Submitted:
05 May 2023
Posted:
06 May 2023
You are already at the latest version
Abstract
Keywords:
1. Introduction
2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis Development
2.1. CSR Disclosure and Performance: A Stakeholder Perspective
2.2. Women on Corporate Boards: From Upper Echelon Theory to Social Role Theory
2.3. Foreign Directors on Corporate Boards: A Neo-Institutional Perspective
2.4. Hypothesis Development
3. Data, Variable Measurement and Methodology
3.1. Sample and Data Collection
3.2. Variable Measurement
3.2.1. Dependent Variables
3.2.2. Independent Variables
3.2.3. Control Variables
3.3. Empirical Model
4. Results
4.1. Result of Empirical Models
4.2. Robustness Tests
5. Discussion
5.1. Theoretical Contributions
5.2. Practical Implications
5.3. Limitations and Future Research
References
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| Variable | Abbreviation | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Dependent | CSRP | Firm’s corporate social responsibility performance measured by RKS rating score |
| CSRD | Firm’s corporate social responsibility disclosure | |
| Independent | WExpE | Percentage of women directors with only foreign education experience |
| WExpW | Percentage of women directors with only foreign work experience | |
| WExpEW | Percentage of women directors with foreign education and work experience | |
| WNat | Percentage of women directors with foreign nationality | |
|
Control (board level) |
BSize | Number of directors on the corporate board |
| BInd | Percentage of independent directors on the corporate board | |
| Dua | Dummy variable = 1 if CEO and board chairperson is the same, otherwise = 0 | |
| WCEO | Dummy variable = 1 if CEO is a woman, otherwise = 0 | |
|
Control (firm level) |
Size | The natural logarithm of firm total assets at the end of the year |
| Staff | The natural logarithm of total number of employees | |
| Tobin’s Q | Ratio of market value of total debt to total assets | |
| Leverage | Ratio of book value of debt to total assets | |
| SOE | Dummy variable = 1 if the firm is state-owned enterprise, otherwise = 0 | |
| Age | Listing age of firm |
| Variable | N | Mean | Standard deviation | Minimum | Maximum |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CSRP | 6,223 | 3.638 | 0.296 | 2.953 | 4.333 |
| CSRD | 6,207 | 0.639 | 0.133 | 0.071 | 0.857 |
| WExpE | 4,079 | 0.005 | 0.021 | 0 | 0.125 |
| WExpW | 4,079 | 0.010 | 0.032 | 0 | 0.143 |
| WExpEW | 4,079 | 0.003 | 0.018 | 0 | 0.111 |
| WNat | 6,212 | 0.002 | 0.015 | 0 | 0.111 |
| BSize | 6,212 | 2.191 | 0.209 | 1.609 | 2.708 |
| BInd | 6,212 | 0.377 | 0.057 | 0.333 | 0.600 |
| Dua | 6,212 | 0.173 | 0.378 | 0 | 1 |
| WCEO | 6,212 | 0.051 | 0.220 | 0 | 1 |
| Size | 6,212 | 23.18 | 1.448 | 20.40 | 27.14 |
| Staff | 6,212 | 8.465 | 1.379 | 5.236 | 12.19 |
| Tobin’s Q | 6,086 | 1.766 | 1.019 | 0.836 | 6.373 |
| Leverage | 6,212 | 0.493 | 0.199 | 0.071 | 0.895 |
| SOE | 6,223 | 0.612 | 0.487 | 0 | 1 |
| Age | 6,223 | 12.75 | 6.385 | 1 | 26 |
| VIFs | CSRP | CSRD | WExpE | WExpW | WExpEW | WNat | BSize | BInd | Dua | WCEO | Size | Staff | Tobin’s Q | Leverage | SOE | Year | |
| CSRP | 1 | ||||||||||||||||
| CSRD | .201*** | 1 | |||||||||||||||
| WExpE | 1.01 | −.0100 | −.043*** | 1 | |||||||||||||
