2. Literature Review
2.1. Banking Sector Efficacy; Definition and Descriptive Statistics
Efficacy of the banking sector or the ability of the banking sector to respond to investors’ financing requirements:
It is expressed by e((Cd-Cs)/LTD)
Where:
According to Bernie Kehrwald (2014) in “The excess demand theory of money”:
“There is no generally accepted theory of how the interest rate is determined. The Keynesian liquidity preference theory claims the interest rate brings together the demand for liquidity and the money supply set by the central bank. The neoclassical loanable funds theory on the contrary suggests that the interest rate is the equilibrium price of capital and hence determined by capital supply (savings) and capital demand (investment)”
Bernie Kehrwald (2014) introduced a new theory that combines both views and gives a better understanding of the interest rate, the credit market and the nature of the central bank in what is called the excess demand theory of money.
As far as this new theory is concerned, it is pointless to go into details. But, according to our understanding of the related theoretical underpinnings, it is noteworthy to state that the credit market doesn’t clear when there are informational asymmetries and imperfect completion, fact that is prevailing in practical and should be conveyed full concern.
Under the framework of our setting of variables in this research, credit demand is the amount of credit that investors are willing to obtain in order to finance their investment activities, whereas credit supply is the amount of loanable funds available for deploying financing by the banks and other financial institutions.
The problem that banks have a certain risk aversion, a certain range of information concerning past performance of investors in their investment activities. Besides, there are some barriers to entry to be allocated credit further exacerbates the extent to which the credit sector functions accurately and the extent to which it heralds disruptions that lead to staggered and biased flows.
Indeed, it is noteworthy to state that credit can be obtained after a certain period of movement in the banking account of enterprises what makes credit supply do not respond to investors needs during the initial period before the bank has gathered information on the path of cash flows of the enterprise to determine the solvency of the investor and the amount of credit it should allocate to him.
This refers to imperfect information and is added to other disruptions to be reviewed more in depth in the following research.
Besides competition is imperfect between banks as banks with older accounts are more eligible to approve credit than banks with new accounts because of information asymmetries.
Therefore the bank can play on the loan rate as if it were acting in monopolistic settings because it is aware that if the investor shifts the bank he wouldn’t have access to credit until he has performed enough movement in the account what constraints his access to credit during a certain period he would be willing to be allocated credit and is willing to forego a lower loan price with delayed delivery for a fast credit with a higher loan price.
e((Cd-Cs)/LTD) is an indicator of the banking system risk aversion or its intension to cover the financing requirements and needs of investors that postulate for credit in other words credit demanders.
Banks proceed to an arbitrage between credit risk and profitability expectations that go hand in hand, on the one hand, and solvency and liquidity, on the other hand.
Prudential regulations in terms of solvency and liquidity as have been emphasized in Basel III have the tendency to depress the allocation efficiency of banking credit for two main reasons.
Firstly, a theoretical reason that stems from the introduction of frictions in the credit market and secondly, a practical managerial reason that results from the fact that the intermediation margin or the essence of banking profitability goes hand in hand with risk.
The more banks bear risk the more they respond accurately to the investors needs of financing or to credit demand.
An increase in this elasticity e((Cd-Cs)/LTD) means that the banking system is less and less effectual
A decrease in this elasticity means that the banking system is more and more effectual.
The main problem that confers to this instrument a role of prominent importance stems from the fact that the relationship between banking system efficiency and financial vulnerability and systemic risk differs according to the term structure purview of assessment.
Indeed, in the short run, if the elasticity is important, it means that banks make the implementation of macro-prudential directives prevail and far outweigh the importance of the response to investors’ financing needs and the banks’ sake for profitability. This means that they are reticent to bearing risk and by a way of consequence mitigate financial vulnerability.
But, this is not the point. Indeed, in this respect, in the long run, there will be a reverse effect that results from the cumulating absence of a learning phenomenon for industrial enterprises that have been in the short run credit demanders and whose needs have not been fulfilled. Indeed, the shortage in responding to their financing needs would have been exacerbated their balance sheets at that point that they would have not engaged in high risk high return investment projects.
Therefore, their ability to manage risk bearing industrial activities like research and development based projects would not have been motivated and their ability to repay their debt would have been exacerbated.
This would have negative repercussions over the long run on credit tolerable by banks as they learned that investment activities bear more and more risk because the industrial sector would have not beneficiated from enough leakage to learn how to improve risk management and profitability in a way that risk decreases and profitability decreases because of a learning effect.
Those enterprises are more and more eligible to make default for the same level of risk, what exerts negative repercussions on the risk tolerable by banks.
