Submitted:
30 October 2023
Posted:
30 October 2023
You are already at the latest version
Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. ESG in Egypt
3. Literature review and hypotheses development
3.1. CSR and auditor choice
3.2. ESG performance and audit opinion
4. Research design
4.1. Sample and data sources
4.2. Research models
5. Research results and discussion
5.1. Descriptive statistics
5.2. Logistic regression results
5.3. Robustness tests
5.4. Additional analysis: ESG Performance, auditor choice and audit opinion during COVID-19
6. Conclusion
| 1 | For more information about the Egyptian ESG index methodology, see https://www.egx.com.eg/en/indexrulesmethodologys-p-egx.aspx?nav=7. |
References
- Abdelhalim, K., & Eldin, A. G. (2019), “Can CSR help achieve sustainable development? Applying a new assessment model to CSR cases from Egypt”, International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 39 No. 9/10, pp. 773-795. [CrossRef]
- Aboud, A., & Diab, A. (2018), “The impact of social, environmental and corporate governance disclosures on firm value: evidence from Egypt”, Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 8, No. (4), pp. 442-458.
- Aboud, A., & Diab, A. (2019), “The financial and market consequences of environmental, social and governance ratings: the implications of recent political volatility in Egypt”, Sustainability Accounting, Management and Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. (3), 498-520.
- Amini, C., & Dal Bianco, S. (2017), “Corporate social responsibility and Latin American firm performance”, Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, Vol.17, No. (3), pp. 403-445.
- Aslan, Ş., & Şendoğdu, A. (2012), “The mediating role of corporate social responsibility in ethical leader's effect on corporate ethical values and behavior”, Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, Vol. 58, pp. 693-702.
- Atkins, B. (2006), “Is corporate social responsibility responsible? FORBES. [Blog] 28th November”. Available at: www.forbes.com/2006/11/16/leadership-philanthropy-charitylead-citizen-cx_ba_1128directorship.htm.
- Ben Amar, A., and Chakroun, S. (2018), “Do dimensions of corporate social responsibility affect earnings management? Evidence from France”, Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Vol. 16, No. (2), pp. 348-370. [CrossRef]
- Branco, M. C., Rodrigues, L. L., (2006), “Corporate social responsibility and resource-based perspectives”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 69, No. (2): pp. 111–132. [CrossRef]
- Carroll, A. B. (1979), "A three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate performance", Academy of Management Review, vol. 4, No. (4): pp. 497-505.
- Chen, H., Liu, S., Liu, X., & Wang, J. (2023), “Do socially responsible audit firms provide higher audit quality? an investigation of corporate social responsibility activity in audit firms”, Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 38, No. (2), pp. 206-240. [CrossRef]
- Chen, L., Srinidhi, B., Tsang, A. and Yu, W. (2016), “Audited financial reporting and voluntary disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports”, Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 53-76. [CrossRef]
- Chen, Z., & Xie, G. (2022), “ESG disclosure and financial performance: moderating role of ESG investors”, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 83, 102291. [CrossRef]
- Chevrollier, N., Argyrou, A., Ainiwaer, N., & Nijhof, A. (2023), “On the encroachment of sustainable value propositions: business model innovation for impact”, Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 382, 135341. [CrossRef]
- Cui, J., Jo, H., and Na, H. (2018), “Does corporate social responsibility affect information asymmetry?”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 148, pp. 549–572. [CrossRef]
- Dakhli, A. (2022), “The impact of corporate social responsibility on firm financial performance: does audit quality matter?”, Journal of Applied Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. (5), pp. 950-976. [CrossRef]
- Diab, A. (2021), “The implications of the COVID-19 pandemic for the auditing and assurance processes”, Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues, Vol. 24, No. (5), pp.1-8.
- Diab, A. A., Abdelazim, S. I., Eissa, A. M., Abozaid, E. M., and Elshaabany, M. M. (2021), “The impact of client size and financial performance on audit opinion: evidence from a developing market, Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol. 10, No. (1); pp. 228-239. [CrossRef]
- Dhaliwal, D. S., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A., Yang, Y.G. (2012), “Nonfinancial disclosure and analyst forecast accuracy: international evidence on corporate social responsibility disclosure”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 87, No. (3), pp. 723–759. [CrossRef]
- Darnall, N., Ji, H., Iwata, K., & Arimura, T. H. (2022), “Do ESG reporting guidelines and verifications enhance firms' information disclosure?”, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Vol. 29, No. (5), pp. 1214-1230. [CrossRef]
- Du, S., and Vieira, E. (2012), “Striving for legitimacy through corporate social responsibility: insights from oil companies”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 110, No. (4), pp. 413–27. [CrossRef]
- Du, X., Zhang, Y., Lai, S., & Tao, H. (2023), “How do auditors value hypocrisy? evidence from China”, Journal of Business Ethics, pp.1-33. [CrossRef]
- Du, S., Xu, X., & Yu, K. (2020), “Does corporate social responsibility affect auditor-client contracting? evidence from auditor selection and audit fees”, Advances in Accounting, Vol. 51, 100499. [CrossRef]
- Ebaid, I. E. S. (2011), “Corporate governance practices and auditor's client acceptance decision: empirical evidence from Egypt”, Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 171-183.
