Submitted:
25 September 2026
Posted:
29 September 2026
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Abstract
Biopure Corporation’s emergency and military program was not initially conceived to develop another transfusion product. Over more than a decade, its development focused on a distinct operational challenge: how can oxygen-carrying support be made available early enough for severely bleeding casualties when conventional donor red blood cells cannot be obtained, arrive too late, are difficult to transport, or cannot be properly maintained near the point of injury? Surviving government, congressional, scientific, and corporate records trace a clear progression. It begins with military blood-logistics concerns in the late 1990s, followed by an explicit U.S. congressional requirement for room-temperature-stable hemoglobin oxygen carriers shortly before September 11, 2001. After the attacks, the work expanded into emergency-readiness deliberations and U.S. Army trauma research funding, culminating in a formal U.S. Navy clinical-development program named Restore Effective SUrvival in Shock - RESUS. These records matter because they reveal a shift away from blood-replacement logistics toward understanding the physiology and practical delivery of oxygen during hemorrhagic shock. By the program’s later stages, the research scope extended beyond oxygen-carrying capacity alone to include vasoactivity, nitric-oxide biology, formulation engineering, and multifunctional resuscitation.
Keywords:
BHOC
; Biological Hemoglobin Oxygen Carrier
; Hemopure
; HBOC-201
; biological product
; product characterization
; hemorrhagic shock
; emergency medicine
; prehospital medicine
; military medicine
; oxygen therapeutics
; Precision Oxygen Therapeutics
Precision Oxygen Therapeutics Historical Evidence Series · Article II
Historical Narrative Review · 1998-2009 · Source-Verified Manuscript · Numbered References
Central historical anchor
4 March 2003—Restore Effective SUrvival in Shock (RESUS)
NCRADA-NMRC-03-1497 · Naval Medical Research Center + Biopure Corporation
Navy Principal Investigator: Daniel Freilich, CDR, MC, USNR · Head, Hematomimetics Program · Combat Casualty Directorate
Series context. This historical review is designed as companion Article II to the conceptual framework published first as a preprint: Rausch CW, Jaliashvili A. Precision Oxygen Therapeutics: From Blood Substitutes to the Biological Hemoglobin Oxygen Carrier (BHOC) Framework for Controlled Microvascular and Tissue-Level Oxygen Delivery [1]. DOI: 10.20944/preprints202609.1886.v1.
Historical Timeline at a Glance
- 22 May 1998—Brooke Army Medical Center. DoD public reporting frames the technology around battlefield survival, storage, pre-positioning and trauma [2].
- 29 Sep 1999—Carl W. Rausch before Congress. Military preparedness and field use enter the public oxygen-therapeutics narrative [3].
- 23 Feb 2001—DoD blood-readiness audit. DoD independently documents weaknesses in frozen-RBC wartime inventory and readiness management [4].
- 4 Sep 2001—House Report 107-194. Congress explicitly identifies a need for room-temperature-stable oxygen therapeutics, particularly HBOCs [5].
- 12 Mar 2002—House Armed Services hearing. Rausch links Hemopure stockpiling to disaster, terrorism and the post-9/11 blood-supply experience [7].
- Sep 2002—Army grant DAMD17-02-1-0697. Military interest becomes funded trauma-development activity [9].
- 4 Mar 2003—RESUS CRADA. NMRC + Biopure formalize Restore Effective SUrvival in Shock; Daniel Freilich is Navy PI [10].
- 2005—Defense Contingencies. CRADA amendment contemplates potential operational contingency supply when blood is unavailable [10].
- 2008—Op RESUS + NO donor. Military operational protocol and planned Hemopure/NO-donor work target vasoactivity [18].
- 2009—Vasoactivity analysis. The research problem is explicitly reframed around vascular response and acute-trauma risk [20].
1998—The Battlefield Problem Was Already Clearly Defined
On 22 May 1998, an American Forces Press Service report archived by the Defense Visual Information Distribution Service documented Biopure’s testing at Brooke Army Medical Center. The clinical scenario outlined at the outset was explicitly military: a severely wounded soldier at risk of death before reaching a facility capable of administering blood transfusions [2].
