In economic systems grounded in rule-based consensus, the architecture of protocol governance is not a peripheral engineering concern but the institutional boundary that determines whether coordination remains rational over time. The simulation results in this paper show that when participants face credible rule-instability, strategy selection shifts toward short-horizon extraction and state-contingent deviation, and equilibria become locally stable rather than globally attracting. That behavioural response is not an anomaly; it is the predictable consequence of introducing policy discretion into what must function as a stable rule environment. Contemporary governance scholarship treats this distinction as central: governance is the bundle of decision rights, processes, and legitimacy mechanisms that determine whether a rule system is perceived as binding or merely provisional [
28,
29]. Within a digital cash system, the implication is direct: any governance posture that leaves core transaction and validation rules open to revision increases institutional uncertainty, and the paper’s results indicate that this uncertainty changes best responses, narrows cooperative basins, and increases switching between strategy profiles.
The policy implication is therefore not a generic appeal to “better governance”, but a more formal requirement: governance must be designed to minimise perceived rule-mutation risk at the layer that defines admissible actions. Governance language often blurs “change management” with “constitutional constraint”; the literature distinguishes them precisely because they have different strategic effects [
29]. In the setting analysed here, the relevant commitment is not that change will be “careful” or “well reviewed”, but that the game participants are playing will not be rewritten after they have sunk capital, built relay advantage, or optimised operational strategies around existing constraints. A governance design that cannot make that commitment will tend to generate exactly the equilibrium multiplicity and metastability observed under uncertainty and high volatility in the results.
5.1.1. Formal Protocols as Constitutional Commitments
Bitcoin’s protocol is often mischaracterised as mere code—as a mutable digital artefact subject to the whims of developers. This is a fundamental error. From the standpoint of institutional economics and formal game theory, the protocol is more accurately modelled as the rule-set that defines the feasible action space and the payoff-relevant state transitions, which means protocol governance functions as constitutional constraint rather than operational policy [
28,
29]. The difference is not semantic: in a repeated game, players can sustain cooperative outcomes only when the rules that define defection, punishment, and admissible moves are stable enough to make future consequences calculable.
Formally, let the system be represented as a dynamic game
, where
P is the player set,
A is the universal action set,
is the protocol-defined feasible action set at time
t,
u is the payoff function, and
is the state-transition function. If governance permits
or
to change with non-negligible probability, then strategies that were optimal and equilibrium-supporting at
may cease to be feasible or may map to different payoffs at
. This is not merely “upgrading”: it is a redefinition of the game. In that environment, equilibrium concepts that rely on time-consistency and credibility lose force because the continuation game is no longer the game that players planned against. The governance literature frames this as a credibility problem: a rule system that cannot bind its own future revisions cannot easily sustain expectations that depend on that binding [
29].
The results sections of this paper give the operational meaning of that credibility problem. Under rule-stable regimes, convergence to cooperative profiles is observed and remains robust to modest perturbations; under uncertainty, switching rates increase and local equilibria persist, which indicates that the effective continuation value that sustains cooperation is being discounted by governance risk rather than by technology alone. This pattern aligns with empirical observations in Bitcoin governance research that emphasise how influence is distributed among miners, developers, exchanges, and users, and how shifts in perceived authority and legitimacy change behaviour even without immediate changes in underlying technology [
14]. In practical terms, when participants believe that rule interpretation can change through social or organisational processes, they rationally treat future payoffs as less enforceable and tilt toward strategies that monetise the present state.
This also clarifies why policy mechanisms at the transaction layer matter to governance, even when they are presented as “minor” or “optional”. A transaction-selection environment that behaves like a probabilistic auction, and a confirmation environment in which inclusion probabilities depend strongly on mutable mempool policies, increases the degree to which short-run informational advantage and fee timing determine outcomes. Recent work on confirmation times and fee selection explicitly models these dynamics as state-dependent and strategic, reinforcing the point that participant behaviour is shaped by the predictability of the inclusion process rather than by an abstract assurance that “consensus” exists [
32]. When governance permits frequent or discretionary reconfiguration of transaction relay, standardness, or replacement policies, the resulting uncertainty is not quarantined: it transmits into strategic incentives by altering the mapping between present actions and future payoffs.
Accordingly, the policy implication for protocol governance is a commitment design problem: the rules that define validity, transaction finality expectations, and admissible behaviour must be credibly stable if the system is to support cooperative equilibria in repeated interaction. This does not mean that every operational parameter must be frozen; it means that governance must draw a bright line between constitutional rules (which must be perceived as fixed) and operational coordination mechanisms (which may evolve without changing the feasible action space). The contemporary governance frameworks in Information Systems research make this separation explicit by treating governance as a set of principles and decision rights, and by evaluating whether those rights introduce discretion into foundational constraints [
28,
29]. The results of this paper provide the game-theoretic consequence of failing to maintain that separation: equilibrium multiplicity, increased switching, and the rational re-optimisation toward extractive strategies when rule credibility is impaired.
