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Rethinking Emotion as Part of the Arousal Appraisal Model

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26 June 2026

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29 June 2026

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Abstract
The Arousal Appraisal Model (AAM) reconceptualizes emotion as one regime within a structural-continuum model of arousal-regulated experience. Its novelty lies in treating arousal not as an episodic fight-or-flight response, but as a continuous energy-calibration process in which the nervous system samples external sensory input, interoceptive bodily condition, and memory-based meaning to determine how much mobilization is needed now. AAM specifies four graded regimes along a mobilization-capacity continuum: low-load contemplation, matched-load action, excess-load emotion, and overload collapse/freeze. When mobilization remains below the threshold for coordinated output, experience is characterized by quiet readiness and tentative inclination. When mobilization approximates available capacity and can be metabolized through throughput, it becomes coherent engagement or flow-like action. When mobilization exceeds what can be directly deployed into the available task or action pathway, surplus activation is expressed phenomenologically and behaviorally as emotion. This excess is not pathological and does not imply negative valence; it is the natural expression of mobilized energy shaped by appraisal, meaning, social context, and outcome. When exceedance persists under high constraint or blocked action, output may be restricted as collapse or freeze. The model yields testable predictions linking physiological mobilization, capacity, throughput, and appraised constraint to reports of possibility, propulsion, affective expression, or output restriction.
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Subject: 
Social Sciences  -   Psychology

1. Introduction

Accounts of emotion have long oscillated between bodily and cognitive explanations. James-Lange views emphasized bodily change as the basis of emotional awareness, whereas Cannon-Bard views emphasized central coordination of arousal and feeling. Schachter and Singer’s two-factor theory joined these traditions by proposing that emotion depends on physiological arousal interpreted through cognitive context (Schachter & Singer, 1962). Later misattribution and appraisal research reinforced the point that similar autonomic activation can be organized into different felt states depending on meaning, context, and perceived cause (Cotton, 1981; Manstead & Wagner, 1981; Sinclair et al., 1994; Mezzacappa, 1999).
The Arousal Appraisal Model (AAM) extends this lineage by asking a broader question: not only how arousal becomes a particular emotion, but how mobilized energy becomes organized into contemplation, action, emotion, or shutdown. The central claim is that subjective experience tracks a mobilization-capacity relation. Mobilization refers to physiological recruitment for engagement, including autonomic and neuroendocrine activation. Capacity refers to the currently available channels through which that activation can be expressed or integrated: behavioral options, executive control, physiological resilience, and social or relational permission. Throughput refers to the degree to which mobilization is metabolized through coordinated output or integrative processing rather than carried forward as tension, residue, rumination, or shutdown.
The model’s central novelty is this continuous-calibration claim. The nervous system is constantly sampling the outside world through sensory input, the body through interoceptive channels, and its own history through memory-based prediction. These streams are integrated to estimate what level of arousal or energetic readiness is needed now. AAM therefore treats mobilization as an ongoing give-and-take between demand, bodily state, remembered meaning, capacity, and constraint. The important caveat is that, when the system detects an obstacle, uncertainty, or blocked action, its first regulatory solution is often to add energy. This increase may support action when throughput is available, but it becomes excess-load emotion when the added mobilization cannot be effectively expressed or integrated.
The AAM proposes four graded regimes. Low-load contemplation occurs when mobilization remains below the threshold for coordinated output. Matched-load action occurs when mobilization approximates available capacity and can be metabolized through organized behavior. Excess-load emotion occurs when mobilization exceeds what can be deployed into the available task or action pathway and is therefore expressed, carried, or communicated as feeling. Overload collapse/freeze occurs when sustained exceedance persists under high constraint and output becomes restricted. Importantly, excess-load emotion is not defined as pathology. It names a normal regime in which mobilized energy has exceeded immediate task-deployment capacity and therefore becomes expressive.
This paper tightens the AAM as a structural model of arousal-regulated experience. Existing theories describe important parts of the arousal-emotion-action field: appraisal theories clarify meaning, two-factor theory clarifies labeling, flow theory clarifies optimized action, circumplex models map affective coordinates, Yerkes-Dodson describes arousal-performance relations, and window-of-tolerance models describe workable versus unworkable arousal ranges. AAM aims to explain the broader transition architecture linking these phenomena. Its central contribution is to specify how mobilization becomes organized as contemplation, action, emotion, or collapse depending on capacity, throughput, and appraised constraint.

