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Pricing the Value of Land: Ground Rent and the System of Housing Land Provision in Australia

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17 November 2026

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18 November 2026

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Abstract
Housing affordability has worsened in Australia, renewing interest in how land is valued and how land markets work. The standard valuation methods of hedonic pricing, mass appraisal and spatial econometrics treat housing land as a bundle of locational, structural and amenity attributes wherein price is set at market equilibrium, and in so doing they take the social relations of production giving rise to land prices as given. I set against them an approach that maps the provision of housing land as an interlocking, dynamic system of social relations, from production through distribution and exchange to consumption, and bring a theory of capitalist landed property to bear on it. Because official statistics are compiled in price categories rather than value categories, the method triangulates price series from the national accounts, valuers-general, the central bank and the tax authorities as proxies for the forms of ground rent. Taking Australia as a case study, I show that residential land values rose nineteen-fold between 1990 and 2025 while the annual rate of dwelling completions was little changed, and that ground rent is shared among landowners, lenders and the state. I close by setting out what such an approach offers for land market regulation, equity and spatial justice.
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1. Introduction

Housing affordability in Australia is now bound up with an entrenched and pervasive cost-of-living crisis, in which renters report “struggling with rental affordability and cost of living pressures” [1] (p. 1910). The National Housing Supply and Affordability Council reported that in 2024 “50 per cent of median household income was needed to meet repayments for the average new mortgage, while 33 per cent was needed to meet rental costs for the average new lease” [2] (p. 1). Explanations of this state of affairs converge on landed property. The Grattan Institute observes that across the developed world “land values have risen sharply over the past 30 years” and finds that in Australia “In 2016, land accounted for 70 per cent of the value of residential property, up from 50 per cent in 1990” [3] (p. 17), while Ryan-Collins and Murray observe that “The rise in Australian house prices has been driven by rising land values”, whereas “construction costs have grown at a rate closer to general price inflation” [1] (p. 1894). The question of how land is valued has therefore returned to the centre of policy debates about housing.
The standard methods of land valuation answer that question in the following specific ways. Hedonic pricing, mass appraisal and the spatial econometric models that extend them treat a dwelling and the land beneath it as a bundle of locational, structural and amenity attributes, each carrying an implicit price that is revealed at market equilibrium. These methods capture a great deal about how prices vary across space in time. What they cannot do is explain why land commands a price at all, since the social relations of ownership and control that imbue land with the power to yield a revenue to its owner and controller are taken as given before the estimation begins. The same limitation afflicts the more critical scholarship on rentier capitalism, which identifies rent with the absence of competition and so shares with valuation orthodoxy the assumption that rent is a deviation from a competitive norm.
This article sets against these approaches a framework that combines the systems of provision (SoP) approach with a theory of capitalist landed property (CLP). It maps the provision of housing land as an interlocking, dynamic system of social relations, from production through distribution and exchange to consumption, and asks how ground rent is generated, captured and contested across that system as a whole. The framework has been developed through studies of extractive industry and large-scale agriculture, beginning with the misappropriation of rents in the Australian mining boom [4] (p. 146). This article extends the analytical framework to consider housing. The key contention is that the social relations undergirding revenue in the form of ground rent condition what gets built, where, at what density and at what pace, as well as dividing the proceeds of dwellings once they are built, and that they bind landowners, lenders, developers and the state into a set of shared and competing claims on the social product.
The argument illumines a methodological problem that is also the article’s empirical contribution. Official statistics on land and housing are compiled in price categories. They record market valuations, transaction prices, assessed values, cash flows and tax receipts, none of which is organised around value-theoretic categories. In an earlier study of landed property and the functional distribution of income in Australia, I posed the question: “First, is it possible, empirically, to isolate the landed property share from the non-labour share in the national income?” [4] (p. 160). The answer offered here is that a set of price series compiled by different agencies can, read together, serve as triangulated proxies for the forms of ground rent and their distribution. Where the series diverge, the divergence is consistent with the argument that the value of land is imputed through the price form, although it may also reflect differences in coverage and method.
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the theoretical terrain: the distinction between competition-based and commodity-based rent, the theory of landed property immanent to historical materialism and the debates it provokes, the systems of provision approach, and the recent debate on residential accumulation. Section 3 describes the method of triangulation and the data. Section 4 presents the Australian case in six parts, from the property-rights regime through to the production of dwellings. Section 5 discusses what the analysis implies for the policy debate and for regulation, equity and spatial justice, and Section 6 offers concluding remarks to further complicate the issues this paper has raised.

