Contemporary Views on Arguments for God’s Existence in Udayana`s Works

1. Introduction

Rational demonstration in favor of God`s existence was a fundamental theme of Indian theism — īçvara-vāda (teaching about Īçvara), an original theistic metaphysics in classical Indian Philosophy. During the whole classical period, īçvara-vāda, as a magnet, pulled almost half of the Hindus philosophical systems (darçanas) such as Yoga, Nyāya, Vaiċeşika, Vedānta (partly) recognized as theistic and asserting Īçvara — personal Divine Absolute. In opposition, Buddhists, Jains, philosophers of classical Sāmkhya and classical Mīmāmsā schools, whose metaphysics was called in Indian tradition nirīçvara-vāda (teaching against īçvara-vāda), elaborated intense polemic argumentation against īçvara-vādins (`disciples of īçvara-vāda`). Traditionally, Nyāya was considered as the most theistic among other darçanas. Udayana, an outstanding Indian philosopher of the X-XI cc., belonged to the Nyāya School. Udayana demonstrated a whole baggage of rational proofs in favor of God`s existence, especially in his brilliant opus “Nyāya-kusumāņjali”, where he synthesized the main Indian theistic trends. Udayana strongly conquered nirīçvara-vādins so that some of them (Buddhists) disappeared from the Indian intellectual scene, according to the medieval sources.

The purpose of this paper is to actualize some of the main questions of Udayana`s argumentation in favor of God`s existence in context of general and Indian theism considering the views of contemporary authors (XX and XXI cc.). N. S. Dravid and Bhaswati Sinha, conscientious English translators and interpreters of the “Nyāya-kusumāņjali” (NK) started the process of Udayana`s engaging in a broader international discourse. Previously, Camille Bulcke and Visvesvary Amma had examined Indian theism in general and Udayana in detail. Last year, (2022) Kisor Chakrabarti analyzing Udayana`s critique of one of the nirīçvara doctrines, stressed that the works of this remarkable Indian philosopher were relevant for contemporary philosophy. There are many themes and problems undertaken by Udayana, which will be interesting for the modern philosophers and theologians. Among Udayana`s proofs of God`s existence, cosmological ones have analogies in Western theistic tradition, particularly in Thomism. Īçvara concept is actual for the new comparative theology in Europe (as Martin Ganeri mentioned in 2012). Here we raise the questions of God`s transcendence and immanence which specify theistic outlook, co-relation between reason and belief in the Udayana`s works and some others. Several aspects of the rich Udayana`s heritage considered here can be enrolled in modern rational theology and philosophy of religion in future.

2. Results

2.1. Indian theism; tradition of īçvara-vāda in classical period of Indian Philosophy.

As a rule, theistic doctrine admits supreme God as Personality (Wainwright, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013, 2-3) who owns the attributes of Consciousness, Freedom, Love, and Weal, Benevolence and Creativeness (or, Demiurge activity). In spite of the regional specialty of worship and discourse in the East and the West, we find similar universal theistic features of Divinity, remarkably arguments for God`s existence and, notably Indian arguments we have to call outstanding (see: Anikeeva 2019). The article ‘Theism’ in Encyclopaedia Britanica showing the panorama of theistic trends anywhere defines, “The supreme God, Isvara, has the personal name Prajapati, Visvakarman or some other” (Encyclopaedia Britanica 2005, 747). ‘Īçvara’ has become a widespread title of personal God in Indian mentality; deriving from the Sanskrit verb «īç» («to possess»), `Īçvara’ means Lord, Owner (of the universe). The term Īçvara first appeared in Atharva-veda (VII, 102, 1; XIX, 6, 4) and historically developed as God’s name and a category of Indian philosophy. The names Īçvara, as well as Maheçvara (`Great Īçvara`) or, Maheça (abbr.), Parameçvara (`Supreme Īçvara`) etc. can be traced beginning from Vedic literature, both in çruti and smŗti, mainly in Çvetāçvatara Upanișad, Bhagavad-Gītā etc.