- Eissa, A. M., Elgendy, T. and Diab, A. (2023). Earnings management, institutional ownership and investment efficiency: evidence from a developing country. Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Vol. ahead-of-print No. ahead-of-print. [CrossRef]
- Eissa, A. M., & Eliwa, Y. (2021), “The effect of political connections on firm performance: evidence from Egypt”, Asian Review of Accounting, Vol. 29, No. (3), pp. 362-382. [CrossRef]
- Gelb, D. S., & Strawser, J. A. (2001), “Corporate social responsibility and financial disclosures: an alternative explanation for increased disclosure”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol.33, pp.1-13. [CrossRef]
- Gonçalves, T., Gaio, C., and Ferro, A. (2021), “Corporate social responsibility and earnings management: moderating impact of economic cycles and financial performance”, Sustainability, Vol. 13, No. (17), pp.1-14. [CrossRef]
- Greenberg, D. (2007), “Making corporate social responsibility an everyday part of the business of business: offering realistic options for regulatory reform”, Bond Law Review, Vol. 19, No. (2), pp. 41-57. [CrossRef]
- García-Sánchez, I. M., & Noguera-Gámez, L. (2017), “Integrated information and the cost of capital”, International Business Review, Vol. 26, No. (5), pp. 959-975. [CrossRef]
- Handayati, P., Sumarsono, H., & Narmaditya, B. S. (2022), “Corporate social responsibility disclosure and Indonesian firm value: the moderating effect of profitability and firm’s size”, Journal of Eastern European and Central Asian Research (JEECAR), Vol. 9, No. (4), pp. 703-714. [CrossRef]
- Harjoto, M. A., and Jo, H. (2015), “Legal vs. normative CSR: differential impact on analyst dispersion, stock return volatility, cost of capital, and firm value”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 128: pp.1–20. [CrossRef]
- Hasnas, J. (1998), “The normative theories of business ethics: a guide for the perplexed”, Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 8, pp. 19-42. [CrossRef]
- Hemingway, C. A., & Maclagan, P. W. (2004), “Managers' personal values as drivers of corporate social responsibility”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 50, pp. 33-44. [CrossRef]
- Hichri, A. (2023), “Integrated reporting, audit quality: the presence of environmental auditing in an international context”, European Business Review, Vol. 35, No. (3), pp. 397-425.
- Hirst, D. E. (1994), “Auditor sensitivity to earnings management”, Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol.11, No. (1), pp. 405-422. [CrossRef]
- Hong, Y., and Andersen, M. L. (2011), “The relationship between corporate social responsibility and earnings management: an exploratory study”, Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 104, pp. 461-471. [CrossRef]
- Hurst, N. E. (2004), “Corporate ethics, governance and social responsibility: comparing European business practices to those in the United States”, Working paper, Santa Clara University.
- Hussein, A., & Nounou, G. (2022), “The impact of internet financial reporting on Egyptian company’s performance”, Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Vol. 20, No. (5), pp. 841-865. [CrossRef]
- Hsu, Y. L., and Yang, Y. C. (2022), “Corporate governance and financial reporting quality during the COVID-19 pandemic”, Finance Research Letters, Vol. 47, pp. 1-13. [CrossRef]
- Lamptey, E. K., Park, J. D., & Bonaparte, I. (2023), “Does corporate social responsibility affect the timeliness of audited financial information? evidence from “100 best corporate citizens”. Journal of Risk and Financial Management, Vol. 16, No. (2), pp. 1-21. [CrossRef]
- Kang, C., Germann, F., & Grewal, R. (2016), “Washing away your sins? corporate social responsibility, corporate social irresponsibility, and firm performance”, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 80, No. (2), pp. 59-79.
- Kim, Y., M. S. Park, and B. Wier. (2012), “Is earnings quality associated with corporate social responsibility”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 87, No. (3), pp. 761-796. [CrossRef]
- Kim, M., Yin, X., & Lee, G. (2020), “The effect of CSR on corporate image, customer citizenship behaviors, and customers’ long-term relationship orientation”, International Journal of Hospitality Management, Vol. 88, 102520.
- Kurniawati, H., Van Cauwenberge, P., & Vander Bauwhede, H. (2019), “Affiliation of Indonesian audit firms with Big4 and second-tier audit firms and the cost of debt”, International Journal of Auditing, Vol. 23, No. (3), pp. 387-402. [CrossRef]
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1998), “Law and Finance”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 106, pp. 1113-55.
