Submitted:
22 December 2023
Posted:
26 December 2023
You are already at the latest version
Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Cyclicality and Pro-Cyclicality of LLPs
2.1.1. Overview
- Cyclicality: Refers to the cyclical nature of the economy, characterized by periods of expansion and recession. Economic cycles impact LLPs due to variations in the financial performance of companies and households.
- Pro-cyclicality: Refers to the tendency of policies, practices, or financial instruments to amplify the cyclical fluctuations of the economy, rather than mitigating them. In the context of LLPs, pro-cyclicality occurs when the actions of financial institutions exacerbate economic movements, increasing risks during periods of expansion and recession.
2.1.2. Subsubsection
- A key variable in credit assessment is the expectation of future cash flows of companies to pay their debts.
- In a booming economic cycle, macroeconomic factors (e.g., consumption, production) significantly favor most companies' projections, such as cash flows and debt repayment capacity.
- With this positive bias, banks' credit assessments are also favored, determining a lower default probability, increasing credit issuance to companies, and thus, their leverage.
- More credit leads to increased production investment and greater infusion of resources into the real economy, further amplifying economic growth (positive pro-cyclicality).
- This assessment can create a vicious cycle, resulting in an economic boom until a specific event occurs or leverage (i.e., risk) increases. This situation is not sustainable and can lead to a reversal of expectations.
- Once expectations reverse, the capacity of companies to generate cash flows is questioned and reassessed.
- With this negative bias, there is an increase in credit risk assessed by banks, also increasing the probability of default and reducing (or even ceasing) credit issuance.
- The reduction (or absence) of credit negatively impacts investments and even production, further amplifying the negative effect on the economy (negative pro-cyclicality), potentially creating a vicious cycle and dragging the economy into a recession and possible collapse.
- Unlike the previous reversal, exiting a recession (especially one exacerbated by credit pro-cyclicality) is more costly and time-consuming. The change is slow to alter market perception and, consequently, the financial institutions' credit risk analysis. The resumption of credit issuance is a critical variable for economic recovery.
2.1.2. Cyclicality and Pro-Cyclicality in the ICL Model of IAS 39
2.1.3. Cyclicality and Pro-Cyclicality in the ICL Model of IAS 39
- At the peak of the economic cycle, PDs and LGDs are lower, requiring less capital, increasing regulatory capital, and allowing for more credit to be granted for the same amount of available capital. However, in the face of phase 1 of the ECL model, a containment in excessive credit granting is expected, considering economic forecasts.
- At the onset of a potential recession period, the PD and LGD are higher, necessitating more capital, thus reducing regulatory capital and, consequently, the availability to grant more credit. It is expected that the LLAs will be larger, enabling the absorption of future LLPs and maintaining credit provision, contributing to the reversal of the downward economic cycle.
2.2. The Relationship Between LLPs and Economic Cycles
2.3. Impact of Dynamic Models on Economic Cycles Management
2.3.1. Dynamic Models of LLPs
2.3.2. Analysis of the IFRS 9 ECL Model
2.4. Formulation of Hypotheses
3. Methodology
3.1. Analysis Model and Variables
3.2. Sample and Data
Semestral GDP Evolution | Net LLP over Total Assets of Banks
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
4.2. Analysis and Discussion of Results
5. Conclusions
Author Contributions
Data Availability Statement
Conflicts of Interest
| 1 | In the specialized literature on the subject, it is common to encounter the terms Loan Loss Provisions (LLPs) and Loan Loss Allowances (LLAs) to designate credit impairment losses. For the sake of uniformity in the terminology used in studies, this research will use the abbreviation LLP to express credit impairment losses recognized in the period, and LLA for the accumulated credit impairment losses, following the approach of Salazar et al. (2023). |
