PreprintArticleVersion 1Preserved in Portico This version is not peer-reviewed
Impact of Using Extension Services of Organic Fertilizers for Carbon Sequestration in China: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Farmers' Behavioral Strategies
Version 1
: Received: 26 August 2022 / Approved: 29 August 2022 / Online: 29 August 2022 (07:29:22 CEST)
How to cite:
Zhang, Q. Impact of Using Extension Services of Organic Fertilizers for Carbon Sequestration in China: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Farmers' Behavioral Strategies. Preprints2022, 2022080471. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202208.0471.v1
Zhang, Q. Impact of Using Extension Services of Organic Fertilizers for Carbon Sequestration in China: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Farmers' Behavioral Strategies. Preprints 2022, 2022080471. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202208.0471.v1
Zhang, Q. Impact of Using Extension Services of Organic Fertilizers for Carbon Sequestration in China: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Farmers' Behavioral Strategies. Preprints2022, 2022080471. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202208.0471.v1
APA Style
Zhang, Q. (2022). Impact of Using Extension Services of Organic Fertilizers for Carbon Sequestration in China: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Farmers' Behavioral Strategies. Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202208.0471.v1
Chicago/Turabian Style
Zhang, Q. 2022 "Impact of Using Extension Services of Organic Fertilizers for Carbon Sequestration in China: Evolutionary Game Analysis on Local Governments and Farmers' Behavioral Strategies" Preprints. https://doi.org/10.20944/preprints202208.0471.v1
Abstract
The application of organic fertilizers plays a crucial role in achieving carbon sequestration in the agricultural sector. This paper discusses how farmers can more smoothly promote organic fertilizer extension services. An evolutionary game model is developed to describe the conflicting interests of Chinese farmers and local governments in organic fertilizer extension services, and the dynamic evolution of the game players and the influence of parameter adjustment on the strategic choices of both parties is presented. In this paper, the game model and the main results are validated with the help of simulation tools, and a sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is performed. The results show that (1) the implementation of subsidy policy is less helpful for organic fertilizer extension services; (2) The ideal event probability of the game was found to be positively related to the cost of applying inorganic fertilizers, additional benefits to farmers, political returns to local governments, and penalties for not using organic fertilizers; (3) This is important for improving the performance of local governments, reducing government regulatory costs, improving policy support for organic fertilizer extension services, and reducing the cost of implementing organic fertilizer extension services.
Keywords
carbon sequestration; evolutionary game theory; organic fertilizer; food security
Subject
Business, Economics and Management, Economics
Copyright:
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
