Submitted:
24 July 2024
Posted:
26 July 2024
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
The Standard Security System
2. A Novel Security System on the Internet of Things
3. Modified Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithm
- Step 1. Mapping the message on the curve.
- Step 2. Generate all the points based on the first point (point doubling & point adding).
- Step 3. Calculate the private key:

- Step 4. Calculate the public key,
- Step 5. Calculate K value:

- Step 6. Apply the encryption equation.

- Step 7. Send that ciphertext to the destination.
- Step 8. Receive that ciphertext.
-
Step 9. Apply the decryption equation.

- Step 10. Mapping the message back.
Full Educational Example


4. The Authority Device (AD)
The Authority Device Structure
- Improved PUF device: This device was developed in the last decade to generate an advance, unclonable random number for each challenge to calculate the private key using the improved ECC algorithm. That number is significantly important on this innovative system. Because it provides an additional layer protection.
- Decommission unit: This unit’s task is destroying the whole motherboard with all other components by sending high voltage suddenly. This unit is acting in an emergency only when the AD devices is lost or intentionally hidden. It activates directly from the server or automatically once the task statement period has expired. The direct order comes from the server when the technical engineer inform his manager of the missing device; Otherwise, he should promptly return the AD device back to company once his mission has finished immediately. because if not the decommission unit will be activated from itself once the mission period has expired. For the security purposes the decommission unit will destroy all the device’s parts if the device does not return safely to company at the appropriate time.
- Fingerprint reader: This unit provides an additional protection layer on the system. The unit’s task is preventing intruder to use the AD device. Therefore, this device should verify the engineer identification first before begin activating all nodes in the system.
- Central Processing Unit CPU: It is the processor which is essential to processing the system instructions to drive the whole device. Basically, the CPU is the main crucial integrated circuitry chip in all devices. Control unit with arithmetic logical unit working together to interpreting the most of device commands.
- Storage units: Random Access Memory RAM is significant part to store the security info comes from the solid-state drive or storage on it before transmitting it to nodes system. Read only memory task is storing the system essential instructions.
- Power supply unit PSU: It is the unique power source which is needed to operate the motherboard and all other the AD device parts.
- Cooling system: That system’s mission is preserving the temperature in the desired range to prevents overheating on the device which generated by electronic components. Furthermore, the cooling system works to enhance device performance by removing overheating, which let the system operating at higher speed.
- Wi-Fi network: Wireless Fidelity is a significant part in this system using to associate AD device with the server by VPN tunnel which will be created over the internet. Figure 4 displays the AD device structure and shows all the device parts.
5. The Node Device
5.1. The Node Structure
5.2. The Node Neighborhood
5.3. The Node Decommission
5.4. Multiple Nodes System
6. The System Reliability and Integrity
6.1. The System Reliability Features
6.2. The Authority Device, Decommission Unit
7. Implementing the Modified ECC Algorithm on Internet of Things
7.1. Applying Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithm on the Internet of Things
7.2. Applying Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm on the Internet of Things
7.3. The Comparison Results between ECC and RSA Algorithms
8. A Comparison Study between the Standard and the Novel Security System
9. Conclusions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
References
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| Standard system | Novel system | |
| Secret keys | plaintext | Encrypted |
| System Safety | Trust Engineers | Zero Trust Network Access |
| Hardware component | None | Improved PUF |
| Authority device | None | Yes |
| Key generation method | Good | Advanced |
| Keys distribution | Manually (weak) | Automatically (strong) |
| Encryption | Strong | Advanced |
| Cryptography algorithm type | Ratchet (good) | Modified ECC (advanced) |
| Authentication | Manually (weak) | Automatically (strong) |
| Authorisation | Individually (weak) | Centrally (strong) |
| Nodes decommission task | Individually (weak) | Centrally (strong) |
| Algorithm speed | Fast | Faster |
| System Reliability | Strong | Advanced |
| System Installation | Slow | Speed |
| System compatibility | Matched with current technology | Matched with current & coming technology |
| Environment | 4G, 5G | 5G & 6G |
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