And the other way round holds too.
If in the short run the elasticity is weak, this means that banks are badly warned in terms of macro-prudential surveillance because their efficiency imposes to make the fact of responding to investors’ financing needs prevail.
Those bear eventually excessive risk and exacerbate early warning considerations over the short run.
But, in the long run, the fact that banks have already engaged in making the response to high-risk investment activities prevail would turn to be beneficial for the learning effect of research and development firms that would have been beginning to fructify their engagement in high risk and the vast majority of earlier risky credit allocations would be repaying back its credit.
Besides the sophistication in the industrial sector that would have resulted would have good repercussions on the tolerable credit risk from an assessment standpoint of bankers that would find that more risk bearing has become safer and pays back credit.
In definitive, the prudential authorities have the imperative to consider thoroughly this arbitrage and reversal effect between the short term and the long term considerations and weigh the stake of bearing more pain in the short run and compromise credit risk and financial vulnerability and benefice in the long run from a more efficient industrial sector that motivates risk bearing at a lesser cost and an improves solvency and liquidity for banks with a better profitability or the other way round which means safeguarding the imperatives of mitigating financial vulnerability in the short run and not engaging in risky financing but exacerbating the situation of the industrial sector and engaging in a bandwagon effect of toughened surveillance and decreased efficiency that results in calling the urge for more strict regulation and so forth.
Determination of the adequate formula to express banking system efficacy:
1st scenario: Impact of credit production on volume of rejected credit: e(ECD/LTD)
As explained above.
2nd scenario: Impact of volume of accepted credit on volume of rejected credit: e(ECD/Cs)
Accepted credit is not a determinant factor for rejection of credit.
Cs alone does not inform on the willingness of the bank to produce credit. The figure must include also the funds financing credit production.
The elasticity expresses the choice among low risk and high risk credit and how much does low risk investment financing affects high risk investment financing by the bank because usually rejected credit is high risk and supplied credit is moderately less risky.
But the proportion of Cs out of deposits informs on the willingness of the bank to produce credit. Thus its impact on rejected credit informs on banking system efficacy or the extent of responsiveness to investors needs.
For a banking sector distinguished by excessive information asymmetries and skyrocketing borrowing rates investors are very sensitive to monetary policy announcements because they are claimed to bear excessive costs for financing their projects.
Therefore their expectations are rational and not adaptive.
We are hence in a New Keynesian world where monetary policy efficacy cannot stimulate investment or where the zero lower bound for monetary rate should be adopted in face of price and information stickiness.
Banking sector efficacy which gauges the extent of response to investor needs for financing are therefore independent from monetary policy and exclusively dependent on the frictions imbedded in the banking sector which are high agency costs due to excessive information asymmetries.
This explain also the important role played by non performing loans in modeling banking sector efficacy in comparison to monetary policy instruments although the credit is a major transmission mechanism of monetary policy. It does not herald a major role played by monetary policy because information asymmetries shield the search for yield motivation of the banking sector and skyrockets the borrowing cost as banks prefer not to adjust to the equilibrium price of demand and supply of credit rather try to compensate for high agency costs.
Monetary policy is claimed to be ineffective in face of rational expectations of individual investors.
Again the specificities of the banking sector prevail as a major determinant of banking sector efficacy as assessed by monetary policy determinants because agents, bankers and investors are forward looking but the New Keynesian model for monetary policy effectiveness advocates a backward looking foresightedness.
Monetary policy is ineffective although price stickiness because of information rigidities that abide competitive borrowing rates in the equilibrium between demand and supply of credit.
The credit sector is very sensitive to the agency costs and is willing to forego profitability for financial stability.
Hence banking sector efficacy which fathoms in the same time profitability and risk exposure prospects is purely dependent on banking sector specificities pertaining to non performing loans rather than short term interest rates knowing that New Keynesian monetary policy is claimed to be effective in the short run thus having short run money market rates or monetary policy determinants model well enough banking system efficacy that signals the strive of banks for profitability and for resilience from financial instability.
Banking sector efficacy reveals a good anchor of the credit sector agent behavior that make the researcher likely to assert predilections on its role on monetary policy conduction and the extent to which the credit sector fulfills the requirement of funding flows from the entity in excess of financing sources to the entity in short of financing sources, which is the mainstream objective of the financial system.
2.2. Effectiveness of Monetary Policy for a New Keynesian Framework with a Credit Sector
According to Piazzesi, Rogers and Schneider (2022) in their article Money and Banking in a New Keynesian model: “ Interest rates on short safe bonds targeted by central banks are not well accounted for by asset pricing models that fit expected returns on other assets such a ong term bonds or stocks”.