- Landi, G., & Sciarelli, M. (2018), “Towards a more ethical market: the impact of ESG rating on corporate financial performance”, Social Responsibility Journal, Vol.15, No. (1), pp.11-27. [CrossRef]
- Lanis, R., & Richardson, G. (2012), “Corporate social responsibility and tax aggressiveness: an empirical analysis”, Journal of Accounting and Public policy, Vol. 31, No. (1), pp. 86-108. [CrossRef]
- Lin, K. C., & Dong, X. (2018), “Corporate social responsibility engagement of financially distressed firms and their bankruptcy likelihood”, Advances in Accounting, Vol. 43, pp. 32–45. [CrossRef]
- Maaloul, A., Zéghal, D., Ben Amar, W., & Mansour, S. (2023), “The effect of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance and disclosure on cost of debt: the mediating effect of corporate reputation”, Corporate Reputation Review, Vol. 26, No. (1), pp. 1-18.
- Nair, R., Muttakin, M., Khan, A., Subramaniam, N., & Somanath, V. S. (2019), “Corporate social responsibility disclosure and financial transparency: evidence from India” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Vol. 56, pp. 330-351.
- Nguyen, X. H., & Trinh, H. T. (2020), “Corporate social responsibility and the non-linear effect on audit opinion for energy firms in Vietnam”, Cogent Business & Management, Vol. 7, No. (1), pp.1-15. [CrossRef]
- Nirino, N., Santoro, G., Miglietta, N., & Quaglia, R. (2021), “Corporate controversies and company's financial performance: Exploring the moderating role of ESG practices”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 162, 120341.
- Omar, B. F., & Zallom, N. O. (2016), “Corporate social responsibility and market value: evidence from Jordan”, Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting, Vol. 14, No. (1), pp. 2-29. [CrossRef]
- Odriozola, M. D., & Baraibar-Diez, E. (2017), “Is corporate reputation associated with quality of CSR reporting? evidence from Spain”, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Vol. 24, no. (2), pp. 121-132. [CrossRef]
- Prior, D., J. Surroca, and J. Tribo. (2008), “Are socially responsible managers really ethical? exploring the relationship between earnings management and corporate social responsibility”, Corporate Governance, Vol. 16, no. (3), pp.160–177. [CrossRef]
- Saeed, A., Gull, A. A., Rind, A. A., Mubarik, M. S., and Shahbaz, M. (2022), “Do socially responsible firms demand high-quality audits? an international evidence”, International Journal of Finance and Economics, Vol. 27, No. (2), pp. 2235-2255. [CrossRef]
- Samaha, K., Dahawy, K., Hussainey, K., & Stapleton, P. (2012), “The extent of corporate governance disclosure and its determinants in a developing market: the case of Egypt”, Advances in Accounting, Vol. 28, No. (1), pp.168-178. [CrossRef]
- Seda, A., & Ismail, M. (2020), “Challenges facing social entrepreneurship: the implications for government policy in Egypt”, Review of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 5, No. (2), pp. 162-182.
- Stein, H., & Rosefielde, S. (2005), “Introduction to issues in finance, corporate control, and growth: lessons from developing and transitional economies”, Eastern Economic Journal, Vol. 31, No. (2), pp. 210-217.
- Sun, W. C., Huang, H. W., Dao, M., & Young, C. S. (2017), “Auditor selection and corporate social responsibility”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Vol. 44, No. (9-10), pp. 1241-1275. [CrossRef]
- Tamimi, N., & Sebastianelli, R. (2017), “Transparency among S&P 500 companies: an analysis of ESG disclosure scores”, Management Decision, Vol. 55, No. (8), pp.1660-1680. [CrossRef]
- Tantawy, S.M. and Moussa, T. (2023), "The effect of political connections on firms' auditor choice decisions and audit opinions: evidence from Egypt", Asian Review of Accounting, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 414-436. [CrossRef]
- Thornton, G. (2008), Corporate social responsibility: a necessity not a choice. International Business Report. New York, NY.