| WExpW | 1.06 | .074*** | .008* | 0.001 | 1 | ||||||||||||
| WExpEW | 1.06 | .048*** | .012** | −.043*** | .016 | 1 | |||||||||||
| WNat | 1.13 | −.052*** | −.011 | −.008 | .213*** | .205*** | 1 | ||||||||||
| BSize | 1.41 | .135*** | −.008 | .009 | .009 | .008 | −.021* | 1 | |||||||||
| BInd | 1.23 | .026** | −.018 | −.026* | .043*** | .017 | .029** | −.424*** | 1 | ||||||||
| Dua | 1.11 | −.059 | .006 | .015 | .023 | −.036** | .003 | −.145*** | .075*** | 1 | |||||||
| WCEO | 1.01 | .001 | .002 | .048*** | .013 | −.010 | .045*** | −.076*** | .032** | .025** | 1 | ||||||
| Size | 2.85 | .449*** | −.027** | −.017 | .044*** | .046*** | .059*** | .205*** | .117*** | −.105*** | −.005 | 1 | |||||
| Staff | 2.03 | .416*** | .030** | .005 | .057*** | .073*** | .092*** | .225*** | .080*** | −.070*** | −.028** | .533*** | 1 | ||||
| Tobin’s Q | 1.34 | −.133*** | −.017 | .035** | 0.001 | −.024 | −.012 | −.145*** | .015 | .103*** | −.001 | −.465*** | −.280*** | 1 | |||
| Leverage | 1.5 | .122*** | −.072*** | −.030* | .020 | .008 | −.025** | .092*** | .051*** | −.090*** | .007 | .526*** | .314*** | −.411*** | 1 | ||
| SOE | 1.3 | .135*** | −.083*** | −.038** | −.030* | −.062*** | −.044*** | .243*** | −.019 | −.295*** | −.085*** | .294*** | .201*** | −.204*** | .222*** | 1 | |
| Age | 1.2 | .086*** | −.039*** | −.019 | −.037** | .015 | −.012 | .040*** | −.012 | −.141*** | .003 | .203*** | .038*** | −.139*** | .195*** | .289*** | 1 |
| Variables | CSRP | CSRD | ||||||
| Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) | Model (6) | Model (7) | Model (8) | |
| Lagged DV | 0.468*** | 0.481*** | 0.467*** | 0.492*** | 0.345*** | 0.304*** | 0.356*** | 0.305*** |
| (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.08) | |
| WExpE | 0.692* | 0.687* | 0.547*** | 0.536*** | ||||
| (0.42) | (0.41) | (0.04) | (0.03) | |||||
| WExpW | 0.968** | 1.017** | 0.229*** | 0.288*** | ||||
| (0.42) | (0.42) | (0.05) | (0.04) | |||||
| WExpEW | 1.129** | 0.979** | 0.496*** | 0.522*** | ||||
| (0.48) | (0.48) | (0.06) | (0.06) | |||||
| WNat | −0.443 | −0.292 | −0.217 | −0.224 | ||||
| (0.61) | (0.62) | (0.59) | (0.58) | |||||
| BSize | 0.051*** | 0.075*** | 0.059*** | 0.085*** | 0.029 | 0.034 | 0.024 | 0.034 |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.07) | |
| BInd | 0.231 | 0.255* | 0.256* | 0.266 | 0.056 | 0.048 | 0.052 | 0.072 |
| (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.15) | (0.18) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.12) | (0.12) | |
| Dua | 0.017 | 0.008 | 0.022 | 0.007 | 0.011 | 0.012 | 0.011 | 0.005 |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | |
| WCEO | −0.019 | −0.071* | −0.013 | −0.062 | −0.017 | −0.026 | −0.016 | −0.036 |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | |
| Size | 0.031 | 0.067* | 0.032 | 0.063* | −0.061 | −0.058 | −0.064* | −0.058 |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | |
| Staff | 0.034 | 0.022 | 0.028 | 0.022 | −0.039 | −0.026 | −0.027 | −0.026 |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.05) | |
| Tobin’s Q | 0.012* | 0.011 | 0.012* | 0.011 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.01) | |
| Leverage | −0.113 | −0.115 | −0.110 | −0.067 | −0.109 | −0.090 | −0.107 | −0.090 |
| (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | |
