1. Introduction
China’s low-altitude economy is expanding rapidly, and landing-pad siting is being institutionalised as a discrete planning phase that precedes route operations. Shenzhen has published a dedicated vertiport layout plan targeting over 1,500 landing sites by 2035 under a three-tier location hierarchy [
1]; Jiangsu has issued the first provincial-level guideline specifying vertiport siting principles and procedures [
2]; Zhuhai has introduced a new land-use category exclusively for low-altitude landing infrastructure to formalise the siting process [
3]; and Guizhou Province has mandated the systematic planning and layout of vertiports and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) landing points as a discrete infrastructure task, prioritising key logistics hubs before any operational routing is addressed [
4]. In each case, depot location is treated as a prerequisite infrastructure decision, completed before operational routing is considered. The growing importance of UAV infrastructure siting has also attracted academic attention: recent studies have examined vertiport network planning and capacity optimisation for UAM systems [
5,
6], and infrastructure-oriented work emphasises that vertiport placement critically shapes operational accessibility and network performance [
7]. Throughout this paper, we use the term
depot to refer to UAV dispatch facilities generically, encompassing vertiports and landing pads as defined in Chinese regulatory documents. This sequential paradigm (select depot locations first, optimise routes second) is equally prevalent in the research literature: existing location–routing models predominantly commit to facility configurations via straight-line (Haversine) screening before any routing constraints are considered [
8,
9,
10,
11], making it a structural property of decoupled architectures that routing infeasibility cannot propagate upward to inform location decisions.
To illustrate this failure, consider the UAV delivery planning scenario examined in this paper. In Dongli District, Tianjin, depot D0008 is selected by any straight-line-based location method (including the
p-median, coverage, and proximity heuristics that dominate the existing literature [
8,
9,
10,
12]) because its aggregate Haversine distance to a cluster of eastern demand nodes is low and it passes every straight-line feasibility check. Yet when road-network routing is attempted, an industrial zone forces a substantial detour (making the actual flight distance approximately 3.4 km longer than the straight-line approximation), and D0008 proves operationally infeasible. This failure is not a planning error; it is a structural consequence of treating location and routing as separable decisions.
The regulatory framework for UAV urban operations in China is still evolving: current regulations require operators to file flight routes for approval, but do not prescribe how urban delivery corridors should be structured. This paper adopts road-network corridors as the operational basis for UAV routing, and argues that this choice is not merely a modelling convenience but a policy-actionable design principle. Road-network-referenced corridors offer three compounding advantages.
Physical clearance: arterials, rivers, and railways constitute the principal linear open spaces in dense urban morphology; setback requirements and lower building density along these corridors provide comparatively clear vertical clearance, making them the natural minimum-detour channels for obstacle avoidance. Any route departing from these corridors must either gain substantial altitude to clear rooftops (increasing energy consumption and flight time) or navigate between buildings (requiring centimetre-level obstacle avoidance infeasible at delivery scale).
Regulatory tractability: routes anchored to named roads are unambiguously specifiable and verifiable by air traffic service providers; arbitrary point-to-point geodesics through built-up areas are not. Provincial and municipal governments have already institutionalised infrastructure-first planning as a precondition for operations: Shenzhen, Jiangsu, Zhuhai, and Guizhou have each issued formal guidelines requiring systematic planning of take-off and landing sites before any operational routing is addressed [
1,
2,
3,
4].
Navigational reproducibility: the same road-referenced route can be executed consistently across hundreds of daily sorties; road-network corridors are spatially continuous, publicly documented, and geometrically stable. Among existing urban infrastructure, road networks most comprehensively satisfy all three criteria simultaneously. The circuity factor
that emerges from this assumption is therefore not a model artefact but an empirically measurable property of the deployment environment, and its consequences for infrastructure planning are the subject of this paper. In our measurements across 2,850 node pairs in Dongli District, the road-to-Haversine ratio (circuity factor
) averages 1.52. When
, Haversine pre-screening overestimates the feasible service radius by:
where
is the UAV maximum flight range and
is the road-to-Haversine distance ratio. For Dongli District (
,
m),
m. Straight-line screening therefore overestimates the feasible service radius by over 3.4 km. Depot–demand pairs falling within this blindzone, such as those between D0008 and its eastern demand nodes, appear reachable but are operationally infeasible, with infeasibility only exposed at the routing stage when the location decision is already irrevocable. We term this structural failure mode
range-feasibility blindness.
Is this a local quirk of Tianjin’s road network, or something more systematic? To answer this question, we conducted road-network circuity measurements across three representative Chinese urban districts. In Beijing’s Chaoyang District (), m; in Shanghai’s Pudong District (), m. Every city we examined has a blindzone exceeding 2.8 km, suggesting range-feasibility blindness is a systemic planning risk across Chinese urban morphologies, rather than a local anomaly.
As illustrated in
Figure 1, the UAV-LRP requires jointly selecting depot sites and constructing delivery routes subject to range and payload constraints, two decisions that are tightly coupled but treated as separable under the sequential paradigm.
Existing methods break the location–routing coupling into sequential or bilevel stages [
8,
9,
10]: the location layer selects depots using an aggregated cost estimate, then the routing layer optimises with those locations fixed. Under road-network circuity, this information loss produces infeasible depot configurations that are only discovered at the routing stage, when the location decision is already irrevocable. In UAV systems this aggregation is more damaging than in ground logistics: a small change in depot location can render demand nodes unreachable under battery-endurance constraints, yet this infeasibility produces no upward signal in a bilevel model [
12,
13].
The main contributions are:
- 1.
Discovery and empirical quantification of range-feasibility blindness in city-scale UAV infrastructure planning. We identify that straight-line distance screening (the standard practice in both policy and research) creates a systematic blind spot, formalise it as the blindzone radius , and empirically quantify it across three Chinese cities, finding it consistently exceeds 2.8 km, regardless of urban morphology. This is not a local anomaly; it is a structural feature of how Chinese cities are built.
- 2.
Causal evidence that decoupled planning picks the wrong depots. A controlled experiment in Dongli District shows that when depot selection and routing are treated as separate decisions, the selected depot set can be operationally infeasible: invisible to the location criterion, only discovered when routing begins and the commitment is already irrevocable. All five independent routing runs failed. The failure is not algorithmic; it is architectural.
- 3.
A feasibility-embedded location–routing formulation that closes the blind spot by design. By enforcing road-network range constraints simultaneously with depot-opening decisions in a unified mixed-integer linear programme (MILP), blindzone depots become implicitly inadmissible. The location layer no longer commits to sites that routing cannot serve, closing the structural information gap that decoupled models leave open.
- 4.
Cross-city benchmark validation demonstrating consistent improvement across three urban districts with distinct road-network morphologies. Tested on real OpenStreetMap road networks in Tianjin, Beijing, and Shanghai, the feasibility-embedded framework consistently outperforms greedy initialisation across all cities and dataset types, including a 28.3% total cost reduction and 100% fleet utilisation in the full Dongli case study where the decoupled baseline fails entirely. The results suggest the framework generalises across diverse Chinese urban environments.
The remainder is organised as follows.
Section 2 reviews related work.
Section 3 presents the MILP formulation.
Section 4 describes the ALNS framework.
Section 5 reports benchmark experiments.
Section 6 presents the Dongli District case study.
Section 7 presents the cross-city circuity analysis and multi-city validation.
Section 9 concludes.