2. The Arousal Appraisal Model

2.1. Core Variables

The model rests on four variables: mobilization, capacity, throughput, and appraisal. Mobilization is the body’s moment-to-moment recruitment for engagement: autonomic activation in the short term, with endocrine support when demand persists. Capacity is the system’s available ability to express or integrate that mobilization through action, executive control, bodily resilience, and social permission. Throughput is the degree to which mobilization is metabolized through coordinated output or integrative processing rather than carried forward as residue. Appraisal is the ongoing interpretive process that estimates significance, cause, controllability, constraint, and available options. These variables operate continuously: the system integrates sensory input, interoceptive state, and memory-based expectation to calibrate how much mobilization is needed, then adjusts that mobilization as demands, obstacles, and options change.
AAM differs from a simple arousal theory because arousal magnitude alone does not determine regime identity. The same level of activation may become absorbed action when output is available, excess-load emotion when output or integration is blocked, or collapse/freeze when sustained mobilization is appraised as inescapable. The model therefore predicts that throughput and appraised constraint should discriminate regimes more effectively than physiological activation alone.

2.2. The Four Regimes

Low-load contemplation. When mobilization remains below the threshold for coordinated output, experience takes the form of possibility rather than discrete emotion. The person may notice passing wishes, inclinations, plans, or faint readiness without full commitment. This regime is not mere inactivity. It is a low-cost sampling mode in which the system conserves energy while simulating possible actions.
Matched-load action. When mobilization approximates available capacity, activation is metabolized through organized output. Phenomenologically, the person often experiences propulsion, clarity, immersion, or ease. Flow states are vivid examples of this configuration, particularly when challenge and skill are balanced and self-monitoring quiets (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). The defining feature is not simply positive feeling or high arousal, but efficient throughput: mobilization is being used rather than carried as residue.
Excess-load emotion. When mobilization exceeds capacity for direct task deployment, expression, or integration, surplus activation is carried subjectively and behaviorally as emotion. The person may experience urgency, agitation, heaviness, tightening, racing cognition, tears, laughter, vocalization, reaching, celebration, disappointment, or other expressive forms. Emotion is therefore not treated as pathology, irrationality, or dysregulation by default. In AAM terms, emotion is surplus mobilization made expressive. Its valence depends on appraisal, meaning, and outcome: similar rising mobilization may become jubilation when a desired outcome occurs, grief or disappointment when it is thwarted, gratitude when connection is restored, or sadness when loss becomes meaningful.
Overload collapse/freeze. When mobilization remains high while action is blocked, socially dangerous, or appraised as futile, the system may restrict output. Collapse/freeze may appear as going blank, numbing, detachment, immobilization, or loss of initiative. In the AAM, collapse/freeze is used as a cautious functional umbrella for output restriction under sustained exceedance, not as a claim that all freezing, collapse, dissociation, or shutdown states share a single mechanism or autonomic profile. The model predicts that many such states are preceded by mobilization under blocked output or high constraint, even when later physiology includes hypoarousal or mixed autonomic features. Defensive-freezing and trauma literatures support the broader view that immobilization can be an organized survival response rather than simple low arousal (Frewen & Lanius, 2015; Roelofs, 2017).

