Submitted:
29 June 2023
Posted:
29 June 2023
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Abstract
Keywords:
1. Intruduction
2. Literature Review and Research Hypotheses
2.1. Expectations of Land Transfer and Contract Renewal Intention
2.2. Trust and Contract Renewal Behavior
2.3. The moderating role of trust
3. Rsearch Design
3.1. Sample Selection
3.2. Model Selection
3.3. Variable Selection
| Variable Categories | Variable Name | Variable Definition and Values | Mean | Std. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dependent Variables | Contract signing | 1 = Written contract; 0 = Verbal contract | 0.530 | 0.015 |
| Contract renewal | 1 = Renewing the contract; 0 = Not renewing the contract |
0.851 | 0.011 | |
| Explanatory Variables | Circulation expectations | 1 = Land transfer meets expectations; 0 = Land transfer does not meet |
0.750 | 0.013 |
| Trust | Rating towards the transfer partner | 3.593 | 0.034 | |
| Control Variables | Age | Measured in years | 58.007 | 0.371 |
| healthy | Higher scores indicating higher trust | 3.764 | 0.025 | |
| Agricultural training | Measured in units (people) | 0.232 | 0.025 | |
| Number of women | Measured in units (people) | 2.017 | 0.034 | |
| Number of workers | Measured in units (people) | 1.084 | 0.036 | |
| Economic level | Economic Level Economic level of the household in the local village |
3.024 | 0.024 | |
| Certificate of Title Confirmation | Ownership Certificate | 0.574 | 0.015 | |
| Land belongs to | 1= Individual; 2= Village collective; 3= State | 2.281 | 0.026 | |
| Crop yield | Unit: Kilograms | 2361.620 | 170.759 |
4. Results and Analysis
4.1. Benchmark Result Analysis
| Variable | CS | CR | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VIF | 1/VIF | VIF | 1/VIF | |
| Contract signing | 1.090 | 0.916 | 1.090 | 0.916 |
| Contract renewal | 1.070 | 0.935 | 1.070 | 0.935 |
| Circulation expectations | 1.010 | 0.986 | 1.010 | 0.986 |
| Trust | 1.020 | 0.977 | 1.020 | 0.977 |
| Age | 1.030 | 0.976 | 1.030 | 0.976 |
| healthy | 1.050 | 0.955 | 1.050 | 0.955 |
| Agricultural training | 1.100 | 0.912 | 1.100 | 0.912 |
| Number of women | 1.090 | 0.917 | 1.090 | 0.917 |
| Number of workers | 1.050 | 0.955 | 1.050 | 0.955 |
| Economic level | 1.050 | 0.955 | 1.050 | 0.955 |
| Certificate of Title Confirmation | 1.100 | 0.912 | 1.100 | 0.912 |
| Land belongs to | 1.090 | 0.917 | 1.090 | 0.917 |
| Crop yield | 1.050 | 0.955 | 1.050 | 0.955 |
| Mean VIF | 1.060 | |||
4.2. Further Analysis
4.2.1. Moderating Effects
4.2.2. Heterogeneity Analysis
| Variable | Gender | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Woman | Man | |||
| Circulation expectations | -0.073 | 0.7515 | -0.357** | 0.869*** |
| (0.067) | (0.603) | (0.123) | (0.131) | |
| Trust | -0.595 | 0.3425 | -0.578*** | 0.219*** |
| (0.058) | (0.273) | (0.054) | (0.053) | |
| Constan | 2.1445*** | -0.741 | 2.506*** | -0.191 |
| (0.288) | (0.601) | (0.224) | (0.188) | |
| Number of obs | 393 | 708 | ||
| Wald chi2(4) | 106.82 | 191.45 | ||
| Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | |||
5. Research Findings and Policy Implications
Author Contributions
Funding
Data Availability Statement
References
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| Variable | I | II | III | IV | V | VI | VII | VIII |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CS | CR | CS | CR | CS | CR | CS | CR | |
| Circulation expectations | -0.213** | 0.806*** | -0.199** | 0.815*** | -0.218** | 0.828*** | -0.176* | 0.836*** |
| (0.099) | (0.104) | (0.100) | (0.105) | (0.100) | (0.106) | (0.101) | (0.110) | |
| Trust | -0.576*** | 0.263*** | -0.594*** | 0.265*** | -0.594*** | 0.265*** | -0.586*** | 0.275*** |
| (0.044) | (0.042) | (0.044) | (0.043) | (0.045) | (0.043) | (0.045) | (0.045) | |
| Age | -0.007* | -0.008* | -0.008** | -0.006 | -0.008** | -0.005 | ||
| (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.004) | |||
| Healthy | -0.116** | -0.029 | -0.108** | -0.040 | -0.111** | -0.055 | ||
| (0.052) | (0.061) | (0.052) | (0.061) | (0.053) | (0.063) | |||
| Agricultural training | 0.215*** | -0.092 | 0.214*** | -0.095* | 0.206*** | -0.093 | ||
| (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.058) | (0.056) | (0.060) | (0.059) | |||
| Number of women | -0.016 | 0.118** | -0.020 | 0.135** | ||||
| (0.037) | (0.052) | (0.037) | (0.054) | |||||
| Number of workers | -0.082** | 0.021 | -0.094* | 0.030 | ||||
| (0.035) | (0.043) | (0.036) | (0.044) | |||||
| Economic level | -0.074 | 0.106* | -0.083 | 0.099 | ||||
| (0.054) | (0.065) | (0.054) | (0.067) | |||||
| Certificate of Title Confirmation | 0.249** | 0.414*** | ||||||
| (0.089) | (0.110) | |||||||
| Land belongs | -0.173*** | 0.182** | ||||||
| (0.051) | (0.061) | |||||||
| Crop yield | -0.022 | -0.010 | ||||||
| (0.014) | (0.017) | |||||||
| Constant | 2.360*** | -0.385** | 3.190*** | 0.180 | 3.592*** | -0.447 | 3.974*** | -1.074* |
| (0.176) | (0.151) | (0.365) | (0.396) | (0.417) | (0.473) | (0.443) | (0.517) | |
| P | 0.000 | 0.002 | ||||||
| Variables | CS | CR |
|---|---|---|
| Circulation expectations | -2.066*** | 1.971*** |
| (0.484) | (0.325) | |
| Trust | -1.011*** | 0.502*** |
| (0.120) | (0.077) | |
| Circulation expectations×Trust | 0.526*** | -0.354*** |
| (0.129) | (0.096) | |
| Control variable | 控制 | 控制 |
| Constan | 5.473*** | -1.833*** |
| (0.599) | (0.562) | |
| Number of obs | 1101 | 1101 |
| Wald chi2(24) | 361.84 | |
| Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | |
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