Army trauma physician Major Stephen Flaherty described the technology’s logistical advantages: no requirement for conventional blood typing and cross-matching, no mandatory refrigeration, an extended shelf life, and the potential to stage the product closer to the point of injury. The report also noted persistent Department of Defense challenges with blood shortages, storage, and forward pre-positioning, while anticipating a research shift from studies of surgical blood loss to battlefield trauma [2].
The historical implication is unambiguous: this military use case predated the September 11 attacks by several years. Even at this early stage, the technology was discussed as a temporary oxygen-carrying bridge intended to support casualties from injury onset until definitive hospital care could be delivered [2].
1999—Oxygen Therapeutics Enter the Congressional Readiness Discussion
On 29 September 1999, Carl W. Rausch testified before the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress in a presentation titled “Oxygen Therapeutics as Alternatives to Red Blood Cells.” [3]
Rausch framed Biopure’s technology around oxygen delivery rather than full replication of all biological functions of whole blood. He argued that prolonged room-temperature storage and elimination of conventional blood-group matching requirements would offer unique value in emergency and remote environments, including military preparedness [3].
Rausch further informed Congress that, per Biopure’s internal assessment, sustaining military blood readiness during Operation Desert Storm cost nearly $1 million per day, with a large fraction of the stockpiled blood supply ultimately unused. This figure remains a historical statement attributed to Rausch and Biopure, not an independently audited contemporary estimate [3].
This conceptual shift is consequential: the technology was framed not merely as a hospital transfusion alternative, but also as a capability for military readiness and blood logistics management.
2001—The Military Requirement Becomes Explicit Before 9/11
On 23 February 2001, the Department of Defense Inspector General issued Report D-2001-059, Armed Services Blood Program Readiness. The report defined the Armed Services Blood Program mission as providing fresh and frozen blood products, blood substitutes, and associated services during peacetime and wartime, and documented persistent readiness-management challenges, including frozen red-cell inventory requirements [4].
This evidence confirms that the operational challenge was recognized independently of Biopure’s advocacy and before September 11: blood supplies had to be pre-positioned for the opening phase of a contingency while replacement liquid blood remained in transit [4].
Seven days before the September 11 attacks, House Report 107-194 accompanying the FY2002 National Defense Authorization Act noted that the military had identified a requirement for an oxygen carrier suitable for rapid use in combat casualties and stable at room temperature. The House Armed Services Committee recommended an additional $7 million for room-temperature-stable oxygen therapeutics, particularly hemoglobin-based oxygen carriers [5].
This timeline is historically significant. September 11 did not create the military HBOC requirement; it changed the strategic environment around a requirement that already existed [5].
11 September 2001—Emergency Preparedness Becomes a National Problem
On September 11, 2001, U.S. Patent 6,288,027 B1, assigned to Biopure Corporation, was issued for technology enabling preservation of a hemoglobin blood substitute using oxygen-protective packaging. The date represents a striking chronological coincidence, yet no evidence links the patent award to the attacks; the patent application and prosecution clearly predated them [6].
A more substantive historical connection emerged in the aftermath. The attacks demonstrated that mass public blood donation mobilized after a crisis cannot resolve the first-hours need for immediate, ready-to-use oxygen-carrying support. This observation later became part of congressional arguments for stockpile-ready oxygen therapeutics [7].
12 March 2002—Hemopure Enters the Homeland-Defense and Terrorism Discussion
Six months after the attacks, Carl W. Rausch testified before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee during the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act hearing on Innovative Technologies, H.A.S.C. No. 107-30 [7].
Rausch described Hemopure as an oxygen-delivery product intended for scenarios where red blood cells were not immediately accessible. He explicitly referenced the attacks in New York and Washington, arguing that newly donated blood could not satisfy the urgent demands of the initial emergency-response phase [7].
Central to his preparedness argument was time-to-availability. A long-shelf-life oxygen therapeutic could, in principle, be stockpiled locally alongside other emergency supplies and pre-positioned for disaster zones, terrorist incidents, and other high-risk environments where compatible donor blood was unavailable or substantially delayed [7].
This official congressional testimony constitutes one of the most important primary-source records in this historical sequence. The link between September 11 and Hemopure’s emergency and military use case is not a retrospective reconstruction; Rausch established this connection within the formal congressional record in 2002 [7].
10 September 2002—The Military Blood-logistics Gap Is Independently Documented
On the day before the first anniversary of September 11, Congress held a hearing titled America’s Blood Supply in the Aftermath of September 11, 2001. Testimony from the Armed Services Blood Program offered an independent governmental perspective on persistent military blood-logistics constraints [8].