2.3. Transition Rule and Boundary Conditions

The AAM’s primary transition rule is that regime identity changes as mobilization is appraised relative to capacity and as throughput becomes available or blocked. When mobilization is low and options remain uncommitted, the system tends toward contemplation. When mobilization is sufficient and usable, it tends toward matched-load action. When an obstacle, uncertainty, or blocked action is detected, the system often attempts to solve the problem by increasing mobilization. If that added energy can be routed through action or integration, it may support engagement; if it cannot, it is carried as excess-load emotion. If mobilization remains high while viable output is blocked or appraised as unsafe, the system may shift toward collapse/freeze as a protective output-restriction mode.
The word capacity is relative. A given mobilization level may be metabolized as action in one person or context and experienced as excess-load emotion in another, depending on skill, health, fatigue, social constraint, and regulatory scaffolding. Likewise, modest mobilization may feel excessive when capacity is sharply reduced by illness, exhaustion, shame, or lack of viable action. The model therefore predicts person-by-context variability rather than fixed arousal thresholds.
This framing also clarifies mixed or rapidly shifting states. Mixed emotions may reflect competing appraisals operating on shared mobilization; a person may appraise the same activation as opportunity, threat, duty, shame, or loss within seconds. Regime shifts are therefore not discrete modules switching on and off, but reorganizations of mobilization as demand, capacity, outcome, and meaning change. A simple spectator example illustrates the point. As fans watch a team approach a score, external cues increase significance and mobilization rises, even though the fans cannot directly deploy that energy into the task of scoring. Eyes widen, bodies lean forward, hands reach toward others, and the room becomes tense. If the team scores, accumulated mobilization may be appraised as success and discharged outwardly as jubilation. If the team misses, the same accumulated mobilization may be appraised as thwarted expectation and collapse inward: the spectator may sink back into the seat, become silent, or appear frozen while later reporting intense disappointment or devastation. The energy itself is not positive or negative. Appraisal, outcome, context, and available expression channels organize whether it is expressed outwardly, held inwardly, socially shared, or restricted.

2.4. Neurophysiological Grounding

AAM is consistent with contemporary affective neuroscience in which the amygdala is not a simple fear center but part of a relevance-detection system that helps recruit resources in response to biologically or personally significant events (Sander et al., 2003; Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). Amygdala-centered mobilization is embedded in distributed networks involving prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, insula, anterior cingulate cortex, and brain-body interoceptive systems. These networks estimate salience, urgency, controllability, and available response options.
The HPA axis provides a slower endocrine arm of mobilization. Cortisol responses are especially reliable under social-evaluative threat and low controllability, a profile that maps onto AAM’s emphasis on sustained mobilization under constraint (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). In this sense, physiological mobilization is not merely a response to danger; it is a resource-allocation process shaped by appraisal. When mobilization can be routed into action or integration, it may return toward baseline. When it cannot, residual activation becomes more likely to appear as emotional urgency, rumination, or shutdown.
The model does not require that every regime have a unique neural signature. It predicts instead that regimes will be distinguishable by dynamic patterns linking autonomic/endocrine mobilization, throughput, appraised controllability, and phenomenological report.