Īçvara-vāda (‘teaching’ (vāda) about ‘God’ (Īçvara)) has formed as original theistic metaphysics and an intense trend in Indian Philosophy that asserts personal Divine Absolute. Īçvara-vāda is mainly presented by schools of Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiċeşika. Yoga, as one of the Hindus philosophical systems (darçana) being sister system of classical Sāmkhya nevertheless sharply differs from Sāmkhya because of admitting Īçvara in its ontology so that Yoga received the name seçvara Sāmkhya (`Sāmkhya with Īçvara`) in Indian tradition. In opposition to Yoga, classical Sāmkhya (beginning from “Sāmkhya-kārikā” and further) was called nirīçvara-Sāmkhya (`Sāmkhya without Īçvara`). “Yoga-sūtra,” and “Yoga-sūtra-bhāşya” (I. 23-24; III.45) define God as an active spiritual world`s generator who also reveals first wisdom to people and organizes natural elements (mahābhūtas). Yoga`s philosophy created the ground for other schools of Indian theism in the first half of the first millennium. Later, united Nyāya-Vaiċeşika borrowing some arguments from Yoga increased and enriched the doctrine about personal God. Camille Bulcke observes, “Theism of Yoga continued and elaborated by Nyāya-Vaiċeşika, the most theistic schools in Indian Philosophy” (Bulcke 1968, 20). Much later, at the beginning of the second millennium Vedānta (excluding advaita-Vedānta) headed Indian theism (Balasubramanian 2008, xlix, 19; Theistic Vedānta 2008; Wainwright 2013).

Nyāya became a flagman of īçvara-vāda among other darçanas in early and mature medieval period. “Nyāya-sūtras” defines Īçvara as “the cause of universe” (IV. I. 19); further, the multiplicative threats from nirīçvara-vādins, primarily Buddhists and Mīmāmsākas, made Indian theism intensify its activity. Beginning from Praśastapāda in VI c. (see: Bronkhorst 1996; Chemparathy 1968) Vaiċeşikas became friendly with Naiyayikas and turned into the active theistic defenders though “Vaiċeşika-sūtras” did not even mention any supreme Divine cause. Onwards united Nyāya-Vaiċeşika caused many hot arguments against nirīçvara-vādins using precise proofs of God`s existence. Uddyotakara (VII c.), for the first time in Indian Philosophy, introduced Īçvara as a philosophical category (padārtha): `Īçvara` belonged to one kind of eternal substance (dravya) (“Nyāya Bhāşyavārttika”. IV. 1. 21); to all known Nyāya dravyas — bhūtas, manas, Ātman etc., Uddyotakara adds a new one dravya — `Īçvara`. The philosopher identifies Īçvara according to Nyāya tradition with Paramātman (supreme Ātman) which differs (guņabhedāt) from other ātmans by supreme consciousness (buddhi), bliss (sukha), and his cosmos-genesis as well as cosmos-destroying desire (Nyāyā Bhāşyavārttika, 464). According to Nyāyā, Īçvara`s peculiarity (viśeşa) is that he cannot have ill, hunger, impression as well as, Īçvara has no karmic merit and demerit due to his eternal supernatural substance which is out of bondage (law of karma-samsāra).

Classical schools of Yoga, Nyāya and Vaiçeşika shaped Indian theism, and it grew like a tree with many branches, flowers and fruits — variety of teachings inside and around īçvara-vāda up to the XI c. and further. Nirǐçvara-vādins, i.e. Buddhists, Jains, disciples of classical Sāmkhya and classical Mīmāmsā schools, continued to wage a severe struggle against īçvara-vādins through the whole history of the ancient and medieval period. “As might be expected, arguments for the existence or nonexistence of the Being variously called Purușa, Brahman, Paramātman, or Īçvara or by the name of one or another sectarian deity, increased in sophistication as methods of philosophical discussion grew more complex and precise” (R. Jackson 1986, 315). That struggle definitely enriched Indian Philosophy as a whole.

According to the general theistic framework, īçvara-vāda is described as a doctrine of Supreme Personal God who is both immanent and transcendent in relation to the world: God rules the world immanently as well as He rises upon it transcendentally: God is Creator/Producer, Dealer, Super-consciousness, and Super-power. Īçvara in Yoga, Vaiċeşika and Nyāya, particularly in Uddyotakara`s and Udayana`s discourse has such attributes: 1) perfect consciousness (buddhi); 2) + 3) unity of desire (icchā) and effectiveness (prayatna); 4) inner unitedness; 5) superpower (aiçvarya), 6) Demiurgic motive. God as wise and merciful Dealer composes the world, holds it and cares about it. Īçvara also considered as the Author of Vedas who initiates all the Logoi of the universe.

2.2. Udayana`s works and arguments for God`s existence

In the “Handful of Blossoms of Nyāya” (“Nyāya-kusumāņjali”).