| 2 | In this study, the term earnings management is used to describe deliberate intervention by managers through the recognition of LLP and its impact on the banks' results and equity. According to Schipper (1989), this manipulation is an intentional intervention in financial information to obtain specific benefits, particularly through the selection of accounting practices that align more closely with the interests of managers or the company. Similarly, Healy and Wahlen (1999) note that earnings management occurs when managers use their judgment to alter financial reports to influence stakeholders' perception or meet specific contractual clauses. |
| 3 | During the COVID-19 pandemic, the IASB intervened, limiting the recognition and increase of LLPs for phase 2 (significant increase in risk) through a communication that altered the accounting policy of the ECL model. In this note, the IASB indicates that the impact on loans due to moratoriums, when backed by the states, should not be interpreted as a significant increase in risk. |
| 4 | "LLA = EAD × PD × LGD" |
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| Variable | Type | Definition | Previous Studies |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent | Net LLPs over total assets of bank i in year t | Araújo et al. (2018), López-Espinosa et al. (2021), Nnadi et al. (2023), Norouzpour et al. (2023) and Pastiranová and Witzany (2022) | |
| Independent | Real GDP growth in year t | Araújo et al. (2018), Beatty e Liao, (2014), Casta et al. (2019), Marton and Runesson (2017), Nnadi et al. (2023), Norouzpour et al. (2023), Ozili and Outa (2017) and Pastiranová and Witzany (2022) | |
| Independent | Unemployment rate in year t | Araújo et al. (2018), Beatty and Liao (2014) and Casta et al. (2019) | |
| Independent | Earnings before taxes and LLPs over total assets of bank i in year t | Araújo et al. (2018), Nnadi et al. (2023), Norouzpour et al. (2023) and Ozili and Outa (2017) | |
| Independent | Equity over total assets of bank i in year t | Araújo et al. (2018), Casta et al. (2019) and Ozili and Outa (2017) |
|
| Control | Variation between total loans of year t and year t-1, divided by total loans of year t of bank i | Araújo et al. (2018), Beatty and Liao (2014), Norouzpour et al. (2023) and Ozili and Outa (2017) | |
| Control | Total loans over total assets of bank i in year t | Araújo et al. (2018), Ozili and Outa (2017) Marton and Runesson, (2017) and Beatty and Liao (2014) |
|
| Control | LLA in relation to total assets of bank i in year t | Beatty and Liao (2014) and Casta et al. (2019) | |
| Control | Natural logarithm of total assets of bank i in year t | Araújo et al. (2018), Beatty e Liao (2014), Casta et al. (2019), Nnadi et al. (2023) and Norouzpour et al. (2023) |
|
| Control | Dummy variable that takes the value 1 in the years of application of IFRS 9, and the value 0 in the years of application of IAS 39 | Casta et al. (2019), Marton and Runesson (2017), Nnadi et al. (2023) and Norouzpour et al. (2023) |
| Variable | Expected behavior | Signal |
|---|---|---|
| Higher sensitivity to economic variations is expected in the ECL model, where a positive or negative change in GDP may decrease or increase, respectively, the level of LLPs, indicating the existence of cyclicality in the model. | +/- | |
| Higher sensitivity to changes in economic measures is expected, where a positive or negative variation in unemployment rate may increase or decrease, respectively, the level of LLPs, signaling the existence of cyclicality in the model. | +/- | |
| Banks are expected to use LLPs as an earnings management tool, where an increase in earnings before taxes and LLPs will increase the level of LLPs. | + | |
| Banks are expected to use LLPs as an equity management tool, where a negative variation in a bank's capital may increase the level of LLPs. Banks tend to increase LLPs when regulatory capital is below required levels. This practice is more common in banks with lower capitals. | - | |
| A positive variation in granted loans represents an increase in credit risk. Hence, a positive change in granted loans is expected to increase the value of LLPs. | + | |
