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URBAN DIPLOMACY AND CRIMINALIZATION OF PIRACY IN SOUTHWESTERN ATLANTIC EUROPE IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES

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09 April 2024

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09 April 2024

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Abstract
War dominated the royal policies in late Medieval Europe, yet recent historiography has shifted focus to the conflict resolution strategies employed by nonsovereign powers. This essay delves into the escalation of confrontations at sea, distinguishing between legal acts of privateering and criminal acts of piracy. It further compares the conflict mitigation policies of the town ports of Northern Iberia and the duchy of Brittany, highlighting the role of an international arbitration court, the Guild of the Contractation. The analysis concludes that attempts to diminish maritime violence through shortlived bilateral peace agreements were largely unsuccessful, with the more stringent policies of monarchical states taking precedence. Despite this, trade and maritime transport remained crucial for the inhabitants of both regions, who endeavored to surmount the perils of the sea by fostering networks of trust, bolstered by shared institutions for risk management. Nevertheless, these efforts were ultimately eclipsed by the royal policies aimed at extending state jurisdiction over the seas, through the criminalization of certain sea activities, thereby reinforcing the state's control over maritime commerce. The essay underscores the complex interplay between local interests and royal ambitions, illustrating how the latter often subsumed the former in the quest for greater control over maritime resources and trade routes.
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Subject: 
Arts and Humanities  -   History

1. Introduction

In the Atlantic region, the delineation between piracy and privateering was ambiguous throughout much of the Middle Ages, as was the distinction between solitary acts of maritime robbery and state sanctioned military endeavors (Mollat, 1975, 1980). However, as the Middle Ages drew to a close, warfare increasingly shaped the strategic agendas of Western European royalty. Traditional diplomatic history has often been preoccupied with the interplay among European monarchies (Black, 2010, Duchhardt, 2008). Yet, it is a relatively recent development in historical scholarship that has shifted focus towards how nonsovereign entities, like cities, have navigated conflict resolution. Despite the efforts of monarchs to centralize diplomatic engagements and establish legal frameworks governing piracy, privateering, and theft, urban centers, particularly port cities, have historically forged transient alliances to safeguard mutual economic and security interests. These alliances were particularly crucial in fostering shortterm periods of peace, essential for the flourishing of trade and commerce in an era marked by frequent and widespread maritime conflict.
Historians specializing in maritime law and economics have drawn clear distinctions between lawful trade and the illicit acts of piracy (Rohmann, 2017). However, societies with a strong maritime orientation often exhibited a degree of normative pluralism. The act of seizing goods at sea has been a longstanding practice, not merely an endemic problem, but one deeply rooted in specific societal norms. The perception of individuals involved in such activities could shift dramatically, influenced by their capacity to advocate for the legitimacy of their actions within legal discourses. Thus, the same individual could be seen as a pirate, privateer, merchant, captain, or admiral, depending on the prevailing views of their actions. This fluidity in roles was particularly evident during the 14th and 15th centuries, a period marked by the "criminalization of piracy," where the legal frameworks and societal norms surrounding maritime conduct underwent significant transformation (HeebøllHolm, 2020). Thereby, criminalization of piracy can be understood as the procedure through which certain behaviors are acknowledged as violations of laws and norms, following discussions and agreements and diplomatic negotiations between social actors. These actions are then formally classified under law as international crimes, gaining legal recognition and status within the international community. This process is crucial for maintaining global order and ensuring that individuals or entities that commit serious offenses are held accountable on an international scale (Randhawa, 2022)
The terms "piracy" and "privateering" are often perceived as inadequate for the analysis of maritime history, particularly in the context of economic and political developments. These concepts are better suited as rhetorical devices employed in the struggle for dominance over maritime rivals, to legitimize one's own economic and political agendas. Historical events, such as the Hundred Years' War and the contest for Atlantic maritime supremacy among the powers of Castile, Portugal, France, England, and the Hanseatic League, were pivotal in shaping the motives for reciprocal attacks, blurring the lines between lawful and unlawful actions at sea (Ruiz, 1978; Solórzano Telechea, 2020). The control over sea lanes thus emerged as a strategic element of political power. Maritime politics, therefore, can be conceptualized as the efforts of sovereign entities to assert legal authority over the oceans, which encompasses the commissioning of naval forces, the sanctioning of privateering as a countermeasure to piracy, and the safeguarding of commercial, fishing, and other seabased economic activities. Monarchs, in their quest for power, aimed to centralize the exercise of lawful force within their territorial waters and any regions influenced by their interests, thereby asserting their sovereignty and control over maritime affairs. This strategic approach to maritime governance reflects the intricate interplay between law, economy, and the exertion of political will through naval strength and maritime legislation (Viúla, 2020; HeebøllHolm, 2019).