The short rate disconnect implies that pass through from the policy rate to the interest rate on savings is imperfect. It is relatively strong at typical parameters values because banks supply of inside money is sensitive to the cost of liquidity.
The process of the disconnect arises because short safe bonds are held by banks to back inside money; the convenience yield on those bonds which is the difference between the short rate and the savings rate reflects their benefit as safe collateral in such a world the plumbing of the economy or the nature of payment flows as well as the structure and assets of the banking system matters for the transmission of monetary policy.
In the short run:
Standard New Keynesian logic says that nominal rigidities imply a higher real short rate and lower nominal spending.
However, lower nominal spending lowers the convenience yield on inside money and hence on short safe bonds that back inside money be they interbank loans or reserves. The overall return on safe bonds therefore does not increase as much as the policy rate itself.
In the long run:
Nominal rigidities vanish but the issue of imperfect competition is a braking force for the transmission of monetary policy.
Indeed, as long as the credit sector is in a monopolistic competition the pricing of loans is at a mark up over marginal costs.
This mark up is not pertaining to the transmission of monetary policy but to the market structure and competition among banks.
Hence forth, the perturbation which is aimed at affecting credit supply through the mechanism of money market rate indeed affects slightly the pricing of loans and vanishes without propagating across the credit channel of transmission to credit supply investment output and inflation.
Therefore, in the short run monetary policy is ineffective because of nominal rigidities and in the long run it is not effective because of imperfect competition in the credit sector.
Since pass through to other interest rates occurs to equate total risk’s adjusted returns, the response of the convenience yield to spending dampens the policy impact on output and inflation.
The market structure of the credit sector through dichotomizing marginal cost and marginal revenue makes transmission obstructed.
As imperfect competition imposes a mark up over marginal cost it slows down the transmission of monetary policy to output and hence obstructs monetary policy efficacy.
This is due to the fact that as long as the loan price is determined as an imperfectly competitive mark up over money market rates once the money market rate is disturbed the transmission through the cost push is obstructed because of the discrepancies with the loan rate.
The more the mark up is far from the money market rate the more the transmission is slowed down and obstructed.
Credit risk and monopolistic competition are playing a braking role to the transmission of the monetary policy as the cost push is less reactive when the overall loan price is elevated.
The more the income is high the more Bankers are less and less sensitive to an increase in costs which might be due to higher agency costs or segmentation based pricing that might exacerbate the high risk premiums especially for monopolistic competition where banks impose a mark up for loans correspondingly to the preferential rates for deposits.
Bernanke and Blinder (1988) identified another aspect of the credit market that affects tremendously monetary policy effectiveness.
According to them:“By relaxing the assumption of perfect bank credit to bond substitutability, there is an independent credit multiplier for monetary policy in addition to the conventional IS-LM monetary multiplier. Imperfect substitutability leads to an increase in leverage of monetary policy. The imperfect substitutability is deriving from the specialness of bank lending which results in bank loan rates becoming partially insulated from the effects of monetary policy hence reducing the leverage of monetary policy ”.
The textbook IS-LM accounts for the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy as centering exclusively on the liabilities side of the bank’s balance sheet and as a counterpart of that the assets side of the non banking private sector.
For instance a tightening monetary policy which raises the interest rate enacted through contraction of bank reserves leads to a shrinking of the banks’ balance sheet and a reallocation non banking private sector assets by substituting money balances with interest bearing bonds which leads to the increase in bond yields providing thereby the re-equilibrating mechanism by which this portfolio reallocation is brought about.
As yields are bid up real activity contracts which forms the money view of the transmission mechanism.
This process is obstructed by the imperfect substitutability that constraints the transmission of the effect of the contraction on yields and real activity and henceforth attenuates monetary policy effectiveness.
Nevertheless, at this stage of the analysis the prevalence of a credit multiplier besides the monetary multiplier would suggest that the fall in borrowing due to the imperfect substitutability between money balances and bonds would lead loans to fall more proportionately to the initial increase in interest rates which would contract output. This would contrariwise to the obstruction of the substitution of money balances with bonds increase the potency of monetary policy indirectly.
According to Levin et Al (2003) there is a need for inertial strategies for the conduct of monetary policy. Although these are useless in affecting credit supply as required for the sake of enhancing the transmission process of the conduct of monetary policy it still remains that even credit demand should be subjected to manipulation through discretionary policy if not stickiness would abide any effect of monetary policy far beyond the claims of short run inefficacy and long run efficacy due to relaxation of nominal rigidities over the long run.