| The larger the share of granted loans in a bank's total investments, the higher its credit risk. An increase in the ratio of total loans to total assets is expected to increase the value of LLPs. | + | |
| The larger the LLAs in a bank's total investments, the higher its credit risk. An increase in the ratio of LLAs to total assets is expected to increase the value of LLPs. | + | |
| The larger the bank, the higher the levels of LLPs recognition. The larger the bank, the higher the value of LLPs is expected to be. | + | |
| Higher LLPs values are expected with the new ECL model of IFRS 9, compared to the ICL model of IAS 39. | + |
| Banks / (in thousands of euros) | Total Assets 31/12/2022 | %* | Net LLPs** | EBTP31/12/2022 | %*** | LLAs31/12/2022 | %**** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CGD | 102 503 009 | 33.44% | - 5 300 | 1 124 898 | 1.10% | 2 254 541 | 2.20% |
| BCP | 89 860 541 | 29.31% | 300 829 | 424 967 | 0.47% | 1 502 373 | 1.67% |
| Santander | 56 166 620 | 18.32% | - 11 943 | 841 856 | 1.50% | 946 296 | 1.68% |
| BPI | 38 904 553 | 12.69% | 66 334 | 527 119 | 1.35% | 519 264 | 1.33% |
| Montepio | 19 106 251 | 6.23% | 13 371 | 93 063 | 0.49% | 374 034 | 1.86% |
| TOTAL | 308 977 957 | 100.00% | 363 291 | 5 596 608 | 5 596 508 | ||
| *Total assets of the bank as a percentage of the total assets | **If negative, it indicates more reversals than LLPs | *** Earnings Before Taxes and LLPs (EBTP) as a percentage of the bank's total assets | **** LLAs as a percentage of the bank's total assets | |||||||
| N | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Min. | -0.002 | -0.166 | -0.224 | -0.003 | 0.040 | -0.128 | 0.610 | 0.012 | 16.7 | 0 |
| Max. | 0.026 | 0.137 | 0.452 | 0.017 | 0.108 | 0.279 | 0.882 | 0.066 | 18.5 | 1 |
| Mean | 0.004 | 0.021 | -0.053 | 0.007 | 0.078 | 0.004 | 0.717 | 0.033 | 17.7 | - |
| Median | 0.003 | 0.023 | -0.080 | 0.006 | 0.079 | -0.004 | 0.717 | 0.028 | 17.8 | - |
| SD | 0.005 | 0.052 | 0.145 | 0.005 | 0.014 | 0.055 | 0.054 | 0.015 | 0.576 | - |
| Variáveis | Modelo ICL (2013 – 2017) | Modelo ECL (2018 – 2022) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Min. | Max. | Mean | Median | SD | Min. | Max. | Mean | Median | SD | |
| H1: | ||||||||||
| -0,003 | 0,029 | 0,018 | 0,019 | 0,009 | -0,166 | 0,137 | 0,025 | 0,027 | 0,072 | |
| -0,224 | 0,103 | -0,082 | -0,080 | 0,089 | -0,209 | 0,452 | -0,023 | -0,080 | 0,180 | |
| H2: | ||||||||||
| -0,003 | 0,017 | 0,006 | 0,005 | 0,005 | 4,27e-4 | 0,016 | 0,007 | 0,006 | 0,004 | |
| 0,040 | 0,100 | 0,070 | 0,072 | 0,014 | 0,065 | 0,108 | 0,085 | 0,086 | 0,010 | |
| Controlo: | ||||||||||
| -0,085 | 0,279 | -0,009 | -0,016 | 0,061 | -0,128 | 0,152 | 0,018 | 0,015 | 0,045 | |
| 0,610 | 0,779 | 0,700 | 0,715 | 0,046 | 0,646 | 0,882 | 0,733 | 0,719 | 0,057 | |
| 0,018 | 0,065 | 0,042 | 0,046 | 0,014 | 0,012 | 0,057 | 0,025 | 0,022 | 0,011 | |
| 16,8 | 18,5 | 17,7 | 17,6 | 0,551 | 16,7 | 18,5 | 17,7 | 17,8 | 0,605 | |
| Sample | 5 | 5 | ||||||||
| Observations | 50 | |||||||||
| 1 | ||||||||||
| *** - 0.297 | 1 | |||||||||
| -0.122 | *** 0.350 | 1 | ||||||||
| -0.124 | 0.030 | -0.164 | 1 | |||||||
| *** -0.450 | *** 0.273 | -0.091 | *** 0.387 | 1 | ||||||
| ** - 0.217 | *** 0.260 | 0.127 | 0.102 | *** 0.288 | 1 | |||||
| -0.073 | 0.136 | 0.029 | -0.020 | 0.118 | ** 0.250 | 1 | ||||
| *** 0.595 | *** - 0.323 | -0.091 | *** -0.262 | *** -0.323 | *** -0.370 | -0.120 | 1 | |||
| -0.019 | 0.041 | 0.034 | 0.084 | -0.035 | -0.002 | *** - 0.398 | 0.057 | 1 | ||
| *** - 0.396 | *** 0.434 | 0.087 | * 0.191 | *** 0.548 | *** 0.498 | ** 0.249 | *** -0.581 | 0.003 | 1 |
| Subperiod models | |||
|---|---|---|---|
| Variables | Main Model (2013 - 2022) | ICL Model (2013 - 2017) | ECL Model (2018 - 2022) |
| H1: | |||
| (-0.019) | (-0.296) | (-1.510) | |
| (0.026) | *** (-3.183) | *** (2.970) | |
| H2: | |||
| *** (2.894) | ** (2.090) | * (1.740) | |
| *** (-4.558) | *** (-4.723) | * (-1.910) | |
| Control: | |||
| (-1.025) | * (1.92) | (1.110) | |
| (1.341) | (1.124) | * (-1.710) | |
| *** (6.194) | *** (3.846) | ** (2.150) | |
| (-0.819) | * (-1.697) | ** (-2.28) | |
| (1.017) | |||
| 0.502 | 0.625 | 0.447 | |
| Teste F | <.001 | <.001 | <.001 |
| N | 100 | 50 | 50 |
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