflow of probabilities into a state is equal to the outflow of probabilities from that state in the steady-state. In other words, the probabilities do not accumulate or deplete over time in equilibrium states.
- Read Request () denoted by the variable ().
- Modify Request () denoted by the variable ().
- Delete Request () denoted by ().
4.2.2. Generating the Equilibrium Equations
- 1)
- Initial phase, where , includes one state S(0,0) as shown in Figure 6:
- 2)
- Authentic phase: where , as show in Figure 7:
- 3)
- Suspicious phases: where , as show in Figure 7.
- 4)
- Malicious phase: where , as show in Figure 8:
- 1-
- Balance equation (1) for S(0,0) in the “Initial phase”; where :(λi+ λj) π(0,0) = μi π(1,0) + μj π(0,1)
- 2-
- Balance equation (2) for S(1,0) in the “Authentic phase”; where :λi π(0,0) + (λi+ λj) π(1,0) = μi π(2,0) + μj π(1,1) + μi π(1,0)
- 3-
- Balance equation(3) for S(0,1) in the “Authentic phase” ”; where :λj π(0,0) + (λi+ λj) π(0,1) = μi π(1,1) + μj π(0,2) + μj π(0,1)
- 4-
- Balance equation(4) for S(2,0) in the “Authentic phase”; where :λi π(1,0) + (λi+ λj) π(2,0) = μi π(2,0) + μi π(3,0) + μj π(2,1)
- 5-
- Balance equation(5) for S(0,2) in the “Authentic phase”; where :λj π(0,1) + (λi+ λj) π(0,2) = μj π(0,2) + μi π(1,2) + μj π(0,3)
- 6-
- Balance equation(6) for S(1,1) in the “Authentic phase”; where :μi π(1,1) + μj π(1,1) + (λi+ λj) π(1,1) = μj π(1,2) + μi π(2,1) + λj π(1,0) + λi π(0,1)
- 7-
- Balance equation(7) for S(1,2) in the “Suspicious phase”; where :λj π(1,1) + λi π(0,2) + (λi+ λj) π(1,2) = (μi+ μj) π(1,2) + μi π(2,2) + μj π(1,3)
- 8-
- Balance equation(8) for S(2,1) in the “Suspicious Phase”; where :λj π(2,0) + λi π(1,1) + (λi+ λj) π(2,1) = (μi+ μj) π(2,1) + μi π(3,1) + μj π(2,2)
- 9-
- Balance equation(9) for S(0,3) in the “Suspicious Phase”; where :λj π(0,2) + (λi+ λj) π(0,3) = μj π(0,3) + μi π(1,3) + μj π(0,4)
- 10-
- Balance equation(10) for S(3,0) in the “Suspicious Phase”; where :λi π(2,0) + (λi+ λj) π(3,0) = μi π(3,0) + μi π(4,0) + μj π(3,1)
4.2.3. Solving the Linear System
5. Simulations, Results and Result Discussions
5.1. Normal-Cycle Scenario:
- A LTE system with 3 PRB ().
- An average arrival rate of (= 1).
- An average arrival rate of (= 1).
- A service rate of (μ1 = 3).
- A service rate of (μ2 = 3).
- Initial phase probability = π(0,0) = 52%
- Authentic phase probability = π(0,1) + π(1,0) + π(0,2) + π(1,1) + π(2,0) = 45 %
- Suspicious phase probability = π(0,3) + π(1,2) + π(2,1) + π(3,0) = 3%
5.2. Suspicious Scenario:
- We keep using the same resources for the LTE system ().
- We increase the average arrival rate of to be (= 2).
- We also increase the average arrival rate of to be (= 2).
- We decrease the service rate of to be (μ1 = 2).
- We also decrease the service rate of to be (μ2 = 2).
- Initial phase probability = π(0,0) = 16%.
- Authentic phase probability = π(0,1) + π(1,0) + π(0,2) + π(1,1) + π(2,0) = 63 %
- Suspicious phase probability = π(0,3) + π(1,2) + π(2,1) + π(3,0) = 21%
5.3. Attack Scenario:
- We fixed the resources used in the LTE system with 3 PRB ().
- We increase the average arrival rate of to be (= 3).
- We keep using the same average arrival rate of (= 2).
- We decrease the service rate of to be (μ1=1).
- In addition, we decrease the service rate of to be (μ2=1).