5.1.2. Mutability and Strategic Breakdown
Protocol mutability injects an endogenous shock process into what would otherwise be a repeated coordination environment. When rule updates are feasible through ambiguous activation standards, shifting relay policies, or governance signalling that alters the admissible action set, participants face a non-trivial probability that the rule set governing payoffs at differs from the rule set at t. In a dynamic-game framing, this is not an exogenous demand shock; it is a state-transition risk on the feasibility constraints of play. The effect is to convert a repeated game with stationary incentives into a stochastic game in which the continuation value becomes contingent on regime realisations rather than solely on strategic histories.
Let the per-period payoff under rule set
R be
, where
is the observable state (mempool load, fee dispersion, propagation conditions). The continuation value in a stationary regime is
. Under mutability,
R itself is a Markov state, and the continuation value becomes
where
summarises governance signals that shift perceived rule-change likelihood. The practical consequence is an equilibrium discipline problem: any punishment-based enforcement that relies on future payoffs inherits an additional hazard rate that is orthogonal to individual patience. This is the precise mechanism by which mutability behaves like a *strategic discount multiplier* rather than a mere technical nuisance.
A convenient way to represent this is to define an effective discount factor
that internalises regime hazard. If a cooperative profile is sustained by continuation values that assume rule stationarity, then the relevant continuation value under mutability is scaled by the probability that the same enforcement environment persists. Under a simple survival approximation with constant hazard
,
. More generally, with state-dependent hazard
, the one-step continuation weight becomes
. This captures the core point: cooperation does not fail because miners “become impatient”; it fails because the institutional environment makes future payoffs less contractible. Economic evidence on uncertainty shocks supports this direction of effect: higher uncertainty measures systematically predict lower investment and weaker forward-looking commitments, consistent with horizon truncation rather than mere noise [
19,
20].
The dominance consequences follow directly. Consider two actions
C (cooperative validation/propagation) and
D (extractive deviation). Let the one-shot gain from deviation in a given state be
(e.g., fee-timing, selective inclusion, latency exploitation), and the contemporaneous penalty be
(e.g., orphan/fork exposure, propagation loss, retaliation risk). In stationary repeated play, cooperation is sustainable when the enforcement inequality holds:
where
is the continuation-value loss from triggering future punishment. Under mutability, the enforcement term is reduced to
. Hence the effective sustainability condition becomes
For any given , there exists such that implies a dominance flip in the relevant subset of states: D becomes a best response not because increases, but because the enforceable value of future cooperation collapses. This is a structural—not rhetorical—route from mutability to extractive equilibria.
This logic also clarifies why “intentional ambiguity” in governance language is strategically destabilising even if actual rule changes are infrequent. If agents cannot map governance signals into a bounded, rule-like commitment, then
becomes volatile and fat-tailed. In macroeconomic credibility settings, ambiguity and time-inconsistency problems are known to alter expectation formation and weaken the effectiveness of forward commitments; models that allow “intentional ambiguity” emphasise precisely the cost of making future policy states less inferable to private agents [
21]. Translating that insight to protocol governance: any practice that enlarges the perceived support of possible future rule sets widens the set of states in which deviation is privately rational.
The empirical implication for this paper is operational and testable within the simulation outputs: mutability should manifest as (i) shorter effective planning horizons in measured behaviour proxies (earlier policy switching; higher responsiveness to immediate fee spikes), (ii) increased incidence and persistence of deviation regimes at the same coordinates relative to rule-stable runs, and (iii) sharper, state-indexed boundaries where dominance flips occur because shifts discretely with . These are not philosophical claims; they are the measurable signatures of a hazard-adjusted repeated-game constraint.
Accordingly, protocol mutability should be treated as a first-order institutional parameter in the mining game: it modifies equilibrium feasibility by compressing continuation values, thereby turning otherwise enforceable cooperative profiles into fragile or unattainable outcomes. Flexibility does not merely “add optionality”; it changes the contractibility of future payoffs. When the rule environment is perceived as renegotiable, the system inherits the same credibility problem that economics identifies in other commitment settings: participants rationally re-optimise toward short-horizon extraction because the game no longer offers a stable intertemporal payoff map [
19,
20,
21].