Udayana continued Uddyotakara in philosophizing theism. Udayana was an eminent Hindus philosopher of the X-XI centuries, and he awarded the title ‘āchārya`/’teacher` (Udayanāchācharya), a very rare and honorable name among Indian philosophers. He was one of the last representatives of the classical Nyāya. Previously, Nyāya philosophers together with friendly Vaiċeşikas created a serious theistic baggage and developed some argumentations and rational proofs of Īçvara’s existence. Udayana synthesized and accomplished varied Nyāya`s arguments of this kind on the basis of logical inference (anumana) and other forms of intellectual art. The style of argumentation in favor of God`s existence got the name Īçvarānumana in later Indian tradition (Gaņgeša 1974). Bhaswati Sinha pointed out that though Udayana relied on the previous Indian theistic tradition, yet he is “a champion in the cause of theism” (Sinha 1999, xii).

One of the top īçvara-vāda achievements is Udayana`s “Nyāya-kusumāņjali” (“Handful of Blossoms of Nyāya”) (NK); it is a highly skillful sophisticated tractate and crucial text for Indian theism. It consists of two combined genres: very compact verses (kārikās) and elaborated Udayana`s auto-commentary written in prose, — a popular type of the medieval Indian philosophical texts. NK has a cycle composition. Udayana starts his tractate with the rhetorical question what a need to argue in favor of Supreme Being is if He is worshipped by all men: all castes, families, schools, social customs, and so on (NK. I. 2 auto-comm.). However, Udayana continues, the process of rational reflection (manana) is a form of worship/Theurgy (upāsana), and therefore he undertakes his own philosophical artwork in favor of God`s existence (NK. I. 3). At the beginning of the NK the author sets a goal to demonstrate his proofs as worship and he ends almost every part of the tractate and completes it with a prayer to Lord (NK. I. 20; II. 4; V. 18-20) which crowns his proofs like apotheosis.

There are many problems that Udayana raises in NK that is why our purpose is to highlight only some of them. We shall dwell on several Udayana`s arguments which have ontological and cosmological character and compare them to some extend with ancient Greek thinking and Christian philosophy. Almost in every passage throughout all parts of the tractate, Udayana finds opportunity to respond to the Nyāya’s opponents and to disprove their position. Each of the tractate’s five parts is composed in classical Indian polemical form with a battle against opponents/nirīçvara-vādins (`disciples of nirīçvara-vāda) with detailed study of every of their counter-arguments (pūrvapakşa — an opponent`s view), then denying them and setting siddhānta (a proponent`s thesis). That shows how Īçvarānumana culminated at the end of classical period. Though being highly sophisticated, the style of medieval Indian polemists was lapidary, with many words and concepts being omitted as ‘well-known’. But ‘well-known’ were they only for the medieval thinkers, therefore many texts require deciphering, reconstructing and interpreting for modern researchers.

The first part of NK deals with the law of karma (adŗşţa — ‘invisible’), which determines the present and future life of people and other entities (lower gods, ghosts etc.), such as merit or demerit, resulted from their actions. Opponents insist that karma works like a natural law as effect/fruit of actions without any supernatural intervention of God. Observing relation between the Īçvara’s guardianship over the world and ‘natural’ law of karma, Udayana arrives at the category of causality in general that is necessary for supernatural Cause demonstration. There was a lot controversy in Indian philosophy concerning causality itself, into which we are not going to delve now. In order to substantiate his position, Udayana insists on two forms of causality — empirical one determined by karma and mental one governed at last by Īçvara (NK. I. 5-6). In the phenomenal world, there are diversity of causes and multiplicity of their operations, but in order to avoid chaos, all natural causes should obey supernatural (a-laukika1 – NK. I. 4) God`s wisdom. According to Indian logic instruments, Udayana has to use an obligatory term in one form of Indian syllogism — an empiric example (dŗşţānta): relation between a seed and a sprout (NK. I. 4 auto-comm.). This example shows necessary causality between a seed and a plant, and then Indian philosopher infers that general causality between any seed and any plant is fully established by Supreme Consciousness/God. Karmic law that determines all natural processes was not created by Īçvara but totally is controlled by him. In this sense Udayana`s argumentation resembles ancient Greek metaphysical tradition from Parmenides to Aristotle and Thomism where being and thinking are identical; like Greek metaphysicians, Udayana understands physical causality as secondary and intellectual causality as primeval — ‘final Cause’, ‘unmoved Mover’. Like Western medieval realists of notions, like Anselm, Thomas and others Udayana teaches that all physical being depends on mental entities, which ascend to metaphysical Sophia. In this relation, we can point out that Martin Ganeri, analyzing Thomist engagement with non-Christian thought, mentions that category of Īçvara is important for the new comparative theology (Ganeri 2012, 1060)