Leaving aside overt naval combat and acts of piracy, the maritime disputes of the preindustrial era—namely privateering and the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal—bear a striking resemblance to the international trade conflicts of today. The imposition of trade barriers and restrictions by one nation, state, or trading bloc often prompts retaliatory measures from the affected party, leading to a cycle of escalating obstructions and tariff increases. This titfortat dynamic invariably results in both parties suffering from the imposed trade constraints. In a similar vein, historical acts of privateering and reprisal among medieval states or individuals typically elicited comparable countermeasures from the aggrieved parties, setting off a chain of retaliatory actions with unpredictable outcomes. The ultimate casualty of these exchanges was invariably commercial expansion, the stifling of which had such detrimental effects that monarchs were compelled to seek ways to curtail, or at least control and direct, these practices, especially during peacetime. Nonetheless, during periods of armed conflict between kingdoms, such activities were often sanctioned and even encouraged as a means of undermining the economic foundations of the adversary.
The onset of the commercial revolution witnessed the emergence of piracy as a notable form of maritime violence, with the early thirteenth century marking its documented beginnings. It was on the 22nd of June, 1210, within the maritime confines of Ireland, that King John I of England, who also held dominion over Ireland, issued a command to John of Winterburn. The directive was clear: to outfit six galleys and, alongside George de Lucy, embark on a quest to apprehend six pirates, a venture financed by 42 pounds. Additionally, Henry de Ver was to receive 40 marks to compensate seven knights, a contingent of soldiers, and an officer to man the ships (Sweetman, 2006). This act of piracy, unlike the statesanctioned practice of privateering, was met with suppression by the ruling authorities, for it lacked their endorsement. Privateering, in contrast, was a legally recognized endeavor, involving one or more privately owned vessels that entered into an agreement with the crown to engage enemy ships in combat, seizing goods as plunder while accounting for the sovereign's share. Governed by its own set of regulations and traditions, privateering was legitimized either through a formal declaration of war or the issuance of a charter of marque. This sanctioned form of maritime aggression also made its historical debut in the Bay of Biscay. In the year 1207, King Alfonso IX of León initiated overtures for an alliance with the English sovereign John I following the interception of León’s vessels by the English—a retaliatory measure for the assistance provided to John I's adversaries. The English monarch consented to dispatch a loyal envoy to negotiate the terms of the accord, which was slated for completion within that same year (Rymer, 2006; González, 1944). The final facet of this triad of maritime violence involved the issuance of letters of marque. These documents granted individuals the authority to commit acts of aggression at sea against private parties, with the objective of recouping losses equivalent to those incurred through piracy or privateering during peacetime. This practice first surfaced in the Mediterranean, subsequently spreading to the Atlantic in the fourteenth century and reaching the northern European waters in the fifteenth century.

3. City Alliances: Exploring Urban Diplomacy in Bilbao and Nantes

From the 13th century, merchants and mariners hailing from the northern Atlantic coast of Spain were instrumental in establishing a network of burgeoning settlements. This expansion was pivotal in integrating the northern peninsular maritime towns into the bustling trade routes of Western Europe. It is widely acknowledged that the Cantabrian traders made significant contributions, notably in recognizing the strategic importance of certain French Atlantic ports like Nantes and La Rochelle. Furthermore, they played a key role in fostering the regional interactions among Brittany, Normandy, Anjou, and Poitou, which were crucial to the late medieval Atlantic trade dynamics (SolórzanoTelechea, 2009). In the 13th and 14th centuries, historical records reveal the presence of merchants, sailors, captains, and pirates from Northern Spain, specifically from regions such as La Coruña, Avilés, Santander, Laredo, and Bilbao, in various significant and midsized European port towns. This presence grew even more pronounced in the 15th century. During this time, these individuals either operated as representatives for the prominent international traders based in Burgos, Medina del Campo, and Seville, or they conducted their business autonomously. They engaged in a range of activities, including commerce, transportation, piracy, and privateering. Their influence and activities were a testament to the dynamic maritime culture of the time, reflecting the complex interplay of economics, politics, and social dynamics that characterized the era's trade and navigation (Thompson, 1994).