5.1.3. A Framework for Immutable Monetary Rules
To prevent equilibrium breakdowns in decentralised monetary networks, governance must be treated as a commitment device rather than as an internal optimisation routine. The governing rule set is not an engineering parameter to be tuned in response to transient conditions; it is the boundary condition that defines the game that participants are playing. In a repeated environment where miners (and other economically relevant actors) invest in durable capacity, the relevant question is not whether a rule-change could raise short-run throughput or reduce a perceived technical friction, but whether the system can credibly bind itself to time-consistent constraints so that intertemporal planning remains rational. In the language of rules versus discretion, mutability imports discretionary policy into what must function as a rules-based constitution: once agents assign positive probability to future revision, they rationally compress horizons, increase sensitivity to short-run extraction opportunities, and substitute portable, reversible strategies for capital-deepening investment [
37,
38,
39].
The results reported in this paper operationalise this commitment problem directly. “Rule stability” is not treated as rhetoric; it is an explicit experimental condition. When the institutional state is stable (uncertainty set to ), convergence occurs more quickly and cooperative play is measurably higher than under institutional noise. Conditioning on converged runs, the mean time-to-convergence rises monotonically with uncertainty (from blocks at to blocks at ), while mean cooperation within those converged runs falls (from at to at , and at ). Fork rates are likewise higher under uncertainty in the converged subset (from at to at and at ). These are not philosophical claims; they are the measured signatures of a credibility problem: rule uncertainty makes cooperative convergence slower and less complete, even when the system eventually converges.
The governance implication is that immutability must be framed as an institutional constraint with economic content. The objective is not to “freeze software” in an abstract sense; the objective is to stabilise expectations about the admissible action space. Let the strategic environment be represented as a dynamic game
where
R is the rule set that defines validity and admissibility. If
R is allowed to mutate endogenously, then the feasible strategy set is time-dependent,
, and equilibrium concepts that rely on dynamic consistency become brittle because the continuation game at
is no longer the continuation of the game anticipated at
t. The empirical pattern above is the behavioural footprint of that brittleness: as institutional noise rises, the system spends longer outside the cooperative basin, and the converged cooperative regime is less cooperative on average. This is the classical commitment logic of rules: in an intertemporal setting, credibility is not an optional virtue but a structural precondition for stable cooperative equilibria [
37].
Accordingly, the proposed framework is anchored on two axioms designed to remove endogenous revision risk from within the protocol domain. First, the monetary and validation rule sets that define validity and transaction semantics are treated as fixed constraints, not policy levers. Second, any permitted changes are restricted to verifiable bug mitigation that preserves the original validity predicate (that is, corrections that restore the intended rule rather than reparameterise the rule). The intent is to keep the admissible action space stable, so that strategic plans conditioned on
R remain feasible across time. This is the governance analogue of constitutional constraint: constitutions are not valuable because they are aesthetically rigid; they are valuable because they make expectations about permissible action durable enough to support investment, coordination, and long-horizon contracting [
38].
This approach also clarifies the appropriate locus of “governance”. Governance should not be confused with endogenous protocol revision. Endogenous revision turns governance into internal politics and transforms the protocol from law into policy. In the framework proposed here, governance is external enforcement of an already-defined rule set: dispute resolution, implementation conformance, and adjudication of whether a given change is a bug fix preserving the validity predicate or an amendment that alters the action space. This separation is essential because it prevents strategic actors from treating the rule set as an additional arena for rent-seeking. In institutional economics terms, it limits opportunism by constraining the scope for ex post redefinition of the contract [
39]. In the measured results terms, it is the mechanism that keeps the uncertainty parameter effectively at (or near) the stable baseline, thereby preserving faster convergence and higher cooperative prevalence.
The framework also yields a concrete, testable claim that aligns with the paper’s results: if the system can bind R credibly, then the effective institutional-uncertainty channel is suppressed, and the repeated game remains closer to the stable regime in which convergence is faster and cooperation is higher. Conversely, if R is treated as revisable through endogenous political processes, the institutional state becomes a stochastic driver of behaviour, and the system inherits the observed delays in convergence and the observed reduction in cooperative prevalence. The empirical relationship between higher uncertainty and longer convergence time provides the operational metric of this claim; it supplies an observable cost of mutability even when convergence still occurs.
In summary, immutable monetary rules are not an ideological preference; they are an institutional technology for credibility. Rules do not evolve within the game; they define the game. Governance does not innovate within the validity predicate; it enforces the predicate and adjudicates conformance. Under this framework, cooperation is not assumed as a moral stance; it becomes the rational long-run strategy in a stable repeated environment because the action space does not shift beneath the participants’ intertemporal plans [
37,
38,
39].