He states that: “Aggregate demand remains primarily a function of long term or the sequence of expected short term interest rates implying that inertial strategies which strongly influence expected interest rates are central to good policy design”.
In this regard, the fact that banking sector assessment with respect to risk and exposure are backward looking risk premiums are based on past observations of non performance of loans and financial performance of borrowers. This further exacerbates the ineffectiveness of monetary policy that expects agents to expectations adjustments with a certain forward looking outlay.
Mankiw and Reis (2010) study the information framework that incorporates an important role for the interaction of monetary policy strategy and expectations formations.
Stickiness of information reveals compromising for the effectiveness of monetary policy according to them.
Hence in the new Keynesian framework alongside price stickiness information stickiness intervenes in the effectiveness of the conduct of monetary policy and highlights the critical role banking sector dynamics exert on the manifestation of the objectives of monetary policy as this financial sector drives both price and information stickiness.
2.3. The Model
The households:
The households consume complementary goods which are consumption goods and cash balances.
The welfare maximization takes into account these two items that are complementary
The producer:
The producer offers output Y and quantity Q that are deriving from the standard inter-temporal Euler equation is=δ+π where δ=1-β-1 is the household’s discount factor
Y=((ε-1/ε)(1/¥)*Q-(1-µ/ơ))(1/(δ+1/ơ))
Q=(1+ϣµ(δ+π-id/1+δ+π)1-µ)1/1-µ
The central bank:
The New Keynesian equation for interest rate pass through:
Is,t-ς=ip,t-rp+ (ς-rp)/µ*(pt^+yt^-dt^)
(ς-rp)/µ*(pt^+yt^-dt^). Convenience yield increasing in velocity
Household money demand:
dt^=yt^+ pt^-(µ/(ς-rd))*(is,t-id,t-(ς-rd,t))
The credit sector:
The credit sector offers loans to the producer and households at a certain averaged rate Lr and collects deposits from households and firms at a rate id.
It is distinguished by deposits, reserve requirements, information asymmetries and banking specificities such as Non performing loans and the sensitivity of excess credit demand to non performing loans and agency costs.
The credit sector is motivated by the search for yields. It strives for profit maximization.
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model, the Loan rate is the risky rate:
Lr= R(risk free) + β*(Risk premium)
Risk premium = (Information asymmetries + NPLs+ Credit risk)/Reserve requirements
The banking sector maximizes its profits:
Max π =Max (Cs*Lr- Agency costs - Operating costs)
The efficacy of the banking sector is measured in terms of the impact of credit production on excess credit demand
BSE= e((Cd-Cs)/LTD)
The problem is to maximize BSE = e((Cd-Cs)/LTD)
It is maximized when de/dr=0
The sensitivity e(ECD/LTD) is the expression of the impact of a supply item LTD on a demand item ECD= Cd-Cs at the economy level concerning the credit sector.
This indeed recalls the short run adjustment of aggregate demand and supply in the IS-LM model whereby AD and AS adjust to form short run equilibrium at a given price level.
Hence we can take e(ECD/LTD)=Ω*(dY/dP) where Y and P are taken from the short run IS-LM equilibrium.
The expression of the Money market equilibrium is taken from the total differentiation of M/p real money balances.