3. Relation to Existing Theories: AAM as a Structural Continuum Model

The AAM is not offered as one more theory competing at the same level as existing models of emotion, arousal, appraisal, performance, or defensive response. It is proposed as a structural continuum model within which those theories describe different portions of a broader regulatory field. Two-factor and appraisal theories explain how physiological activation is interpreted; circumplex models locate affective states along arousal and valence dimensions; Yerkes-Dodson describes arousal-performance relations; flow theory describes optimal challenge-capacity matching; predictive-processing accounts formalize affect as inference about bodily state; allostatic accounts emphasize anticipatory resource allocation; and window-of-tolerance models describe workable and unworkable arousal ranges. The AAM organizes these contributions by specifying how mobilization, capacity, throughput, and appraised constraint determine whether activation is lived as contemplation, coordinated action, excess-load emotion, or collapse/freeze. Its novelty is therefore not that arousal, prediction, appraisal, or bodily regulation matter, but that moment-to-moment energy calibration can be mapped onto distinct experiential regimes.
This distinction is especially important in relation to predictive-processing and allostatic accounts. Predictive-processing models emphasize the brain’s generation of predictions and the updating of those predictions in light of incoming sensory and interoceptive information; allostatic models emphasize anticipatory regulation of bodily resources in preparation for expected demands (Sterling & Eyer, 1988). The AAM instead foregrounds present-centered energetic calibration. It proposes that the nervous system continuously assesses external input, bodily condition, and memory-based meaning to estimate the amount of mobilization required now. Prediction and anticipation may inform that assessment, but they are not the model’s primary explanatory target. The AAM asks whether mobilized energy is below output threshold, matched to capacity, exceeding capacity, or sustained under constraint. In this way, it translates ongoing input assessment into a regime model of contemplation, action, emotion, and collapse/freeze.

3.1. Two-Factor and Appraisal Theories

AAM extends this tradition by changing the unit of analysis. It asks not simply which emotion the person experiences, but which regulatory configuration mobilization enters. Appraisal is not only labeling; it evaluates significance, controllability, constraint, and available options. On this view, the same arousal-appraisal process may yield emotion, but it may also yield contemplation, coordinated action, or protective output restriction. Two-factor theory explains how arousal becomes labeled feeling; AAM explains why arousal becomes feeling in some conditions, action in others, and collapse when capacity and throughput are blocked.

3.2. Flow, Performance, and Arousal Maps

Flow theory describes states in which challenge and skill are matched and engagement becomes intrinsically absorbing (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990). AAM interprets flow-like states as instances of matched-load action: mobilization is high enough to support performance but remains coupled to available capacity and efficient throughput. The Yerkes-Dodson law describes an inverted-U relation between arousal and performance (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), but AAM reframes this curve as a matching problem rather than a simple arousal problem. Performance declines not because arousal is intrinsically too high, but because mobilization begins to exceed the limiting capacity channel under current constraints. Circumplex models locate affect by arousal and valence (Russell, 1980), while window-of-tolerance models distinguish workable from unworkable arousal (Siegel, 1999). AAM adds a transition rule: similar arousal can be sampled as contemplation, metabolized as action, carried as emotion, or restricted as collapse/freeze depending on throughput and appraised constraint.

3.3. Predictive Processing, Constructionism, and Autonomic-State Models

Predictive-processing and interoceptive-inference accounts describe emotion as inference about bodily state under uncertainty (Seth & Friston, 2016), and constructionist theories emphasize that emotion categories emerge from bodily activation interpreted through context, learned concepts, language, culture, and social meaning (Barrett, 2017). AAM is compatible with these accounts but addresses a different level of explanation. Constructionist theories help explain how a mobilized bodily state is categorized as a particular emotion, such as anger, fear, sadness, gratitude, joy, shame, or pride. AAM asks a prior regulatory question: how mobilization is generated, calibrated, deployed, or left as surplus in the first place. In AAM terms, constructionist accounts help explain why surplus mobilization is experienced and labeled as one emotion rather than another; AAM explains how mobilization becomes surplus rather than being absorbed into contemplation, coordinated action, or protective output restriction. Thus, constructionist theories describe one portion of the continuum, whereas AAM specifies the mobilization-capacity architecture within which that portion arises.
A similar distinction applies to autonomic-state models. Polyvagal Theory emphasizes context-sensitive autonomic shifts linked to safety, social engagement, and defensive response (Porges, 2011). AAM uses a more general mobilization-capacity rule: it does not require a one-to-one mapping between subjective regime and autonomic state, and remains cautious about whether collapse/freeze presents with high sympathetic arousal, later hypoarousal, or mixed autonomic patterns. Its claim is that subjective regimes track dynamic relations among mobilization, capacity, throughput, and appraised constraint.