Historically, the intricacies of the relationships between merchants and ship operators from Bilbao and their counterparts in Nantes during the late Middle Ages have remained somewhat obscure. The establishment of corporative institutions aimed at resolving disputes related to commerce and navigation further complicates the understanding of these interactions. Despite the significance of these connections in shaping early trade networks, details about them have been limited and lacking in precision. This gap in historical knowledge has persisted, leaving a nebulous understanding of the economic and social dynamics of the period. Efforts to clarify these relationships and institutional roles are crucial for a comprehensive grasp of the mercantile and maritime history of the Late Middle Ages (Sarrazin, 1991; Rivera, 2018). The historical presence of a Castilian settlement in the Sainte-Croix parish from the 13th century remains a subject of debate, though records from the subsequent century confirm its existence. These early institutions laid the groundwork for enduring and fruitful bilateral ties, transcending conventional trade relationships by recognizing each other as preferred trading partners and bestowing mutual benefits akin to those granted to the most favored nations in international trade. The efficacy of these diplomatic tools was evident in the 15th century when trade was particularly robust—Brittany, then a semiautonomous duchy with an economy that complemented Castile's, especially along the Cantabrian coast, saw the establishment of the Cofradía de la Contratación (Guild of Contracting). Even after the French monarchs assumed the title of Duke of Brittany later in the century, these advantageous connections were quickly reestablished after sporadic conflicts, despite the ongoing hostilities between the French and Spanish crowns. By the 16th century, the entity responsible for mediating peace and conducting negotiations between Nantes and Bilbao had evolved into the Compañía del Salvo Conducto (Greif, 2006).
Figure 1. Nantes in the 15th century.
Figure 1. Nantes in the 15th century.
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Figure 1. Bilbao in the 15th century.
Figure 1. Bilbao in the 15th century.
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During the 14th century, merchants from Nantes established themselves in Bilbao, and not long after, Bilbao's merchants reciprocated by settling in the Breton town. This mutual exchange fostered a collaborative relationship, leading to a reciprocal privileged treatment. The partnership was solidified when Bilbao extended the same rights and privileges to the merchants and sailors from Nantes as it did to its own citizens. Nantes, in turn, reaped the benefits of a neutrality policy set by the Duke of Brittany. This policy positioned Nantes as one of the four Castilian trading posts, alongside La Rochelle, Rouen, and Bruges, strategically placing it to influence the control of the lucrative wool trade (Brown, 2018). In the year 1372, a significant commercial treaty was orchestrated by Duke Jean IV of Brittany, engaging with the Biscayan towns, a precursor to a subsequent agreement. This earlier accord was followed by a notable 1430 treaty cosigned by his successor, Jean V, and the Castilian monarch, King Juan II. This latter treaty heralded the inception of a substantial Castilian settlement within the city of Nantes. As stipulated within the treaty's provisions, this colony was to be administered by a consul, notary, and purser, collectively exercising jurisdiction over the Spanish mercantile community in Brittany. The year 1435 marked the ratification of a camaraderie pact between Bilbao's merchants and their counterparts in Nantes. This pact, imbued with devotional elements, laid the groundwork for what would evolve into an international mercantile brotherhood, the Cofradía de la contratación, a guild alliance of a unique international character (Archives Départementales de Loire [hereafter: ADL], E 124; Blanchard, 1890). The accord in question was rooted in precedents established in 1428, when Castile and the Duke of Burgundy entered into a series of agreements. These early treaties conferred certain rights upon Castilian traders operating within Flanders, a region of high commercial importance at the time. The significance of these privileges was further underscored when, several decades later, they received the formal endorsement of Charles VIII. As both the reigning monarch of France and the duke consort of Brittany, his sanction in the years 1487 and 1491 lent considerable weight to the original terms, thereby reinforcing the stature of Castilian merchants within the European trade networks of the late Middle Ages. This sequence of events not only highlights the interconnected nature of European polities but also underscores the enduring influence of commercial interests in shaping diplomatic relations (ARCV, Pergaminos, 104, 4; Moal, 2008; Guiard, 1913). The establishment of this fraternal bond resulted in the creation of a mutual tribunal endowed with consular authority, a subject we will explore through particular instances. Additionally, the Nantes traders designated an envoy in Bilbao, authorized to partake in the tribunal's sessions and contribute to its discussions, while the Bilbao merchants were accorded similar privileges in Nantes. Likewise, the Castilian wool incurred minimal taxation in Nantes, just as the levies on Breton cloth imports remained low in Bilbao. Overall, the accords yielded benefits for both municipalities.