The DoD reported maintaining more than 59,000 frozen red-cell units aboard ships and across Pacific and European operational theaters, because fully meeting blood requirements for a major regional conflict could take approximately 7-10 days [8].
The hearing record also acknowledged the prospective role of a safe, FDA-licensed hemoglobin-based oxygen carrier as one potential component of a solution to these logistical constraints. At that stage, however, such a technology remained a developmental future capability rather than an operationally fielded resource [8].
These deliberations refined the military requirement. Life-saving trauma care may demand immediate oxygen-carrying support, whereas conventional donor blood relies on a sequential workflow of collection, processing, testing, compatibility verification, storage, transport, and forward staging. The time gap between injury and arrival of definitive conventional blood support defined the operational niche for which the Hemopure trauma program was developed [8].
September 2002—The Army Moves from Interest to Funded Trauma Development
3Biopure’s 2002 Annual Report documents that the U.S. Department of the Army awarded the company a $908,900 research grant to support a standard-therapy-controlled Phase II trauma trial evaluating Hemopure’s safety and tolerability in injured trauma patients [9].
Grant DAMD17-02-1-0697 was administered by the U.S. Army Medical Research Acquisition Activity at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Subsequent corporate filings indicate the total award value increased substantially as the program progressed [9].
The same annual report stated that trauma had become Biopure’s next clinical-development priority, with explicit focus on emergency-department and prehospital/ambulance settings. Biopure also reported collaborative work with the Army, Navy, and Air Force on a program designed to address both civilian and military operational requirements [9].
4 March 2003—Restore Effective SUrvival in Shock (RESUS)
This is the central historical milestone.
On 4 March 2003, Biopure Corporation and the U.S. Naval Medical Research Center entered into Cooperative Research and Development Agreement NCRADA-NMRC-03-1497: [10]
Restore Effective SUrvival in Shock—RESUS
The Navy Principal Investigator was:
Daniel Freilich, CDR, MC, USNR
Head, Hematomimetics Program
Naval Medical Research Center
Combat Casualty Directorate
The capitalization of “SU” within SUrvival was part of the original program name and created the acronym RESUS. This naming choice carries historical significance because it states the intended endpoint in operational terms: survival following hemorrhagic shock, rather than correction of an isolated laboratory parameter [10].
The title Hematomimetics Program is equally noteworthy. It embodies an engineering philosophy broader than simplistic “blood replacement”: the development framework focused on mimicking selected functional components of blood and the physiology of resuscitation [10].
RESUS as an Operational Medical System
The objectives written into the CRADA extended far beyond a single clinical trial. If the hypothesis were confirmed and regulatory requirements satisfied, the program contemplated potential relevance to:
- Tactical Casualty Combat Care;
- the En Route Care System;
- naval vessels;
- NASA;
- civilian trauma;
- and ultimately potential procurement and deployment of Hemopure.
The agreement appropriately stated that neither party guaranteed these objectives would be achieved. Nevertheless, the presence of procurement and deployment in the formal program objectives demonstrates the intended end-state: not only scientific knowledge, but a potentially deployable prehospital oxygen-delivery capability [10].
The program was also described as consistent with Office of Naval Research Future Naval Capability priorities involving low-volume resuscitation fluids that inhibit shock and oxygen-carrying blood substitutes [10].
Financial Scale of the Original RESUS Architecture
The original CRADA projected contributions over FY2003-FY2006 of approximately:
- Biopure: $8.75 million
- NMRC: $4.0 million
for a combined program framework approaching $12.75 million [10].
Later Biopure filings stated that Congress had appropriated a cumulative $22.5 million to DoD for Hemopure trauma development: $16 million to the Navy and $6.5 million to the Army. These are corporate-reported appropriation figures and should remain attributed to the relevant filing [15].
2004-2006—Delayed Evacuation and Far-Forward Trauma
The scientific program increasingly modeled the distinctive challenges of military hemorrhage: delayed evacuation, constrained resuscitation volume, and the absence of immediate definitive care.
A 2004 study involving Daniel Freilich and colleagues examined HBOC-201 in a swine model of uncontrolled liver hemorrhage with delayed evacuation. In that model, HBOC-201 produced a strong survival signal relative to comparators and accelerated restoration of tissue oxygenation. These findings are preclinical animal results and must not be represented as human survival estimates [12].