- Velte, P. (2022), “Meta-analyses on corporate social responsibility (CSR): a literature review”, Management Review Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. (3), pp. 627-675. [CrossRef]
- Waddock, S. (2008), “Building a new institutional infrastructure for corporate responsibility”, Academy of Management perspectives, Vol. 22, No. (3), pp. 87-108. [CrossRef]
- Welford, R. (2007), “Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility: Issues for Asia”, Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, Vol. 14, No. (1), pp. 42-51. [CrossRef]
- Wang, X., Song, X., & Sun, M. (2023), “How does a company’s ESG performance affect the issuance of an audit opinion? the moderating role of auditor experience”, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, Vol. 20, No. (5), pp. 1-17. [CrossRef]
| Panel A: Sample selection | No. of firms | Observations | |
| EGX100 across the study period 2014-2022. | 100 firms | 900 | |
| (-) Banking and financial firms. | (22) | (198) | |
| (-) firms with missing financial and governance data. | (10) | (90) | |
| Final sample | 68 | 612 | |
| Panel B: Sample distribution | |||
| Merchandising | 18 | 2.9% | |
| Manufacturing | 495 | 80.9% | |
| Service | 99 | 16.2% | |
| Total | 612 | 100% | |
| Variables | Definition |
|---|---|
| AC | Auditor choice, measured as a dummy variable, assigning one for firms audited by a Big-4 audit firm in the year t, and zero otherwise. |
| AO | Audit opinion, measured as a dummy variable, assigning one for firms that received a qualified opinion in the year t, and zero otherwise. |
| ESG | ESG performance, measured as a dummy variable, assigning one for firms listed in the ESG index in the year t, and zero otherwise. |
| FSIZE | Firm size, calculated as a natural logarithm of total assets in year t. |
| LEVERAGE | Financial leverage, calculated as total debt over total assets in year t. |
| PROFITABILITY | Firm profitability is net profit after tax and extraordinary items in year t, scaled to total assets. |
| FGROWTH | Firm growth, calculated according to change in net sales in year t, scaled to revenue in year t-1. |
| LOSS | A carryforward loss, measured as a dummy variable that equals one if the firms have carryforward loss in year t, and zero otherwise. |
| FAGE | Firm age, measured by the natural logarithm of the number of the years since the firm has been listed in Egyptian Exchange. |
| BSIZE | Board size, calculated as number of directors in the board in year t. |
| BMEETINGS | Board meetings, calculated as number of meetings in year t. |
| DUALITY | Duality, calculated as a dummy variable that equals one if the Chairman and CEO are the same person, and zero otherwise. |
| BINDEPENDENCE | Board independence, measured as the number of non-executive directors in the board, scaled to its total number of directors in year t. |
| ACSIZE | Audit committee size, calculated as the number of members in the audit committee in year t. |
| ACMEETINGS | Audit committee meetings, calculated as the number of meetings in year t. |
| ACINDEPENDENCE | Audit committee independence, measured as the number of non-executive directors in the audit committee, scaled to its total number of directors in year t. |
| Panel A: Descriptive results for all samples (Full Sample = 612) | ||||||||
| Variables | Mean | Median | SD | Minimum | Maximum | |||
| AC | 0.327 | 0.000 | 0.469 | 0.000 | 1.000 | |||
| AO | 0.413 | 0.000 | 0.493 | 0.000 | 1.000 | |||
| ESG | 0.240 | 0.000 | 0.428 | 0.000 | 1.000 | |||
| FSIZE | 21.050 | 21.138 | 1.728 | 16.822 | 25.639 | |||
| LEVERAGE | 0.432 | 0.433 | 0.248 | 0.001 | 0.986 | |||
| PROFITABILITY | 0.046 | 0.036 | 0.086 | -0.124 | 0.225 | |||
| FGROWTH | 0.133 | 0.080 | 0.452 | -0.848 | 1.057 | |||
| LOSS | 0.240 | 0.000 | 0.426 | 0.000 | 1.000 | |||
| FAGE | 2.910 | 3.044 | 0.546 | 0.693 | 4.080 | |||
| BSIZE | 8.173 | 8.000 | 2.797 | 3.000 | 16.000 | |||