There is a discussion of an efficacy of sacrifices in the second part of NK. The opponents, precisely Mīmāmsākas, assert that impulses resulted from Vedic sacrifices and their ‘fruits’ which are causes and effects of invisible world operate due to their intrinsic holy power without any help of God. Udayana considers the argumentation of his opponents in detail. For Mīmāmsākas sacrifices and mantras’ recitation automatically reach the desired results of attaining heaven, therefore sacrifices can be offered without God, since Vedas are deprived of any imperfections, they are holy and authoritative due to their eternity (NK. II. 1-2). Udayana counters Mīmāmsākas regarding their belief in eternity of Vedas and ‘determinism’ of Vedic sacrifices. Naiyāyik negates that Vedas are eternal and sacrifices have self-depended autonomic powers because these invisible powers like adŗşţa ultimately have Īçvara’s guidance. Besides, Udayana says that Vedas are revelation, and so there must be perfect Subject who reveals them and who knows all hidden conceivable ideas and all reasonable senses of Vedic words. Here Udayana promotes another cosmological proof of Īçvara`s existing. Cosmos in Hindus outlook periodically is composed and destroyed during kalpas and yugas, and for Naiyāyikas these periods obey Īçvara`s will. In contrast to Mīmāmsā position about eternity of the scriptures, Naiyāyikas consider Vedas also as composing and destroying periodically due to Īçvara throughout many cycles of sarga-pralaya (creation-dissolution) (NK. II. 1). Udayana asserts that no one but God can create sacred texts in every period: “…since creation and annihilation of the world may occur again and again… therefore there is no go but to admit the reality of God (Parameçvara) to explain the uninterrupted existing of religious tradition” (Udayana 1996, 106-107).

Nirīçvara--vādins` objections in these two parts concern ontological and cosmological questions, other objections in the third and the forth parts of NK have epistemological character. Partly, for if God does exist, he cannot be a source of true knowledge for us because ‘we (opponents say) do not perceive him’, so God does not exist. Udayana accuses nirīçvara-vādins of absurdity and logical fallacies, i.e. how you may infer the absence of something (God) from non-perception of something (NK. III. 1; IV. 1). After rejecting all objections of his opponents in the polemical battle in four parts, Udayana provides fundamental logical or rational proofs of Īçvara`s existence in the fifth part of the NK.

Notably, nirīçvara-vādins slanderously allege that there is no any arguments in favor of God’s existence. To this counter-argument Udayana replies with resentment, “May we not say that there are no proofs to establish God’s existence?” (NK. V. 1 auto-comm.)— No, says Naiyāyik, and he, collecting basic streams of previous Indian theism, completes the proofs in subtle and precise way and divides them in eight ‘paragraphs’ or, stages (NK. V. 2-17). In short, they are (NK. V. 1): 1) ‘from effects’ — cause-effect relations, an argument with realistic-rationalistic and cosmological background; 2) ‘from combination’ of atoms — physical-cosmological argument defending God`s transcendence in relation to the world; 3) ‘from Īçvara`s supporting’ the universe, a proof defending God`s immanence therein. Next 4-7 arguments concern Vedas as revelation of Īçvara: 4) ‘from words’, i.e. all meanings of the words, notions, human skills and arts that God guided first people; 5), 6): ‘from authoritativeness’ (Pratyaya) and ‘revelation’ (çruti/Vedas), — the arguments demonstrate that the only Author and Revealer of holy texts can be God. 7) ‘From sentences’: combination of initial words and holy chants into sentences could make only Īçvara. 8) ‘From particular numbers’, or mathematical structure of the world — another cosmological argument in favor of God`s existence

Among many crucial themes and problems in Udayana`s proofs, I would like to underline only some of them having cosmological and ontological grounds.

First argument in the fifth part of the NK — ‘from effect’ (kāryāt) (NK. V. 2-3) continues Udayana`s reasoning in the first part of NK, where he establishes the causality doctrine of God`s rational guardedness over the world. In the fifth part, the Indian thinker pays much attention to the whole universe as an effect produced by Super Cause – God. All materials, he says, like the earth, and others must have a creator because they have the nature of “effects” like a pot (NK. V. 2); then who is the Potter? – Of course, Īçvara is. Here we can see rather widespread in many ancient civilizations an archetype or symbol of Potter/Demiurge/Viçvakarman (‘universal Dealer’, Blacksmith) that indicates God and his cosmological function. In Indian theism Īçvara is Demiurge, considered as creative (nimitta-kāraņa), i.e. actual, intelligent, and non-material, ‘uncompounded’ Cause, (asamavāyi—kāraņa2), or conscious Subject creating the world. This argument, which Udayana many times deals with, actually resembles Plato`s arguments for Demiurge in “Timeous”.