4. Operationalization and Testable Predictions

4.1. Operational Definitions and Measurement Anchors

AAM can be tested by measuring four linked variables: mobilization, capacity, throughput, and appraised constraint. Mobilization refers to moment-to-moment physiological recruitment for engagement and may be indexed through heart rate, heart-rate variability, electrodermal activity, respiration, pupil dilation, cortisol, startle, wearable-derived activation estimates, and brief subjective activation ratings. Capacity refers to currently available resources for expression and integration and may be indexed through task skill, fatigue, sleep quality, working-memory load, available behavioral options, perceived permission to act, social safety, physiological resilience, and recovery history.
Throughput is the degree to which mobilization is converted into coordinated output or integrative processing rather than carried forward as residue. In early studies, throughput can be indexed by action completion, motor initiation latency, time-on-task, error-adjusted performance, recovery speed, persistence under demand, and low spillover after task completion. Residue can be indexed through rumination, intrusive monitoring, lingering tension, repeated rehearsal, and delayed physiological recovery. Appraised constraint refers to the perceived availability of viable action, and can be assessed through ratings of controllability, blocked output, social-evaluative threat, inability to leave or respond, and perceived safety.
Surplus mobilization should therefore not be equated with subjective emotion intensity. Subjective intensity is one reportable expression of surplus mobilization, but the construct can also be operationalized as a mismatch between physiological or task activation and effective throughput. For example, two individuals may report similar emotional intensity while differing in action efficiency, recovery speed, motor agitation, rumination, muscular tension, or residual physiological activation. AAM predicts that surplus mobilization will be visible in these mismatch markers: physiological activation relative to task output; impaired coordination, latency, or error-adjusted performance; delayed recovery; intrusive monitoring or repeated rehearsal; and expressive discharge through voice, gesture, posture, facial expression, or social signaling. The empirical question is therefore not only how emotional a person feels, but whether mobilized energy has been metabolized through task performance or integration, or remains as residual activation requiring expression, discharge, communication, or interpretation.