| BMEETINGS | 10.005 | 9.000 | 4.628 | 2.000 | 23.000 | |||
| DUALITY | 0.716 | 1.000 | 0.451 | 0.000 | 1.000 | |||
| BINDEPENDENCE | 0.701 | 0.750 | 0.201 | 0.200 | 1.000 | |||
| ACSIZE | 3.583 | 3.000 | 0.987 | 2.000 | 8.000 | |||
| ACMEETINGS | 5.291 | 4.000 | 2.678 | 1.000 | 14.000 | |||
| ACINDEPENDENCE | 0.934 | 1.000 | 0.170 | 0.000 | 1.000 | |||
| Panel B: Univariate analysis (Full Sample = 612) | ||||||||
| Variables | Firms listed in ESG index. (147 observations) |
Firms not listed in ESG index. (465 observations) |
t-test | Sig. | ||||
| Mean | SD | Mean | SD | |||||
| AC | 0.646 | 0.480 | 0.226 | 0.419 | 10.239 | 0.000*** | ||
| AO | 0.211 | 0.409 | 0.477 | 0.500 | -5.870 | 0.000*** | ||
| FSIZE | 22.255 | 1.515 | 20.669 | 1.614 | 10.534 | 0.000*** | ||
| LEVERAGE | 0.401 | 0.250 | 0.441 | 0.247 | -1.711 | 0.088* | ||
| PROFITABILITY | 0.071 | 0.076 | 0.039 | 0.087 | 4.003 | 0.000*** | ||
| FGROWTH | 0.172 | 0.418 | 0.121 | 0.462 | 1.176 | 0.240 | ||
| LOSS | 0.068 | 0.253 | 0.294 | 0.455 | -5.749 | 0.000*** | ||
| FAGE | 2.715 | 0.504 | 2.971 | 0.545 | -5.049 | 0.000*** | ||
| BSIZE | 9.673 | 2.740 | 7.699 | 2.647 | 7.818 | 0.000*** | ||
| BMEETINGS | 10.347 | 5.140 | 9.897 | 4.455 | 1.028 | 0.304 | ||
| DUALITY | 0.612 | 0.489 | 0.748 | 0.434 | -3.211 | 0.001*** | ||
| BINDEPENDENCE | 0.731 | 0.157 | 0.692 | 0.212 | 2.058 | 0.040** | ||
| ACSIZE | 3.707 | 1.218 | 3.544 | 0.899 | 1.753 | 0.080* | ||
| ACMEETINGS | 5.354 | 2.415 | 5.271 | 2.758 | 0.326 | 0.744 | ||
| ACINDEPENDENCE | 0.976 | 0.073 | 0.921 | 0.189 | 3.457 | 0.001*** | ||
| Variables | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1-AC | 1.000 | |||||||||||||||
| 2-AO | -0.380*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||||||
| 3-ESG | 0.383*** | -0.231*** | 1.000 | |||||||||||||
| 4-FSIZE | 0.337*** | -0.082** | 0.392*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||||
| 5-LEVERAGE | -0.055 | 0.175*** | -0.069* | 0.036 | 1.000 | |||||||||||
| 6-PROFITABILITY | 0.072* | -0.093** | 0.160*** | 0.272*** | -0.305*** | 1.000 | ||||||||||
| 7-FGROWTH | 0.006 | -0.048 | 0.048 | 0.090** | 0.042 | .135*** | 1.000 | |||||||||
| 8-LOSS | -0.163*** | 0.229*** | -0.227*** | -0.349*** | 0.319*** | -0.478*** | 0.037 | 1.000 | ||||||||
| 9-FAGE | -0.256*** | 0.179*** | -0.200*** | -0.007 | 0.271*** | -0.103** | 0.022 | 0.147*** | 1.000 | |||||||
| 10-BSIZE | 0.140*** | -0.118*** | 0.302*** | 0.414*** | -0.116*** | 0.249*** | 0.014 | -0.093** | -0.074 | 1.000 | ||||||
| 11-BMEETINGS | -0.093** | 0.246*** | 0.042 | 0.167*** | 0.126*** | 0.191*** | 0.028 | -.089** | -0.039 | 0.138*** | 1.000 | |||||
| 12-DUALITY | -0.240*** | 0.191*** | -0.129*** | -0.093** | -0.028 | 0.016 | -0.006 | 0.074* | 0.004 | 0.017 | 0.202*** | 1.000 | ||||
| 13-BINDEPENDENCE | 0.197*** | -0.289*** | 0.083** | 0.060 | -0.211*** | 0.045 | -0.021 | 0.014 | -0.154*** | 0.379*** | -0.096** | -0.269*** | 1.000 | |||
| 14-ACSIZE | -0.055 | 0.180*** | 0.071* | 0.158*** | -0.035 | 0.171*** | 0.028 | -0.025 | 0.111*** | 0.273*** | 0.267*** | 0.164*** | 0.013 | 1.000 | ||
| 15-ACMEETINGS | -0.097** | 0.313*** | 0.013 | 0.013 | 0.067* | -0.008 | 0.039 | 0.114*** | 0.142*** | 0.049 | 0.404*** | 0.108*** | -0.233*** | 0.401*** | 1.000 | |
| 16-ACINDEPENDENCE | 0.197*** | -0.187*** | 0.139*** | 0.035 | -0.065 | 0.062 | -0.016 | 0.005 | 0.006 | 0.175*** | -0.099** | -0.227*** | 0.289*** | -0.184*** | -0.186*** | 1.000 |
| Panel A: Omnibus test of model coefficients | ||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | |||||||||||
| Step 1 | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | ||||||
| Step | 247.868 | 24 | 0.000 | 205.309 | 24 | 0.000 | ||||||
| Block | 247.868 | 24 | 0.000 | 205.309 | 24 | 0.000 | ||||||
| Model | 247.868 | 24 | 0.000 | 205.309 | 24 | 0.000 | ||||||
| Panel B. Hosmer-Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test | ||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | |||||||||||
| Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | |||||||
| Step 1 | 9.455 | 8 | 0.305 | 11.310 | 8 | 0.185 | ||||||
| Panel C: Nagelkerke R2 square test | ||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | |||||||||||
| -2 Log likelihood | Cox and Snell R2 | Nagelkerke R2 | -2 Log likelihood | Cox and Snell R2 | Nagelkerke R2 | |||||||
| Step 1 | 525.563 | 0.333 | 0.464 | 624.651 | 0.285 | 0.384 | ||||||
| Panel D: Wald test | ||||||||||||
| Variables | Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||
| B (Wald) | Exp (B) | 95% C.I. for EXP(B) | B (Wald) | Exp (B) | 95% C.I. for EXP(B) | |||||||
| Lower | Upper | Lower | Upper | |||||||||
| Step1 ESG |
1.127*** (16.604) |
3.088 | 1.795 | 5.311 | -1.083*** (14.193) |
0.339 | 0.193 | 0.595 | ||||
| FSIZE | 0.604*** (43.296) |
1.830 | 1.529 | 2.191 | 0.005 (0.003) |
1.005 | 0.860 | 1.174 | ||||
| LEVERAGE | 0.279 (0.233) |
1.322 | 0.425 | 4.112 | 0.512 (0.952) |
1.669 | 0.596 | 4.673 | ||||
| PROFITABILITY | -0.111 (0.005) |
0.895 | 0.038 | 21.242 | 0.643 (0.194) |
1.903 | 0.108 | 33.360 | ||||
| FGROWTH | 0.050 (0.036) |
1.051 | 0.632 | 1.748 | -0.497** (4.330) |
0.608 | 0.381 | 0.972 | ||||
| LOSS | -0.153 (0.200) |
0.858 | 0.438 | 1.680 | 1.374*** (21.576) |
3.952 | 2.213 | 7.057 | ||||
| FAGE | -1.005*** (19.871) |
0.366 | 0.235 | 0.569 | 0.436** (4.494) |
1.547 | 1.033 | 2.314 | ||||
| BSIZE | -0.122** (6.316) |
0.885 | 0.805 | 0.974 | -0.036 (0.the 594) |
0.964 | 0.879 | 1.058 | ||||
| BMEETINGS | -0.092*** (10.972) |
0.912 | 0.864 | 0.963 | 0.094*** (14.524) |
1.098 | 1.047 | 1.152 | ||||
| DUALITY | -0.530** (4.273) |
0.588 | 0.356 | 0.973 | 0.229 (0.859) |
1.257 | 0.775 | 2.040 | ||||
| BINDEPENDENCE | 2.712*** (12.124) |
15.057 | 3.272 | 69.294 | -2.587*** (15.724) |
0.075 | 0.021 | 0.270 | ||||
| ACSIZE | 0.047 (0.120) |
1.048 | 0.804 | 1.365 | 0.234** (3.952) |
1.263 | 1.003 | 1.591 | ||||
| ACMEETINGS | 0.003 (0.002) |
1.003 | 0.893 | 1.126 | 0.162*** (9.846) |
1.176 | 1.063 | 1.302 | ||||
| ACINDEPENDENCE | 3.243*** (6.924) |
25.606 | 2.287 | 286.661 | -1.172* (3.810) |
0.310 | 0.096 | 1.005 | ||||
| Constant | -14.810*** (33.728) |
0.000 | -1.394 (0.534) |
0.248 | ||||||||
| Years Effect | Included | Included | ||||||||||
| Industries Effect | Included | Included | ||||||||||
| Observations | 612 | 612 | ||||||||||
| Panel A: Omnibus test of model coefficients | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| Step 1 | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | |||||||||
| Step | 240.272 | 24 | 0.000 | 205.629 | 24 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Block | 240.272 | 24 | 0.000 | 205.629 | 24 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Model | 240.272 | 24 | 0.000 | 205.629 | 24 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Panel B. Hosmer-Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | ||||||||||
| Step 1 | 10.690 | 8 | 0.220 | 9.134 | 8 | 0.331 | |||||||||
| Panel C: Nagelkerke R2 square test | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| -2 Log likelihood | Cox and Snell R2 | Nagelkerke R2 | -2 Log likelihood | Cox and Snell R2 | Nagelkerke R2 | ||||||||||
| Step 1 | 533.158 | 0.325 | 0.453 | 624.330 | 0.285 | 0.384 | |||||||||
| Panel D: Wald test: | |||||||||||||||
| Variables | Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | |||||||||||||
| B (Wald) | Exp (B) | 95% C.I. for EXP(B) | B (Wald) | Exp (B) | 95% C.I. for EXP(B) | ||||||||||
| Lower | Upper | Lower | Upper | ||||||||||||
| Step1 Lagged ESG |
0.829*** (9.348) |
2.292 | 1.347 | 3.899 | -1.102*** (14.394) |
0.332 | 0.188 | 0.587 | |||||||
| FSIZE | 0.622*** (46.301) |
1.863 | 1.557 | 2.229 | 0.003 (0.001) |
1.003 | 0.859 | 1.171 | |||||||
| LEVERAGE | 0.242 (0.179) |
1.274 | 0.416 | 3.904 | 0.499 (0.904) |
1.648 | 0.589 | 4.612 | |||||||
| PROFITABILITY | 0.222 (0.019) |
1.249 | 0.053 | 29.531 | 0.379 (0.066) |