2. Rent Theory and the Valuation of Housing Land

2.1. Competition-Based and Commodity-Based Rent

The hedonic method rests on a theory of equilibrium. In Rosen’s foundational formulation, “Hedonic prices are defined as the implicit prices of attributes and are revealed to economic agents from observed prices of differentiated products and the specific amounts of characteristics associated with them” [5] (p. 34). The theory presupposes competition: “Competition prevails because single agents add zero weight to the market and treat prices p(z) as parametric to their decisions” [5] (p. 35). Applied to housing, the method treats the dwelling as “a bundle of characteristics such as size, quality and location”, and “The regression estimates give the implicit prices of each variable or characteristic” [6] (pp. 3–4). As Sirmans and colleagues summarise the literature, the model “assumes that consumers derive utility (and therefore value) from various housing characteristics and that the value of this utility can be priced” [6] (p. 4).
Mass appraisal, the practice by which assessing authorities value large numbers of properties for ad valorem taxation, has absorbed the same method. McCluskey and colleagues note that “Hedonic modelling or regression analysis is today the widely accepted or orthodox technique applied within the ad valorem assessment process”, and that “The basic objective of MRA is to develop a strong predictive relationship between property characteristics and value, so that the latter can be estimated through knowledge of the former (IAAO, 2011)” [7] (p. 246). The standard of success is practical: “predictive accuracy is of fundamental importance when evaluating modelling approaches from an industry perspective” [7] (p. 259). Spatial econometrics extends rather than replaces this procedure: “Global spatial models are usually an improved form of the traditional hedonic model (Anselin, 1998; Can, 1992). A plethora of spatial studies have incorporated an expansive array of spatial effects to account for location in hedonic price modelling” [7] (p. 241). Value, in this procedure, is whatever the characteristics of a property predict about its price.
Fine identified the theoretical consequences of this conceptual framing four decades ago. “For neoclassical economics, rent theory either dissolves in general equilibrium theory or is restored by the restrictions involved in moving to partial equilibrium” [8] (p. 132). Marginalism, he argues, “can only restore a theory of rent in the framework of partial equilibrium and in general by allowing some physical attribute of land to stand as a proxy for the social relations of ownership” [8] (p. 142). This describes hedonic valuation precisely. Location, lot size and amenity enter the regression as physical attributes, and the relation of ownership that allows those attributes to command a payment is represented through them only. Harvey’s critique of neoclassical urban land-use theory makes the same point from a different angle, observing that Alonso, Beckmann, Mills and Muth “presume utility-maximizing behaviour on the part of individuals” in order to derive “equilibrium conditions in the urban housing market—conditions which are held to be Pareto optimal” [9] (p. 161).
In earlier work I proposed a distinction that clarifies what is at stake [10]. In the competition-based approach, “rent arises during the process of exchange and can be identified through the formation of prices. Indeed, according to this approach, rent itself is determined by price” [10] (p. 69). Here “the degree of competition in the market not only determines the level of rent but is the very basis for it” [10] (p. 69). Commodity-based rent, by contrast, “refers to the fact that the rental payment for the use of a resource is a function of the commodity”, where “The basis of rent for this commodity is its material character but the reason that it produces rent for its owner at all is due to the system of property rights within which its ownership, control, exchange and consumption is determined” [10] (p. 71). Hedonic pricing and mass appraisal are quintessential expressions of competition-based rent theory. They estimate the implicit prices of attributes on the assumption that competition among buyers is what determines them.
The same distinction applies to the critical literature on rentier capitalism, which has done much to restore rent to the centre of political economic analysis. Christophers defines rent as “income derived from the ownership, possession or control of scarce assets under conditions of limited or no competition” [11] (p. xxiv), and locates the problem of rent in the rentier’s freedom from competition: “Rentierism is problematic, I argue, specifically insofar as it operates entirely or largely free of competitive constraint. That is to say, the rentier, by her very nature, enjoys monopoly power” [12] (p. 305). On this account, “Rent remains, by this expanded understanding, payment to monopoly control of an asset, but the asset need not be land” [12] (p. 306). As I have argued elsewhere, this literature displays “a wholehearted consensus that rent is synonymous with what the marginalists called ‘economic rent’. This supple concept of rent is ostensibly a function of competition in markets. Herein lies the problem” [13] (p. 50). The rentier capitalism literature and valuation orthodoxy therefore rest on the same premise. Both identify rent against a competitive ideal, and they differ only on whether that counterfactual obtains. The first finds rent wherever competition is absent, the second prices land as if competition were complete, and neither grounds rent in the historically specific social relations of landed property.
Rent grounded in those relations is a claim on value produced elsewhere. In his exchange with Christophers, Fine insists that rental payments do not mean “land or housing produces value”, and that “finance does not produce value even though it receives it as a surplus. The same is true of profits and rents but the forms and mechanisms are different” [14] (p. 20). He warns against accounts in which “the myriad of factors that affect price then become contributors to value in their own right”, so that “Value and price become synonymous and so value is not needed at all” [14] (p. 20). Birch reaches a related conclusion from science and technology studies, treating rentiership “as a social process and practice rather than a distortion of an idealized and naturalized political-economic process or logic” [15] (p. 13), and Andreucci and colleagues define rent as “both a social relation and a distributional process” [16] (p. 28). Christophers himself concedes that “land is arguably the rentier asset par excellence” [17] (p. 73), and, summarising his critics, accepts that land rent can be understood “as a dominant expression of the particular way in which societies organize people’s relationship to the land and – through the land – to one another under Western capitalism” [17] (p. 73). What remains is to specify the social relations themselves. For land, that relation is its commodified form, capitalist landed property. It also follows that the hedonic procedure of decomposing a price into the contributions of its attributes has no counterpart in the rent relation. As Fine observes of housing rents, the forms of rent “cannot be readily unbundled with any precision since rent is a single payment, and not distinguished in practice by its constituent parts” [18] (p. 457). Two senses of monopoly need to be kept apart here. Marx’s notion of landed property is, among other things, a juridical monopoly over portions of the globe [19] (p. 752), and it conditions rent whatever the degree of competition in the markets where land and its products are exchanged. The rentier capitalism literature means by monopoly the absence of competition in those markets.

2.2. Landed Property and Ground Rent

Marx’s treatment of ground rent begins from the social relations through which land is rendered accessible in the capitalist mode of production. “Landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy the monopoly of disposing of particular portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their private will to the exclusion of all others” [19] (p. 752). The legal title alone is inert: “The use of this power depends entirely on economic conditions, which are independent of their wills” [19] (p. 753). Ground rent is “the form in which landed property is economically realized, valorized” [19] (p. 756), and the price of land follows from it: “The price of land is nothing but the capitalized and thus anticipated rent” [19] (p. 944). Marx treats this price as a peculiar category. “It is the ground-rent as capitalized in this way that forms the purchase price or value of the land, a category that is prima facie irrational, in the same way that the price of labour is irrational, since the earth is not the product of labour, and thus does not have a value. On the other hand, however, this irrational form conceals a genuine relation of production” [19] (p. 760). Two consequences follow for the analysis of land prices. First, the price of land moves with the rate of interest as well as with rent: “once the ground-rent is given, the price of land is governed by the rate of interest. If this is low, the price of land is high, and vice versa” [19] (p. 947). Second, the price anticipates future rent: “As soon as land is sold, it is sold as rent-bearing” [19] (p. 807). In contemporary terms, Fine notes, “the price of land, as well- and long-recognised, is the securitized value of the streams of rents that it (potentially) generates, and which can then be traded as fictitious capital” [18] (p. 454). Marx also noted the specific features of rent on urban building land, characterised “first by the preponderant influence that location exerts here on the differential rent (very important, for example, in the case of vineyards, and building land in big towns) ; secondly, by the palpable and complete passivity displayed by the owner, whose activity consists simply in exploiting advances in social development” [19] (p. 908).
The revival of Marxian rent theory in the 1970s, when, as Haila puts it, “rent was regarded as the economic expression of landed property” [20] (p. 280), turned on how far these categories could be generalised. In an exchange in Economy and Society, Fine argued that “Marx’s starting point then is the existence of landed property as a specific means by which surplus value can be appropriated in the form of rent” [21] (p. 248), and that “Just as these conditions differ so the effects of landed property differ. There is therefore no general theory of rent” [21] (p. 248). Ball, in reply, agreed that “land does not produce value; its ownership only enables landed property to appropriate surplus value in the form of rent” [22] (p. 304), but charged that Fine’s treatment of the second form of differential rent reproduced a marginal-capital logic in which “class relations, which should be central to a Marxist theory of rent, have to be imposed upon a theory of rent which relies only upon technical conditions (differing marginal productivities) for its existence” [22] (p. 314). Fine rejected the charge, noting that it was Ball’s intention to show “the logic of my position is Ricardian” [23] (p. 327), while setting out the common ground: “there can be no general theory of rent (or agricultural rent) as, for example, in neoclassical theory where the structure of rents emerges from technical and market conditions and rents are appropriated by those who happen to own the land” [23] (p. 327), and landed property acts as a barrier to accumulation “so that rent cannot be seen solely or even primarily as a distributional relation” [23] (p. 327). The point of departure for rent theory, Fine concluded, “must be those relations which make such interventions possible and significant” [23] (p. 330).
The urban literature subsequently took up the problem. Harvey defined class-monopoly rent as “any situation in which the rate of return to a class of providers of an urban resource (such as housing) is set by the outcome of conflict with a class of consumers of that resource” [24] (p. 239), and later identified in land markets “the increasing tendency to treat the land as a pure financial asset” [25] (p. 347). Under such conditions, “what is traded is a claim upon future revenues, which means a claim upon future profits from the use of the land or, more directly, a claim upon future labour” [25] (p. 347). For Harvey, “What is bought and sold is not the land, but title to the ground-rent yielded by it” [25] (p. 367), and “Capitalism cannot do without land price and land markets as basic co-ordinating devices in the allocation of land to uses” [25] (p. 371). Haila reconstructed this line as a theory of the coordinating role of expected rent, glossing Harvey’s position as holding that “The price of land envelopes a relationship between rent and interest” [20] (p. 288) and that “It is expected rents that coordinate land uses” [20] (p. 289). Ward and Aalbers add the necessary qualification that the treatment of land as a financial asset is itself an achievement: “it takes a complex set of institutional, regulatory, socio-cultural, calculative and political practices to make it so” [26] (p. 1773).
Ball draws different conclusions from these debates. He argues that “the ambiguous theoretical status of urban land rent stems from an overemphasis in the rent literature on the distributional implications of rent mechanisms at the expense of their potential influence on the social relations of building provision” [27] (p. 503), and that the role of rent “is more likely to be found through examining rent as one mechanism within historically determinate structures of building provision, than as the market clearing price in a separable urban land market” [27] (p. 504). His work on structures of housing provision is an acknowledged antecedent of the systems of provision approach [28] (p. 9), and it sought, in Aalbers and Christophers’s words, “to break away from Marxian productionism” [29] (p. 374). The framework used here, however, derives from Fine’s systems of provision rather than from Ball’s structures of housing provision. The distinction is an important one. Moreno Zacarés, who is sympathetic to Ball, nonetheless describes his later trajectory as an “abandonment of rent theory and his departure from Marxism” [30] (p. 59). The systems of provision approach retains value theory and treats provision as the terrain on which value is produced, appropriated and contested. My own earlier formulation of the relation between rent and landed property stated the premise precisely as such: “the generation and distribution of rents presupposes a system of property rights” [31] (p. 154), so that “The character of the system of landed property, however, must therefore condition the magnitude, flows and recipients of rent” [31] (p. 154).

