Theories of consciousness span a wide conceptual spectrum, yet most may be broadly categorised into one of two methodological perspectives: the Local-Quantitative (LOQ), positing consciousness arises exclusively from quantifiable, neurological processes, and the Anti-Local-Quantitative (ALOQ), positing extra-physiological, unquantifiable origins. By delineating key criteria—such as neural localisation, empirical measurability, and metaphysical assumptions—this framework offers a structure with which one may more effectively organise and compare theories ranging from Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988) to Orchestrated Objective Reduction (Hameroff and Penrose, 1996). Rather than replacing existing philosophical taxonomies, this framework serves as a supplementary tool to identify the commitments and experimental conditions of contemporary models. Establishing this dichotomy may streamline discourse, clarify philosophical commitments, and promote more coherent debate in consciousness research.