The Guild of the Contratation established its base within the Saint Francis monastery's chapel in Nantes, a place where Basque merchants had conducted their trade for years. It was in this sacred space that the guild convened to deliberate, worship, and perform its ceremonial duties. Governed by regulations set forth by the Bilbao consuls, the guild operated under a framework that was welldocumented in the late fifteenthcentury port records of Bilbao, which referred to the "cónsoles de los mercaderos de la Naçión de España, estantes en la çiudad de Nantes" (the consuls of the merchants of the Nation of Spain residing in the city of Nantes). These consuls mandated tolls on all maritime commerce and goods arriving at the port from Castile, with the collected funds earmarked for the maintenance and repair of the guild's fa-cilities, as well as other services essential to the merchant community. However, in 1476, a dispute arose when the Bilbao consuls reported that certain merchants, especially those from Guipúzcoa, were defying the longstanding obligation to pay these fees. This defiance prompted the Catholic Monarchs to step in, decreeing that the statutes authored by the Castilian consuls in Nantes be maintained and adhered to without exception (Mathorez, 1912; Recalde, 1988).
For over a century, Brittany had been a key commercial partner of Castile, particularly the city of Bilbao, with which it had established strong trade connections and signed agreements that designated them as preferred associates. Despite this longstanding partnership, disputes did occasionally emerge, leading to confrontations and the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal. In 1488, the Catholic Monarchs responded to a petition from Juan de Arbolancha, a merchant from Bilbao, who sought redress for wrongs inflicted by certain Breton individuals. The monarchs' letter stipulated a thirty day waiting period before any action could be taken, during which time they hoped the conflict would be resolved. This grace period was later extended by an additional fifty days amidst ongoing negotiations involving the Castilian rulers and the Duke of Brittany. Should Arbolancha have detained any Bretons during this time, he was instructed to release them upon posting a bond, en suring compensation in the event the talks failed. If no settlement was reached within the allotted time, Arbolancha was authorized to target subjects of the Duchy of Brittany, capturing their ships and goods to recover his losses, all without facing legal repercussions (AGS, RGS, 1488-01, 260).
The robust economic ties between Biscay and Brittany were so crucial for the flourishing of both regions that it was deemed prudent to mitigate the effects of potential commercial conflicts that might arise, leading to reciprocal punitive actions. The harmonious relationship between the Castilian traders and the Breton mariners was evident in the utilization of Breton vessels for the conveyance of goods along the maritime path connecting Flanders and Castile. In the year 1483, grievances were lodged in the courts of England by an emissary of the "Consuls of the Nation of Spain in Bruges", identified as Pedro de Salamanca, acting in a legal capacity, on account of several Spanish nationals who had suffered the wrongful confiscation of their merchandise transported on Breton ships (Childs, 1978). In the year 1489, an intriguing pact was forged between the Biscayans and the Bretons, stipulating that Breton traders operating in Castile were obliged to pay merely 3% of their goods' value. This measure was to circumvent any retaliatory actions sanctioned by the letter of marque possessed by Arbolancha. Essentially, it was agreed that the Bretons would collectively shoulder the repercussions associated with this letter of marque, apportioning the said percentage across their merchandise. This was a strategic move to prevent the potential confiscation of all goods belonging to those randomly targeted. Should any individual decline to comply with this arrangement willingly, they would be subjected to the stipulations of the preceding letter of marque. In enforcing this agreement, Arbolancha and his representatives were authorized to compel Breton merchants and their associates to swear an oath on the goods they had disembarked. Furthermore, these merchants were required to present a comprehensive list of their cargo upon their arrival in Castilian harbors, thereby enabling the collection of the aforementioned 3% levy (AGS, RGS, 1489-01, 381).