Emergency-Research Infrastructure
The original RESUS design involved critically ill trauma patients who could not necessarily provide prospective informed consent. The CRADA therefore included infrastructure for:
- community consultation and disclosure;
- EMS and trauma-center training;
- independent data monitoring;
- expert ethics input;
- and possible participation by other military and clinical organizations.
This illustrates the program’s advanced institutional planning. RESUS was not merely a laboratory concept; substantial arrangements were in place for a multicenter emergency-research network [10].
2005—Defense Contingencies Enter the Contract
Amendment #3 includes one of the most notable operational provisions in the archival record.
Under the “Defense Contingencies” section, if the U.S. military identified a requirement involving special operations forces or personnel operating in remote combat settings at high risk of life-threatening injury, NMRC could request contingency HBOC-201 material for hemorrhagic-shock casualties for whom blood transfusion was unavailable [10].
The contractual planning example contemplated:
- military units totaling at least 10,000 personnel;
- 1,500 HBOC-201 units;
- an estimated product-cost ceiling of no more than $650 per unit, subject to legal and regulatory requirements [10].
This provision does not confirm that 1,500 units were purchased, fielded, or administered. It shows that by 2005 the Navy-Biopure partnership had matured to the point that the legal agreement itself contemplated operational contingency supply of HBOC-201 for hemorrhagic shock when blood transfusion was unavailable [10].
Regulatory Barriers
The historical record must also acknowledge the program’s major limitations. U.S. trauma development faced FDA safety concerns and clinical holds. RESUS therefore did not proceed to the large planned prehospital human trial in its originally designed form [21].
This setback is scientifically important because it explains the program’s subsequent direction: rather than treating oxygen-carrying capacity as adequate, the Navy and Biopure began investigating whether the oxygen carrier itself could be redesigned or combined with agents that modulate physiological response [21].
2007—From One Product to Multiple Physiological Designs
During fiscal 2007, the U.S. Navy entered an agreement to acquire Hemopure together with seven modified Hemopure formulations for preclinical evaluation. According to Biopure’s SEC filing, these formulations were manufactured specifically to test hypotheses linking formulation changes to physiological effects [16].
The development question was therefore changing from:
toward:“Can HBOC-201 carry oxygen?”
“Which oxygen-carrier architecture produces the appropriate physiological response?”
Multifunctional Resuscitation
Between 2007 and 2009, Biopure filings documented collaborative work with NMRC on modified and new formulations for trauma applications, alongside development of a potential multifunctional blood-substitute platform. The historical term “blood substitute” is retained because it appears in the source material; the underlying engineering framework extended beyond replacement of the full range of blood functions [17,19].
2008—Op RESUS
The RESUS concept was subsequently redesigned. Biopure reported that the Navy intended to submit multiple protocols to FDA. One was a revised version of the original RESUS trial; another was Op RESUS, a similar but pre-consented protocol intended specifically for the military operational environment [18].
The historical distinction was explicit:
RESUS—civilian patients in the United States and overseas
Op RESUS—military field / operational setting [18]
2008—Hemopure Plus a Nitric-Oxide Donor
A third proposed Navy protocol was described as a Phase 1b safety study combining Hemopure with a nitric-oxide donor specifically to reduce vasoactivity [18].
This marks a pivotal conceptual shift. The program no longer framed oxygen carriage as an isolated physiological function. The engineering problem had expanded to integrate oxygen carriage, vascular tone, nitric-oxide biology, microcirculatory flow, and tissue oxygen delivery [18].
2009—Daniel Freilich and the Vascular-Control Problem
In 2009, Daniel Freilich and colleagues from the Hematomimetics Program, Trauma and Resuscitative Medicine Department, Naval Medical Research Center published a dedicated analysis of HBOC-201 vasoactivity and its implications for acute-trauma trials [20].
The paper identified vasoactivity as a major barrier to HBOC development because of concerns regarding adverse blood-pressure responses and secondary complications. The investigators reviewed available clinical data to assess whether risk profiles might differ across trauma-relevant populations and emphasized that controlled trauma studies were still required [20].
This represents the logical scientific culmination of the RESUS-era development trajectory: oxygen transport cannot be evaluated in isolation from the vascular system required to deliver that oxygen [20].