5.1.4. Credibility, Calculability, and Institutional Design
A digital monetary system that aspires to support long-horizon contracting must make one property economically legible: the rule set that defines validity, settlement, and ordering must be predictable in a way that is not contingent on discretionary reinterpretation. The central issue is not “community preference” or “engineering agility”; it is whether forward-looking agents can form stable expectations about the mapping from actions to payoffs across time. When the base-layer rule set is treated as revisable, the relevant uncertainty faced by miners and transactors is no longer confined to market states (fees, demand, latency, competition). It becomes second-order uncertainty about the game form itself: what actions will remain admissible, what transactions will remain standard, what validation semantics will remain binding, and what costs will be imposed ex post by policy shifts. That second-order uncertainty is not priced cleanly because it is not generated by the underlying economic environment; it is generated by institutional choice. It therefore contaminates calculability at the precise layer where calculability is required for repeated-game cooperation to survive.
Credibility is the name given in economics to the capacity of an institution to bind future states of the world to an announced constraint. Where credibility is high, expectations anchor; where credibility is low, rational agents allocate effort toward hedging and short-term optionality. Evidence from monetary-policy communication shows the mechanism directly: information that is perceived as credible can measurably shift and (at least temporarily) anchor expectations in the wider public, while weak or transitory communication effects dissipate quickly and leave expectations unanchored [
40]. The analogy is structural rather than rhetorical. A base-layer rule set functions as a commitment device only insofar as the relevant population believes it will not be re-optimised when future states make revision attractive to some coalition. Once agents infer that revision is feasible, the equilibrium object changes: strategies are chosen not merely for their payoff under the current rules, but for their robustness to anticipated rule drift.
Calculability is the operational counterpart of credibility. When the rules governing admissible actions are stable, agents can invest in optimisation that pays off only over many rounds: infrastructure, propagation improvements, higher-capacity validation, and business processes that rely on predictable inclusion and settlement. When the rule environment is perceived as mutable, the private return to such investments falls because the mapping from investment to payoff becomes contingent on a political or coordination process. Investment theory under uncertainty predicts horizon compression: agents substitute away from irreversible capital commitments toward choices that can be reversed or redeployed, even when demand conditions are unchanged. Empirical evidence at the firm level is consistent with this: institutional or policy uncertainty induces reduced investment and a shift in adjustment margins toward more reversible inputs, leaving persistent effects on capital intensity [
41]. In a mining environment, the same logic applies to choices such as capacity expansion, long-term network engineering, and behaviour that is only rational if repeated-game discipline remains credible.
Commitment devices matter precisely because time inconsistency is not a moral flaw; it is a predictable incentive. A future coalition that can change rules will often find it privately optimal to do so once the state realises—yet the anticipation of that possibility distorts behaviour now. The core policy implication is that “flexibility” at the base layer is not a free option: it is an embedded probability mass over future rule states that rational agents must price. Commitment devices work by removing that probability mass. In macroeconomics, the literature on hard commitments (including currency arrangements that constrain discretionary policy) treats the mechanism as reducing the scope for opportunistic re-optimisation and thereby lowering credibility premia that otherwise attach to forward contracts and investment [
42]. The relevant inference for protocol design is straightforward: when the monetary base layer is positioned as revisable, agents will attach a credibility premium to future payoffs and will rationally prefer strategies that monetise the present.
This paper’s results sections operationalise the same structure within the mining game: where the environment is rule-stable, cooperation can be observed to converge and persist; where rule instability is introduced as a state process, behaviour shifts toward myopic extraction, policy switching, and strategic responses to short-run opportunities. The point is not to import central-banking institutions into protocol discourse; it is to recognise that the economic function is identical. A monetary base layer is a constitution for admissible actions, and constitutions work when they are not treated as ordinary policy instruments.
Institutional design therefore has a narrow, technically enforceable target: reduce second-order uncertainty at the base layer to near zero, so that expectations about validity and settlement are not conditional on political or coalition dynamics. Innovation is not eliminated by this constraint; it is relocated to layers where experimentation does not redefine base-layer admissibility. That separation restores calculability because the agent no longer has to forecast two coupled processes—market evolution and rule evolution—in order to plan. When the base layer is credible, the remaining uncertainty is economic rather than institutional, and equilibrium selection reverts to incentives generated by the market state rather than by governance volatility.
The governance conclusion follows in strictly economic terms. If credibility falters, the system’s effective discounting rises: future cooperative payoffs are valued less, punishment mechanisms weaken, and the repeated-game support for cooperative equilibria decays. If calculability collapses, long-horizon investment becomes irrational, and the system becomes dominated by strategies that treat participation as an option rather than a commitment. A fixed-rule base layer is not a stylistic preference; it is the institutional precondition for predictable payoffs, anchored expectations, and sustainable cooperation under repeated interaction [
40,
41,
42].