The essence of such a letter of marque and reprisal is captured within a historical document dating back to the year 1492. This type of letter was a government license that authorized a private person, known as a privateer, to attack and capture vessels of a nation at war with the issuer. It was a significant part of naval warfare during the age of sail, serving as a legal form of piracy. The document from 1492 likely detailed the terms and conditions under which the privateer could operate, the specific targets, and the division of spoils. It would have served as a crucial piece of authorization, empowering individuals to act on behalf of their nation against enemy states during times of conflict. Letters of marque and reprisal were a testament to the complexities of maritime law and the interplay between private interests and national authority during the last decades of the 15th century (AGS, RGS, 149212, 206). In a manner akin to other decrees of its kind, the monarchs relayed orders to both civil and military officials, as well as to the naval contingent from Biscay and Guipúzcoa, regarding the ship owned by Juan de Arbolancha, which he coowned with his siblings and was captained by Lope de Arbolancha, one of his brothers. This ship was subject to boarding in the year 1484. During the time of this event, the vessel was laden with an assortment of goods including kermes and woolen fabrics, small wares, leather goods, and metals such as tin and lead, in addition to sacks filled with wool. This cargo was aboard near the English harbor of Antona, known today as Southampton, situated on the isle of Oyque, or Wight. The offensive was executed by a flotilla of five ships acting under the authority of the Duke of Brittany, notwithstanding the ongoing truce and active alliances between the Duchy of Brittany and the Kingdom of Castile. This action was in direct violation of the assurances and safeconduct documents issued by the Duke, which were in the possession of the ship's master. The duke had previously assured his protection and safeguarding of the ship, and there were no recorded transgressions committed by the vessel or its crew against the Duchy or its people. Among the aggressor ships was La Figa, helmed by Captain Juan Viemo of Morlaix; La Grifona, commanded by Rochar Hetiena with a certain Robert serving as pilot; La Picada, under the leadership of Juan de Esquilen and Guillaume Picart; and La Barca of Morlaix, steered by Yvo Lamrux and Yvo Bramaner. Accompanying these ships were numerous constables, shipowners, sailors, and denizens of the Breton Duchy.
Disregarding the Castilian flag and emblem, the attacking ships unleashed their cannons upon the Santiago, inflicting damage that resulted in the demise and injury of several crew members. The assault led to the plundering of the ship's cargo and equipment, culminating in a loss valued at 18,000 gold crowns. The aggressors seized control of the vessel along with the surviving crew, who, despite their appeals and references to treaties and assurances that should have protected them, were ignored. The captured crew were confined below deck, subjected to the cruelty of being given only seawater to drink and deprived of food. This inhumane treatment led to the tragic death of fifteen individuals and the poisoning from seawater of the others who remained captive. Lope de Arbolancha, in a desperate search for assistance, found none in the Breton towns of SaintPoldeLéon and Morlaix, despite reasserting his Castilian identity and the treaties that should have guaranteed the safety of the ship. The local authorities ignored his entreaties, permitting the assailants to divide the spoils of the Castilian ship amongst themselves (González Arce, 2021).
Notwithstanding, the duke of Brittany did grant the injured shipmaster a document allowing him to seek justice in these ports, and prohibiting the seizure of said assets, which could not be sold or distributed until the ducal council had ruled accordingly. However, when the plaintiff presented this order before the local authorities and the assailants, far from respecting it, they attempted to murder both Arbolancha and the ducal judge who was with him, forcing them to flee to the duke’s court in Nantes. Here, the shipmaster presented a claim before the duke and the treasurer of Brittany, keeper and justice of peace and of the alliances concluded with Castile—this position of judge keeper, or chancellor, of the alliances, is the one discussed above when describing the Castilian consulate in, as a mediator and arbitral judge between Nantes and Bilbao—against the naval delinquents and the citizens of the ports that supported them. The judge summoned the defendants before the court, of whom the plaintiff demanded the 18,000 gold crowns, plus expenses and damage. The plaintiff also requested that the defendants be captured and imprisoned. The of-fenders were sent to prison only to be liberated before Lope de Arbolancha was granted justice.
Juan de Arbolancha, acting on behalf of his sibling, sought justice from the Catholic Monarchs, urging them to intervene and ensure his grievances were heard by the duke. Despite the noble's assurance to incarcerate the culprits, re-imprisoning some, the lack of Breton witnesses to corroborate the Castilian's account, due to the isolated nature of the assault, hindered his pursuit of justice. This absence of wit-nesses led the accused to shift blame onto others. In a desperate bid for truth, Arbolancha proposed an ordeal by trial, anticipating that the accused would reveal their guilt under duress. Nevertheless, the alleged pirates were released once more, and the judge decreed the auctioning of the pilfered goods, with proceeds allocated to Arbolancha's shipping costs, disregarding his additional sufferings. Persistently, the plaintiff demanded the rearrest of the offenders, which eventually led to confessions that substantiated his allegations.