The second proof ‘combination’ (āyojana) closely relates to cosmogony specifying Indian theism in comparison to other theistic doctrines. Since Īçvara is not Creator ex nihilo, there must be some primeval substrate, passive elements responsible for the material structure of the world. Naiyāyikas-Vaiċeşikas chooses for this material substrate atoms (aņu, paramaņu), each of them isolated from another without Īçvara`s action; thus, Īçvara coexists with these external and eternal material forms. The ground (āyojana) means that at the beginning of universe creation some intelligent Subject or his volition has to conjunct passive, isolated, non-conscious atoms and that the Subject is of course Īçvara (NK. V. 4, NK. V. 6). Apart from Nyāya-Vaiċeşika, disciples of Mīmāmsāka and Jainism also sticked to atomistic hypothesis (paramaņu-vāda) for explaining physical nature, but we can hardly find such combination of theism and atomism in any other teaching except for India beginning from ancient times, at least from Praśastapāda (VI c.) or earlier (ash`arism historically came later). In contrast to the ancient atomists such as Democritus, Epicurus who rejected any conscious super-power in combination of atoms, Udayana demonstrated a concept of God`s initial impulse for paramaņu moving and conjunction within theistic framework. We can say that for the ancient and medieval times īçvara-vāda created a unique system of theistic atomism.

After primeval atomic conjunction done by Īçvara, what has been already confirmed in the second proof, the eighth cosmological proof of NK ‘from numerical difference’ (samkhyāvišeşāt) states that God`s will combines atomic dyads (dvyaņuka), triads (tryaņuka) and so on (NK. V. 5; NK. V. 17). Only God is responsible for all cosmic measures and complete arithmetic structure of the world. This point reminds us Pythagoreans who definitely belonged to Greek metaphysicians and held their maxima about numbers, which ruled the world.

In sum, NK paid much attention to theistic cosmogony. Udayana`s verses, author-commentaries with their translations of the 1-3 proofs (NK. V. 1-4) dedicated to ontological and cosmological God`s activity occupy apparently far more place in the tractate than those dedicated to the 4-7 proofs (NK. V. 5) highlighting the scriptural and soteriological topics3. It was remarkable that Udayana dealt much with cosmogony and cosmology; meanwhile in Indian tradition Nyāya was considered predominantly as philosophy of logic and epistemology, and Vaiċeşika`s interest was usually associated with ontology and cosmology. In her book, in chapter 4, Visveswari A. reasonably raises a question “Udayana — a Naiyāyika or a Vaiċeşika?” (Visveswary 1985, 190). This question shows the process of symbiosis and mutual complementation between two friendly theistic Indian systems — Nyāya and Vaiċeşika.

Further, we shall discuss other questions with viewpoints of modern interpreters and researchers of Udayana`s works.

3. Contemporary views on Udayana`s argumentation.

The first translation into English of “Nyāya-kusumāņjali” known to us was done in XIX century (Udayana 1864). The last translations into English of NK (Udayana 1996; Sinha 1999) are very qualified, have detailed commentaries and based on traditional Sanskrit school under the guardianship of paņdits. N. S. Dravid is a famous Indian philosopher; he also translated another great book by Udayana “Ātma-tattva-viveka” (Udayana 1995). The reviewer said, “It is gratifying to note that such a scholar like N. S. Dravid undertook a difficult job of translating” these “two masterpieces of Udayanāchācharya” whose texts are “abstruse” (Sen 2000, 345). Since that, the works of Udayana have become available to a wider range of readers. Mrs. Bhaswati Sinha spent more than 20 years of sustained labor translating the NK guided by her guru, and her English variant of NK of course differs (not essentially) from Dravid`s one due to multiplicity of puņdit`s traditions. The translation of B. Sinha based on “only elaborate and exhaustive commentary” (Sinha 1999, xiii) owned by contemporary Indian guru Vīrarāghavācharya wrote in Sanskrit: “Kusumāņjali-vistara-sahita” (“Commentary extended and united with “Kusumāņjali””) (Vīrarāghavācārya 2010). No doubt, these two English translations of NK have given an impetus and offered more opportunities to the further research of Udayana`s philosophy.