2.3. Systems of Provision and Material Cultures

The systems of provision (SoP) approach “sees consumption of particular commodities as a component of an integrated ‘vertical’ system, relating to the particular item of consumption under consideration, linked to processes of production, distribution and exchange (and sometimes disposal) as well as to ‘horizontal’ socio-economic variables such as income and gender” [28] (p. 2). Systems of provision are “defined in terms of the structures, agents, processes and relations that characterise the entire chain of provision underpinning particular commodities” [32] (p. 362). Bayliss and Fine use housing to illustrate the structural dimension, noting that “different forms of housing tenure (owner-occupied, private rental, social housing) combine with social structures to lead to social outcomes which might take the form of inequalities in levels of, and access to, housing” [28] (p. vii).
The approach also attends to the material cultures attached to provision. “There is an intimate, integral two-way relationship between material provisioning and material cultures (and varieties of discourses) attached to SoPs, with each conditioning the other” [28] (p. 62). Fine sets out the ten attributes of these cultures, which are “Constructed, Construed, Conforming, Commodified, Contextual, Contradictory, Closed, Contested, Collective and Chaotic” [33] (p. 371), and Bayliss and Fine give owner-occupation as an example of how control over material culture shapes a system of provision, citing “the construction of owner-occupation as the ideal form of housing” [28] (p. viii). Robertson, for whom “mortgage-dependent owner-occupation” is “the quintessential feature of financialised housing provision”, finds in the United Kingdom a contradictory culture in which “the extrinsic value of generating capital gains co-exists with the way in which the home is valued for its intrinsic properties as a site of constancy and safety” [34] (pp. 399, 407).
This is where material culture plays a substantive role in the formation of land prices. The valuation of land is a practice as well as a calculation. Smith, Munro and Christie show that housing markets “are variously performed in the power-filled negotiations of buyers, sellers and market professionals” [35] (p. 81), and that in a rising market “surveyors found it as difficult as anyone else to attach values to properties, caught as they were between lending institutions (looking for a sound investment), buyers (looking for higher loans to compete in a rising market) and local comparators (yielding sale prices that might have been the product of a single, anomalously high bid)” [35] (p. 91). Bourdieu’s study of the French housing market makes the state central to this construction. The market in single-family houses is “the product of a twofold social construction to which the state contributes crucially” [36] (p. 16), and the dwelling is at once a consumer good and “an ‘investment’ in the sense of being a non-financial form of saving and an investment good, and as such is expected to retain or enhance its value” [36] (p. 19). The expectation that the home will appreciate is part of what gives it its price, and that expectation is itself formed within the system of provision.

2.4. Residential Accumulation and the Rentierisation of Australian Housing

The nearest relative of the framework used here is Moreno Zacarés’s account of residential accumulation, a concept that “condenses how housing provision under capitalism is caught between two forms of profit-making with opposing dynamics: rent extraction and capitalist production” [37] (p. 6). His framework analyses “the different stages of capitalist housing provision, from the point of production all the way down to the household as a site of consumption and social reproduction” [37] (p. 6), and it distinguishes land rent from building rent and holds that the “combination of these rent streams forms the substance of house rent” [37] (p. 8). It identifies the paradox that “capitalist housing production pivots around, and is ultimately animated by, the prospect of house-rent extraction” [37] (p. 8). Moreno Zacarés describes his concept of residential social-property relations as “my own attempt to make Michael Ball Marxist again” [30] (p. 59).
The responses to the framework show how quickly the debate returns to the competition-based view. Ball replies that “Competing uses for finite quantities of land, not monopoly itself, determine rents in urban contexts as well as elsewhere” [38] (p. 29), and the editor of the exchange frames the dispute as a choice between “rapacious rentiers” and “simply a lack of supply” [39] (p. 2). Moreno Zacarés, for his part, holds that “the type of rent that housing assets yield is primarily ‘monopoly rent’: rent afforded by a landed asset simply on account of the capacity and a willingness of a consumer to pay for it” [30] (p. 57). Fine reaches a similar conclusion, deducing that “the vast majority of housing rents derive from MR” [18] (p. 457), that is, from monopoly rent. The issue at stake here though is what conditions and constitutes that monopoly. In the Marxian sense monopoly rent presupposes landed property and, like rent in general, is paid out of value produced elsewhere, rent being “in effect, a transfer payment” in Harvey’s estimation [24] (p. 240); in the rentier capitalism literature monopoly means the absence of competition. Ball’s position and the rentier reading of monopoly rent both locate rent in the market for the finished dwelling. Tapp objects that owner-occupied dwellings are not priced as income-bearing assets at all: “The valuation, and subsequent price, are not based on the expected income from the property (again, because most personal homes don’t generate income)” [40] (p. 35). Valuation by comparable sales, however, reproduces in each transaction the capitalised rent embodied in the prices of neighbouring properties, and it leaves the owner-occupier’s imputed rent in place. Ward’s response spotlights what is missing, observing that “land is valued according to future rents but bought in lump sums up front, so that potential future rents must be capitalized as present value through borrowing” [41] (p. 43). The framework advanced here grounds residential accumulation by specifying where exactly in the system of provision rent is produced and by whom it is appropriated. Monopoly rent in housing, on this reading, is one moment in a system wherein other moments include the capitalisation of expected rent into land prices, the division of rent with lending capital and the state, and the conditioning of production by the prospect of rent.
In the Australian literature, Ryan-Collins and Murray define rentierisation as “a broad shift in both policy, and in market and household behaviour, towards the treatment of housing as a source of economic rent extraction rather than a source of (affordable) shelter and security” [1] (p. 1889), with three features: “the dominance of private landed home ownership as the preferred form of tenure” [1] (p. 1892), “a liberalized financial system where a large proportion (if not a majority) of bank lending supports the purchase of existing property”, and “a tax regime that favours landed property both as a form of tenure and as a financial asset” [1] (p. 1893). The asset-economy literature adds the class dimension. Adkins, Cooper and Konings begin from the observation that “the past decades have seen a dramatic growth of property prices in a context where wages have, by and large, stagnated” [42] (p. 549), and Marsh and Stilwell stress that the value of residential property, “particularly its land component, varies so much between different places” [43] (p. 83). These accounts identify key features of the Australian system. What the framework used here adds is an account of why these features cohere: each is a moment in the production, capture and contestation of ground rent across a single system of provision, grounded in a historically specific form of landed property.