- Initial phase probability = π(0,0) = 3%
- Authentic phase probability = π(0,1) + π(1,0) + π(0,2) + π(1,1) + π(2,0) = 44 %
- Suspicious phase probability = π(0,3) + π(1,2) + π(2,1) + π(3,0) = 53%
6. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
| 1 | CTU-13: The CTU-13 is a dataset of botnet traffic captured in the CTU University, Czech Republic, in 2011. https://www.stratosphereips.org/datasets-ctu13. |
| 2 | Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) conducts network research and builds research infrastructure to support large-scale data collection, curation, and data distribution to the scientific research community https://www.caida.org/about/
|
| 3 | The Intrusion detection evaluation dataset (CIC-IDS2017) is provided by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity (CIC) and it can be accessed from https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/ids-2017.html
|
| 4 | This dataset is provided by the Canadian university of New BRUNSWICK, see https://www.unb.ca/cic/datasets/iotdataset-2022.html
|
| 5 | This IoT Botnet targets IP Cameras, see https://www.trendmicro.com/fr_fr/research/17/e/persirai-new-internet-things-iot-botnet-targets-ip-cameras.html
|
| 6 | Mirai scans the web for devices protected by factory-default passwords or hard-coded credentials to compromise and infect them, https://securityintelligence.com/news/leaked-mirai-malware-boosts-iot-insecurity-threat-level/
|
Abbreviations
| Abbreviation | Description |
| 3GPP | 3rd Generation Partnership Project |
| 4G | Fourth Generation |
| CAIDA | Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis |
| CC | Command Control |
| CIC | Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity |
| DDoS | Distributed Denial of Service |
| H2H | Human-to-Human |
| ICS | Industrial Control Systems |
| IoT | Internet of Things |
| LPWAN | Low Power Wide Area Networks |
| LR | Logistic Regression |
| LTE-A | Long Term Evolution- Advanced |
| LTE-M | Long Term Evolution for Machines |
| M2M | Machine-to-Machine |
| MDP | Markov Detection and Prediction |
| MTC | Machine Type Communications |
| OFDMA | Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access |
| PCA | Principal Component Analysis |
| PRB | Physical Resource Block |
| RB | Resource Block |
| RE | Resource Element |
| RF | Random Forest |
| RFE | Recursive Feature Elimination |
| SVM | Support Vector Machine |
| UE | User Equipment |
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| Symbol | Description |
|---|---|
| The threshold of authentic phase | |
| The threshold of suspicious phase | |
| number of ongoing services for Read Request () | |
| number of ongoing services for Modify Request () | |
| average arrival rate for (++) | |
| average arrival rate for (++) | |
| completed service rate for (--) | |
| completed service rate for (--) | |
| S(i,j) | The state with certain &j requests |
| π(i,j) | Steady-state probability |
| Steady-state probability vector | |
| number of ongoing Malicious for Delete Request () |
| State | Steady-state probability | Probability Value | Phase |
|---|---|---|---|
| S(0,0) | π(0,0) | 162/314 = 51.6% | Initial |
| S(0,1) | π(0,1) | 54/314 =17.2% | Authentic |
| S(0,2) | π(0,2) | 9/314 = 2.86% | Authentic |
| S(0,3) | π(0,3) | 1/314 = 0.3% | Suspicious |
| S(1,0) | π(1,0) | 54/314 = 17.2% | Authentic |
| S(1,1) | π(1,1) | 18/314 = 5.73% | Authentic |
| S(1,2) | π(1,2) | 3/314 = 0.95% | Suspicious |
| S(2,0) | π(2,0) | 9/314 = 2.86% | Authentic |
| S(2,1) | π(2,1) | 3/314 = 0.95% | Suspicious |
| S(3,0) | π(3,0) | 1/314 = 0.3% | Suspicious |
| State | Steady-state probability | Probability Value | Phase |
|---|---|---|---|
| S(0,0) | π(0,0) | 6/38 = 15.78% | Initial |
| S(0,1) | π(0,1) | 6/38 = 15.78% | Authentic |
| S(0,2) | π(0,2) | 3/38 = 7.9% | Authentic |
| S(0,3) | π(0,3) | 1/38 = 2.63% | Suspicious |
| S(1,0) | π(1,0) | 6/38 = 15.78% | Authentic |
| S(1,1) | π(1,1) | 6/38 = 15.78% | Authentic |
| S(1,2) | π(1,2) | 3/38 = 7.9% | Suspicious |
| S(2,0) | π(2,0) | 3/38 = 7.9% | Authentic |
| S(2,1) | π(2,1) | 3/38 = 7.9% | Suspicious |
| S(3,0) | π(3,0) | 1/38 = 2.63% | Suspicious |
| State | Steady-state probability | Probability Value | Phase |
|---|---|---|---|
| S(0,0) | π(0,0) | 6/236 = 2.54% | Initial |
| S(0,1) | π(0,1) | 12/236 = 5.08% | Authentic |
| S(0,2) | π(0,2) | 12/236 = 5.08% | Authentic |
| S(0,3) | π(0,3) | 8/236 = 3.4% | Suspicious |
| S(1,0) | π(1,0) | 18/236 = 7.62% | Authentic |
| S(1,1) | π(1,1) | 36/236 = 15.25% | Authentic |
| S(1,2) | π(1,2) | 36/236 = 15.25% | Suspicious |
| S(2,0) | π(2,0) | 27/236 = 11.44% | Authentic |
| S(2,1) | π(2,1) | 54/236 = 22.88% | Suspicious |
| S(3,0) | π(3,0) | 27/236 = 11.44% | Suspicious |
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