M/p=l(r) +k(y)+ (Interest received/Lr)+D+ECD
M/p=l(r) +k(y) +(interests recieved/(r+β(IA+CR+AC/RR))+D + ςOG
d(M/p) = l’dr+k’dy+(-interests received* dr)/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2+ςdy
d(M/p)=(l’-(interests received/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2))dr+(k’+ς)dy
dy=1/(k’+ς)*((interests received/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2-l’)dr+d(M/p)
dy/dr=1/(k’+ς)*((interests received/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2-l’)+d(M/p)
By chain rule we have:
dy/dr= dy/dp*dp/dr
dy/dp=dy/dr*dr/dp
dy/dp=1/(k’+ς)*((interests received/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2-l’)dr/dp+dMdr/pdp+Mdr/p2
e(ECD/LTD)=Ω*(1/(k’+ς)*((interests received/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2-l’)dr/dp+dMdr/pdp+Mdr/p2)
e(ECD/LTD) is maximized when de/dr =0
de/dr= Ω*((1/(k’+ς)* (interests received(2r+2 β(IA+CR+AC/RR)/ (r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))4*1/dp+(dM+M/p2))
-(dM+M/p2)= Ω*((1/(k’+ς)* (interests received)d(1/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2/dr
-d(M/p) *dr/dp= Ω*((1/(k’+ς)* (interests received)d(1/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2
de/dr=de/dy*dy/dr
de/dy=d Ωdy/dp/dy*dy/dr
Ω*((1/(k’+ς)* (interests received*(2r+2 β(IA+CR+AC/RR)/ (r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))4*(1/dp)+(dM+M/p2)=d(Ω)/dp* 1/(k’+ς)*((interests received/(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2-l’)+d(M/p)
We multiply both sides by (r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))4
Ω*((1/(k’+ς)* (interests received*(2r+2 β(IA+CR+AC/RR)* 1/dp+(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))4* (dM+M/p2)= d(Ω)/dp* 1/(k’+ς)*((interests received) (r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))-l’)*((r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))2+d(M/p)*(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))4)
Implicit differentiation with respect to r qnd simplification both sides leads to
2* Ω (interests received)*1/dp+= 3*d(Ω)/dp*((interests received) (r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR)2-2*l’*(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))
1=3/2*d(Ω) /Ω*(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR)2-l’*dp/ (Ω (interests received)) *(r+ β(IA+CR+AC/RR))
(3/2*d(Ω) /Ω)*r2+(3 d(Ω) /Ω* β(IA+CR+AC/RR)-l’dp/(Ω (interests received)))r+3 β2/2*(d(Ω) /Ω)* (IA+CR+AC/RR)2-l’*(β/ Ω) *(IA+CR+AC/RR))/ (interests received)*dp -1=0
This is second order equation whose solutions are :
R1= -b+(square root (b2-4ac))/2a
R2=-b-(square root(b2-4ac))/2a
r1= l’dp/(Ω (interests received))+(3/2*d(Ω) /Ω)* (3 β2/2*(d(Ω) /Ω)* (IA+CR+AC/RR)2-l’*(β/ Ω) *(IA+CR+AC/RR))/ (interests received)*dp -1)/ (3*d(Ω) /Ω)
r2= l’dp/(Ω (interests received)) – -4*(3/2*d(Ω) /Ω)* (3 β2/2*(d(Ω) /Ω)* (IA+CR+AC/RR)2-l’*(β/ Ω) *(IA+CR+AC/RR))/ (interests received)*dp -1)/ (3*d(Ω) /Ω)
Hence, r the risk free rate is dependent on Credit Risk, Agency Costs, Information Asymmetries, Reserve Requirements which are banking sector specificities and inflation and the propensity to speculate l’ and the proportion of credit transactions on overall transactions in the business cycle expressed by d(Ω)/dp as well as the average loan rate explicitly represented in interests received by banks.
As long as the maximization of the elasticity led to a setting of the risk free rate expressed in terms of the above mentioned determinants it follows suit that it is expressed in terms of the same items if not its maximization would have led to other determinants in the expression of the risk free rate.
Banking sector efficacy is dependent on propensity to speculate, the borrowing rate and banking sector specificities as well as inflation and the proportion of credit transactions of overall transactions in the business cycle.
Over the long run nominal rigidities end up by vanishing and there is no way for short run adjustments affordable through differentiation.
But in the long run Money Demand which is proxiable to excess credit demand in depth and variance and varies in amplitude with a certain coefficient such that Md= µ*ECD is stable and also ECD=Cd-Cs and Cs proportional to profitability of banks because of monopolistic competition that exerts a demand pull of prices of loans by credit demand more substantial that the cost push of Cs by banks as long as Cs is independent of output growth because it follows banking profitability through a search for yield motivation that steps aside affordability of credit following the law of demand and prioritizes profitability such that at the end
ECD is proportional to Md.
It is therefore not affected by output growth but by business cycle effects that exert transitory effects but remain overlapping each business cycle sothat over the long run it depends on e(Cs/OG) and e(Cd/OG).
It depends also on inflation as for the case of an economy whose growth prospects end up with an upward inflationary pressure inflation remains prevailing as a consequence of economic performance.
Over the long run diversification of asset portfolios make banks step aside he bank specific factors especially if it has achieved a learning effect through assimilation of the essentials of agency costs information asymmetries credit risk and loan non performance because of the experience effect about borrowers.
Monetary policy is not efficacious over the long run because of imperfect competition that hinders the transmission of interest based monetary policy as the interest pass through is disconnected from affecting the loan rate and credit supply and afterwards ECD and the e(ECD/LTD) because of the competition that is imperfectly competitive with regard to the monopolistic competition structure of the credit market.