3. Materials and Methods

The method has two parts. The first is the systems of provision framework conditioned by a theory of capitalist landed property, referred to here as SoP-CLP. It identifies the agents, structures, processes, relations and material cultures that constitute the provision of housing land in Australia, and it asks at each node how ground rent is produced, captured and contested. The second part is a method of triangulation designed to overcome a limitation of the available data.
The official statistics on Australian land and housing are compiled in price categories. The national accounts estimate the value of land by land use and state; the valuers-general produce statutory land values for rating and taxation; the central bank publishes household balance sheets, loan payments and lending rates; the tax authority records rental income and deductions; and the statistical agency records tax revenue, construction prices and dwelling completions. None of these series measures ground rent or its distribution directly because none is organised around value-theoretic categories. Each series is therefore read here as a proxy for a category of the analysis, and each category is approached through more than one series so that the proxies can be checked against one another. Table 1 sets out the correspondence.
The data were taken from the latest releases available at the time of writing: the Australian System of National Accounts for 2024–25 [44,45,46]; Total Value of Dwellings for the June quarter 2026 [47]; Producer Price Indexes for June 2026 [48]; Building Activity for March 2026 [49]; Taxation Revenue for 2024–25 [50]; Reserve Bank of Australia statistical tables E2, E13 and F6 [51,52,53]; Taxation Statistics 2023–24 [54]; the NSW Valuer General’s reports on land values at 1 July 2024 and 1 July 2025 [55,56]; the Victorian property sales report time series for 2014–2024 [57]; and the Treasury’s Tax Expenditures and Insights Statement for 2025–26 [58]. Ratios and multiples reported in Section 4 were calculated by the author from these series.
Three limits of the data should be stated at the outset. First, statutory land values are compiled under each state’s own legislation, so state figures are compared as movements within a state rather than as levels across states. Second, the tax statistics on rental income are reported by rental property schedule in one table and by individual in another, and neither counts properties; the Australian Taxation Office notes that its data are “at the rental property schedule level, and is not representative of the total number of properties, or the total number of individuals with a rental property” [59], and that the most recent year’s statistics are not necessarily complete. Third, the Victorian comparison of vacant land and house prices by suburb compares medians of different sets of lots, so it indicates the direction of movement in the land share of prices rather than its level.

4. Results: The System of Housing Land Provision in Australia

4.1. The Property-Rights Regime

Every land price in Australia rests on an act of violent dispossession in service of the extirpation of those who inhabited the continent prior to 1788. “The British treated Australia as terra nullius—as unowned land. Under British colonial law, aboriginal Australians had no property rights in the land, and colonization accordingly vested ownership of the entire continent in the British government” [60] (p. 95). The doctrine “remained the law in Australia throughout the colonial period, and indeed right up to 1992” [60] (p. 95), and in the nineteenth century it could not easily be reversed, because “The number of landowners in Australia was steadily increasing, and all of them—every single one—depended on terra nullius for the security of their title” [60] (p. 130). Wolfe’s account of settler colonialism identifies the logic at work: “Territoriality is settler colonialism’s specific, irreducible element”, and among its outcomes is “the breaking-down of native title into alienable individual freeholds” [61] (p. 388). Settler society, he writes, “required the practical elimination of the natives in order to establish itself on their territory” [61] (p. 389). The historiography of the settler colony has long obscured the connection between dispossession and development, a connection Stanner described, in a passage quoted by Clark, as “more than an accidental correspondence between the ruin of Aboriginal, and the making of European, life in Australia. There was, in fact, a functional concomitance” [62] (p. 69).
The Crown’s original ownership made the colonial state the first landowner and therefore also the first entity to establish a market for land. Banner notes that in the nineteenth century recognising Indigenous title would have deprived the government of “what was anticipated to be a major source of revenue, the sale and lease of Crown land” [60] (p. 130), and Lloyd characterises the first regime of accumulation in New South Wales, from 1815 to 1840, by the “central role of the state in the undeveloped land market with a mixture of state grants and sales, and growing illegal squatting” [63] (p. 45). The distribution of that land was itself fought out between fractions of property owners. Baker describes the conflict behind the Robertson Land Acts of 1861 as a class war “not simply between rich and poor, but rather between pastoral wealth and bourgeois wealth” [64] (p. 166), at a time when in New South Wales “the squatters held a little over seventy million acres and paid about two-thirds of a farthing per acre in rent” [64] (p. 169). The modern system of housing land provision, with its statutory valuations and state land taxes, is built on this foundation and, arguably, has inherited logics of violent class antagonisms. The capacity of land to command a price in Australia is, in the first instance, a legacy of the dispossession of its Indigenous owners and of the Crown’s claim to all land, and that capacity has been reproduced in every subsequent sale.