1.461 | 0.081 | 26.356 | |||||||
| FGROWTH | 0.064 (0.062) |
1.066 | 0.645 | 1.762 | -0.485** (4.123) |
0.616 | 0.386 | 0.983 | |||||||
| LOSS | -0.145 (0.181) |
0.865 | 0.443 | 1.689 | 1.340*** (20.478) |
3.820 | 2.138 | 6.826 | |||||||
| FAGE | -1.073*** (22.910) |
0.342 | 0.220 | 0.531 | 0.444** (4.700) |
1.559 | 1.044 | 2.330 | |||||||
| BSIZE | -0.112** (5.381) |
0.894 | 0.813 | 0.983 | -0.036 (0.593) |
0.964 | 0.879 | 1.058 | |||||||
| BMEETINGS | -0.095*** (11.821) |
0.910 | 0.862 | 0.960 | 0.095*** (14.699) |
1.099 | 1.047 | 1.154 | |||||||
| DUALITY | -0.554** (4.775) |
0.574 | 0.349 | 0.944 | 0.228 (0.852) |
1.256 | 0.774 | 2.040 | |||||||
| BINDEPENDENCE | 2.533*** (10.837) |
12.596 | 2.787 | 56.921 | -2.555*** (15.378) |
0.078 | 0.022 | 0.279 | |||||||
| ACSIZE | 0.057 (0.176) |
1.058 | 0.812 | 1.380 | 0.233** (3.909) |
1.262 | 1.002 | 1.590 | |||||||
| ACMEETINGS | 0.008 (0.020) |
1.008 | 0.899 | 1.131 | 0.162*** (9.716) |
1.176 | 1.062 | 1.301 | |||||||
| ACINDEPENDENCE | 3.467*** (7.505) |
32.055 | 2.683 | 383.043 | -1.155* (3.699) |
0.315 | 0.097 | 1.022 | |||||||
| Constant | -15.078*** (34.490) |
0.000 | -1.396 (0.539) |
0.248 | |||||||||||
| Years Effect | Included | Included | |||||||||||||
| Industries Effect | Included | Included | |||||||||||||
| Observations | 612 | 612 | |||||||||||||
| Panel A: Omnibus test of model coefficients | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| Step 1 | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | |||||||||
| Step | 234.705 | 24 | 0.000 | 200.570 | 24 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Block | 234.705 | 24 | 0.000 | 200.570 | 24 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Model | 234.705 | 24 | 0.000 | 200.570 | 24 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Panel B. Hosmer-Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | ||||||||||
| Step 1 | 14.397 | 8 | 0.072 | 14.507 | 8 | 0.069 | |||||||||
| Panel C: Nagelkerke R2 square test | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| -2 Log likelihood | Cox and Snell R2 | Nagelkerke R2 | -2 Log likelihood | Cox and Snell R2 | Nagelkerke R2 | ||||||||||
| Step 1 | 538.725 | 0.319 | 0.444 | 629.390 | 0.279 | 0.376 | |||||||||
| Panel D: Wald test: | |||||||||||||||
| Variables | Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | |||||||||||||
| B (Wald) | Exp (B) | 95% C.I. for EXP(B) | B (Wald) | Exp (B) | 95% C.I. for EXP(B) | ||||||||||
| Lower | Upper | Lower | Upper | ||||||||||||
| Step1 Predicted ESG |
0.555** (3.863) |
1.741 | 1.002 | 3.027 | -0.942*** (9.836) |
0.390 | 0.216 | 0.702 | |||||||
| FSIZE | 0.642*** (48.771) |
1.899 | 1.586 | 2.274 | -0.001 (0.000) |
0.999 | 0.855 | 1.168 | |||||||
| LEVERAGE | 0.202 (0.127) |
1.223 | 0.404 | 3.700 | 0.503 (0.927) |
1.653 | 0.594 | 4.602 | |||||||
| PROFITABILITY | 0.200 (0.015) |
1.221 | 0.051 | 29.326 | 0.525 (0.129) |
1.691 | 0.096 | 29.644 | |||||||
| FGROWTH | 0.061 (0.056) |
1.062 | 0.644 | 1.753 | -0.487** (4.166) |
0.615 | 0.385 | 0.981 | |||||||
| LOSS | -0.193 (0.326) |
0.825 | 0.425 | 1.599 | 1.381*** (21.948) |
3.978 | 2.233 | 7.088 | |||||||
| FAGE | -1.122*** (24.906) |
0.326 | 0.210 | 0.506 | 0.456** (4.959) |
1.577 | 1.056 | 2.356 | |||||||
| BSIZE | -0.111** (5.162) |
0.895 | 0.812 | 0.985 | -0.036 (0.574) |
0.965 | 0.880 | 1.058 | |||||||
| BMEETINGS | -0.096*** (12.270) |
0.908 | 0.861 | 0.959 | 0.095*** (15.012) |
1.099 | 1.048 | 1.153 | |||||||
| DUALITY | -0.560** (4.876) |
0.571 | 0.347 | 0.939 | 0.204 (0.676) |
1.226 | 0.754 | 1.996 | |||||||
| BINDEPENDENCE | 2.524*** (10.717) |
12.473 | 2.753 | 56.510 | -2.588*** (15.854) |
0.075 | 0.021 | 0.269 | |||||||
| ACSIZE | 0.069 (0.257) |
1.071 | 0.821 | 1.398 | 0.231** (3.861) |
1.260 | 1.001 | 1.586 | |||||||
| ACMEETINGS | 0.010 (0.029) |
1.010 | 0.901 | 1.133 | 0.160*** (9.637) |
1.174 | 1.061 | 1.299 | |||||||
| ACINDEPENDENCE | 3.693*** (8.151) |