4.2. Discriminant Criteria for the Four Regimes

The four AAM regimes should be distinguished by the relation among mobilization, capacity, throughput, and constraint rather than by arousal level alone. Low-load contemplation is expected when mobilization is below the threshold for coordinated output, throughput is low by design, optionality remains preserved, and experience is reported as possibility, inclination, or quiet readiness. Matched-load action is expected when mobilization is moderate to high, capacity is sufficient, throughput is high, feedback is usable, and experience is reported as propulsion, absorption, or coherent doing.
Excess-load emotion is expected when mobilization exceeds available capacity for direct task deployment, expression, or integration, throughput becomes inefficient or indirect, and activation is expressed as urgency, pressure, tears, laughter, vocalization, celebration, disappointment, rumination, or differentiated feeling. The discriminant issue is not whether the emotion is positive or negative, but whether mobilization is being directly metabolized through the task or has become surplus energy that must be expressed, carried, communicated, or integrated. Overload collapse/freeze is expected when exceedance is sustained under high constraint or low perceived controllability and output becomes restricted.
This also distinguishes task-deployment action from expressive emotional action. AAM does not claim that emotion lacks action; emotional expression is often embodied and active. The key question is whether the action deploys mobilization into the demand itself or expresses surplus mobilization when direct task completion is unavailable, blocked, or already complete. In a sporting event, players can metabolize mobilization through task-deployment action: running, passing, defending, or scoring. Spectators may become similarly mobilized as a scoring opportunity develops, but they cannot deploy that energy into the game itself. Their mobilization may therefore become expressive: widened eyes, leaning forward, standing, shouting, embracing, groaning, sinking back into the seat, or becoming silent. These are actions or output patterns, but they are expressive-discharge or output-restriction responses rather than actions that complete the original task.
Nor does surplus imply loudness, pathology, or uniformly high outward arousal. Quiet emotions are not necessarily low-intensity emotions. Tenderness, calm gratitude, nostalgia, grief, or disappointment may appear externally subdued while being experienced internally as deep or powerful. Tenderness may involve approach mobilization held as care or protective orientation; nostalgia may involve memory-evoked mobilization without a present action target; calm gratitude may involve mobilization toward appreciation, connection, or receptivity; and grief may involve mobilization toward repair, reunion, protest, or meaning-making when no action can restore the loss. In AAM, emotion arises when mobilization, whether visibly intense or externally quiet, becomes available to awareness, expression, integration, or meaning rather than being fully absorbed into immediate task throughput.
The AAM therefore distinguishes subjective intensity from outward expression. External behavior is only one channel of mobilization and should not be treated as a direct proxy for emotional depth. A person may show high subjective intensity with high external expression, as in exuberant celebration; high subjective intensity with low external expression, as in silent devastation; low-to-moderate subjective intensity with gentle expression, as in quiet appreciation; or high mobilization with restricted output, as in shock, shame, grief, or disappointment that becomes stillness. In this sense, still rivers may run deep: the absence of overt expression does not imply the absence of mobilization. Surplus mobilization may be outwardly expressed, inwardly held, socially communicated, integrated through meaning, or restricted depending on appraisal, outcome, context, and available channels for expression.
AAM should therefore be read as a model of shared regulatory architecture rather than as a claim that all emotions are identical, equally intense, or reducible to arousal quantity. Emotion categories may differ in appraisal, action tendency, social meaning, temporal course, expressive channel, and subjective intensity. Anger, fear, joy, grief, tenderness, nostalgia, awe, and gratitude need not share the same physiological profile or outward form. What they share, in AAM terms, is a regulatory condition in which mobilization becomes experientially salient because it is not fully absorbed into immediate task deployment and must instead be expressed, held, socially communicated, integrated, or restricted. The model therefore generalizes at the level of mobilization-capacity architecture, while preserving important differences among particular emotions.

4.3. First Empirical Hypotheses

First, for a given level of physiological mobilization, regime classification should be better predicted by throughput and appraised constraint than by arousal magnitude alone. Similar activation should be more likely to appear as matched-load action when task demands are clear, skill is adequate, feedback is available, and response options are permitted; it should be more likely to appear as excess-load emotion when output is blocked, meaning is threatening, or integrative capacity is reduced.
Second, high-mobilization states should separate into matched-load action and excess-load emotion on the basis of metabolization versus residue. Matched-load action should show relatively stable performance, lower subjective effort relative to demand, faster recovery, and lower post-task residue. Excess-load emotion should show higher subjective effort, tension, rumination or intrusive monitoring, impaired recovery, and reduced effective output despite comparable or even lower mobilization.
Third, output-restriction states described here as overload collapse/freeze should be most likely when sustained mobilization occurs under high constraint and low perceived controllability, especially in socially evaluative or inescapable conditions. This hypothesis concerns a functional pathway rather than a single autonomic signature. Fourth, interventions that reduce mobilization, expand capacity, or reopen throughput should shift regime reports in predictable directions: from excess-load emotion toward action or contemplation, and from collapse/freeze toward a wider range of viable outputs.

4.4. Early Study Designs and Falsifiability

Initial studies need not require a fully developed AAM-specific scale. A practical first step would combine physiological monitoring, task performance, brief regime ratings, and controllability/constraint ratings. Experimental work could manipulate mobilization through exercise, CO2 challenge, time pressure, social evaluation, or cognitive load, while manipulating capacity and throughput through skill-demand matching, feedback clarity, response options, and behavioral permission. Experience-sampling and EMA designs could test whether daily shifts in mobilization-capacity mismatch predict transitions among contemplation, action, emotion, and shutdown.
AAM is falsifiable. It would be weakened if regime classification were no better predicted by throughput and appraised controllability/constraint than by arousal magnitude alone. It would also be weakened if high-arousal states failed to differentiate into matched-load action and excess-load emotion based on throughput and residue, or if output-restriction states typically emerged without evidence of prior mobilization under blocked output or constraint. These tests would determine whether AAM adds a transition architecture beyond existing descriptive maps of arousal, affect, performance, and defensive response.