4.2. The Magnitude of Capitalised Ground Rent

The national accounts estimate the value of land separately from the value of the structures upon it, and they provide the broadest proxy for capitalised ground rent. At 30 June 2025 the value of all land in Australia was estimated at $10,373.6 billion, of which residential land accounted for $8,316.8 billion [44]. Table 2 sets out the movement of the main series since 1990.
Three features of Table 2 bear on the argument. First, the value of residential land rose from $432.8 billion in 1990 to $8,316.8 billion in 2025, a nineteen-fold increase, while compensation of employees rose less than seven-fold over the same period [44,46]. The value of residential land was a little over twice annual compensation of employees in 1990 and more than six times it in 2025. Second, land accounted for a rising share of the combined value of household land and dwellings, from 56.2 per cent in 1990 to 73.9 per cent in 2025 [45]. This series is consistent with the Grattan Institute’s estimate, which is drawn from the same national accounts, that land accounted for 70 per cent of the value of residential property in 2016 [3] (p. 17), and with the finding of Kohler and van der Merwe that “housing prices have increased by a considerably faster pace than even the value of new dwellings, which include the costs of quality improvements of housing over time” [65] (p. 23). Third, the ratio of the gross operating surplus of dwellings to the value of household land and dwellings, which serves as an implied gross yield, fell from 3.14 per cent in 1990 to 1.94 per cent in 2025 [45,46]. The price of land has risen much faster than the flow of housing income that it is supposed to capitalise, a point taken up in Section 4.3.
The statutory valuations of the states provide a second official measure of the same category of land. The NSW Valuer General defines land value as “the market value of the land only, as if it had sold on 1 July in the valuing year. It does not include the value of buildings or other structures” [55] (p. 9). At 1 July 2025 the total value of residential land in New South Wales was $2,369,598,471,154, an increase of 4.2 per cent on the previous year’s total as restated in the 2025 register [56]. The national accounts put residential land in New South Wales at $3,170.4 billion at 30 June 2025 [44], about one third higher than the statutory valuation of the same category of land one day later. A gap of the same proportion appears in 2024, when the national accounts figure was $3,019.4 billion [44] and the Valuer General reported that residential land values had increased “from $2.11 trillion to $2.27 trillion” [55] (p. 6). The two official estimates of the value of residential land in one state differ by around $800 billion in 2025 and around $750 billion in 2024. The two estimates may differ in coverage, for instance in their treatment of Crown land and other land that is not rated, and in method, and the gap may owe much to those differences. It is nonetheless consistent with the argument advanced here. Land value is an imputed magnitude, the product of a method of valuation, and the statutory method is explicitly one of imputation: “Representative properties (known as benchmarks) are selected from each component and valued as at 1 July each year. This shows how much the land value has changed in the past year. This change is applied to most properties in the component to work out their new values” [55] (p. 11). The Queensland Valuer-General describes the same practice in its own terms: “valuers do not set the market, they interpret market evidence and valuations are representative of that evidence” [66].
A third proxy comes from transaction prices. In the 168 Victorian suburbs for which both a median vacant land price and a median house price are recorded for 2014 and 2024, the median ratio of vacant land price to house price rose from 0.451 to 0.512, and the vacant land price rose faster than the house price in 70.8 per cent of those suburbs [57]. Kendall and Tulip’s decomposition of Sydney prices, in a Reserve Bank research paper, is consistent with this: “the average Sydney house, valued at $1.16 million in 2016, represents a $395 000 structure on a $765 000 block of land” [67] (p. 1). The national accounts, the statutory valuations, the transaction data and the Reserve Bank research agree that the land component dominates the price of housing, and the national accounts and the transaction data show that its share has grown.

4.3. The Rent Flow and Its Division with Interest-Bearing Capital

Engels observed in The Housing Question (1872) that the rent of a dwelling “must also pay interest on the increased value of the land upon which the building is erected and that therefore a part of it consists of ground rent” [68] (p. 19). If the price of land is capitalised rent, the flow of rent should bear some relation to the price. The national accounts record the gross operating surplus of dwellings owned by persons, the income generated by the household housing stock, including the imputed rents of owner-occupiers [1] (p. 1895). In 2024–25 this surplus was $229.3 billion [46]. Against household land and dwellings valued at $11,816.1 billion at 30 June 2025 [45], it represents an implied gross yield of 1.94 per cent. The denominator includes all land held by households, some of it non-residential; measured against residential land and household dwellings instead, the yield is 2.01 per cent, and the direction of change since 1990 is the same. In June 2025 the average interest rate on outstanding owner-occupier housing loans was 5.76 per cent, and on outstanding investor loans 6.02 per cent [53]. The current flow of housing income, capitalised at the prevailing rate of interest on the credit that finances its purchase, would support a price for land and dwellings well below the price actually paid. Haila’s observation that “The value of land is extremely susceptible to changes in interest rate” [69] (p. 94) is apt: a fall in interest rates raises the price at which a given rent is capitalised, and a rise in interest rates raises the share of the rent that passes to lenders.
The gap between the two is the space occupied by anticipated rent. Marx’s observation that land is “sold as rent-bearing, and the prospective character of the rent (which is considered here as the fruit of the soil, something that it is only in surface appearance) does not distinguish the uncultivated land from the cultivated” [19] (p. 807) is apposite in this regard. The price of Australian residential land capitalises an expected increase in rent, or, which amounts to the same thing for the owner, an expected increase in the price of land itself. This is the material basis of what Adkins, Cooper and Konings describe as valuations “heavily bound up not with a sense of ‘fundamentals’ but with what people think others will be willing to pay for it in the future” [42] (p. 552). The price is a claim on future rent, and, as Harvey puts it, “a claim upon future labour” [25] (p. 347).
The rent that is realised is thereby divided. For owner-occupiers, the imputed rent is derived through the national accounts and the interest they pay is a claim on their wages; the series below are proxies, measuring the claims of lenders on housing income in price terms. The national accounts record household interest payable on dwellings of $125.0 billion in 2024–25, equivalent to 54.5 per cent of the gross operating surplus of dwellings [46]. The Reserve Bank’s independent series of interest charged on housing loans, compiled from lender data, sums to $120.0 billion over the four quarters to June 2025, of which $80.3 billion was charged on owner-occupier loans and $39.7 billion on investor loans [52]. The two measures are about 4 per cent apart. In 2024–25 more than half of the housing income recorded in the national accounts was paid to lenders as interest. The share has moved with interest rates, from 43.8 per cent in 1989–90 to 33.2 per cent in 2019–20 and 54.5 per cent in 2024–25 (Table 2), while the debt on which it is charged has grown relative to incomes. Housing debt rose from 31.6 per cent of household disposable income in June 1990 to 132.1 per cent in June 2025 [51], and Ryan-Collins and Murray report outstanding mortgage loans “having risen from less than 15% of GDP in 1990 to over 80% today” [1] (p. 1899).
The tax statistics of landlords confirm the division from another vantage point. In 2023–24 individuals lodged 3,403,238 rental property schedules, reporting gross rent of $61.4 billion, interest deductions of $32.0 billion, land tax of $2.5 billion and council rates of $4.3 billion [54]. Interest absorbed 52.1 per cent of gross rent. Taken together, the schedules showed a net rental loss of $2.7 billion, after deductions that included $4.6 billion of capital works deductions and $2.4 billion of capital allowances, neither of which is a cash outlay, and 52.4 per cent of schedules reported a loss [54]. Interest, land tax and council rates alone absorbed 63 per cent of gross rent. Of the 2,335,540 individuals with an interest in a rental property in 2023–24, 1,266,454, or 54.2 per cent, had an overall net rental loss [59]. Treasury reports that of those with rental deductions in 2022–23, “49 per cent (1.2 million) had a rental loss, known as negative gearing, which added up to total rental losses of $11.0 billion. These rental losses provided a tax benefit of around $3.9 billion in 2022–23” [58] (p. 42). Most of the rent that landlords collect passes to lenders and the state, and for most landlords the return on the property depends on a capital gain on sale, which is, in other words, capitalised rent.

