Institutional Overlap and the Politics of Accountability: A Systematic Review of Concurrent Parliamentary and Judicial Inquiries in South Africa

Introduction: Concurrent parliamentary and judicial inquiries are intended to strengthen accountability, yet overlapping investigative arrangements may also fragment responsibility, divert resources and weaken implementation. The supplied literature provides relevant evidence on South African commissions of inquiry, public-sector governance and municipal accountability, but offers limited direct evidence on simultaneous parliamentary and judicial investigations. Methods: The researcher-selected databases and information sources were Google Scholar, ERIC, OpenAlex and Crossref. The eligibility protocol restricted publication years to 2015–2026. COSTAQDA recorded source-level retrieval through OpenAlex (150 retrieved; 319 available), Crossref (150 retrieved; 691 available). Where researcher-selected sources did not expose a suitable direct bulk-search connector, COSTAQDA used its OpenAlex/Crossref discovery bridge while preserving the researcher-selected source names in the PRISMA record. The identification run recorded 300 records before cross-source deduplication and 298 unique records after deduplication. Results: Six codes, three categories and three analytical themes were developed. Institutional overlap expanded investigative capacity and public documentation but could reproduce fragmentation when existing enforcement systems remained unreformed. Repeated inquiries could displace prosecution and divert resources. Effective democratic oversight depended on institutional independence, professional capacity and implementation pathways. Direct South African evidence was sparse, and systematic comparative evidence on resource efficiency was absent. Discussion/Conclusion: Institutional overlap is neither intrinsically beneficial nor harmful. Its effects depend on whether overlapping mandates are coordinated with independent enforcement, clear responsibility and mechanisms that convert findings into sanctions or administrative change.