5. Clinical and Everyday Implications

Clinically, AAM reframes emotion regulation as the restoration of flexible movement among regimes. The goal is not to eliminate arousal or emotion, nor to treat emotion as pathological. Rather, the aim is to improve the system’s ability to sample options, deploy mobilization when action is available, express surplus energy when action is not available, symbolize and integrate activation, and recover from states of overload. Interventions may therefore reduce unnecessary mobilization, expand capacity, open viable channels for throughput, or support safe expression of surplus mobilization.
Many established interventions can be described in AAM terms. Somatic and breath-based approaches reduce mobilization and restore physiological capacity. Cognitive reappraisal changes how mobilization is interpreted and may reduce amygdala-linked reactivity through prefrontal modulation (Beauregard et al., 2001; Schaefer et al., 2002; Doll et al., 2016; Farb & Anderson, 2012). Behavioral activation and values-based action create viable throughput, allowing energy that might otherwise become rumination or agitation to become coordinated engagement. Relational support can increase capacity by changing appraised constraint and restoring permission for expression.
This framework also helps normalize states often moralized as weakness. Low-load contemplation may be a useful regulatory stance rather than avoidance. Excess-load emotion may be a natural expression of mobilization exceeding immediate deployment capacity rather than proof of irrationality. Collapse/freeze may be a protective output-restriction regime rather than laziness or indifference. AAM therefore offers a nonjudgmental language for understanding how arousal becomes lived experience.

6. Consciousness and Integrative Awareness

The AAM has implications for consciousness, but it need not function as a full theory of consciousness. Its more limited claim is that reportable experience reflects how mobilization is being organized by appraisal and capacity. Consciousness, in this functional sense, is an interface through which the organism registers whether energy is possible, usable, excessive, or restricted. Low-load contemplation is registered as possibility; matched-load action as absorbed doing; excess-load emotion as urgency or differentiated feeling; and collapse/freeze as blankness, numbing, or enforced stillness.
This framing avoids treating consciousness as a passive observer of emotion. What becomes felt is part of the regulatory process: the system renders its energetic situation intelligible enough to guide engagement, restraint, expression, or recovery. Further work will be needed to connect this functional account to broader theories of consciousness, but AAM’s immediate contribution is to make lived experience part of the control architecture rather than a secondary report after regulation has occurred.

7. Conclusion

The model’s contribution is not to replace existing theories of emotion, arousal, appraisal, flow, performance, or shutdown, but to explain how their observations can be organized within one energy-calibration system. The nervous system is constantly sampling sensory input, bodily condition, and memory-based meaning to estimate how much mobilization is needed now. When mobilization remains below output threshold, experience tends toward contemplation; when it matches capacity and throughput, it becomes action; when it exceeds immediate task-deployment capacity, it becomes expressive emotion; and when exceedance persists under constraint, it may become collapse/freeze. On this account, emotion is not pathology but a family of expressive, inwardly held, socially communicated, or restricted forms of surplus mobilization shaped by appraisal, meaning, context, and outcome. This gives AAM a specific transition rule for how energy becomes experience.
Future work should test whether throughput and appraised constraint predict regime identity beyond arousal magnitude alone. If supported, AAM would offer a parsimonious framework linking psychophysiology, appraisal, consciousness, performance, and clinical regulation across everyday and high-stress contexts.

Author Contributions

The author is solely responsible for the conception, drafting, and final approval of this manuscript.

Funding

This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement

This theoretical work did not involve human participants or animals and therefore required no institutional ethics approval.

Data Availability Statement

No datasets were generated or analyzed for this article.

Conflicts of Interest

The author declares no conflict of interest.

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