| SOE | −0.031 | −0.025 | −0.030 | −0.022 | −0.131* | −0.085 | −0.124* | −0.115 |
| (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.07) | |
| Age | 0.002 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| (0.06) | (0.00) | (0.03) | (0.00) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | (0.09) | |
| Constant | 2.995* | 2.824** | 3.008** | 2.575** | 0.885 | 0.533 | 0.476 | 0.327 |
| (1.77) | (1.13) | (1.46) | (1.21) | (1.18) | (1.17) | (1.71) | (1.71) | |
| N | 5,067 | 3,276 | 5,067 | 3,276 | 5,056 | 3,268 | 5,056 | 3,268 |
| Year dummies | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled |
| Industry dummies | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled |
| Number of instruments | 137 | 137 | 151 | 191 | 151 | 196 | 167 | 213 |
| Number of groups | 833 | 706 | 833 | 706 | 832 | 705 | 832 | 705 |
| Hasen J-test | 56.02 | 64.65 | 63.43 | 76.37 | 56.49 | 107.84 | 72.73 | 110.21 |
| Variables | CSRP | CSRD | ||||||
| Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) | Model (6) | Model (7) | Model (8) | |
| Lagged DV | 0.468*** | 0.481*** | 0.493*** | 0.516*** | 0.345*** | 0.287** | 0.354*** | 0.286*** |
| (0.05) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.05) | (0.12) | (0.05) | (0.11) | |
| WExpE | 0.35*** | 0.36*** | 0.058* | 0.045** | ||||
| (0.07) | (0.07) | (0.03) | (0.02) | |||||
| WExpW | 0.058*** | 0.059*** | 0.026** | 0.037* | ||||
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | |||||
| WExpEW | 0.269** | 0.283** | 0.154* | 0.146* | ||||
| (0.13) | (0.12) | (0.08) | (0.08) | |||||
| WNat | −0.328 | −0.306 | −0.114 | −0.085 | ||||
| (0.28) | (0.23) | (0.14) | (0.16) | |||||
| BSize | 0.051*** | 0.071*** | 0.06*** | 0.081*** | 0.029 | 0.033 | 0.022 | 0.069 |
| (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.01) | (0.06) | (0.08) | (0.06) | (0.07) | |
| BInd | 0.231 | 0.243 | 0.262* | 0.278* | 0.056 | 0.050 | 0.052 | 0.070 |
| (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.16) | (0.15) | (0.12) | (0.14) | (0.11) | (0.12) | |
| Dua | 0.017 | 0.007 | 0.021 | 0.009 | 0.011 | 0.012 | 0.011** | 0.005 |
| (0.02) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.05) | |
| WCEO | −0.019 | −0.058 | −0.012 | −0.052 | −0.017 | −0.026 | −0.018 | −0.033 |
| (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.05) | (0.04) | (0.18) | (0.03) | |
| Size | 0.031 | 0.071* | 0.042 | 0.069** | −0.061 | −0.058 | −0.066* | −0.057 |
| (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.04) | (0.04) | |
| Staff | 0.034 | 0.029 | 0.031 | 0.022 | −0.039 | −0.026 | −0.027 | −0.026 |
| (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.05) | (0.06) | (0.05) | (0.03) | |
| Tobin’s Q | 0.012 | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.007 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.03) | (0.01) | |
| Leverage | −0.113 | −0.146 | −0.121 | −0.094 | −0.109 | −0.088 | −0.112 | −0.100 |
| (0.10) | (0.12) | (0.11) | (0.11) | (0.09) | (0.10) | (0.09) | (0.09) | |
| SOE | −0.030 | −0.022 | −0.037 | −0.024* | −0.131 | −0.092 | −0.118 | −0.114 |
| (0.05) | (0.07) | (0.06) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.07) | |
| Age | 0.002 | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.004 | 0.001 | 0.000 | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.10) | (0.01) | (0.90) | (0.01) | |
