Submitted:
05 June 2024
Posted:
10 June 2024
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
1.1. Introduction Internet of Things (IoT)
1.2. Internet of Medical Things (IoMT)
1.3. Problem Statement and Research Question
2. Background & Literature Study
2.1. IoMT Transforming Healthcare
2.2. Smart Healthcare Facilities
2.3. Necessity of Data Security and Privacy
2.4. Enhancing Data Security and Confidentiality in Smart Healthcare Settings
3. Materials and Research Methods
3.1. Requirements
3.1.1. Key Functional Requirements for the System
- Encrypted communication between devices and server (IoMT and Webserver).
- Information Integrity checking implementation for message verification.
- Information avalability, Authentication of users and devices and non-repudiation functionality incorporation.
- Salting of the stored hashes to add next level of security.
- Data secure storage.
- Self-healing and no data loss during network failure.
3.1.2. Other Non-functional Requirements for the System
- Data visualisation for ease of data interpretation.
- Use of visual or auditable engagement like LED and Buzzer sound to be inclusive in the interaction and engagement.
- User’s participation during the securing process.
3.2. Security Constraints and Requirements

3.3. System Requirements
3.4. Other Tools
3.7. Testing Strategy
4. Proposed System & Architecture
4.1. RTPM Monitoring Architecture
4.2. RTPM Controller at the Client

4.3. RTPM User, Device, and Key Management
5. Results and Discussion
- a)
- Data confidentiality: It is crucial to maintain data confidentiality since it deals with health and or wellbeing-related data. The proposed system interacts and engages between the client node and the IoMT server using an AES session key which is generated and provided by the server to the IoMT client. The session key is securely delivered using RSA public key cryptography and the key is signed to guarantee the source of the generation and maintain the integrity of the information. The client and the server are both capable of generating keys. To maintain freshness and preserve security, the session keys are generated for every new connection and each session. Table 2 provides the security method’s overhead in terms of time of execution, and these results are tested using IoMT client (Raspberry Pi 4) with a configuration, Broadcom BCM2711 SoC with a 1.8 GHz, 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A72 processor with 4GB RAM and the IoMT server executing with 64-bit, Intel Core i7, CPU @2.6GHz with 32GB RAM. The system is tested with various key sizes (standard and above) to select the best key sizes for performing real-time communication. The results of Table 2 are average values of executing over 10 rounds for each key size. The key generation and the key file generation take exponential time as the key size increases. The AES key generation time encryption time or decryption time takes only a few milliseconds irrespective of the key sizes ( 128-bit, 192-bit, or 256-bit) while the RSA takes a little less than a second only for those key sizes below 2048-bit key size for key generation, but takes some seconds to minutes for key sizes RSA 4096 and above respectively. However, the RSA method of encryption takes from around 0.01s to 0.07s when the key size increases from RSA 1024 bit to RSA 8192 bit. On average the decryption time takes more than the encryption time. To meet the real-time requirement of interaction between the client and the server, the best option is the use of the AES encryption method while the secure session key transfer is done by RSA. To meet real-time requirements, this paper uses RSA 2048, AES 256, and SHA 256.
- b)
- Data Integrity: Every data generated by the IoMT client is signed and the integrity of the data is preserved using SHA-256 along with the private of the sender to avoid any form of non-repudiation attack. Creating a digital signature of the IoMT data takes 0.0011s to 1.03s when the RSA 1024-bit key and RSA 8192-bit key respectively are used. As expected as the key size increases the digital verification takes longer, but it is more of a linear and not exponential. Since the paper uses an RSA 2048-bit key, it takes 0.04s for signing and 0.0008s for the verification which is ideal for real-time communication.
- c)
- Data Availability (Authorisation, Authentication, and Access Control): To ensure data availability and protect the system from conducting any form of DoS or DDoS attack. The proposed system authorised every user through a registration process and a unique code is generated using SHA 256 with the help of the user’s registration data (ɤ), MAC address (∂), and a 32-bit random number (µ) at the IoMT server and is provided to add in the IoMT client as a unique ID = SHA256(ɤ+∂+µ) along with the NHS number to help the server uniquely identify and authenticate the connecting IoMT devices. This ensures that every connection request is unique, and the system also removes any idle connection request (including any half-open connections using a timeout technique) to guarantee service availability.
- d)
- System Recovery and Self-Healing Network: One of the biggest issues when data collection is done over a network is the fear of network failure. In a real-time monitoring system, network failure will lead to data loss, but health and well-being data are critical, so every data should be delivered. So, in this system is self-healing network system is adopted to recover and avoid data lost in the process of network failure. If the client is disconnected, the last data block sent is remembered and continues sending the data from the last point of failure automatically when the application is restarted. So, the interaction of the client with the server is seamlessly synced without any data duplication or data loss when the network fails. To achieve this goal, the client reading the sensory data shares the same database with the application that connects with the server, and every data that is acknowledged by the server is set to 1 to realise what is delivered and what is yet to be delivered otherwise.
- e)
- Privacy-based Alerting, Monitoring, and Evidence Collection: The system can securely alert the user’s selected individual e.g. friends or family (via email) when the condition of the monitoring outcome is not normal (e.g. when the body temperature is too high or when the air quality of the room is bad). It is to support and update the wellbeing of the user to the carers and near ones. The IoMT device detects when someone approaches and when someone touches or moves the IoMT device with the help of proximity, accelerometer, and gyroscope sensors and alerts about the events with a message and a red LED and Buzzer. This is to ensure that the system is not disturbed, stolen, damaged, or moved unnecessarily when the system is in operation. If the alert messages are ignored and the IoMT device is touched or moved, then visual evidence is captured by a camera, and the evidence is securely transferred to the server. However, these settings can be disabled when the monitoring is done remotely from home, but these functions can be enabled when it is deployed in public care areas like hospitals to track and trace events in and around the patient for their safety and security. Figure 8 shows a warning message while Figure 9 alert message is triggered when someone comes too close to the device and Figure 10 shows an activation of the camera when someone attempts to take or move the IoMT device. These systems are necessary to alert the surroundings and also connect with the concern stackholders of the user. s
- f)
- Visualisation of the Collected Data: The health and well-being environmental data that are collected from IoMT sensors can be viewed by the stakeholders through the IoMT server and web server. The screenshots of the temperature reading and moisture level of the skin when holding the sensors were collected using temperature sensor and humidity sensors and the results are shown in Figure 11. The spikes in the results are the results of blowing warm air through the mouth which guarantees a proper working of the system. The readings are taken from a snapshot record from 11:51:33(AM) to 12:58:17(PM) and the readings are taken every 5 seconds and updated on the server only when there is a change in the reading value, however, the IoMT client pushes the last recorded data even if there is no change if the time lapse over 5 minutes with no change in the data reading to ensure that the connection is live.