Now we should point out three researchers of Udayana and his proofs in favor of God’s existence. Camille Bulcke dedicated his work to theism of Nyāya-Vaiċeşika (Bulcke 1968) which was though lapidary but clear and precise, with the correct Sanskrit recourses. The book contains both descriptive and analytical chapters highlighting main theological questions such as “The nature of God”, “Qualities and attributes of Īçvara” according to Vātsyāyana, Praśastapāda, Udayana etc. separately and synthetically for Nyāya and Vaiċeşika philosophy. The most interesting in Bulcke`s work is the chapter VIII “Īçvara and karma” (Bulcke 1968, 51) discussing a very difficult and controversial issue of Indian theism. Indian scholar Visveswary Amma published a book about Udayana and his philosophy (Visveswary 1985) where questions of God`s existence proving were examined in more details than in Bulckc`s opus and where other metaphysical themes were considered: God and Spirit/Self, cosmology, ethics, adŗşţa/law of karma, and others. The author knows Sanskrit and gives references to original Udayana`s writings.

Lastly the work on Udayana was issued by Kisor Chakrabarti who had analyzed the problem of Udayana`s critique of Buddhist theory of momentariness in his grandiose and massive book “Ātma-tattva-viveka” (ATV) (Chakrabarti 2022). Kisor Chakrabarti is a qualified scholar of Indian philosophy of Mind, logic and epistemology and he translated from Sanskrit a part of ATV. K. Chakrabarti gave the following assessment of Udayana`s intellectual art, “Udayana responds with meticulous care and thoroughness to the formidable dialectics of Buddhist philosophers. While arguing against the Buddhist views, Udayana presents them with a marvelously high level of profundity and rigor” (Chakrabarti 2022, 11). We support thoroughly the idea of this author that Udayana`s works must be of intense study and his “groundbreaking contributions are relevant for contemporary philosophy” (Chakrabarti 2022, 11 fn.).

Now we are going to consider two problems of Udayana`s proofs of God`s existence in accordance with the views of modern scholars: 1) God`s transcendence and immanence relating to the world, 2) co-relation between reason and belief. Visveswary contemplates a question of Īçvara`s transcendence in “Ātma-tattva-viveka” (Visveswary 1985, 156). The main purpose of this Udayana`s book is to defend the theistic idea of Ātman and oppose Buddhist anātma-vāda (or, nairātmya- vāda) because Īçvara is identical with Supreme Ātman/Paramātman. The most suitable term to describe God`s transcendence is a Sanskrit term ‘nimitta-kāraņa’ — ‘instrumental, creative Cause’ of the world, meanwhile atoms (paramaņu) are material, ‘compounded’ cause (samavāyi-kāraņa). In ATV, Udayana extensively discloses four main Buddhist objections against the idea that God is Creator, or Producer/Demiurge of the universe. Buddhists believe as follows:

1) there is a diversity of effects, therefore there should be a diversity of causes; how God can be the only one cause?

2) If God is eternal then the universe is expected to be eternal too, but that is absurd.

3) Why and how can God act in the world if everything in it obeys adŗşţa, which Naiyāyikas recognize?

4), 5) objections concern motive and purpose of God`s creation/producing activity. There are the following two opportunities, Buddhists say,

— the first opportunity: God creates for selfish motives. Thus, he has egoistic reasons etc. So, is he still benevolent God?

the second opportunity: God creates for the sake of others. If so, then how can one explain why our life is full of misery and sufferings?

Udayana opposes these Buddhist counter-arguments.

1), 3). The first and the third of these Buddhist objections and Udayana`s responds resemble polemics in the first part of NK which has been already considered. There are two kinds or rows of causes: the first one is physical which consists of two types such as seen and non-seen/adŗşţa; and the second kind is super-natural, metaphysical, non-material (a-laukika) cuase, i.e. God. Karmic law acting in the physical universe as unconscious power cannot be self-depended and needs conducting from the side of upper and mental Cause that is Īçvara.

2) Udayana rejects absurdity of his opponents. There are various causes, some of them are temporal, others are eternal, and the hierarchy of causes does not interrupt the processes but harmonizes under God`s eternal wisdom. Similarly as in the first and the third objections, it is wrong to infer what Buddhists said.