4.4. The State’s Share

The state is a co-proprietor of ground rent in Australia, both through what it takes and through what it declines to take. In 2024–25 the states and local governments raised $20.0 billion in land taxes, $25.1 billion in municipal rates and $34.4 billion in stamp duties on conveyances [50]. These three taxes on property and its transfer amounted to $79.6 billion, or close to half of all state and local taxation [50]. They are nonetheless small against the capitalised rent on which they fall. The increase in the value of all land in Australia in the year to June 2025 alone was $597.2 billion [44], seven and a half times the combined yield of these taxes in the same year.
The composition of the state’s share is shaped by the exemption of owner-occupiers. The Henry Review found that “The exemption of owner-occupiers rules out around 75 per cent of residential land and, for the remainder, high thresholds in some States effectively exempt many small-scale investors” [70] (p. 261), and the Grattan Institute estimated that as a result “state government budgets forgo about $7 billion a year in revenue” [3] (p. 36). The Commonwealth forgoes much more through the capital gains tax. In the Treasury’s estimates of revenue forgone in 2025–26, the discount component of the main residence exemption, at $32,000 million, is the largest item in its table of large tax expenditures and deductions; the main residence exemption is listed separately at a further $28,000 million, rental deductions at $29,200 million, and the capital gains discount for individuals and trusts at $21,790 million [58] (p. 5). The capital gains discount, which applies to gains on all assets, property among them, is highly concentrated: in 2022–23, “Around 95 per cent of the benefit was received by people with above median income, with around 83 per cent of the benefit received by people in the top income decile” [58] (p. 19). Treasury’s own benchmark also excludes the imputed rent of owner-occupiers from income altogether [58] (p. 205), so the rent that owner-occupiers enjoy in kind lies outside even the measured tax expenditures.
The Henry Review defined the object of land taxation in competition-based terms. “Economic rent is the return to the owner above that needed to keep the land in its current use. That is, it is the return once the owner has been compensated for the capital and labour they employ on the land. Economic rent therefore flows from the efforts of others, or simple luck” [70] (p. 249). On this definition the case for land tax rests on efficiency: “Land is an efficient tax base because it is immobile” [70] (p. 247). The Review nonetheless recognised the social character of the base when it observed that “By levying a land tax, the community effectively shares in the benefit that would otherwise flow to the landowner” [70] (p. 250). The Australian tax system, however, is geared to function against that principle. The states take their share of ground rent mainly at the point of sale, through conveyance duties that raised $34.4 billion in 2024–25 against $20.0 billion from land taxes [50], and through a land tax from which owner-occupiers are exempt [70] (p. 261). The largest share of residential rent, that accruing to owner-occupiers, is left with them. It escapes land tax; the main residence exemption from capital gains tax shelters its capitalisation into rising prices, and Treasury’s estimates for that exemption’s two components sum to $60 billion in revenue forgone in 2025–26 [58] (p. 5); and the rent itself goes untaxed, because imputed rent is excluded from income [58] (p. 205). The community shares least in the rent where the rent is largest.

4.5. Landed Property as a Foundation for Class?

Landed property in Australia is widely held, including by the 2.3 million individuals who hold an interest in a rental property [59], and this is central to the political durability of current arrangements. Harvey observed that “Any agent who controls land is in a position to use that land as a pure financial asset, to speculate in land price and to appropriate rent. If workers own small plots of land and the property thereon, they can just as well play this game as anyone else” [71] (p. 24), and that the preservation of private property in land “performs an ideological and legitimizing function for all forms of private property; hence, some would argue, the importance of conferring privileges of home ownership (possession of a means of consumption) upon the working class” [25] (p. 360). The Australian system of provision gives this function a mass base, while the distribution of the gains is highly unequal. Adkins, Cooper and Konings report, in their study of Sydney, that “Between 1999 and 2019, wages grew by an annual average of 3.10%, while property prices grew by an annual average of 7.55% (ABS)” [42] (p. 552), and Ryan-Collins and Murray found that “Prior to June 2019, in 16 of the previous 29 quarters (55% of the time) we find that the median Sydney home earnt more than the median full-time worker” [1] (p. 1896). The ratio of housing assets to household disposable income rose from 274.0 per cent in June 1990 to 601.5 per cent in June 2025 [51].
The class character of landed property is therefore visible in the distribution of the rent more clearly than in the distribution of title. The concentration of capital gains concessions, which extend to property among other assets, in the top income decile, the 3.4 million rental property schedules lodged by individuals, and the share of rent that passes to lenders describe a hierarchy of claims on the same stream of capitalised rent. Ball’s observation, made of producers who own their land, that “As the purchase price of land is based on the rental flow, the main effects of rent will still be operative” [72] (p. 399), applies with qualification to Australian owner-occupiers. Owner-occupiers with mortgages share their imputed rent with lenders; investors share their gross rent with lenders and the state and look to the capital gain for their return; outright owners retain the rent, net of rates, and the gain. My earlier observation that the rising cost of land for housing, “In conjunction with wage stagnation, this has meant that home ownership is increasingly concentrated in fewer hands” [4] (p. 159), can now be restated in terms of the rent relation. The widening gap between the price of land and the wage transfers social product from those who must buy access to land to those who already hold it.