In the end, his efforts were in vain, as neither the duke nor his council would meet his demands for compensation for the damages incurred. This led him to seek a letter of marque and reprisal from Isabel and Fernando. However, before issuing such a letter, the monarchs demanded that the duchy's officials once more consider the case, directing that it be presented to two members of the ducal council. They determined that the plaintiff had indeed suffered losses to the tune of 25,000 escudos. Contrarily, the ducal council assessed the damages at a mere 6,000 francs, an amount Arbolancha found unacceptable. Persisting in his quest for justice, he sought further royal intervention and insisted on the issuance of the letter of reprisal. Amidst this backandforth, and under the looming threat of reprisal—which had been drafted to pressure the duke but had been postponed—the ducal council increased the compensation offer to 12,000 francs. Yet again, this was a figure that Arbolancha could not countenance, leading to its rejection. The Breton envoys implored the Castilian rulers to desist from granting or implementing the letter of reprisal. The Royal Council of Castile aligned with Arbolancha's stance, initially decreeing a compensation of 18,000 crowns plus expenses, which the monarchs subsequently reduced to 15,000 crowns, showing leniency towards the duke and his representatives. The ducal council contested, asserting the plaintiff was denied justice in his legitimate appeals and proposed that, to circumvent court bias, French jurors from Paris, Bordeaux, or other scholarly cities should decide in an international arbitration. However, this suggestion was belated; Arbolancha confirmed his claim for 15,000 crowns without postponement, yet the ducal chancellor declined to fulfill any payment, neglecting even the duke's directives. Consequently, the Catholic Monarchs resolved to issue the letter of marque and reprisal for 18,000 crowns and an additional 5,000 for costs, targeting Brittany nationals and their possessions, cumulating to 23,500 crowns. Moreover, the costs for enforcing the reprisal, as determined by the judicial authorities of the adjudicating cities, were to augment this amount (AGS, RGS 1492-12, 206).
In the historical context, the municipalities of Bermeo, Bilbao, La Corunna, and Betanzos collectively opposed the directives issued by Juan de Arbolancha. These directives pertained to the dissemination of his letter of reprisal among the Breton people, which imposed a tax based on the value of goods they imported. This resistance was a significant act of defiance against what was perceived as an unjust levy, reflecting the towns' commitment to protecting their economic interests and autonomy in trade matters. It underscores the complexities of trade relationships, and the measures local authorities were willing to take to safeguard their communities from financial burdens deemed excessive or unfair (Ferreira Priegue, 1988). Consequently, the provost of Bilbao, Tristán de Leguizamón, perceiving a threat to his commercial interests, joined forces with his representative, Juan de Estella, to initiate legal proceedings against Arbolancha. They leveled allegations that Arbolancha coerced certain Breton vessels departing from the respective harbors to comply with his requisitions, leveraging the menace of confiscating their vessels and merchandise. This legal action underscored the tensions arising from maritime commerce practices and the protection of local economic stakes at the end of the Middle Ages (AGS, RGS 150006, 347; AGS, CC, CED 5, 289, 1; 8, 41bis, 3). For several years, he had engaged in extortion, accumulating a fortune far exceeding his financial losses. The accused countered with a claim of possessing royal sanction to levy a 3% tax on the cargo of Breton ships, aiming to collect up to 1.04 million maravedis, an amount he had not yet fully acquired. Nevertheless, the judicial process proceeded unabated, with both parties amassing testimonies as evidence. Leguizamón insisted that Arbolancha submit to the Royal Council a documented account of the proceedings he initiated against his Breton aggressors, to ascertain the full indemnity he sought. Moreover, the Catholic Monarchs issued directives to the local magistrates in Flanders and the Duchy of Brittany, as some witnesses slated to support Leguizamón's case resided there and were required to furnish written statements in answer to a questionnaire drafted by the claimant, to be forwarded to Castile. A similar approach was taken with the officials of the coastal communities in Cantabria and Galicia (AGS, RGS 1494-07, 327; 1494-10, 250; 1494-11, 503-504; 1494-12, 187, 198-199; 1495-02, 516).