| Constant | 2.995* | 0.814 | 3.228** | 2.044 | 0.885 | 0.642 | 0.432 | 0.369 |
| (1.77) | (1.74) | (1.51) | (1.54) | (1.18) | (1.16) | (1.71) | (1.69) | |
| N | 5,067 | 3,276 | 5,067 | 3,276 | 5,056 | 3,268 | 5,056 | 3,268 |
| Year dummies | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled |
| Industry dummies | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled |
| Variables | CSRP | CSRD | ||||||
| Model (1) | Model (2) | Model (3) | Model (4) | Model (5) | Model (6) | Model (7) | Model (8) | |
| Lagged DV | 0.546*** | 0.611*** | 0.545*** | 0.576*** | 0.31*** | 0.282*** | 0.323*** | 0.286*** |
| (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | (0.08) | (0.09) | |
| WExpE | 1.656*** | 1.826*** | 3.738** | 3.555** | ||||
| (0.56) | (0.56) | (1.72) | (1.72) | |||||
| WExpW | 4.933*** | 5.065*** | 1.351*** | 1.356*** | ||||
| (0.79) | (0.80) | (0.44) | (0.44) | |||||
| WExpEW | 3.169*** | 2.362*** | 3.461*** | 3.331*** | ||||
| (0.72) | (0.72) | (0.76) | (0.75) | |||||
| WNat | −1.837 | −1.268 | −0.444 | −0.604 | ||||
| (1.12) | (1.11) | (2.34) | (2.34) | |||||
| BSize | 0.105* | 0.106* | 0.105* | 0.106* | 0.132 | 0.147 | 0.123 | 0.151 |
| (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.06) | (0.25) | (0.27) | (0.24) | (0.25) | |
| BInd | 0.454 | 0.450 | 0.425 | 0.443 | 0.276 | 0.252 | 0.252 | 0.316 |
| (0.55) | (0.55) | (0.52) | (0.52) | (0.47) | (0.49) | (0.47) | (0.47) | |
| Dua | 0.030 | 0.022 | 0.057 | 0.026 | 0.048 | 0.047 | 0.047 | 0.049 |
| (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.07) | (0.08) | (0.29) | (0.28) | (0.28) | (0.28) | |
| WCEO | 0.026 | −0.146 | 0.035 | −0.111 | −0.074 | −0.082 | −0.069 | −0.115 |
| (0.16) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.14) | (0.21) | (0.20) | (0.21) | (0.21) | |
| Size | 0.217* | 0.234* | 0.215 | 0.232* | −0.247 | −0.243 | −0.246 | −0.232 |
| (0.13) | (0.13) | (0.14) | (0.13) | (0.20) | (0.22) | (0.21) | (0.19) | |
| Staff | 0.080 | −0.008 | 0.075 | −0.045 | 0.173 | −0.120 | 0.128 | −0.119 |
| (0.10) | (0.11) | (0.10) | (0.10) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.21) | (0.20) | |
| Tobin’s Q | 0.020 | 0.019 | 0.021 | 0.019 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.005 | 0.004 |
| (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.04) | (0.03) | (0.03) | |
| Leverage | −0.242 | −0.221 | −0.240 | −0.209 | −0.384 | −0.348 | −0.346 | −0.348 |
| (0.31) | (0.31) | (0.34) | (0.34) | (0.40) | (0.41) | (0.40) | (0.41) | |
| SOE | −0.045 | −0.039 | −0.044 | −0.039 | −0.508 | −0.439 | −0.427 | −0.464 |
| (0.19) | (0.19) | (0.18) | (0.18) | (0.53) | (0.53) | (0.52) | (0.53) | |
| Age | 0.021** | 0.019 | 0.021 | 0.018 | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.004 | 0.004 |
| (0.01) | (0.01) | (0.02) | (0.02) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.03) | (0.02) | |
| Constant | 4.029 | 4.676* | 4.775* | 4.232 | 3.195 | 2.959 | 2.912 | 2.908 |
| (2.83) | (2.84) | (2.84) | (2.83) | (4.85) | (4.86) | (4.86) | (4.86) | |
| N | 5,067 | 3,276 | 5,067 | 3,276 | 5,056 | 3,268 | 5,056 | 3,268 |
| Year dummies | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled |
| Industry dummies | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled | Controlled |
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