4), 5). Speaking about Īçvara`s motives of creating the world, Udayana underlines Divine excellent will (icchā). Īçvara does not have any egoistic motives and is full of compassion and love; he produces the world only for creatures` happiness and destroys it to stop all the evil of the world. This position of Udayana enriches the well-known theistic theodicy that God cannot be responsible for the vices of creatures. The same theistic theodicy is demonstrated by S. N. Dasgupta describing God`s cosmos-generic and cosmos-destroying function in Nyāya-Vaiċeşika: “Īçvara begins about this creation not for any selfish purpose but for the good of all beings” (Dasgupta 1975, 324). Also destroying the world to disintegrated atoms “is not an act of cruelty on the part of Īçvara, for he does it to give some rest to the sufferings of the living beings… He is like our father who is always engaged in doing us good” (Dasgupta 1975, 324; 326).

We can successfully display God`s immanence inside theistic framework through the third Udayana`s proof in NK (V. 4-5), that is ‘from support’ (dhŗtyādéḥ; dhŗti). The root of the word dhŗti links to ‘dharma’ (from the verb dhar — ‘to support’, ‘dharma’ — ‘what supports’) and relates to global foundation upon which all things depend. Here, Udayana cites many verses from çruti and smŗti where supporting Absolute Ātman-Brahman established, and the Naiyāyika interprets this Absolute in theistic way: Īçvara ontologically identical to Ātman-Brahman is that global sustainer. In order to demonstrate this argument in NK, Udayana insists on the fact that God penetrates the world, and we should show this in various translations having the same meaning. Kārikā NK. V. 4 shortly asserts that atoms (paramaņu) cannot move self-dependently because in this case they cease to be insentient matter. In auto-commentary on this kārikā, Udayana suggests the supportive function of Īçvara pointing out that all heavy things like a bird flying in the sky do not fall down only due to God`s caring volition. “Where the scriptures say that Indra, Yama and others sustain their respective world, there <according to Udayana,> it should be understood that God being immanent in them sustains the world… Otherwise God and the world being different, there cannot be identity relation between them” (Sinha 1999, 271-272). N. S. Dravid emphasizes another aspect when translating this part of Udayana`s auto-commentary on kārikā NK. V. 4: “because God pervades the being of all deities (Indra, Yama etc.) God is regarded as identical with them and so all these (and other entities too) are described as divine” (Udayana 1996, 407). Lower deities are here understood as lower demiurges (or, angels) controlled by Īçvara`s rule. This world full of dead matter is destructible, like cloth or rag, therefore it requires some enliven divine principle, — really, many theists will agree with this.

Now we are going to dwell on co-relation between faith and reason, scriptural and rational truths, immediate and mediated knowledge of God in Udayana`s NK.

Firstly, the title of this work translated by Macdonell as “Handful of Blossoms (on the Tree) of Nyāya” (Macdonell, 160) needs revising. ‘Blossoms’ and even ‘tree’ are here correctly associated with flourishing and rich stream or tree of Nyāya-Vaiċeşika theism, but how can one understand ‘handful of blossoms on the tree’? B. Sinha explains that the word ‘handful’ in the title is not occasional and directly refers to worshipping ceremony of offering flowers at a pair of the feet (padayuga) of Īçvara: handful of Nyāya inferential arguments (‘Nyāya-kusumāņjali’) as handful of flowers (kusumas) brought to God (NK. I. 1). “The word āņjali here stands for the treatise, Nyāya-kusumāņjali. Logical arguments are gathered and collected in the treatise just as flowers are gathered and collected within the folds of hand (with a view to offering at the feet of the Lord…)” (Sinha 1999, 3). Thus, Macdonell`s interpreting ‘tree’ in the title of the NK is redundant. We state that for Udayana there is a close connection between rational proofs of God`s existence and belief in God. In addition, the cycle composition of the NK with prayers to God at the beginning and the end indicates that connection.

Secondly, there is a question concerning subordination between scriptural4 revelation and inferential truths in NK, i.e. what is primarily and what is secondary? N. S. Dravid translates kārikā NK. I. 3 and Udayana`a auto-commentary as follows, “Yet this rational discussion about God is nothing other than God`s worship and such a worship follows (italics mine – E. A.) the study of scriptural texts about God from Çrutis, Smŗtirs, the epics… The Vedas also say that, first one should listen to texts and then think” (Udayana 1996, 4-5). Priority of the holy texts is evident: inferential arguments in favor of God`s existence are effective only after hearing (çruti) and Udayana does not deviate from this thesis in other parts of NK. Comparing himself with a bee flying over Nyāya flowers and drinking their mental nectar, the author of the NK (I. 1) is full of joy. Nevertheless, he is ready to devaluate his grandiose intellectual labor in case nobody will convert and then Udayana will bring his work like a sacrifice to the feet of Lord, who is ‘ocean of bliss’ (ananda-nidha) (NK. V. 19-20: concluding sentences). Udayana`s position resembles St. Augustin`s and Anselm`s (‘Augustin the second’) views in regard to uniting faith and reason with priority of faith — “I belief in order to understand”.