40.145 | 3.182 | 506.489 | -1.217** (4.124) |
0.296 | 0.091 | 0.958 | |||||||
| Constant | -15.409*** (35.122) |
0.000 | -1.364 (0.507) |
0.256 | |||||||||||
| Years Effect | Included | Included | |||||||||||||
| Industries Effect | Included | Included | |||||||||||||
| Observations | 612 | 612 | |||||||||||||
| Panel A: Omnibus test of model coefficients | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| Step 1 | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | |||||||||
| Step | 249.064 | 18 | 0.000 | 204.980 | 18 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Block | 249.064 | 18 | 0.000 | 204.980 | 18 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Model | 249.064 | 18 | 0.000 | 204.980 | 18 | 0.000 | |||||||||
| Panel B: Hosmer-Lemeshow’s goodness of fit test | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | Chi-square | Df. | Sig. | ||||||||||
| Step 1 | 11.073 | 8 | 0.198 | 7.290 | 8 | 0.506 | |||||||||
| Panel C: Nagelkerke R2 square test | |||||||||||||||
| Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | ||||||||||||||
| -2 Log likelihood | Cox and Snell R2 | Nagelkerke R2 | -2 Log likelihood | Cox and Snell R2 | Nagelkerke R2 | ||||||||||
| Step 1 | 524.366 | 0.334 | 0.466 | 624.980 | 0.285 | 0.383 | |||||||||
| Panel D: Wald test: | |||||||||||||||
| Variables | Model (1): Auditor Choice | Model (2): Audit opinion | |||||||||||||
| B (Wald) | Exp (B) | 95% C.I. for EXP(B) | B (Wald) | Exp (B) | 95% C.I. for EXP(B) | ||||||||||
| Lower | Upper | Lower | Upper | ||||||||||||
| Step1 ESG |
0.830*** (6.858) |
2.292 | 1.232 | 4.265 | -1.483*** (16.263) |
0.227 | 0.110 | 0.467 | |||||||
| COVID-19 | -1.634*** (22.300) |
0.195 | 0.099 | 0.384 | -0.078 (0.107) |
0.925 | 0.580 | 1.476 | |||||||
| COVID-19*ESG | 1.027** (3.612) |
2.793 | 0.968 | 8.054 | 1.055** (4.050) |
2.871 | 1.028 | 8.017 | |||||||
| FSIZE | 0.586*** (41.363) |
1.797 | 1.503 | 2.148 | -0.019 (0.061) |
0.981 | 0.841 | 1.144 | |||||||
| LEVERAGE | 0.277 (0.228) |
1.319 | 0.423 | 4.113 | 0.448 (0.741) |
1.566 | 0.564 | 4.348 | |||||||
| PROFITABILITY | -0.255 (0.026) |
0.775 | 0.035 | 17.348 | 0.198 (0.019) |
1.219 | 0.074 | 20.176 | |||||||
| FGROWTH | -0.004 (0.000) |
0.996 | 0.607 | 1.633 | -0.510** (4.840) |
0.601 | 0.381 | 0.946 | |||||||
| LOSS | -0.140 (0.168) |
0.869 | 0.445 | 1.699 | 1.342*** (20.901) |
3.825 | 2.152 | 6.799 | |||||||
| FAGE | -1.014*** (20.568) |
0.363 | 0.234 | 0.562 | 0.401** (3.922) |
1.493 | 1.004 | 2.220 | |||||||
| BSIZE | -0.114** (5.604) |
0.892 | 0.812 | 0.981 | -0.028 (0.353) |
0.973 | 0.887 | 1.066 | |||||||
| BMEETINGS | -0.089*** (10.523) |
0.914 | 0.866 | 0.965 | 0.097*** (15.360) |
1.101 | 1.049 | 1.156 | |||||||
| DUALITY | -0.569** (4.915) |
0.566 | 0.342 | 0.936 | 0.187 (0.573) |
1.206 | 0.743 | 1.958 | |||||||
| BINDEPENDENCE | 2.675*** (11.825) |
14.508 | 3.159 | 66.632 | -2.668*** (16.678) |
0.069 | 0.019 | 0.250 | |||||||
| ACSIZE | 0.025 (0.036) |
1.026 | 0.789 | 1.333 | 0.225* (3.638) |
1.252 | 0.994 | 1.578 | |||||||
| ACMEETINGS | 0.013 (0.048) |
1.013 | 0.903 | 1.137 | 0.171*** (10.665) |
1.186 | 1.071 | 1.314 | |||||||
| ACINDEPENDENCE | 3.215*** (6.810) |
24.908 | 2.226 | 278.652 | -1.176** (3.866) |
0.308 | 0.095 | 0.996 | |||||||
| Constant | -12.787*** (28.086) |
0.000 | -0.592 (0.106) |
0.553 | |||||||||||
| Years Effect | Not included | Not included | |||||||||||||
| Industries Effect | Included | Included | |||||||||||||
| Observations | 612 | 612 | |||||||||||||
Disclaimer/Publisher’s Note: The statements, opinions and data contained in all publications are solely those of the individual author(s) and contributor(s) and not of MDPI and/or the editor(s). MDPI and/or the editor(s) disclaim responsibility for any injury to people or property resulting from any ideas, methods, instructions or products referred to in the content. |
© 2023 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