6. Conclusions
Supplementary Materials
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
Acknowledgments
Conflicts of Interest
References
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| Cyber Attack Name | Description | Mitigation | Impact Example |
| SQL Injection | Malicious code injected via web application vulnerabilities to gain unauthorised access. | Use parameterised queries, input validation, and access controls to restrict unauthorised database access. | Community Health Systems in the US lost 4.5 million patient records in a 2014 SQL injection attack [11]. |
| Zero-Day Exploits | Using undiscovered hardware or software flaws for unauthorised access. | Implement intrusion detection/prevention systems, monitor for unusual activity, and stay updated with security advisories. | Hacking Team’s 2015 breach revealed several zero-day vulnerabilities in widely used software [12]. |
| Insider Threats | Staff or subcontractors with access to patient data might inadvertently cause harm or steal information. | Set access controls, monitor user behavior, run background checks, and offer regular cybersecurity training to staff. | A former employee of a New York health system was indicted in 2015 for stealing information on over 12,000 patients and selling it on the dark web [13]. |
| Phishing | False emails trick users into revealing sensitive data. | Provide cybersecurity training, use email filters, and employ two-factor authentication to prevent phishing attacks. | Anthem, a US health insurer, lost 78.8 million patient details in a 2015 phishing attack [14]. |
| Password Attacks | Cracking passwords for unauthorised access; includes brute force or dictionary attacks. | Enforce strong password regulations, regular changes, complexity requirements, and establish two-factor authentication. | During a credential-stuffing attack on Magellan Health in 2020, 365,000 patients’ information was stolen [15]. |
| Malware | Dangerous software, like viruses, Trojans, and ransomware, that can steal data or corrupt systems. | Implement anti-malware software, perform routine backups, and keep systems updated with security patches. | The NHS in the UK faced the WannaCry ransomware in 2017, demanding ransom for file decryption [16]. |
| Supply Chain Attacks | Infiltrating healthcare systems through third-party hardware or software providers. | Monitor third-party vendors, enforce strict contracts, and conduct routine risk assessments. | Cyberattack on software developer SolarWinds compromised businesses, including healthcare providers in 2020 [17]. |
| Social Engineering | Coercing individuals into disclosing private information or performing certain tasks. | Regular cybersecurity training, security awareness programs, and implementing security controls like spam filters and two-factor authentication. | Save the Children suffered a BEC attack in 2018, costing them £1 million due to a fraudulent money transfer [18]. |
| Misconfiguration | Misconfiguring medical equipment or systems, making them vulnerable to intrusions or data breaches. | Adopt automated configuration management systems, secure configuration practices, and conduct routine auditing/testing of system configurations. | In 2018, 500,000 patients’ information was stolen due to a misconfigured ransomware attack demand submission at HMC in the US [19]. |
| DDoS | Overwhelming healthcare systems with traffic, causing breakdown or inaccessibility. | Implement network segmentation, deploy DDoS mitigation services/hardware, and create a DDoS response strategy. | The WannaCry ransomware’s 2017 spread was momentarily halted by a denial-of-service attack on its command-and-control servers [20]. |
| Methods | Cryptographic Algorithm (Seconds) | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Security Processes | AES 128 | AES 192 | AES 256 | RSA 1024 | RSA 2048 | RSA 4096 | RSA 7936 | RSA 8192 |
| Key Generation (IoMT) | 0.000522 | 0.000554 | 0.000631 | 0.283 | 0.865 | 8.912 | 119.947 | 178.202 |
| Key Generation (Server) | 0.0001 | 0.000139 | 0.00014 | 0.215 | 0.731 | 4.708 | 49.21 | 54.043 |
| Key File Generation (IoMT) | 0.002196 | 0.002214 | 0.002631 | 0.328 | 0.911 | 9.102 | 120.005 | 178.809 |
| Key File Generation (Server) | 0.000219 | 0.000221 | 0.000221 | 0.33 | 0.788 | 4.811 | 49.43 | 54.102 |
| Encryption | 0.000261 | 0.000261 | 0.000261 | 0.0149 | 0.015 | 0.0238 | 0.0688 | 0.072 |
| Decryption | 0.000042 | 0.000042 | 0.000043 | 0.0095 | 0.0202 | 0.0522 | 0.2802 | 0.3152 |
| Digital Signature | - | - | - | 0.0011 | 0.0408 | 0.1744 | 0.9283 | 1.0355 |
| Digital Signature Verification | - | - | - | 0.00048 | 0.000829 | 0.00126 | 0.00387 | 0.00409 |
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