Thirdly, the structure of arguments in NK shows a balance among cosmological (1-3, 8) and scriptural/soteriological (4-7) arguments. First part of NK proofs does not refer exactly to Anselm`s ontological argument, but is nearer to Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition (natural theology) since these proofs start from causality, combination, supporting discovering in the world and thereof God`s activity infers. Visveswary accounts these Udayana`s proofs, especially the first one, as teleological and cosmological (Visveswary 1985, 163-164). According to Visveswary, the difference between NK and Western theism is that there is no such an idea of creation from nothing in Indian theism (Visveswary 1985, 163). 4-7 proofs describe the authoritativeness and the holiness of the Vedas as sources of all words, words` meanings, sentences, and therefore all skills, traditional arts and other forms of human activity. As far as these are reasonable proofs, we cannot refer them to supernatural theology, yet the NK V.16 where citations from holy texts confirm Īçvara`s existing has similarities with revealed theology. In the NK V. 18 Udayana is an advocate for intuitive contemplation of God: “Even those who oppose our proposition when start keenly reflecting on Thou at the time of misfortune Thou remove their doubts about Thy existence” (Sinha 1999, 342). Therefore, Thomistic harmony between faith and reason is not alien for Udayana.

At last, we agree that Udayana`s creativity, crystal logic, dialectics and methodology enrich theism, metaphysics, philosophy of religion and make “valuable contribution to rational theology” (Sinha 1999, xiii). As well as we agree that, “The Nyāya-kusumāņjali will remain one of the best works on theism in the whole of world literature…” (Visveswary 1985, 190).

4. Materials and Methods

Substantive materials are the works of Udayana and other representatives of Indian theism (Prašastapāda, Uddyotakara etc.) which became available in qualified English translations from Sanskrit based on traditional Indian learning and international standards of philosophy and humanities. For this reason, we have divided primarily sources (the works of medieval thinkers) and secondary sources (literature about Udayana, Indian theism, and so on) in the reference list. The used methods are analysis, comparison, and translation. The author of this article has confined to translating and rendering not so many Sanskrit terms when citing ancient Indian philosophers in order not to create linguistic difficulties for a wide range of readers. Both analytic and comparative methods are used to find common and specific features of Indian īçvara-vāda and theism in general.

5. Conclusions

Udayana`s works are a fundamental part of Indian theism — īçvara-vāda. Īçvara, a main category of the most theistic Indian school Nyāya-Vaiċeşika, is presented as personal God Demiurge, Supervisor, and Sustainer of the world, benevolent Guardian of all living beings. Udayana (X-XI cc.) was a brilliant philosopher of Indian theism who synthesized īçvara-vāda tradition, refuted the arguments of his opponents (nirīçvara-vādins) and demonstrated proofs of God`s existing in his work “Nyāya-kusumāņjali”. The eight famous Udayana`s arguments in favor of God`s existence have cosmological, ontological, scriptural/soteriological character. According to general theistic outlook, Udayana argues that God has a transcendent character as omniscient Producer and mental Super Cause of the world; and Udayana proves that Īçvara is immanent, intrinsic in the world (the third proof ‘from support’). The special thing about īçvara-vāda is that eternal atoms constitute material substrate of the universe which Īçvara wisely conjuncts and organizes. Contemporary scholars have only recently (end of XX c. - beginning of XXI c.) started studying the large and profound heritage of Indian theists and Udayana. Today we have qualified translations of the main Udayana`s works (by N. S. Dravid, B. Sinha) and works devoted to their research done by such scholars as K. Bulck, Vesveswary A., K. Chakrabarti and some others. Among the main theologian questions, they considered Udayana`s proofs of God`s existence, Udayana`s Critique of the Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness, co-relation between rational theology and revealed theology, Īçvara`s rule over karma etc. We have come to the conclusion that Udayana`s cosmological proofs of God`s existence are comparable with some postulates of Western ancient, medieval philosophy and Christian theology, precisely Thomism. However, most of the themes and issues regarding Udayana`s creativity have not been properly considered yet and require thorough research in future.