Historical Interpretation
The program originated from a blood-logistics challenge: conventional donor blood is highly effective, yet it cannot be positioned indefinitely at every potential site of injury.
It evolved into a prehospital oxygen-delivery problem: casualties may require oxygen-carrying support before definitive donor blood becomes available.
RESUS converted this operational need into a formal development objective:
Restore Effective SUrvival in Shock
By the program’s later stages, the research question shifted again toward vasoactivity, nitric oxide biology, formulation engineering, and multifunctional resuscitation.
Blood logistics → Oxygen carrying → Prehospital oxygen delivery → Survival in shock → Vascular regulation → Multifunctional physiology
Why This History Matters for Precision Oxygen Therapeutics
This historical military program ultimately confronted the same fundamental challenge that defines contemporary oxygen-delivery science: an oxygen carrier has therapeutic utility only when the oxygen it transports can be delivered safely, predictably, and at the required time across the systemic circulation, microcirculation, and local tissue environment [1,10,16,17,18,19,20].
The most enduring lesson, therefore, is not that this historical product “replaced blood.” Instead, the development pathway progressively isolated the oxygen-delivery function from blood’s broader physiological system while demonstrating that this function cannot be engineered without rigorous attention to vascular regulation, tissue perfusion, and safety [1,10,16,17,18,19,20].
This historical trajectory provides a rational bridge from legacy HBOC terminology toward the broader framework of Precision Oxygen Therapeutics [1].
Blood is a system. Oxygen delivery is a function.
Biological Product Identity, Class Membership and Therapeutic Qualification
The aim is not to define BHOC solely through a regulatory class label. The more fundamental principle is that a biological medicinal product must first be identifiable as a distinct, defined product. In the European Union, Annex I to Directive 2001/83/EC defines a biological substance as one produced by or extracted from a biological source that requires a combination of physicochemical and biological testing for characterization and quality determination, alongside the production process and its controls [26]. ICH Q6B provides the corresponding technical framework for product characterization and specification-setting for covered biotechnological/biological proteins and polypeptides, including physicochemical properties, biological activity, immunochemical properties where relevant, purity and impurities, with justified acceptance criteria [22].
Accordingly, product identity should be assessed through a sequential chain rather than by class name alone: biological source and starting material; manufacturing, modification and purification technology; formulation; process controls; physicochemical and structural attributes; biological activity and potency; product- and process-related impurities; stability; and the QA/QC specifications defining acceptable production lots. Different products may achieve a similar intended oxygen-delivery function via different manufacturing technologies and still belong to the same scientific or therapeutic family, yet each product must be characterized on its own merits. ICH Q11 and Q6B situate starting materials, manufacturing knowledge, process controls, release testing and specifications within this product-specific quality framework [22,23].
Manufacturing is therefore not incidental to the identity of a biologic. ICH Q5E mandates comparability assessment when manufacturing changes may alter a biotechnological or biological product [24]. FDA comparability guidance similarly recognizes that changes in manufacturing methods, equipment, facilities or site can modify the biological product and may require additional analytical, nonclinical or clinical evidence [25]. From a CMC perspective, the approved product is linked to a defined manufacturing configuration, control strategy and specification set; changes to that configuration constitute regulated changes rather than presumptions of automatic equivalence.
We therefore propose a staged evidence architecture that separates product identity and intrinsic capability from proof of clinical performance. BHOC class membership requires three criteria to be satisfied concurrently: (1) molecular or biological origin consistent with the class definition; (2) a primary function of controlled hemoglobin-mediated oxygen carriage and delivery; and (3) sufficient product-level characterization, manufacturing definition and quality control to establish both what the product is and what it is demonstrably capable of doing as that defined biological product. “Capable of doing” here is not an intended-use statement or prediction of clinical success. It requires measurable product-specific functional attributes—such as biological activity/potency and oxygen-binding and oxygen-unloading performance—linked to defined analytical methods, specifications and a controlled manufacturing configuration. Products manufactured by different technologies may therefore belong to this proposed BHOC therapeutic class, but only if each product independently meets this identity-plus-capability threshold. This is a scientific and therapeutic taxonomy proposed herein, not an EMA or FDA regulatory class designation, and membership alone does not imply approval, comparability, interchangeability or clinical efficacy [1,22,23,24,25,26,27,28].