4.6. Rent and the Production of Dwellings

A central implication of the SoP-CLP framework is that rent conditions production. Fine argued in the agricultural case that rents “modify the structure of capital accumulation on the land” [21] (p. 256), and Ball noted that builders “try to organise their operations in ways that avoid the gain being syphoned-off in higher land prices, for example, through costly land banking” [73] (p. 153). The Australian evidence is consistent with this. Dwelling completions totalled 162,046 in 1989–90, itself a cyclical high, and 175,510 in 2024–25, below the peak of 219,052 in 2016–17 [49], a peak the National Housing Supply and Affordability Council also records as “219,000 in 2016–17” [2] (p. 32). Over thirty-five years in which the value of residential land rose nineteen-fold [44], the annual rate of dwelling production rose by 8.3 per cent. The capitalised value of land has grown out of all proportion to the rate at which the dwellings that give it a use are produced.
The gap between the prices of established houses and the prices of building them is a residual proxy for the growth of capitalised ground rent. Between the June quarter of 2002 and the June quarter of 2026, the median price of established houses rose 3.78 times in Sydney, 3.27 times in Melbourne, 6.33 times in Brisbane, 5.32 times in Perth and 5.57 times in Adelaide [47]. Over the same period the output price index for house construction rose 2.60 times in New South Wales, 2.18 times in Victoria, 3.12 times in Queensland, 4.02 times in Western Australia and 2.45 times in South Australia [48]. Table 3 sets out the comparison. In every city the median price of established houses rose faster than the output price of new house construction. Productivity in housing construction has been poor: the Productivity Commission reports that over thirty years “the number of dwellings completed per hour worked by housing construction workers has declined by 53% (physical productivity)” and that labour productivity “has declined by 12%”, while in the broader economy it “has increased by 49% over the same period” [74] (p. 2). The gap between the two series is a rough indicator of the part of the rise in house prices that the cost of building does not explain; the medians shift with the composition of sales, and established houses carry depreciated structures.
The prospect of rent also governs the pace of production. Murray found that “over 200,000 housing lots, or 13 years of new supply, are held by the eight largest housing development companies”, that “the amount of zoned supply in a region is unrelated to the rate of new housing supply”, drawing on Queensland data, and that “housing developers routinely delay housing production to capitalise on market cycles” [75] (p. 1). The value of undeveloped land, he argues, includes a premium, since “the optimal density of a subdivision also changes with home prices” [75] (p. 8). The rate at which land is released and built on is set by the rate at which dwellings can be sold without depressing their price, which Murray, citing the UK Letwin review, calls the “absorption rate, or the ‘value-unaffecting rate of sale’” [75] (p. 2). This is what Moreno Zacarés describes as the developer’s goal “to expand the margin between the costs of construction (capitalist production) and their capacity to inflate the final price on a monopolistic basis (rent extraction)” [37] (p. 8). The developer is at once a producing capitalist and a holder of land, and the second role governs the first. Bloom’s observation that the “entanglement between labour, finance, and rent further blurs the line separating production and exchange” [76] (p. 52) holds with particular force in the Australian case.
The supply-side literature reads the same phenomena through a competition-based lens. Kendall and Tulip estimate that “as of 2016, zoning raised detached house prices 73 per cent above marginal costs in Sydney, 69 per cent in Melbourne, 42 per cent in Brisbane and 54 per cent in Perth” [67] (abstract), while cautioning that “this is not the amount that housing prices would fall in the absence of zoning” [67] (abstract). The Centre for International Economics identifies in Queensland “the ‘zoning premium’, reflecting the cost of planning regulations that limit housing supply” as the most significant regulatory cost for each type of development, and defines the premium as “the value (above opportunity cost) associated with permission to build the house, and is fully reflected in the lot’s sales price” [77] (pp. 3, 51). In the terms of the framework used here, the zoning premium is capitalised rent attached to a right conferred by the state. Its existence is well established. The competition-based reading predicts that relaxing planning controls will dissolve it. Murray argues otherwise: “The demonstrated existence of extensive landbanks suggests that the economic logic of policies that relax planning controls in order to increase the rate of new housing supply and reduce home prices are flawed, at least in Australia” [75] (p. 9). Where land is held as a financial asset, the release of more zoned land adds to the stock of rent-bearing titles without obliging anyone to build on them.

5. Discussion

The Australian policy debate on housing affordability has cycled through a familiar set of remedies: land tax in place of stamp duty, the reform of negative gearing and the capital gains tax discount, the relaxation of planning controls, and the capture of the windfall gains from planning permission through “A betterment tax, or value capture mechanism” [1] (p. 1909). The analysis above suggests why the debate cycles without resolving core issues. Each remedy follows from a particular concept of rent, and each addresses one node of the system of provision while leaving the others in place.
The case for land tax is most closely associated with Henry George, for whom “It is not necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent” [78] (p. 403) (emphasis in original), and it was restated by the Henry Review in the language of efficiency: “Stamp duties are a highly inefficient tax on land, while land tax could provide an alternative and more stable source of revenue for the States. When applied uniformly across a broad base, land tax is one of the most efficient means of raising revenue” [79] (p. 48). The Review recommended that “In the long run, the land tax base should be broadened to eventually include all land” [79] (p. 90), and suggested that “Most residential land could be subject to tax of about 1 per cent” [79] (p. xxii). The Grattan Institute estimates that “An annual flat-rate tax on unimproved land values of between 0.5 and 0.7 per cent of property value would be sufficient to replace stamp duties in each state” [3] (p. 124). These proposals address the state’s share of the rent, and their authors recognise that a broad land tax would be capitalised into lower land prices: “As the capital value of the land is equal to the discounted present value of all the future expected rental returns, a lower rental return implies a one-off fall in the value of all land” [70] (p. 249), and “Owners of land bear the incidence of the land value tax” [70] (p. 249). Their concept of economic rent, however, is the competition-based surplus above the return needed to keep land in use. What the framework used here adds is that such a fall in land prices would also alter the relation between landowners and lenders that sustains the present level of prices, which makes the reform a larger political undertaking than the language of efficiency might suggest.
The supply-side remedy follows from the reading of the zoning premium as a regulatory distortion. Its concept of rent is the scarcity premium of the competition-based approach, and it predicts that more permissive zoning will bring prices towards the cost of construction. The evidence on landbanking and on the absorption rate indicates that where land is held as a financial asset, the rate of production is governed by the prospect of rent rather than by the quantity of zoned land. The demand-side remedies, including the Grattan Institute’s recommendations that policy “should reduce the capital gains tax discount to 25 per cent; abolish negative gearing; and include owner-occupied housing in the Age Pension assets test” [3] (p. 3), bear mainly on the investor’s claim on capitalised rent. Only the inclusion of the family home in the pension assets test, and the proposed shift to “swap stamp duties for general property taxes” [3] (p. 3), would affect the owner-occupier’s share, which is the larger of the two. The rentierisation account, finally, proposes remedies across several nodes at once, arguing that “Taxes should focus on land rents” and proposing a land value tax “on primary residences as well as investor housing”, the removal of negative gearing and the capital gains discount, a betterment tax and public provision [1] (pp. 1909–1910). Each of these concepts of rent picks out a real feature of the Australian system. What they lack is an account of why these features cohere.
A value-grounded reading offers three things to the attempts to understand, and change, the dynamics regulating land markets, equity and spatial justice. First, it identifies land price as a claim on future labour and so locates the question of affordability in the relation between capital, landed property and labour, where the competition-based reading locates it in the relation between supply and demand. Harvey’s observation that “when value determines use, the allocation takes place under the auspices of rampant speculation, artificially induced scarcities, and the like, and it loses any pretence of having anything at all to do with the efficient organization of production and distribution” [9] (p. 190) describes the Australian evidence well. Second, it shows that the forms of rent require different instruments. Haila’s study of Singapore makes the point that differentiating the forms of rent is useful “to pay attention to different conditions of these forms of rent, and hence the different policies seeking to affect them” [80] (p. 61). A tax on the rent of investors cannot claim the rent enjoyed by owner-occupiers, a zoning reform will not affect the premium on land already zoned, and a restriction on credit does not sway the owner who holds land outright. Third, it places the settler-colonial origin of title within the analysis of land value, whereas valuation orthodoxy places it outside the frame of analysis. Lefebvre’s proposition that “(Social) space is a (social) product” [81] (p. 26) has a precise meaning in the settler colony. The capacity of land to command a price in Australia derives from an original appropriation inextricably bound up in violent dispossession intent on extirpation of Indigenous peoples, and any serious account of spatial justice in the settler colony must proceed from that irrefragable fact.
The analysis has limits. The proxies used here are unavoidably imprecise, and the divergence between the national accounts and the statutory valuations shows how much depends on method and coverage. The distribution of rent among classes can be inferred from the tax and balance-sheet data only in aggregate, and the tax data count schedules rather than owners. The comparison of house prices with construction prices is a residual measure that does not isolate land from other influences on price. The next step is to build these proxies into a consistent set of accounts of ground rent for Australia, by state and over time, and to test them against the micro-data on land transactions and ownership.

