Wang, X.; Zhang, N.; Zhou, H.; Huang, X.; Luo, R. Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Analysis of Group Panic Buying in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Mathematics2023, 11, 3006.
Wang, X.; Zhang, N.; Zhou, H.; Huang, X.; Luo, R. Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Analysis of Group Panic Buying in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Mathematics 2023, 11, 3006.
Wang, X.; Zhang, N.; Zhou, H.; Huang, X.; Luo, R. Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Analysis of Group Panic Buying in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Mathematics2023, 11, 3006.
Wang, X.; Zhang, N.; Zhou, H.; Huang, X.; Luo, R. Multi-Agent Evolutionary Game Analysis of Group Panic Buying in China during the COVID-19 Pandemic. Mathematics 2023, 11, 3006.
Abstract
With the global outbreak of COVID-19, the panic buying incidents triggered by the variants of the Omicron strain have severely affected the normal social order. This paper considers the complex interest game and interactive relationship among multiple subjects in the mass panic buying event caused by rumors and constructs a three-party evolution game model of local government, rumor-monger, and public. Based on the theory of evolution game, the evolutionary process of the strategy selection of game subjects is studied, and the strategy selection of the three-game subjects under different scenarios is compared and analyzed. Taking the example of the montmorillonite powder panic buying caused by the XBB virus strain rumor in China, the evolutionary game model constructed in this study is simulated and analyzed. The study shows that: the evolution process of the mass panic buying event is characterized by six stages: the initial stage E1(0,0,0); the outbreak stage E3(0,1,0);the spread stage E7(0,1,1);the climax stage E8(1,1,1);the relief stage E5(1,1,0);and the recovery stage E4(1,0,0); there are four stable points in the evolutionary game of the three game subjects, namely (no intervention, no rumor, no panic buying), (no intervention, rumor, no panic buying), (intervention, no rumor, no panic buying), and (intervention, rumor, no panic buying), and the strategy of government intervention will be adjusted according to the strategy selection of the public and the rumor-monger; under the mechanism of reward and punishment of the higher-level government, increasing the punishment and reward intensity of the higher-level government will promote the local government to intervene in the rumor-mongering event faster, but increasing the reward intensity has a more significant impact on the intervention behavior of the local government than punishment, and increasing punishment intensity has a more significant impact on the non-rumor-mongering behavior of the rumor-monger than reward; the parameters of social risk-bearing cost, risk transmission coefficient, rumor-mongering income and cost, and public drug purchase cost have different degrees of influence on the evolutionary behavior of game subjects. This study provides new ideas for effectively responding to mass panic buying events in the context of public emergencies.
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