Membership = what the product IS and what it is demonstrably CAPABLE OF DOING as a characterized biological product. Clinical/regulatory qualification = what that specific product HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED TO DO in humans within a defined clinical use.
These are sequential, product-specific tiers of evidence. Clinical/regulatory qualification applies to a defined route, dose, indication, population, manufacturing configuration and use context. In the United States, 21 CFR 600.3 defines a biological product to include a protein and separately defines process, control and specification in product-specific terms [27]. Under 21 CFR 601.2, a biologics license application must contain nonclinical and clinical information supporting safety, purity and potency, together with manufacturing and stability information for the product [28]. Clinical or regulatory success of one class member therefore does not automatically qualify another member, just as failure of one characterized member does not automatically predict failure of non-identical members. Membership establishes product identity and intrinsic functional capability; clinical/regulatory qualification establishes what that particular product has actually demonstrated in the specified clinical use.
Real-world validation = what the clinically qualified product actually DOES in routine practice.
This forms a third evidence layer, distinct from both class membership and initial clinical/regulatory qualification. It evaluates performance across broader populations, variable care environments and longer follow-up periods. The FDA explicitly recognizes real-world data and real-world evidence for regulatory decision-making on drug and biological products, including pre- and post-market evaluation [29]. The proposed hierarchy is therefore:
identity + measurable capability → clinical/regulatory demonstration → real-world performance.
This framework reshapes how the historical HBOC literature ought to be interpreted. Class-level grouping remains useful for studying shared molecular origin, mechanisms, pharmacology and potential class-wide signals, but it becomes misleading when a pharmacological label is treated as a complete definition of non-identical biological products. A negative outcome from a sufficiently characterized product remains part of the class evidence base and must not be discarded; however, it should first be attributed to that specific product, manufacturing configuration, formulation, dose, route, population and study design. It can only be generalized to the broader class when evidence confirms that the relevant causal determinant is genuinely shared across members. The converse also holds: a favourable result for one product cannot be automatically extrapolated to another. This prevents historical averaging from converting product-specific success or failure into an unsupported class-level verdict [1,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29].
The same logic supports revised terminology. The proposed therapeutic class should not be labelled “artificial blood” or a “blood substitute.” These terms define the intervention by analogy to blood as a complete biological system and can pull development, administration and clinical assessment toward an inappropriate substitution or equivalence model. The class is better defined by its specific therapeutic function: controlled hemoglobin-mediated oxygen carriage and delivery by a characterized biological product. Clinical development should therefore evaluate the oxygen-delivery intervention itself—its route, dose, timing, pharmacology, tissue-level effect, safety and indication-specific clinical outcomes. Donor blood or red cells may serve as an appropriate comparator when the clinical question requires it, but blood is not the definitional benchmark for class membership, and a BHOC trial need not demonstrate recapitulation of all functions of donor blood [1].
Evidence Boundary
- This historical overview does not establish current clinical efficacy, current regulatory approval, current military deployment, or current performance of a future BHOC formulation.
- Historical performance statements about Hemopure/HBOC-201 remain attributable to the specific period, product, model and source from which they originated.
- Preclinical survival results are animal-model findings and must not be represented as expected human outcomes.
- The RESUS contingency provisions demonstrate planning and contractual intent, not proof that contemplated quantities were purchased, deployed or administered operationally.
- The significance of the historical record lies in the development architecture and scientific evolution, not in converting historical research claims into present-day clinical claims.
Funding
This review was self-funded by the authors. No external funding was received for its preparation.
Data Availability Statement
This historical narrative review is based on publicly accessible government, congressional, regulatory, scientific, and corporate archival sources cited in the reference list. No new experimental dataset was generated.
Use of Artificial Intelligence
OpenAI ChatGPT was used to assist with drafting, organization, and language editing of this manuscript. The authors are responsible for the content, interpretation, and accuracy of the final manuscript.
Conflicts of Interest
All authors disclose past and/or current professional or commercial interests related to hemoglobin-based oxygen-carrier products and their development. Carl W. Rausch and Bing-Lou Wong were involved in Biopure Corporation and the oxygen-therapeutic products and programs discussed in this historical review. Archil Jaliashvili leads BHOC Therapeutics and has current interests in the development of Precision Oxygen Therapeutics.
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