Commerce between Nantes and Bilbao remained uninterrupted at the dawn of the 16th century despite numerous challenges,. The exchange of goods between the Cantabrian seaports and Brittany flourished, largely benefiting Breton merchants and shipmasters throughout the first half of the century. Their vessels were primarily engaged in ferrying commodities such as iron, steel, oranges, and wool to Brittany. This was partly due to a scarcity of ships from the Bay of Biscay, which were otherwise occupied with even more lucrative ventures. A notable instance from 1539 highlights this era's trade dynamics: Ibon Larger, a Penmarch merchant, openly admitted to having loaded steel purchased in Bilbao onto his ship, captained by Juan L Due, a notable figure from Nantes. This period marked a significant chapter in maritime commerce, characterized by robust trade networks and the strategic utilization of available shipping resources (Archivo Histórico Provincial de Guipúzcoa, legajo 2/1883, A, f. 104r). Trade and maritime transport were essential for the inhabitants of both regions, providing crucial resources. These communities endeavored to surmount the perils of the sea by creating trust networks, bolstered by shared institutions for risk management. However, their attempts were ultimately eclipsed by sovereign policies aimed at extending state jurisdiction over maritime domains through the criminalization of certain sea activities. This was part of a broader strategy to augment state control over maritime trade.

4. Conclusions

Throughout history, the distinction between acts of violence at sea and those on land has been a subject of moral debate and legal interpretation. Such acts were universally condemned, yet it was the prerogative of sovereign powers to define their legality, often swayed by the tides of economic, political, and strategic interests. Prior to the fourteenth century, historical records are insufficient to draw clear lines between statesanctioned naval warfare, privateering, and outright piracy. The overlap between these activities was significant, with each endeavoring to inflict maximum harm upon adversaries. It was through the evolution of legal frameworks and the expansion of monarchical dominion over coastlines, coupled with the establishment of new maritime jurisdictions, that clearer definitions and regulations concerning these maritime activities were established.
Before the establishment of formal diplomatic entities by European monarchies, the Atlantic port cities had already developed enduring institutions to safeguard their interests. Contrary to the longheld belief that permanent diplomatic engagements were exclusive to Italian states, these ports maintained robust diplomaticlike relations. Particularly, the port cities of Castile and Brittany, exemplified by Bilbao and Nantes, fostered strong personal and economic bonds, creating a reliable network that circumvented overt conflicts. When maritime trade disputes emerged, primarily due to piracy and the issuance of letters of marque, these cities transitioned from aggressive plundering to the less hostile practice of issuing letters of marque and reprisal. Eventually, they established an international arbitration tribunal to resolve conflicts without military engagement. This tribunal evolved into the "Brotherhood of Contractation" in the fifteenth century and was later known as the "Company of the Safeconducts" in the sixteenth century. This innovative joint institution of shipowners and merchants from both cities aimed to curtail the misuse of letters of marque, which were initially intended to apply pressure and penalize noncompliance with bilateral agreements and alliances. The success of these institutions was evident; they not only thrived in the fifteenth century under the “Brotherhood of Contractation” but also persisted when the French monarchy assumed the duchy of Brittany. Despite intermittent warinduced disruptions and the near constant state of conflict and piracy between the French and Spanish crowns, these privileged relationships endured, underscoring the efficacy of mutual understanding and recognition in international relations.
In the tapestry of history, the port cities of the Gulf of Biscay stand out for their approach to resolving disputes. They favored agreements and established common institutions for conflict resolution, highlighting a preference for diplomacy over discord. In stark contrast, the maritime kingdoms of Spain, England, and France of ten turned to confrontation, engaging in wars and committing various abuses as a means to address their disagreements. These two distinct methods of handling maritime conflicts highlight the varying strategies of the time. Monarchs, recognizing the strategic importance of maritime dominance, viewed control of the seas as a crucial step towards international supremacy. This pursuit of naval power was instrumental in the establishment of the Atlantic empires during the Early Modern period, marking a pivotal era in the shaping of global dynamics. The sea became a stage for power plays, with control over it equating to influence and authority on the world stage, thus altering the course of history and the development of nations during this trans-formative epoch.

Funding

This research article was funded by State Research Agency (Ministry of Science and Innovation of the Government of Spain), grant number PID2020- 118105GBI00.

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