6. Conclusions

The standard methods of land valuation treat land as a bundle of attributes wherein price is set at market equilibrium. The critical literature on rentier capitalism treats rent as a return to monopoly, a departure from the competitive ideal. Both identify rent against a competitive counterfactual, and neither grounds it in the historically specific relations of landed property. This article has set against them a framework that maps the provision of housing land as a system of social relations and traces the production, capture and contestation of ground rent across that system.
Applied to Australia, the framework shows a system in which capitalised ground rent has grown far faster than wages, housing income or the production of dwellings. Residential land values rose nineteen-fold between 1990 and 2025, while compensation of employees rose less than seven-fold and the annual rate of dwelling completions was little higher at the end of the period than at the beginning. In 2024–25 more than half of the housing income recorded in the national accounts was paid to lenders as interest. Interest, land tax and council rates absorb most of the rent that landlords collect, a majority of rental property schedules report a loss, and landlords look to the capital gain for their return. The state takes a share of the rent through taxes on property and its transfer, forgoes a sum of comparable size through the exemptions granted to owner-occupiers, and confers a further rent through the permission to build. The price of land in Australia is a claim on future rent, and its level depends on the relations among landowners, lenders, developers and the state that the system of provision reproduces.
The official statistics do not report these relations, because they are compiled in categories of price. Read together, however, they can be compelled to disclose them. The method of triangulation developed here offers a way to impute value from data geared toward price, and so to bring the distributional conflicts behind unaffordability into view. That is the precondition for any regulation of land markets that aims at equity and spatial justice rather than at the restoration of a competitive equilibrium that has never governed the price of land.

Author Contributions

The author confirms sole responsibility for the conceptualisation, methodology, formal analysis and writing of this article.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The data analysed in this study are publicly available from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Australian Taxation Office, the Treasury, the NSW Valuer General and the Victorian Department of Transport and Planning, as cited in the text. The calculations reported in Table 2 and Table 3 are available from the author on request.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflicts of interest.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations are used in this manuscript:
CLP capitalist landed property
NSW New South Wales
SoP systems of provision

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Table 1. Price series used as proxies for categories of ground rent.
Table 1. Price series used as proxies for categories of ground rent.
Category of analysis Price series used as proxy What the price form conceals Cross-checked against
Capitalised ground rent National accounts value of land by use and state; household balance sheet; valuer-general land values (NSW); median vacant land and house prices (Victoria) Each is a capitalisation of expected rent at a rate of interest; none records the rent or its recipient National accounts against valuer-general totals for the same land; land share of prices across four sources
Rent as a flow Gross operating surplus of dwellings owned by persons; gross rent on rental property schedules Imputed rent of owner-occupiers is a modelled price; net rent merges ground rent, interest and return on the building Implied gross yield against housing lending rates
Rent shared with interest-bearing capital Household interest payable on dwellings; interest charged on housing loans; interest deducted on rental schedules; housing debt ratios Interest appears as the price of credit rather than as a share of rent National accounts interest payable against central bank interest charged; interest against gross rent
The state’s share Land taxes, municipal rates and conveyance duties; tax expenditures on the main residence and capital gains Taxes appear as revenue items; tax expenditures depend on a benchmark defined by the Treasury Taxes on land against annual change in land value
Landed property as a foundation for class Rental property schedules; household housing assets and debt relative to income Holdings are reported by tax schedule or household rather than by class Distribution of tax expenditure benefits by income decile
Rent and production Median established house prices; house construction output prices; dwelling completions House prices bundle land and structure, so rent and construction cost appear together Price growth against construction price growth; completions against land values
Source: Author’s classification. Series as cited in Section 3.
Table 2. Residential land, housing income and interest, Australia, selected years.
Table 2. Residential land, housing income and interest, Australia, selected years.
Year Residential land ($ billion) Land share of household land and dwellings (%) Residential land to compensation of employees (ratio) Gross operating surplus, dwellings owned by persons ($ billion) Household interest payable on dwellings ($ billion) Interest to gross operating surplus (%) Implied gross yield (%)
1990 432.8 56.2 2.17 27.6 12.1 43.8 3.14
2000 951.0 61.4 2.93 46.5 15.5 33.3 2.81
2010 3,068.0 69.8 5.02 96.5 56.7 58.8 2.12
2020 5,070.7 71.7 5.34 161.4 53.6 33.2 2.20
2025 8,316.8 73.9 6.26 229.3 125.0 54.5 1.94
Source: Author’s calculations from [44,45,46]. Residential land is from Table 61 (all sectors). Land share and implied gross yield use household land and dwellings from Table 41. Implied gross yield is gross operating surplus of dwellings owned by persons divided by household land plus dwellings; household land includes some non-residential land. Stocks are at 30 June of the year shown; flows are for the year ended 30 June.
Table 3. Median established house prices and house construction output prices, June quarter 2002 to June quarter 2026.
Table 3. Median established house prices and house construction output prices, June quarter 2002 to June quarter 2026.
City Median house price 2002 ($’000) Median house price 2026 ($’000) Multiple State (construction price index) Index 2002 Index 2026 Multiple
Sydney 393.5 1,487.6 3.78 New South Wales 74.1 193.0 2.60
Melbourne 260.0 850.0 3.27 Victoria 75.7 164.7 2.18
Brisbane 182.6 1,155.0 6.33 Queensland 63.8 199.2 3.12
Perth 190.0 1,010.0 5.32 Western Australia 54.6 219.7 4.02
Adelaide 175.0 975.0 5.57 South Australia 73.4 179.7 2.45
Source: Author’s calculations from [47,48]. Median price of established house transfers (unstratified) by capital city; output price index for house construction (class 3011) by state. June quarter 2026 observations are the latest published and may be revised.
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